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ABSTRACT 
Election administration in Nigeria has always been marred with malpractices and 
violence which threaten democratization process in the country. This makes it 
imperative in this study to examine the impact of election administration on the 
legitimacy of hybrid democracy in Nigeria, with the emphasis on the 2015 general 
elections. Using ‘Structural Functionalism Theory’, ‘Electoral Authoritarianism (EA)’ 
and ‘Liberal Democratic Theory’ as the main analysis framework, the thesis analyses 
the effectiveness and weakness of Nigeria’s electoral democracy. The first theoretical 
segment discusses the functionality of different sub-structures that supported the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in conducting the country’s 
general elections in 2015, while the second theoretical postulation concentrates on the 
overall assessment of democratization in Nigeria. This study adopts qualitative method 
in data collection and analysis. The sources of research data and information were 
derived from in-depth interview session, focus group discussion, published reports, 
working papers and relevant scholarly articles and books.  By examining and analyzing 
the nature of Nigeria’s electoral politics, this thesis categorizes the country’s 
democracy as a ‘Hybrid Democracy,’ combining the values of liberalism and 
authoritarianism. The findings of this study also indicate that the paradigm shift in the 
management of the 2015 general elections was anchored on the leadership approach 
of the Electoral Management Body (EMB) that introduced several innovations and 
mechanisms which boosted the credibility and integrity of the elections’ exercise. At 
the same time, the role and impact of other relevant stakeholders which cut across local 
and international dimensions have also been influential in the conduct of the 2015 
general elections. Despite the improvement and success recorded in the 2015 elections, 
a series of shortcomings ranging from pockets of violence, under-age voting to 
malfunctioning of the technological gadgets in several polling units remain a major 
obstacle to electoral democracy in the country. For Nigeria’s electoral democracy to 
be consolidated, all players who are involved in electioneering process must adhere to 
electoral guidelines entrenched in the electoral laws and regulations.  
 
Key Words: Election Administration, Hybrid Democracy, Electoral Management 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Pentadbiran pilihan raya di Nigeria seringkali dikaitkan dengan penyelewengan dan 
keganasan yang mengancam proses demokrasi di negara itu. Kajian ini amat penting 
untuk meneliti impak pentadbiran pilihan raya ke atas legitimasi demokrasi hibrid di 
Nigeria, dengan memberi penekanan kepada dinamisme pilihan raya umum 2015. 
Dengan menggunakan ‘Structural Functionalism Theory’, ‘Electoral 
Authoritarianism (EA) dan Liberal Democratic Theory’ sebagai kerangka analisis 
utama, kajian ini menganalisis keberkesanan dan kelemahan demokrasi pilihan raya di 
Nigeria. Segmen teoritis yang pertama membincangkan fungsi sub-struktur yang 
berbeza yang menyokong Suruhanjaya Bebas Pilihan Raya Nasional (INEC) dalam 
melaksanakan pilihan raya umum pada tahun 2015, sementara postulasi teoritis yang 
kedua memfokuskan kepada penilaian keseluruhan terhadap pendemokrasian di 
Nigeria. Kajian ini telah mengadaptasi kaedah kualitatif di dalam proses pengumpulan 
data dan analisis data.  Sumber data dan maklumat kajian diperolehi daripada sesi 
temubual mendalam, perbincangan kumpulan fokus, laporan penerbitan, kertas kerja 
dan juga artikel dan buku ilmiah yang berkaitan. Dengan mengkaji dan menganalisis 
sifat politik pilihan raya Nigeria, tesis ini mengkategorikan sistem demokrasi Nigeria 
sebagai ‘Demokrasi Hibrid’ yang menggabungkan nilai-nilai liberalisme dan 
autoritarianisme. Hasil dapatan kajian ini juga menunjukkan bahawa anjakan 
paradigma di dalam pengurusan pilihan raya umum 2015 adalah berasaskan kepada 
pendekatan kepimpinan oleh Badan Pengurusan Pilihan Raya (EMB) yang telah 
memperkenalkan beberapa inovasi dan mekanisme dalam meningkatkan kredibiliti 
dan integriti pengurusan pilihan raya tersebut. Pada masa yang sama, peranan dan 
impak dari pihak-pihak berkepentingan yang merentasi dimensi tempatan dan 
antarabangsa turut mempengaruhi perlaksanaan pilihan raya umum 2015. Walaupun 
penambahbaikan dan kejayaan telah direkodkan di dalam pilihan raya tersebut, 
beberapa siri insiden yang tidak diingini dari jenayah terpencil, pengundi bawah umur 
hingga ke kepincangan alatan teknologi di beberapa pusat pengundian masih lagi 
merupakan halangan utama kepada demokrasi pilihan raya di negara ini. Pengukuhan 
demokrasi pilihan raya di Nigeria memerlukan kesemua pihak yang terlibat di dalam 
proses pilihan raya mematuhi garis panduan dan tatacara yang telah ditetapkan di 
dalam undang-undang dan peraturan pilihan raya. 
 
Kata Kunci: Pengurusan Pilihan Raya, Demokrasi Hibrid, Badan Pengurusan Pilihan 
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1.1 Background to the Study 
The conduct and administration of the 2015 general elections signaled a watershed in 
the history of electoral democracy in Nigeria. The election was historic for two major 
reasons: firstly, being the first elections where the opposition party defeated the 
incumbent ruling party. Secondly, it proved the insinuation and prediction wrongly 
that Nigeria may disintegrate after the elections. In fact, it is a paradigm shift from a 
‘do or die’ characterized elections to a free and fair electoral conduct. Considering the 
electioneering processes in Nigeria right from independence, the country’s electoral 
system has always been accused of selections rather than elections (Mustapha, 2007).  
 
However, the setback of election irregularities witnessed in the previous elections 
could be traced not only from the macro perspective but also at the micro-political 
settings which invariably cuts across the entire country. Borrowing a leaf from local 
government elections administration in Nigeria, what has been obtainable is a 
‘kangaroo’ election which has always been manipulated and conducted by the dictates 
of the state government. The idea of conducting elections at the local level was born 
out of the need to bring government closer to the people as a mechanism for 
engendering socio-economic and political development at the micro level. However, 
the reverse is the case because state governments interfered in the local administration 
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without any recourse that indeed local governments are constitutionally guaranteed as 
the third tier of government. Consequently, what is obtainable is a kind of 
disconnection between the local government administrators and the people. The 
elected officials at the local government level are hardly accountable to the people. 
Preferably, their target has usually been how to satisfy the state governors who by and 
large installed and imposed them on the people. By implication, state governors run 
the local government councils as fiefdoms. Thus, what is intended to be the 
government of the people, by the people and for the people is emasculated at the local 
government level (Aliyu, 2014). As a matter of fact, the State Electoral Umpire 
(Independent State Electoral Commission) functions as if it is a department or ministry 
of the state government rather than being independent and neutral. 
 
Meanwhile, as rightly observed by Attahiru (2014), election is a very significant civic-
political obligation in democratic societies. It constitutes a critical desideration for the 
sustenance and consolidation of democracy. Free and fair electoral contest that 
enhance mass political participation is the beauty of democracy. The validity of a 
democratic polity is usually sustained through a credible election, and such gives 
brighter hope for meaningful political participation.However, in a situation whereby 
the electorates are repeatedly faced with episodes of election malpractices, violence 
and misconduct, their fundamental trust in the institutions and processes of 
electioneering may dissipate, and the benefits of the election may turn to deficits 
(Peter, 2007).  
 
In Nigeria, election as a democratic principle is easily traceable to the colonial period. 
However, its introduction by the colonial government did not come without some 
 
3 
struggles, especially the role of the educated elites during the elections cannot be over 
emphasized. The path to the introduction of electoral principle in Nigeria was believed 
to have been dotted with obstacles and struggles (Uche, 2003). For clarification, see 
Appendix A that gives background summary of electioneering system from 1922 to 
2011. It covers two major periods which are colonial and post-colonial era. The salient 
features of the key points are captured in the table vis a vis the key players in the 
history of Nigeria’s electoral politics.  
 
 The colonial administration conducted five elections beginning from the Clifford’s 
1922 to the 1959 elections. During these exercises, the level of the franchise was not 
favourable to Nigerians. It was a limited franchise though later improved as witnessed 
in Richard’s 1946 elections through the introduction of regionalism. The criticism 
from the Nigerian nationalists contributed to changing of colonial administrative styles 
through constitutional developments. However, having attained independence in 1960, 
the first election ever conducted by Nigerian leaders in 1964 was flawed, biased and 
highly tensed. In fact, the basis for the first military coup in 1966 was a result of the 
inability of the Nationalists to have a united country and also to conduct free and fair 
elections. As rightly pinpointed by Oyediran (cited in Uche, 2003:58), the 1964 
election was a ‘signpost to disaster’. Since Nigeria got independence till date, nine 
general elections have been administered, and the 2015 elections became a paradigm 
shift. 
 
However, the fourth republic that started in 1999 has been able to produce the first 
civilian to civilian transfer of political power. Since the beginning of the present 
republic till date, the military is being kept in the barrack. In as much as improvement 
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has been made due to uninterupted political transition from 1999, the electioneering 
system has largely been perverted, and the conduct of elections could not substantiate 
credibility and legitimacy attributes of democracy. Electoral malpractices dominated 
Nigeria’s electoral floor which includes hijacking ballot boxes, inflating election 
results, intimidating of voters and partiality role of the electoral body (Aiyede, 2007). 
As witnessed in 2003 and 2007 general elections, voting was being exercised in some 
polling units, and elections results (of the units) were announced simultaneously at the 
headquarter office of the electoral umpire (Ojo, 2007).The number of registered voters 
was not tallied with the number of casted votes and, in fact, the ‘do or die’ nature of 
the 2007 general elections confined Nigeria’s electoral democracy to normalisation of 
rigging (Omotola, 2009). The aftermath of the 2011 election was violence in some 
states in the Northern part of Nigeria, which claimed lives and properties worth billions 
of Naira destroyed. Though the conduct of the 2011 general elections shown 
improvement in the electoral process compared to the three previous elections (NDI, 
2011), the bloody post-election jettisoned the credibility of the entire exercise. 
 
The administration of 2015 elections remains impressive to both the local and 
international observers. The 2015 General Election was historic being the first of its 
kind that witnessed opposition party defeating the incumbent and ruling party at the 
presidential race. The election according to Hakeem (2015), is symbolic to Nigeria’s 
political history. Although the idea of “two turnovers”  is yet to be obtainable in 
Nigerian political context, the 2015 general election was significant in the country’s 
electoral history. Such is based on the fact that 2015 general elections awakened the 
tempo of democratic consolidation with the first turnover. Also, the dislodging of the 
political party that has held the country for sixteen years by the opposition party is a 
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move towards achieving Huntington’s democratisation test. The integrity of 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in the comity of electoral 
democracies boosts Nigeria’s stance among democratic societies. However, despite 
the credibility attribute ascribed to the 2015 elections, some pockets of elctoral 
violence, under age voting and malfunctioning of the technological gadgets resurfaced 
in the administartion of the elections. This gives concern to the level of legitimacy of 
Nigeria’s electoral democracy. In view of this, it becomes imperative for this study to 
examine the impact of election administration on the legitimacy of hybrid democracy 
in Nigeria. The thrust of the study would be based on assessment of the 2015 general 
election and Nigeria’s electoral democracy.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
One of the challenges confronting Nigeria’s democracy is the inability to conduct 
credible elections. This singular dilemma predated the present democratic 
dispensation. As a matter of fact, the political instability witnessed in the country was 
largely caused by the failure of the political stakeholders to conduct free and credible 
elections (Ogundiya, 2009). The military incursion in Nigeria’s politics was 
neccessiated, as claimed by the armies, as a result of series of electoral malpractises 
and violence in the polity. However, the military hijack of political power was ususally 
followed with suspension of the constitution and introduction of decrees. Neverthless, 
the military suffered from legitimacy crisis and this propelled the yearnings by 
Nigerians for democratically elected government (Ojo, 2006). 
 
Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999 and since then, the country democratisation 
process has remained stable. However, the snag of electoral fraud remains a virus that 
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threatens Nigeria’s democracy. As  noted by Omotola (2009), despite the long political 
transition from 1999 till date, the electoral process in the country is devoid of 
credibility and by implication, Nigeria’s government suffers legitimacy crisis. Though 
the jinx of political instability has been broken due to series of power transition from 
one civilian to anotther, the political leaders are majorly product of fradulent 
elections.The dimension and pattern of electoral politics in the current fourth republic 
raises concern that  Nigeria’s power brokers employ election as a tool to continuously 
remain relevant without respecting the principles of electoral democracy devoid of 
fraud and violence. The preference for democracy by the political elites does not 
automatically confer legitimacy on the government in as much the people wish will 
remain subverted (Ogundiya, 2009). 
 
The main problem with the electoral system in Nigeria has been lack of neutrality from 
the electoral commission and political interference which does not create a level 
playing field for all political parties among others (Agbor, 2007). The state control of 
the resources is an avenue for deliberate crippling of some critical institutions like the 
electoral body. This simply makes the electoral management body to be so dependent 
on the government thereby forcing it to be partial and unaccountable to the public in 
its deal (Omotola, 2009). Such act challenges the legitimacy of the Nigerian leaders  
(Sakariyau, Mohd Azzizuddin & Ummu Atiyah, 2016). As rightly observed by 
Ibrahim (2011), the outcome of many elections in Nigeria have been so fiercely 
contested that the survival of democratic virtue has always been compromised, and the 
results of elections have been the subversion of the democratic process rather than its 
consolidation. Put differently, the political stakeholders have always perceived 
elections in Nigeria as “the ultimate contest” in do or die affairs, deploying brain and 
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brawn to change the outcome to suit their selfish and personal interests (Kew, 2010). 
This negates the common phrasing that ideal democracy needs elections conducted in 
a free and fair context (Schedler, 2002, Ojo, 2007) 
 
Although the 2015 general elections appeared to have presented a different case, it was 
the first time opposition party won overwhelmingly both at national and state level 
(EUEOM, 2015, AUEOM, 2015) indicating a change in the  political configuration of 
the country, yet the issue of legitimatisation of government is not resolved (Omotola, 
2015). The dimension of the electoral exercise in Nigeria has always been a reflection 
of hybrid regime that conforms to periodic election for political transition without total 
submission to democratic norms particularly in the electioneering contest (Otawa, 
2000).  The Nigeria’s electoral democracy having suffers from legitimacy crisis 
corresponds with Smith (2005) perspective of semi-democracy.  The administration of 
the 2015 general elections suffered setbacks due to recurrence scenario of under- age 
voting, pockets of electoral violence, political gerrymandering and issue of 
technological challenges. For instance, as reported by both local and international 
observers, phenomenon of  under- age voting was largely spread across in Kano, 
Kaduna, Taraba and some other states in the Northern region (TMG, 2015; EUEOM, 
2015; Hamalai, Egwu & Omotola, 2017). 
 
The implication of conducting elections in hybrid regime has prompted scholars in the 
discipline of politics to categorise such system to be operating a defective democracy 
(Diamond, 2002; Zakaria, 2003). As rightly observed by Diamond, Linz and Lipset 
(2005), the absence of egalitarianism and application of rule of law in electoral contest 
does not only connote illegitimate representatives but also showcases a government 
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under disguised dictatorship. Narrowing this to the Nigeria’s electoral democracy, the 
administration of election has been absolute subversion of popular sovereignty 
(Omotola, 2009) which paves way for representative institution without representative 
government. In fact, the failure on the part of the electoral commission to regulate 
party finances resulted to abuse of money politics. The phenomenon of vote buying 
and selling was openly displayed during the 2015 elections. The most blatant abuse 
was the sharing of money to the electorates at the polling units without any repel from 
the security agencies and election officials (Obianyo & Emesibe, 2015)  
 
 
It is against this backdrop that this study examines the impact of election 
administration on the legitimacy of hybrid democracy in Nigeria. Notwithstanding the 
positive remark from both local and international observers on the 2015 general 
elections, the critical issue remains the inability of the Nigeria’s electoral system to 
conform to the virtues of liberal democracy. This showcases the legitimacy of hybrid 
democracy in Nigeria’s electioneering politics.   
 
1.3 Research Questions  
Based on the background information and problem statement, this study is anchored 
on the following research questions: 
1. What is the impact of election administration on Nigeria’s democracy? 
2. Why has Nigeria’s electoral democracy always been marred by irregularities? 
3. What accounts for the improvement in the conduct of the 2015 general elections? 




1.4 Objectives of the Study  
The objectives of the study are to: 
1. Explain the impact of election administration on Nigeria’s democracy 
2.  Investigate the challenges of electioneering in Nigeria’s democratisation. 
3. Explore the factors that enhanced the improvement in the conduct of the 2015 
general elections in Nigeria 
4. Formulate the possible solutions towards strengthening Nigeria’s electoral 
democracy 
 
1.5   Election Administration in Nigeria: A Review of Extant Literature  
The study of political theory has revealed that in a democratic setting, the legitimacy 
of government is derivable through the consent of the governed and that the 
mechanism through which such consent is realised and transformed to government 
authority is the administration of elections (Agbor, 2007:89). The regular conduct of 
elections is a key determinant to democratic governance anywhere in the world. In 
consideration of this, election administration is a crucial factor in determining 
democratic practice in any country as its proper conduct enhances free and fair 
election. 
 
 Considering the study of Micheal (2015) “Aftermath of the 2015 elections in Nigeria”, 
it is stated that since the country got independence in 1960, her electoral process has 
been characterised by all manner of malpractices and violence. According to him, the 
destructive nature of Nigeria’s elections is more poignantly exhibited whenever the 
electioneering processes are handled by incumbent democratic governments when 
compared with those conducted by the former colonial authority or military regimes. 
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The irony has been that rather than electoral processes improving with more elections; 
they were worsening.  
 
However, this perspective as argued by Micheal (2015) fails to underscore the fact that 
elections conducted in Nigeria during colonialism were characterised by political 
subjugation and the imposition of candidates as witnessed in the Clifford, Richard and 
Macpherson constitutions of 1922, 1946 and 1951 respectively.  As rightly observed 
by Uche (2003), the anomalies of election administration under colonial masters 
showcased the lack of willingness to release Nigeria from the shackle of exploitative 
colonial tendencies and that the divide and rule policy could not have been said to 
represent the general interest of Nigerians. In an expository write up of a former British 
Colonial Officer, Harold Smith, titled: ‘How Britain Undermined Democracy in Africa 
gives a full account of the Nigeria’s independence election. The elections were at both 
regional level (1956) and federal level (1959). According to Harrold, the  British did 
the counting in both instances, in line with their pre-set plan, massaged the figures of 
the electoral process and ensured subversion of the election results; particularly, from 
the elections from the  West, which could have been won by the leading political 
figures, Chief Anthony Enahoro and Chief Obafemi Awolowo, in the region (Harrold, 
2005:11). Despite the flaw in the conduct of the election, Nigerians were forced to 
accept the outcome due to the eagerness of attaining independence and freedom. 
 
In the argument of Uche (2003), one cannot understand the administration of election 
in Nigeria except the political leadership is put into consideration. Based on his 
findings, elections can be freely administered if there is political will to do so. Using 
the 1979 election as a parameter, the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) under 
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the Chairmanship of Micheal Ani, was accused of being a stooge of the military regime 
of Olusegun Obasanjo used to achieve the government interest and not the wishes of 
the electorates. The five registered political parties recognised by electoral umpire 
were the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), the Great 
Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and the Peoples 
Redemption Party (PRP). Although Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the NPN was declared a 
winner, the outcome of the election was strongly challenged by other political parties 
most especially the UPN, which felt that the military had a deliberate plan to impose 
NPN candidate using the Electoral Commission (FEDECO) and the judiciary to 
enthrone the party to power. In a nutshell, election administration from this perspective 
is highly influenced by the military dictators who exercised political muzzle and 
interfered with the electoral process. Meanwhile, the major reason for peoples’ silence 
aftermath of the election was as a result of clamour for the civilian government because 
what was obtainable in the 1979 general elections could not be qualified to be 
democratic (Mohammed, 2011:18). 
 
The trend of election administration after Nigeria’s independence borrowed a leaf from 
the inherited shadow elections from the British colonial masters. This is justified by 
Ahmadu Kurfi, the pioneer Nigerian Electoral Officer, in his remark on Nigeria’s 
electoral history. With reference to  the 1983 General Elections, Kurfi (2005) reveals 
how its conduct was synonymous with violence, arson, intimidation and illegitimate 
means of hijacking power at all costs. The issue of rigging was so pronounced that   
Kurfi devotes a whole chapter in his memoirs to discuss the phenomenon. According 
to him, the administration of the 1983 elections encouraged manipulations in two ways 
namely; “Manipulation of the electoral poll or voter register and Manipulation of ballot 
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papers and ballot box on polling day” (Kurfi, 2005:102). The first manipulative 
exercise was carried out through inflation of the register by the inclusion of ghost 
names and underage children. In the end, results were falsified to favour preferred 
candidates or political parties during the election. On the other hand, the manipulation 
of the ballot paper on the polling day took several dimensions. To him, “these 
malpractices are usually perpetrated with the active participation and/or connivance of 
the poll clerks, counting clerks security agents as well as candidates polling and 
counting agents” (Kurfi,2005:104). 
 
Nevertheless, the Report of Election Administration Centre (2011) takes a caption look 
at what connotes administration of election at the local levels. Going by the report, 
administering election at locality includes running the polls on the election day, as well 
as pre and post-election activities, such as maintenance of eligible voters lists, drawing 
precincts, selecting polling sites, procuring equipment, recruiting and training poll 
workers, canvassing the vote, and enhancing the evaluation, implementation and 
improvement of the entire process. This trend is expected to be applicable at the state 
level being the component of the federal government. Though administration of 
election at state level calls for the implementation of both national and state laws to 
safeguard the balloting, the component units have the authority to conduct local 
government elections as it is entrenched in the Nigeria’s electoral democracy. 
  
Not only that, what Nigerians witnessed in the administration of the 2003 and 2007 
elections from local to federal levels was the epitome of sham elections. The conduct 
of the 2003 elections was so marred that Diamond (2008: 59) included Nigeria among 
the countries that had suffered “third wave reversals” despite the fact that the country 
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has not witnessed military intervention since 1999. For him, electoral democracy 
perverted in Nigeria in 2003 “by massive electoral fraud” (Diamond 2008:60). This 
makes Mustapha (2007) to have categorised election administration in Nigeria since 
1999 into competitive and coercive rigging. From Mustapha’s point of view, the 
electoral umpire needed to relocate its office to the government house, and that 
behaviour of the electoral officers have shown clearly the partisanship in them. 
 
This argument of partisanship in the administration of elections in Nigeria is examined 
further by Agbor (2007) in his finding on partiality and impartiality of the electoral 
commission (INEC). According to him, INEC operated as a stooge of the PDP led 
government, making it impossible for it to organize the elections without abiding by 
the directive of the administration and the ruling party (PDP). The partiality of the 
electoral commission was displayed in some ways. In the prelude to the elections, 
INEC ensured that there was confusion about the candidature of those representing the 
opposition parties, especially the stronger ones. From the beginning of the preparation 
up to the real voting exercise, INEC denied and refused to display the names of the 
opposition candidates. Where the names were reluctantly displayed, images and logo 
of their parties were missing. In fact, it was a calculative attempt to make the ruling 
party appeared as the only party prepared for elections.   
 
Put differently, Sakariyau and Aliu (2014) in their comparison of the 2007 and 2011 
elections in Nigeria see the EAC report on election administration from ‘what ought 
to be’ rather than focusing ‘on what is’. That the report only raises issue pertaining the 
procedural and bureaucratic tendency in the administration of elections but a true 
reflection of the electioneering process in Nigeria is guided by the request of highest 
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bidder and that the more financially buoyant one is, the most politically relevant such 
person can attain. This does not only serve as threat to democratic sustainability in the 
country but also places money politics above ideological politics.  The implication of 
this is that mismanagement of the electoral process poses serious concern to 
sustainability of democracy in Nigeria (Ojo, 2008) 
 
Going by the view of Iwara (2010), election administration can be determined by the 
effectiveness of the components of election which include structure and process. By 
structure and process, the organisers of election only require being systematic and 
working with the rules and regulation of the electoral act that governs the conduct of 
elections. To Arifalo (cited in Moveh, 2015:15), election administration is the optimal 
use of both man and human resources in ensuring the conduct of the credible election. 
Thus, to administer election involves a strategic step put in place towards 
enthronement of democracy.  
 
In a more comprehensive analysis, Elklit and Reynolds (2000) categorise election 
administration into various steps required in the electioneering process and the 
essential elements that must be followed. The summary of their view on election 
administration is represented in the content of table 1.1 below: 
Table 1.1 
 Steps in Electoral Process 
STEPS IN THE 
ELECTORAL PROCESS 
 
IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN STEP 
1. Legal framework of       the 
EMB’s structure 
• Constitutional /legal basis  
• Rules and regulation  
• Seat allocation system (i.e. method of composition of electoral 
commissioners 
2.Elections management • Electoral commissions appointment and independence, including 
terms of tenure  
• Commission/administration relationship  
• Method of allocation of resources   
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3. Constituency and polling 
district demarcation 
• Relevant body identified and active (i.e which body is responsible 
for constituency and polling district demarcation)  
• Principles for delimitation identified  
• Rules about automatic periodical revision  
• Adequate resources available  
• Rules for handling complaints in place 
•  
4. Voter education • Timing  
• Quality  
• Outreach  
• Adequate resources available  
• Relationship between electoral commissions efforts and efforts by 
parties and NGO’s 
•  
5. Voter registration • Automatic or voluntary registration  
• Appointment and training of registration personnel  
• Adequate time for registration and access to registration stations  
• Rules for public scrutiny of voters register  
• Complaints procedure 
•  
6. Access to and design of the 
ballot, nomination and 
registration of parties and 
candidates 
• Registration of parties/ candidates  
• Rules about independent candidates  
• Mechanism for ballot paper access  
• Ballot paper design 
•  
7. Campaign regulation • Spending rules  
• Public funding of party expenditure/ campaign costs  
• Access to public media  
• Rules for meetings and rallies  
• Codes of conduct  
• Rules for handling of violations of codes of conduct and campaign 
regulations 
8. Polling • Plan for distribution and location of polling places  
• Appointment and training of polling station personnel  
• Procurement of polling materials  
• Polling observation by representative of political parties and 
candidates as well as by local and international observations  
• Security and integrity of polling  
• Clear rules for assistance to incapacitated voters 




• Counting procedures established ( including whether to count at 
polling station level or at counting centers). Availability of counting 
results to party agents and others at the lowest level of counting 
immediately after completing the count  
• Access for interested parties to observe the count and request a 
recount  
•  
10. Resolving election 
related disputes and 
complaints, verification of 
final results. Certification 
• Provisions for special electoral courts and/ or adjudication system. 
Time limits for handling election disputes and complaints  
• Verification of the final results verified  
• Certification of the election 
11. Election results 
implementation 
•  
• Procedures for taking office 
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12. Post election procedures • Provisions for publication of election results at all levels of electoral 
administration 
• EMB subject to ordinary accounting 
Source Elklit .J and Reynolds A.  (2002:92-96) 
 
Similarly, what constitutes election administration according to Jinadu (1997) is the 
organization and conduct of elections by an electoral management body to various 
elective political positions. This perception of election management captures both 
structures and processes. By structure, it deals with the bureaucratic set-up and the 
electoral body that ensures the conduct of election. By process, on the other hand, it 
indicates rules, procedures and activities relating to among others: the establishment 
and appointment of membership of the election commission, training development for 
the electoral officials, voters’ education, political parties registration, registration of 
voters, the nomination of candidates, voting, counting of votes, results declaration, and 
possibly in some instances supervision and regulation of party nomination and 
congresses. The structure given the mandate to conduct election in Nigeria is the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Meanwhile, the issue of election 
administration is elaborate and goes beyond structures and process from the electoral 
commission; there are agencies or institutions like the civil society, police and security 
agencies whose cooperation through the provision of logistic support is significant to 
the functionality of the electoral management body (Moveh, 2009). This expression is 
believed to be in tuned with reality in any democratic setting. The issue of election 
administration is not a monopolistic function of the electoral commission; 
complementary roles from other relevant stakeholders cannot be ignored in enhancing 




In another dimension, Ajayi (2007) states that election administration can only be 
justified to have passed democratic test if electoral conduct survives three stages 
namely; the pre-election, election and post-election stages. The first phase entails 
registration of voters, provision of logistics materials, adequate electoral orientation 
etc. The second phase is the real voting exercise, counting and sorting of votes and 
declaration of results while the last phase is the feedback stage where people react to 
the two phases. According to him, the last phase is critical of all which expresses the 
level of credibility and otherwise of the election conducted. Strengthening Ajayi’s 
view is seen in the contention of Olatunde (2007) that attributes election administration 
to political stability of a country. What makes this view be correct is the fact that the 
big excuse for military intervention in Nigerian politics revolves around poor 
electioneering management. The collapse of different republics in Nigeria, first to third 
republics in particular that led to the seizure of political power by the military was a 
result of corruption, electoral irregularities and bad governance. 
 
Election administration in Nigeria has been examined by different scholars from 
different perspectives, but none has ever disputed its determinant to democratic 
sustainability. The issue of electoral administration can holistically be explored if one 
looks at its impact on sustaining democracy. The phenomenon of sustaining 
democracy via election management is captured in the work of Usman (2013) that 
reports how Nigeria’s electoral process has been a major challenge to democratic 
sustainability in the country. In his findings, corruption has been the obstacle hindering 
the conduct of credible elections in Nigeria. To him, corrupt practises among the 
electoral officials have led to subversion of peoples ‘mandate which could not 
guarantee democratic sustainability. The denial of Nigerians to freely choose their 
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leaders was as a result of the compromise on the part of electoral officials who 
favoured the highest bidders. With this, conducting free and fair election becomes a 
mirage. 
 
In addition, Bariledun (2013) identifies electoral fraud as the bane of democratic 
sustainability in Nigeria. In his expository study, cooperation between politicians and 
electoral officials under the influence of material inducement has caused setback to the 
country’s electoral system. The politicians use to money to induce the officers of the 
electoral commission and promise them of juicy appointment into the government. As 
a result of this, ballot boxes would be stock with illegal voters as people were hired to 
do multiple thumb print. In some instances, polling units were shifted from the original 
locations to an undisclosed area. The security agency such as the police also abet 
electoral fraud as they have been used to intimidate voters in order to favour particular 
candidate over another. This to Ojo (2006) electoral fraud is a conspiracy between the 
political office holders and electoral officials to deny credible elections. The 
implication is emergence of weak and bad leadership posing threat to achieving 
democratic dividends.  To Nwokeke and Jayum (2011), election rigging in Nigeria has 
led to the emergence of bad politicians who want power by hook or crook. According 
to them, the frequent rigging of election has delayed Nigeria’s hope to consolidate 
democracy. 
     
 Given this, it becomes imperative in this study to explore the impact of election 
administration beyond organizational structures and political interference to analysing 
the legitimacy of hybrid democracy within the Nigeria’s context. The pros and cons of 
the 2015 general elections place the country’s democracy on the verge of hybrid 
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regime. More also, as rightly posits by Alade (2005), elections and electoral processes 
are expected to usher in the integrity of democratic rule rather than embracing 
irregularities and fraudulent practices. The Nigeria’s electoral system is yet to be 
absolutely free from anti-democratic tenets notwithstanding the departure in the 
conduct of the 2015 general elections.  
 
1.5.1   The Democratic Utility of Elections: Reviewing the Nexus 
The nexus between elections and democracy is believed to be so strong that some 
scholars have argued that all democratic variables ‘revolve around elections’ (Almond 
et al., 2004, cited in Alabi, 2009:280). In fact, Ogunsanwo (2003) points out the link 
between elections and democracy as glaring and that no superior method has been 
discovered for choosing the leadership of a democratically ruled society. Thus, 
democratic elections make provisions towards the realisation of common goods. 
Mesfin (2008), for example, argues that “the founding pillars of any democratic 
political system, whether considered fragile or established, remain undoubtedly 
elections”. Similarly, Agbaje and Adejumobi (2006), while making attempt to 
underscore the centrality of elections to democracy, submit that ‘election is a viable 
mechanism for consummating representative government.’ The position of Obi (2008)   
is that democracy is best expressed through periodic elections in which equal voters 
choose their representative leaders from the competing elites. However, added to this 
is the fact that these elites can be held accountable for their actions and inactions since 
they could be voted out if they failed to deliver. The beauty of electoral democracy is 
also exposed by Peter Lewis who added his voice to the significance of elections when 
he affirms that elections are a confirmation of democratic rights, inclusion and 
transparency (Lewis, 2007:13). 
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The perceived centrality of elections to the democratisation process in any country has 
been predicated upon some reasons, which centre on the multiplicity of roles a solid 
election play to reinforce democracy. First, elections assist in institutionalizing the 
process of democratic succession. This is done by creating a legal administrative 
framework for handling competitiveness in electioneering contests among candidates 
(Omotola, 2009: 8). By implication, elections serve as the mechanism through which 
legitimization and mobilization of popular support for the government are enhanced. 
This, has rightly pin-pointed by Ojo (2007) ensures the legitimacy of the government 
which is needed to avert political succession crisis.  Nigeria had faced serious 
succession crisis due to electoral irregularities and which became an excuse for 
military interventions in the country. However, elections do not only serve the purpose 
of peacefully changing of government, but it also confers and enhances the legitimacy 
of government. The interpretation of this and by implication makes an election to be 
the only instrumental tool for legitimization and mobilization of popular support for 
the government. This is perceived in Ojo’s (2007) assertion that ‘elections bolster the 
state’s power and authority’. Kambudzi (2008, quoted in Omotola, 2009a) also averts 
that elections ‘must act as a mechanism for a regular access to power or exit from it, 
not a recipe for chaos. 
 
 Deducing from Richard Joseph, he comments on the power of legitimacy possessed 
by-elections using African context, that: ‘the prime purpose of elections will remain 
the legitimization of whatever regime that currently holds governmental power… 
moreover, are far from being autonomous operations: they reflect the character of the 
political order and in particular the degree of risk incumbents are willing to tolerate’ 
(Joseph, 1999: 11). To substantiate this, Samuel Huntington avers: 
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Of greater importance is that in all democratic systems the principal 
officers of government are chosen through competitive elections in 
which the bulk of the population can participate. Democratic systems 
thus have a common institutional core that establishes their identity 
(Huntington, 1991: 32). 
 
Based on this, considering a wider variety of political systems competitive and non-
competitive, developed and developing, Afro-Asian, Communist and Western- there 
seems to be uniformity in the general acceptance that elections are the means through 
which popular support to any government can be ascertained (Ojo, 2007). Although, 
several scholars have also argued that democracy is contested, no theory has proved 
otherwise the virtue of elections to democratisation anywhere in the world. The style 
of democracy may differ in different countries of the world; no finding has jettisoned 
the need for electioneering in democratic societies.  
 
The import of elections empowers ordinary citizens to choose between contestants for 
top political, competitive positions and by this, citizens have been allowed to shape 
and reshape their governments. Moreover, elections are supposed to serve as a viable 
tool for development. This role has been accorded more attention in the African 
context where there has been an embattled synergy between the concepts of democracy 
and development. Proving the relationship between elections and development, 
Kambudzi (cited in Omotola, 2009:.10) writes that ‘properly conducted elections in 
any African country would be an important contribution to Africa’s social and material 
development’. Also, Odukoya (2007) captures the economic imperative of elections to 
developmental democracy by affirming that a properly conducted election creates an 
avenue to promote an environment for enhancement of high capital mobility and 
increased productivity, more importantly in a society that has experienced 
authoritarianism and political conflict with the dire need for restructuring. In this 
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scenario, election is used to check and task government for basic needs of the society. 
This justifies how properly conducted elections play a role as a development asset in 
any given country (Omotola, 2009:11).  
 
In another dimension, the place of opposition participation is a central yardstick in 
measuring the level of credible elections in a democratic system. This is because the 
level of involvement by opposition parties is seen as a reflection of the level of 
available democratic space. The absence of viable political opposition some have 
argued, ‘makes it even harder for voters to have any leverage over a political party 
which is predictably returned to power time after time’ (Southall & Daniel, 2005; 
quoted in Ballard, 2007:1). In such circumstance, elections are of limited democratic 
value because the outcome has been the expectation of the elites that control the 
political terrain (Ballard, 2007:11).  
 
However, the viability of opposition parties in the 2015 elections in Nigeria cannot be 
overemphasised. What made the electoral contest more interesting was the merger of 
various opposition parties namely; the ANPP, CPC, ACN and a faction of APGA that 
formed the APC, which unseated the incumbency (PDP) in the presidential polls and 
invariably enhanced the credibility of the 2015 general elections. The result, as 
commonly posted was the eventual victory of the APC, granting Nigeria a true 
democratic credential regarding alternation of power. Muhammadu Buhari of the APC 
polled a total of 15, 424, 921 votes to emerge winner of the presidential election, 
against incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan’s 12, 853, 162. Parliamentary 
majority was also in favour of the APC, which has simple majority in both the Senate 
and House of Representatives (Omotola, 2015:8) 
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The legitimacy of elections, according to Lindberg (2004), can also be measured by 
the peacefulness of the elections, which connotes violence free or otherwise at the 
stages of elections. This according to him, is ‘a symptom of failed institutionalisation’ 
(Lindberg, 2004:64). So also the issue of breakdown, which is the abortion of the 
electoral cycle. This can occur either through military seizure of power or the outright 
breakout of civil wars. Not mindful of the odds of electoral conduct, what inspires is 
the continuity of the electoral circle which gives election some element of legitimacy, 
and  this has what  Lindberg tagged ‘the ultimate indicator of legitimacy’ (Lindberg, 
2004:65). The validity of Lindberg theoretical proposition could be seen in various 
electioneering processes in Nigeria right from independence where electoral violence 
has been a major threat to Nigeria’s democracy. 
 
 The military hijacking of political powers in the history of Nigeria was majorly 
anchored on electoral irregularities which had always embraced violence. Some of the 
manifestation of electoral violence in the Nigerian context surfaced in several ways. 
As rightly mentioned by Omotola (2009), voter register is usually over-bloated with 
fictitious names, including the underage and sometimes distorted in such a way that  
prospective electorates face difficulty in locating voting centre or confirm if truly their 
names are on voters’ registered list. Instances have shown in the previous general 
elections in Nigeria where voter register was not displayed timely before the elections 
as statutorily required so that voters can confirm their registrations make a call for  
adjustment if any. This has given enough leverage for elections results to be 
fraudulently manipulated to a dizzying height whereby actual voters outnumber 
registered voters. As a matter of fact, due to such tendencies, some registered voters 
often decided not to participate in the election. This justifies Bratton’s (2008) view in 
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his study, ‘vote-buying and violence in Nigerian elections campaigns’ that money 
politics is a major determinant of voters’ turnover in Nigeria’s election  
 
In some cases, elections have been perverted and disguised due to authoritarian rule. 
This according to Omotola (2009) is ‘Garrison Democracy’, Wilson (2005) ‘faking 
democracy’ and Adejumobi (2000) ‘a fading shadow of democracy’.  In such 
situations, elections are mere democratic rituals, where participation, competition and 
legitimacy are eliminated. Claude Ake (2000) describes such systems as one where 
voting does not amount to choosing. Therefore, it is  ‘a system of ideological 
ratification of the hegemony and power of the dominant class, a system of social 
acculturation through which dominant ideologies, political practices and belief are 
reproduced’ (Adejumobi, 2000:61). It is clear from these that Nigeria’s elections share 
the aforementioned common features.  
 
1.5.2   Evaluating Nigeria’s Democracy: A Review  
Despite the universality of democratic concept, it is believed to be contested. What 
democracy implies to the Western communities revolves around liberal and capitalist 
democracy.  In Eastern world, socialist democracy is seen to be the best. Meanwhile, 
Arab countries also lay claim to democracy in as much as the interest of the people is 
guaranteed (Ojo, 2006). However, Dahl (1971) argues that notwithstanding the 
complexities of democracy, there are basic characteristics which distinct democracy 
from any other form of government. The responsiveness of government to the people 
requires giving equal opportunities to the citizens in the following are:  
1. Freedom to form and join organization 
2. The freedom of expression 
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3. The right to vote 
4. The eligibility for public office 
5. The right of political leaders to compete for support and for votes 
6. Alternative sources of information 
7. Free and fair elections 
8. The dependence of policy making institutions in government on votes and 
other expressions of preference. 
 
These are the supposed institutional foundation stones of democracy as highlighted by 
Robert Dahl. He later emphasised that hardly can a country meets all these 
requirements and the best terminology for a political system should be ‘Polyarchies’ 
and that democratic conditions are only meant for ‘ideal type’ (Dahl, 1971) 
 
The increasing level of democratisation in Africa could be traced to over four decades; 
however, Nigeria’s democratic system was renewed in 1999 after years of military 
dictatorship. The military had served as a bane to democratisation in Nigeria by 
hijacking, on several occasions, political transition in the country. In the evaluation of 
Nigeria’s democracy, scholars have come up with different measures towards the 
assessment of the country’s democracy. Mohammed (2011) is of the view that despite 
successive political transitions in Nigeria since 1999, democracy is yet to be 
guaranteed in the country and what has been operational is civilian rule rather than 
democratic system.  According to him, the prolonged years of military regimes have 
destroyed democratic institutions in the country and election that could have 
strengthened democratic practice in the country has always been abused. Nigeria as a 
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country in his submission has not attained the status of full- fledged democratic state 
because nurturing democracy requires sustainability of democratic values and cultures. 
 
However, Mohammed’s (2011) perception of Nigeria’s democracy is not mindful of 
the fact that democracy is a process and not an end itself. Absoluteness of its 
practicability is not obtainable anywhere in the world even in the advanced 
democracies. The problem with Nigeria’s democracy has observed by Omotola (2009) 
is on consolidation. In his view, the stability of democracy is what the country requires 
and which can only be guaranteed if the political leadership effectively turns the 
naturally endowed human and material resources to the socio-economic and political 
development of the society. This is expantiated by Ojo (2011) in his work ‘Constrains 
and Prospects of Democracy in Nigeria’ that the expectations of Nigerians became 
high since the inauguration of a democratically elected president in 1999 after years of 
military rule. However, unfortunately, the strength of Nigeria’s economy only grows 
by GDP and not on per capita individual’s growth. No doubt, Nigeria is the largest 
economy in Africa, substantiating this with the peoples’ standard of living proves 
otherwise. Borrowing from the idea of Prezeworski (quoted in Ojo, 2011:263) on 
‘What makes Democracy Endure’: 
Once a country has democratic regime; its level of economic 
development has a very strong effect on the probability that 
democracy will survive.......democracy can be expected to last an 
average of about 8.5 years in a country with per capita income under 
$2,000; 33 years between $2,000-$4,000 and 100 years between 
$4,000-$6,000...... Above $6,000 democracies are to live forever. No 





The strength of economic development determines the survival of any democracy. It 
is assumed that democracy cannot thrive amidst poverty, and this has been a threat to 
most African democracies. In a similar perception, Okeke (2014) while justifying 
sustainable development argues that economy is the backbone of political 
development. Sustaining national development can only be anchored on economic 
development which must reflect in the living conditions of the populace. In view of 
this, Nigeria’s democracy is at the crossroads, and national development is an 
imagination of decision makers in Nigeria.  
 
The democratic operational system in Nigeria has adopted a market economy approach 
since the inception of the fourth republic. This according to Ademu (2012) only 
exposes Nigeria’s democracy to tension because contradiction would always surface 
if both market capitalism and democracy are adopted. The contradictions are 
highlighted in the findings of Ademu (2012) thus:  
1. The private right of disposal enjoyed by some over the means of production 
leads to an unequal distribution of wealth which is inconsistent with “equal 
freedom” and participation in society 
2. The balance of power in society weighted so far in favour of employers, as 
against employees, that it denies the latter any opportunity to live their lives 
on the basis of self-determination;  
3. Owing to the pursuit of profit by some, market capitalism stands in the way 
of the welfare for all, which can be ensured only by the democratic principle; 
4. The state’s sole function is to provide for peace and order. Democracy 
obstructs pure market capitalism if: 
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5. Freedom of enterprise is substantially curtailed or even abolished using 
democratic decision-making;  
6. State interference by democratic decision-making – for example, by the 
expropriation of private property in favour of the public at large – 
jeopardises the development and freedom of the individual; the private 
sphere of the individual is infringed.  
 
In another dimension, Nigeria’s democratisation has also been evaluated on 
governance style and most literature confirm that the crisis with Nigeria’s democracy 
is lack of good governance and which has nearly collapsed some institutional 
functionalities. The greatest manifestation of the weak institution in Nigeria is her 
inability to conduct free and fair election (Ojo, 2011) and this according to Kolawole 
(2007) is antithetical to sustaining and consolidating democracy in the country. In the 
whole African continent, only a few states could claim to have genuinely administered 
free and fair elections that meet international standard. What is obtainable is sit-tight 
syndrome like the case of Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the ‘third term agenda’1 of 
Nigeria’s former president Olusegun Obasanjo. The leadership crisis has really 
weakened so many institutions in the country to the extent that people have resulted to 
political cynicism having lost hope in the leaders to give good governance (Ojo, 2006). 
    
                                                          
1 The third term agenda was proposed during Obasanjo second term in office aimed at extending the 
president tenure to three terms. It  was  introduced as a bill  on the floor of the Senate and House of 
Representative requesting constitutional review on the terms of executive president to allow third term 
as against the second term  entrenched in the 1999( as amended) constitution. But both the legislative 
chambers rejected the proposed bill and it failed to pass through. See Interview of Bello Masari, 
former speaker of House Representative, with the Daily Trust, February 8, 2017 ‘How we frustrated 
Obasanjo’s third term agenda’. 
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Another serious threat to democratic sustainability in Nigeria is the issue of corruption. 
Though it is an international phenomenon, corruption has eaten deep in Nigeria’s 
socio-economic and political system to the extent that it has become a cultural norm 
in the country (Omotola, 2006). Since Nigeria attained independence, records have 
shown that corruption had crippled the government of Nigeria right from the first 
republic. According to Adele, the first republic (1960-1966) was a victim of political 
corruption to the extent that contracts and loans emanating from the government were 
tactically milked to enrich the few state elected officials. With the military intervention 
in 1966 under Gowon’s regime, the display of corruption was so pervasive that ten out 
of his twelve military governors were not only arrested for diverting over $20 million 
but also convicted of illegal awards of states’ contract for personal gains. During the 
second republic (1979-1983) when Sheu Shagari was the executive president, the level 
of corruption was reported to have surpassed the experience of the previous regimes. 
Over 16 $billion oil revenue could not be accounted for during the four year of 
Shagari’s government (Ogbeidi, 2012). In fact, the magnitude of corruption in the 
Shagari’s era called for tagging of the second republic by Adamolekun (1985) as ‘the 
golden age of corruption in Nigeria’. The Babaginda military administration (1985-
1993) could be said to have institutionalised corruption in Nigeria. The Abacha regime 
that took over from Babaginda also followed suit in corruption saga before his 
mysterious exit. The coming of Abdulsalam, a military ruler, in 1998 ushered in a 
transitional programme that later produced the beginning of the present fourth 
Republic in 1999. 
 
With the inception of the fourth republic in 1999, corruption got the leading nod from 
the National Assembly, which was spearheaded by the speaker of the House of 
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Representative (Aliu & Sakariyau, 2013). This was the beginning of the test for 
Nigeria’s nascent democracy after long years of military regimes. Salisu Buhari, the 
speaker, was accused of forgery and perjury of his academic certificate and declaration 
of age. After series of investigations, it was discovered that the speaker was guilty of 
the allegations which led to his removal from the seat of the speaker of the lower 
chamber of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In a short interval of time, the president 
of the Senate (upper house), Evan Enwerem, was also accused of questionable 
character and invariably impeached as the Senate President. His predecessor, 
Okadigbo, could not last long as he was also alleged of financial misconduct. 
Unfortunately, within two years of Nigeria’s nascent democracy, the country had 
experienced three senate presidents and two speakers of the House of Representative 
(Ojo, 2001). The case of Adolph Wabara, Senate president, in 2005 is still fresh in the 
memory of Nigerians who was accused of bribery.  According to the report (The News 
April 4, 2005), he was alleged to have collected a bribe of fifty-five million naira from 
the Minister of Education, Professor Fabian Osuji, so as to increase the budget 
appropriation of the said ministry. The bribery scenario between Farouk Lawan, a 
member of the legislative, and Femi Otedola, a business icon, in 2013 showcased the 
ugly trend of corruption in Nigeria which is not limited to the public sector but also 
manifested in the private organisations (Premium Times, February 1, 2003) 
 
Although no country in the world is corruption free, its pervasiveness differs in every 
society. However, it has been a major barrier to Nigeria’s democratisation, and this 
hurdle is one of the factors that counted against the previous administration of 
Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015).  The current administration of Muhammadu Buhari 
having enjoyed good will, internally and externally, as a man of integrity has vowed 
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to bring corruption to its kneel. This is being done by strengthening the anti-corruption 
agencies, Independent Corrupt Practises Commission and Economic Financial Crimes 
Commission (ICPC and EFCC), set up by the Obasanjo’s administration. Whatever 
success to be recorded by this Buhari’s administration in the fight against corruption 
would go a long way in enhancing democratic sustainability in Nigeria. 
 
Democracy cannot be sustained without contribution from the political parties in any 
democratic system which Nigeria is not an exemption. Political parties are machinery 
or umbrella through wish candidates can seek an elective position in a democratic 
setting. In acknowledging the centrality of political parties in any democratic state, 
Amuchaezi (2007) notes that the most critical institution of governance anywhere in 
the world is a political party. The widening of political space in a democratic society 
is also  guaranteed through party politics and individuals key in into political 
participation via party ideology and manifestoes. Gambo and Ribadu (2015) give a 
framework on the versatility of political party by attributing it to be the major channel 
through wish the people partake in the political process. Similarly, Manu and Ibrahim 
(2015) view the political party as an organized avenue through which the people can 
capture power in a free and fair election. However, as mentioned earlier, the formation 
of political parties in Nigeria can be traced to the colonial era. Indeed, the political 
parties were established during colonialism as a result of necessity.  
 
As rightly put by Saka and Ifejika (2015), the creation of political party during 
colonialism was needed to abrogate colonial rule. In fact, it was through political 
parties that the nationalists were able to mobilize the local people against colonial rule. 
The scenario, however, especially after the independence of 1960 was party formation 
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and dominance by regionalism and ethnicity. The leading political parties by the first 
republic (1960-1966) were the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), the 
Action Group (AG) and the Northern People’s Congress. Regrettably, these parties 
were having sectional outlook rather than national configuration. Thus, each of the 
parties had its stronghold in the region of its leadership. For instance, the NCNC had 
its stronghold in the Eastern region, the AG was maintaining popularity in the Western 
region, and the NPC was strong in the Northern region. In essence, these parties were 
being used by the elites of these regions as political machinery for power acquisition 
and consolidation (Ofoeze, 2001).  
 
In the second republic, the registered political parties were not significantly differed 
from the first Republican. The issue of regionalism and sectionalism also surfaced, and 
none of the five adjudged political parties had a national outlook. The five political 
parties given recognition by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) were 
gaining popularity on a regional basis. Although the NPN won the presidency race, its 
popularity was dominant in the Northern part of the country. The aborted third republic 
only witnessed two recognised political parties imposed by the military administration 
of Babangida namely the Social Democratc Party and the National Republican 
Convention. Both SDP and NRC faced criticism as being government parties and not 
the people’s parties. The result of the presidential election conducted on June 12, 1993, 
was annulled by the military head of state, Babangida. 
 
After years of democratic truncation by the army, Nigerians began the fourth republic 
on May 29, 1999, after the general election which ushered in Olusegun Obasanjo as 
the civilian head of state. During the political transition, the Independent National 
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Electoral Commission (INEC) registered three political parties namely; Peoples’ 
Democratic Party (PDP), All Peoples Party (APP) and Alliance for Democracy (AD). 
The PDP won the presidency and majority seats at the parliament. The party was not 
a great one as far as the South West axis was concerned. By 2003 and 2011 elections, 
party formation had been liberalised, and 63 registered political parties were 
recognised in 2011. However, only ten parties won seats in the 2011 general election, 
and INEC had to deregister seven political parties that did not contest elections of 
2011(Saka & Ifejika, 2015).In the 2015 general elections, out of the 26 registered 
political parties, only 14 of them had candidates for the presidential election which 
was won by the All Progressive Congress (APC). 
 
The political parties in Nigeria played a significant role in creating more space for 
political participation due to the multiplicity of the country’s party system. However, 
as mentioned earlier, the party formation has been denied a national outlook right from 
independence, and this threatens the unity of the country. Though the federal country 
arrangement laid claim to unity in diversity, party formation on sectionalism and 
regionalism reflects on the voting patterns in the series of the country’s electoral 
democracy. Apart from the PDP that later cut across Nigeria after the 1999 elections, 
other political parties have been operating on a sectional basis which poses a wrong 
signal to Nigeria’s democratisation. Even the recent 2015 elections witnessed a voting 
pattern by regionalism, such needs to be addressed for Nigeria’s party arrangement to 
be nationalistic to ensure democratic sustainability (Bello, 2015) 
 
The synergy between security and democracy cannot be over emphasised. The return 
of Nigeria to a democratic system in 1999 raised the hope of Nigerians. This optimism 
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is predicated on the fact that democracy would not only guarantee freedom of speech 
and fundamental human rights, but also enhance the security of lives and property, 
which would indeed reposition the country for sustainable development (Jaja and Jude, 
2015). Unfortunately, this hope seems to be dashed as a result of deteriorated level of 
security in the country. Security disaster threatens Nigeria's return to democratic rule. 
Despite the fact that considerable progress has been achieved in the areas of freedom 
of speech and liberty, issues of resource control in the Niger Delta, ethnoreligious 
crisis in some parts of the North and communal clashes persisted.  Though response 
of Amnesty Programme introduced by Yar’Adua administration curtailed the 
militancy in the Niger Delta, kidnapping is the current security threat in the region. 
However, the climax of these security threats is the insurgence of Boko Haram group 
that has killed over seventy thousands people (Vanguard, 19th November 2015).  
 
The group which was formed in 2009 began unleashing violence on Nigerian security 
forces and subsequently claimed the lives of more than 1000 people with over 700 
killed in Borno State capital Maiduguri within three years (Amoda, 2012).This 
exposed the weakness of the Nigerian security system by its inability to curb the crisis 
in time. The sect continued its attack when it orchestrated a large prison break in 
Bauchi and freed over 700 inmates including the sect members. This prison break 
showed how capable the group is in undermining the security of the country and 
exposed the weakness of the Nigerian security to the international community. The 
sect claimed responsibility for headquarters police attacks that was believed to be the 
first suicide bombing in Nigeria in 2011. The attack as claimed by the sect was targeted 
at the former Inspector General of Police. The successful attack on powerful security 
institution like the police headquarters is not favourable to Nigeria’s national security. 
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In the same year, the group carried out another suicide bombing on United Nations 
Headquarters in Abuja in which twenty people were killed and more than sixty were 
injured.  The US Department of State in November 2013 classified Boko Haram as 
‘Foreign Terrorist Organization’ (Henrik, 2014:6).  
 
The Boko Haram insurgency has continued to pose a serious threat to the country’s 
security system and corporate political entity. Since the emergence of the Boko Haram 
in 2009, the attacks and suicide bombing carried out by the group was increasing 
beyond the national boundary. In the study of Henrikn Pearsson, ‘Nigeria: An 
Overview of Challenges to Peace and Security’ he laments about the porous borders 
of Nigeria that have made smuggling of arms to the country an easy task   (Henrik, 
2014). Moreover, that is why the Boko Haram group, in pursuit of their violence, have 
successfully engaged in bombing of police stations, schools and Mosques. The sect 
also engages in the kidnapping of foreigners, and the recent tactics of kidnapping 
women. The group kidnapped more than 250 school girls in Chibok town of Borno 
state. By implication as noted by Eze and Agwanwo (2014), the sect has impeded the 
socio-economic and political matrix of Nigeria. Unfortunately, the changing dynamic 
of the operations and tactics of the group confused many scholars and analysts. Its 
initial campaign of violence targeting security personnel and their formations have 
now expanded to include civilians, nongovernmental organizations and the entire 
Nigeria populace.  
 
In the final analysis, evaluating Nigeria’s democracy by electoral system has suffered 
a setback in the recent 2015 elections. Nwokeke and Jayum (2011) state that election 
rigging in Nigeria has become an avenue for the imposition of illegitimate leaders that 
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have no regard for the general interest of the people not to talk of democratic tenets. 
In fact, Nigeria is believed to have been practising authoritarian democracy which to 
the western Democrats is ‘pseudo-democracy’. Nigeria is always being looked upon 
by many African countries and beyond, but becomes a crippled giant for her inability 
to denounce electoral violence (Nwolise, 2007). The inability of the country’s electoral 
system to get it right since independence has been a serious concern and which 
threatens her democratic system. The prevalence level of electoral violence in the 
country has been a major reason for political apathy and enabled imposition of 
candidates, programmes and policies. Kean (2004:1) observed that violence ‘is the 
greatest enemy of democracy’. Several scholars within and outside Nigeria have 
covered the ugly phenomenon of electoral violence in Nigeria, most of the studies 
reaffirmed the assertion of Daniel Iyabode in her work ‘Nigerian politicians, linguistic 
rascality  and the security implication’  that certainly something had gone wrong with 
the  political situation of Nigeria (Daniel,2015:.3).     
 
1.6    Research Methods and Study Design 
The study adopts the qualitative research design in the collection and analysis of data. 
As it is known, research design centres on the plan, structure and strategy of 
investigation intended to provide answers to the questions of the focus in a particular 
research (Ahmed, 2005:35). A research design captures the arrangement and 
conditions for data collection and analysis and also showcases the conceptual structure 
upon which research is conducted. In view of this, research design represents a 
planning of the methodology to be adopted in gathering relevant data and techniques 
to be used in their analysing. The need to understand decisions regarding what, when, 
how, where and why in the course of research findings constitute a research design 
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(Kothari, 2006). Thus, the function of research design is to ensure that information 
obtained in data collection assists a researcher to answer unambiguously questions 
raised at the initial stage (Vaus, 2007). 
 
Qualitative research is concerned with phenomenon relating to quality or kind. For 
instance, making investigation into the reasons for human behaviour (why people act 
or think in a certain way). Given this, the researcher was determined to know the 
motivational factors using an in-depth interview for this purpose. Through such, the 
study is guided to analyse the various factors that serve as motivations for people to 
behave in a particular manner (Kothari, 2006). Qualitative research often embraces a 
small group of respondents in its in-depth investigation and also encourages 
researchers to work within an interpretative research paradigm which uses flexible and 
sensitive data generation methods to the prevailing social context of the issue being 
investigated. In essence, the study adopts qualitative research design in order to 
elaborate description of the phenomena under study. 
 
 The nature of the study informs the philosophical approach employed interpretivism. 
By interpretivist method, one can comprehend through interpretation of the meanings 
to social behaviour. This distinct the social world from the natural world because the 
latter only deals with inanimate objects that can be subjected to laboratory 
experimentation which calls for positivism paradigm in explaining natural 
phenomenon (Tuli, 2010).  Based on this, this the researcher employed interpretivism 
to expanciate the divergent views of respondents on the open ended questions that 
guided the study. This becomes imperative to analyse the diverse opinions on the 
subject matter. As it is known that issues related to social phenomenon cannot be 
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subjected to laboratory test, this prompted the researcher through field work to get 
different interpretations regarding the conduct of the 2015 general elections. As rightly 
observed by McFarland (2014), the social world is subjective to individual’s 
interpretation of a given phenomenon. Based on this, electoral democracy can be 
underscored on interpretative mode in order to understand the philosophy guarding 
electoral process and politics. 
 
With the aid of inductive approach, the study embraces a narrative analytical tools in 
assessing the Nigeria’s electoral democracy particularly the 2015 general elections. 
This becomes imperative as a result of divergent views and perspectives which the 
phenomenon under study is assessed by scholars, analysts and experts on the subject 
matter. To Kothari (2004), assessment of views, attitudes and behaviours can be 
analysed from various different contexts. This factor justifies the inductive approach 
in analysing Nigeria’s electioneering politics. Unlike quantitative research that tests 
hypothesis, qualitative method address and answer questions rather than testing 
hypothetical statements (Hall, 2005). 
 
 Similarly, the study adopts narrative mode of analysis as a research design in 
exploring the dynamism of the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. According to 
Cresswell (2014:70), “the narrative strategy of research design is understood as a 
spoken or written text giving an account of an event / action or series of events / 
actions, chronologically connected”. Given this, the study does not only explore the 
electoral events in 2015 but also gives chronological accounts of previous elections in 
Nigeria. With this, the issue of electoral democracy in Nigeria can be understood 
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holistically. Narrative mode of analysis as employed in this study enhances a 
comprehensive assessment of the research objectives. 
 
1.6.1 Methods of Data Collection 
Qualitative research which this study is anchored is believed to allow a greater 
expression and deeper issues based. This study adopts in-depth interview, focus group 
discussion and archival research method of data collection. According to Harrison 
(2001:90), interview is explained as a social encounter between a researcher and a 
respondent. The response in forms of answers serves as the basis of raw data in social 
research for the researcher. An in-depth interview, therefore, is an unstructured, direct 
and personal interview that allows a researcher to question a single respondent to find 
out underlying factors, motivations, attitudes, beliefs and perceptions on a topic. It is 
a way of collecting data through verbal interaction between the researcher and the 
respondent. It also helps in getting a detailed investigation of each person interviewed 
through personal perspective for in-depth understanding of the subject of coverage. 
 
Based on this, respondents for in-depth interview (see table 1.2) were drawn from the 
stakeholders of the electoral body and those that actively played significant roles in 
the administration of elections in Nigeria. The researcher interviewed one of the 
National Commissioners that was actively involved in the 2015 elections. The Director 
of Planning and Logistics of the electoral commission was also interviewed. To 
complement the interview sessions, the researcher also engaged members of the 
academia, political parties, civil society groups and journalists that served in one 





List of  Interviewees 
List of In-depth Interviewees Designation  
Respondent 1 National Commissioner, INEC, Abuja. 
Respondent 2 Director of Planning and Monitoring, 
INEC, Abuja. 
 Respondent 3 Department of Political Science, Bayero 
University, Kano, Nigeria 
Respondent 4 Former Minister of National Planning, 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 
Respondent 5 Senior Lecturer, Department of Political 
Science, Ahmadu Bello University, 
Zaria, Nigeria 
Respondent 6 Head of Research Unit, YIAGA, Abuja. 
Respondent 7 National Secretariat, All Progressive 
Congress (APC), Abuja. 
Respondent 8 Chairman, Inter-Party Advisory 
Committee (IPAC), Nigeria 
Respondent 9 Director, Centre for Democracy and 
Development, Abuja, Nigeria. 
Respondent 10 Director, Political, Civil, Ethics and 




Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) on the other hand are used to get information from 
interactions with different participants on the research issue. This involves discussion 
and hearing from others, their perception on the subject of discourse and thus 
guarantees divergent views. Also hearing from different views enriches researcher to 
gather broader perceptions on the matter arising. As rightly noted by Mainhein and 
Rich (1995), the use of Focus Group Discussions involves a carefully selected small 
group of people with the use of a moderator for the researcher to learn and know the 
thinking of the people on the issue under investigation. However, FGD facilitates good 
exploratory and discovery of peoples’ thought and perception through an open 
interaction and deliberation. For the FGD, two sessions were conducted and the 
researcher engaged relevant stakeholders as participants ranging from scholars on 
African elections, members of research institutes, members of legislative institutes, 
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party members, civil society groups and members of election observers (see table 1.3 
and table 1.4). Those engaged were actively on the field on elections days. 
 
Table 1.3 
List of Informants (FGD Session 1) 
List of Informants (FGD Session 1) Affiliation 
Informant 1 National Institute of Social and Economic 
Research 
Informant 2 Department of Political Science, Federal 
University Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria 
Informant 3 Social-Political Unit, National Institute of 
Legislative Studies, Abuja, Nigeria 
Informant 4 Administrative Unit, National Institute of 
Legislative Studies, Abuja, Nigeria 
Informant 5 Research Officer, National Institute of 
Legislative Studies, Abuja, Nigeria 
 
The second FGD session was done to complement the data collection process. This 
involved large numbers of participants comprising of civil society groups, members of 




List of Participants (FGD Session II)  
List of Participants (FGD Session II)  Affiliation 
Informant 1 Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth 
and Advancement 
Informant 2 Applied Radio, Abuja. 
Informant 3 Partner for Election Reform 
Informant 4 Say No Campaign 
Informant 5 Transition Monitoring Group 
Informant 6 Peoples Democratic Party 
Informant 7 National Democratic Institute 
Informant 8 Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth 
and Advancement 
Informant 9 Political Analyst 




1.6.2 Justifications for the Selected Respondents 
The respondents were purposively selected due to their verse knowledge on the subject 
matter. As it is known that purposive sampling enables researcher to engage 
knowledgeable individuals on area of study by virtue of their experience and 
participation. Random sampling is not applicable in this study in order to avoid 
selection of respondents that might not be familiar with the subject matter. Given this, 
the sampling technique adopts in this study is non probability using purposive 
sampling method. As noted by Marshal (1996), purposive sampling enables researcher 
to select productive respondents that would answer the research questions effectively. 
 
The in-depth interview and focus group discussion consist of prominent players in 
election administration in Nigeria. The National Commissioner interviewed by the 
researcher was the most senior commissioner in the electoral commission and she had 
served in acting capacity as the Chairperson of the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC). Also, the researcher engaged the Director of Planning and 
Logistics who played prominent role in the administration of the 2015 general 
elections. In fact, his department was given the mandate to plan and strategize on 
mechanism adopted for the conduct of the elections. Apart from the officials of the 
electoral body, university dons were interviewed to find out their view on the subject 
matter. The selected academia are experts on election and democracy and participated 
in the exercise of the 2015 elections. Other respondents ranging from party officials, 





To complement all these, personal experience of the researcher also counted in 
enriching the study. The researcher served as Returning Officer in the 2011 and 2015 
general elections and such participant observation actually assisted in the course of 
gathering data. As a Returning Officer at ward level, the researcher was involved in 
collation and declaration of results from ward to local collation centres in Bwari Area 
Council of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria. Lastly, the study falls back 
on election reports from both local and international observers. These were used to 
streamline and get the perceptions of some of the accredited observers during the 
elections. Information from newspapers, magazines and election handbooks also 
enrich the study. The Electoral Institute that serves as the research backbone of the 
election commission was visited and several revealing reports were annexed which 
assisted in getting direct information on the conduct of the 2015 general elections. 




1.6.3 Interview Guide 
The interview guide (see appendix E) was prepared from the research questions raised 
and conducted in an open ended manner. The researcher engaged the respondents 
based on the research questions and objectives and allowed free flow of information 
without diverting from the subject matter. The guide assists the researcher to be 
focused and concentrated on the research area. The research questions were asked and 
followed strictly in both in depth interview and focus group discussion. The analysis 
of responses from the in-depth interview and focus group discussion was done 
 
44 
thematically to ascertain the findings of the study. Chapter six gives details of the 
themes and sub themes that emerged in the analysis and findings. 
 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
The administration of the Nigeria’s 2015 elections remains a paradigm shift in the 
electoral politics of Nigeria. This makes it significant in this study to showcase the 
salient factors that contributed to the changes experienced in the conduct of the 
elections. Unlike the previous studies that have accessed electoral conduct from 
partiality of the electoral commission (Ojo, 2007; Omotola, 2009) and political 
interference by the ruling party (Ojo, 2008), this study investigates the dynamic of the 
2015 elections within the context of legitimatisation of hybrid democracy in Nigeria. 
   
Theoretically, the study contributes to enrich the existing literature on Nigeria’s 
politics. In view of this, scholars and students of politics would be better informed on 
how election management has contributed to the legitimacy of hybrid democracy in 
Nigeria. This enhances the theoretical contribution of this study on the application of 
‘Electoral Authoritarianism’ that embraces some elements of liberalism and 
authoritarianism in analysing the Nigeria’s electoral politics. With emphasis on the 
administration of the 2015 general elections, the study infers that Nigeria’s electoral 
democracy is not fully liberalised neither fully authoritarian but could be placed within 
the context of hybrid democracy.  
 
More importantly, the study is a good academic report that would assist policy makers 
and election stakeholders on the nature of election management in Nigeria. With the 
aid of relevant suggestions recommended in the study, the electoral umpire and other 
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key players would be guided towards improving future elections in the country. In 
essence, the study is significant via its theoretical and practical contributions to the 
understanding of Nigeria’s electoral democracy. . 
 
1.8 Scope of the Study 
To begin with, this study is exploratory considering its objective to assess the impact 
of election administration on Nigeria’s democratisation. However, with much 
emphasis on the 2015 elections qualifies the study to a case study. Nevertheless, the 
study is not disconnected from the previous elections to enrich the understanding of 
the background of electioneering politics in Nigeria’s democratisation. 
 
The belief that electioneering politics is a wider area and which can be viewed from 
different perspectives contributes to narrowing this study on the recently conducted 
2015 elections in Nigeria. The choice of this is to enhance a focused based research 
and as well as to determine the sustainability of Nigeria’s democracy. 
 
1.9 Organization of the Study 
The study is  divided into seven chapters with each dwelling on contending issues that 
are related to the topic of this thesis. The first chapter which is titled ‘Introduction’ 
gives background information of the general focus of the study. In this chapter, the 
evolution of electioneering politics in Nigeria was traced to the colonial era before the 
independence of 1960. The chapter links this to the current election administration in 
Nigeria using micro and macro perspective. With this overview, the problem in which 
this study explores is identified. After stating the research problem, relevant research 
questions were raised, and objectives of the study followed suit. The literature review 
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which falls in the first chapter considers critical assessment of relevant scholarly 
outputs on the subject matter. The contending and contemporary literature on election 
administration in Nigeria are thoroughly reviewed. Also, the centrality of election to 
democracy is well discussed by exploring different scholarly perceptions while the last 
aspect of review dwells on overview of Nigeria’s democracy. The significant of the 
study and scope and limitations as well as research method also surface in this chapter.  
 
The second chapter is a theory based segment. The study adopts three theoretical 
postulations in explaining the issue of election administration and Nigeria’s 
democracy. The first theory is structural functionalism which explains the interwoven 
components in election administration as reflected in the Nigeria’s 2015 general 
elections. The structural functionalism theory only explains the functionality of sub-
structures that enhanced the peaceful conduct of the election. The second theory is 
Liberal Democratic Theory and looks at the element of liberalism in the Nigeria’s 
electoral democracy. The adoption of Electoral Authoritarianism (EA) as a theoretical 
framework looks at electoral democracy from authoritarian perspective. However, the 
EA theory in its typology also borrows some attributes of liberal electoral democracy. 
It is against this backdrop that Nigeria’s electoral democracy is viewed from ‘hybrid’ 
perspective. 
    
In the third chapter, the historical overview of Nigeria’s political transition and 
electoral politics is discussed.  This is well substantiated by considering both colonial 
and post - colonial era, and how different elections right from the period of British 
administration till the attainment of self-government in 1960 were conducted. More 
also, the post- colonial general elections which began with the 1964/65 general 
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elections get adequate attention in the third chapter. Given this, the political transitions 
are examined with special consideration to various military incursions in Nigeria’s 
politics and how different military regimes had truncated democratisation processes. 
These are complemented by making reference to the different Republican era in 
Nigeria. With the assessment of Nigeria’s political transition, the chapter captures the 
politics of political instability in the country. The last caption of the chapter looks at 
the evolution of the current democratic dispensation that began in 1999 after years of 
military authoritarianism. 
 
The fourth chapter looks at the place of election administration in Nigeria’s 
democracy. The processes and procedures of the electioneering system in Nigeria are 
analysed extensively. Also, the underlying factors and mechanism adopted by the 
electoral umpire that shaped the credibility of the 2015 elections get serious attention 
in this section. The overall electoral process in Nigeria is holistically explained with 
much emphasis on the procedural interplay of the 2015 general elections.       
  
The fifth chapter considers the role of other stakeholders in the conduct of the 2015 
general elections. This is categorised into internal and external dimensions. In doing 
this, the role of key relevant stakeholders in the outcome of the elections is highlighted. 
It looks at the internal and external factors that influenced the conduct of 2015 general 
elections. The local and international perceptions of the national elections are key 
issues raised in this chapter. 
 
Chapter six gives detailed analysis using thematic evaluation in explaining the subject 
matter. The chapter also explores the credibility and integrity question regarding the 
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2015 elections by using the generally accepted Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) 
mechanism initiated by Pippa Norris and co. This is done to assess if the conduct of 
Nigeria’s 2015 elections met the requirement of best practises in the world. The 
chapter employs analytical tool to consider pros and cons regarding the debate on the 
issue of credibility and integrity of the 2015 general elections.  
 
Finally, the seventh chapter which coincidentally is the concluding section entails the 
summary and concluding remark. The study concludes by making relevant suggestions 







This chapter captures relevant theories that explain the Nigeria’s electoral politics. 
Several theories have been propounded by scholars on electoral studies which their 
relevance depends on the practicability of electoral system in different democracies. 
In order to examine Nigeria’s electioneering politics and with particular reference to 
the 2015 general elections, this study adopts three theories namely; ‘Structural 
Functionalism’, Liberal Democratic Theory and ‘Electoral Authoritarianism’. The first 
theory gives a caption of the effective collaboration and partnership enjoyed by the 
electoral commission in discharging the 2015 elections. Despite the fact that INEC is 
the only recognised body empowered by law to manage and conduct elections to 
various elective positions at federal and state levels in Nigeria, the electoral umpire 
required supports of some other relevant stakeholders in fulfilling this task. Other 
stakeholders like security agencies, civil society groups, election monitoring bodies 
and other relevant agencies played significant role during the 2015 elections. Those 
bodies are viewed as sub-structures that cooperated with INEC during the conduct of 
the 2015 elections 
 
The Liberal Democratic Theory and The Electoral Authoritarianism (EA) as adopted 
in this thesis try to do a general assessment of Nigeria’s electoral democracy. The 
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relevance of the theories is situated in the attributes and principles of elections under 
authoritarian regime. Interestingly, Nigeria democratisation process has passed 
through phases of different political transitions and electoral politics. Based on this, 
this chapter gives a better picture of Nigeria’s electoral democracy on theoretical 
postulations and from the content of this thesis, the application of Liberal Democratic 
Theory and Electoral Authoritarianism are suitable perspective employed to 
explaining Nigeria’s electoral democracy. 
 
2.2   Structural Functionalism 
This theory is derived from earlier usage of functionalism and systems models in 
Anthropology, Sociology, Biology, and Political Science. The analysis of structural 
functionalism in the field of Anthropology was fabricated from an organic model of 
life. In this model, it is assumed that the parts and pieces of an organism contribute to 
the functioning whole of the organism. Moreover, any failure from either of the parts 
has the tendency of affecting the natural organism. Given this, society is situated on 
mutually interdependent parts. Notable scholars in this direction are Malinowski, 
Radcliffe-Brown and Parsons. Whenever a change occurs in a segment of the societal 
culture, it leads to corresponding changes in other cultural segments. The model of a 
socio-cultural system according to Spencer (cited in Chilcott, 1998) could be likened 
to the mechanical structure of the human body. The functionalist tradition also 
postulates that ‘social systems meet certain needs and suggests that there are functional 
imperatives that must be met for a group to survive’ (Olaniyi, 2001:24). That is why 
Macionis (2010) from sociological perspective sees structural functionalism as a 
framework through which society is observed from complexity and whose parts work 
together for the promotion of solidarity and stability of the entire system. 
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In the field of Sociology, scholars such as Emile Durkheim, Herbert Spencer, Talcott 
Persons and others have extensively analysed the rationale behind functionalism to 
society. The concern of Durkheim (cited in Macionis, 2011) is centred on how 
societies maintain internal stability and survive overtime. According to him, societal 
survival is anchored on “mechanical solidarity”. By mechanical solidarity, Durkheim 
is of the view that people in the societies have social bonds based on moral values 
shared together for the survival of the whole society. However, in the complex modern 
societies, the functionality and sustainability of human societies are held together by 
organic solidarity. This is a reflection of support and cooperation from the people of 
the society. This argument of Durkheim got further elaboration through the work of 
Talcott persons. Persons (1975) views the social system from the actions of individuals 
and that each within the society expects reactions to his own behaviour. These 
expectations (if successful) are usually guided by norms and values of the society. The 
influence of individual’s behaviour towards social function cannot be over-
emphasised. The approach of functionalism in this context considers social structure 
vis a vis social function and that the former is set-up to enhance the latter.  
 
It also addresses society from its constituent elements which comprise customs, norms, 
values, culture, traditions and institutions. The function of each of those components 
determine the stability of the society. Herbert Spencer came up with a simple analogy 
by likening societal components to an organism which needs to be functioning for the 
survival of the whole body (Urry, 2000). To sum it all from a sociological angle, 
structural functionalism as a theoretical framework sees society as a complex system 
whose parts work interrelated to promote solidarity and stability of the society. It 
perceives society from a macro-level perception, which is a broad focus on the social 
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structures that shape society as a whole, and believes that society has evolved like 
organisms. 
 
However, structural functionalism gained popularity in Political Science in 1960 when 
it became necessary to develop a new approach to the study of American (United 
States) and European politics. The assumption of the theory is that existence of a state 
revolves around different structures, and their functionality determines the survival of 
the generality of the state. For structural functionalists, the nagging question to be 
answered is, what does a structure do within the political system? The rationale behind 
this is to find out what a structure does (not what to do) towards the stability of a 
political system. The adoption of structural functionalism to political studies has a 
historic link to the work of Gabriel Almond and James Coleman ‘The Politics of the 
Developing Areas’ which was further elaborated critically by Almond and Powell 
(1966) in their ‘Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach’ and was later 
reviewed by Herbert Spiro (1967). Gabriel Almond claims that political functions exist 
in all political system by input and output. The functions according to him entail 
political socialization, interest articulation, interest aggregation and political 
communication. The output, on the other hand, includes making, implementation and 
adjudication of the rule.  
 
In political context, however, Gabriel and Powell, introduced a structural-functionalist 
approach to comparing political system. Their argument is that the understanding of a 
political system requires the overal knowledge of the institutions within and their roles 
respectively. They also insisted that these institutions, to be properly understood, must 
be placed in a meaningful and dynamic historical context (Almond & Powell, 1966). 
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As a matter of fact, structural functionalism as a theory to the study of political 
phenomenon tries to explain the fundamental function of the political structures in the 
political system, and it is also an investigative tool. In essence, it explains the 
relationships between the parts (structures) on one hand and between the parts and the 
whole (political system) on the other hand. The relationship is explained regarding the 
functions of each (Olaniyi, 2001:73). 
 
The theory of analysing political phenomenon is guided on fundamental elements. It 
is believed that all political arrangement or system has a political structure and 
secondly, the structure functions to aid the multifunctional of the whole political 
setting. Also, political system as entity is being shaped by the environment and to 
understand the process of political development, acknowledging the interactions of the 
political system within its domestic and international environment is necessary. On 
this, structural functionalism at domestic level considers structures and substructures 
with their relevance roles towards sustaining the entire political system. At the 
international dimension, on the other hand, the political system of a country can be 
studied through an understanding of the political structures that influence the action 
and inactions of countries within the global arena. 
 
The emphasis of structural functionalism is that all political systems in the world can 
be effectively understudied and compared by understanding the performance and 
functionality of different structures being operated in the various political systems. For 
the purpose of analysis, the political system is considered to be a state that needs the 
complementary role of the interactions between socio-economic and political 
variables. The belief is that several actors partake in the national political system (the 
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military, political parties, bureaucratic organizations) and their functions as players 
have an effect on each other and as well on the entire society as a whole. A political 
analyst needs to determine the significance of the different actors towards the survival 
of the political system. This is simply done by an in-depth analysis of the functionalism 
and performance of the various players. Any changes from either of the actors affect 
others which invariably would have an effect on the political system. 
 
However, the structural functionalists (like system approach) has a bias towards 
systemic- equilibrium, (stability). This bias nature of the theory is one of its major 
criticisms which make the approach to be qualified as being conservative and non-
sensible to evolutionary change. The radicalism school of thought believe that 
structural functionalism is static and not dynamic to the tune of a radical change of 
evolution. Though the theory of structural functionalism is a relevant framework for 
categorization and comparison, it has been accused of not being dynamic and is too 
static. Thus, the approach is not very useful for predicting change. Meanwhile, the 
issue of change and development is crucial for any political systems. 
 
While responding to criticism, structural functionalists flashed back to the history and 
concluded that political development is imperative when the existing system is unable 
to tackle and cope with the challenges confronting it without further structural 
differentiation or cultural secularization. To Almond (quoted in Olaniyi, 2001:72), 
political development is an ‘increased structural differentiation and increased cultural 
secularization’. By challenges, Gabriel Almond refers to changes in the size, content, 




According to Gabriel Almond (1966), in order to underscore any political system, it is 
pertinent to note the function and role of election, political parties and guerrilla 
movement within the polity. In view of this, the justification for structural 
functionalism in this study revolves around the functionality of different structures that 
rallied round the electoral umpire in discharging the 2015 general elections. Relating 
Gabriel Almond’s view on what a structure do in political system, it becomes 
imperative in this study to actually find out the impact of the electoral body as the main 
structure and other agencies as sub-structures.  It can be stated that the role of electoral 
commission towards sustaining the political system cannot be ignored (Olaniyi, 2001) 
and as stated earlier, the inability of the electoral commission to conduct free and fair 
elections in the previous exercise in Nigeria produced leadership that suffered 
legitimacy crisis. Such is the effect of electoral fraud. The welcoming development 
observed in the administration of the 2015 general elections also deserves recognition. 
The electoral body which is a structure with the mandate to manage electioneering 
system in Nigeria recorded a pass mark in the last elections because other structures 
and sub-structures contributed their quota to the successful electoral exercise. Thus, 
the functions of organizing an election is not necessarily the monopoly of the electoral 
body, other structures like the Security Apparatus, Civil Liberty Organizations (CLO), 
Electoral Observers, and some other relevant stakeholders are involved in attaining 
any significant and credible elections. After all, complementary roles are required for 
different structures towards enhancing solidarity and stability of a political system. 
 
In a similar vein, the partiality question on the part of the electoral commission (INEC) 
which according to Agbor (2007) must be resolved to enable positive cooperation from 
other relevant stakeholders. Narrowing this to the Nigeria’s electoral system, 
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previously, the electoral management body has been accused of impartiality and this 
led to lack of confidence on the sincerity of the commission to conduct credible 
elections. The level of cooperation and collaboration from civil society groups and 
election observers in the past was not cordial due to ‘unfriendly’ approach from the 
electoral body. For instance, during the 2007 general elections, some of the electoral 
observers (local and international) alleged lack of openness in the electoral process 
and that the electoral commission failed to carry them along in its programs and 
guidelines adopted during the conduct of the election (EU Report, 2007). However, 
one of the fundamental departure in the 2015 elections was the level of openness and 
transparency enjoyed by the civil society groups, security agencies, election 
monitoring groups and other relevant stakeholders in carrying everyone along. Several 
workshops and seminars were organised comprising different electoral stakeholders 
which the Independent National Electoral Commission employed to interact, dialogue 
and open up debates on programmes and initiatives to be adopted for the 2015 elections 
(INEC, 2015).  The solidarity and support from all participatory stakeholders during 
the process of the 2015 general elections justifies the theoretical relevance of structural 
functionalism  
 
Finally, although the critique of Structural Functionalism argues that understanding 
political system goes beyond the functionality of a structure that behavioural tendency 
of individuals within the institution is paramount, it is agreed however that individuals 
only work on the specification and jurisdiction of the institutional framework. For the 
establishment of any institution, it must be supported with guidelines and principles 
which are not obtainable at individualistic perspective. Nevertheless, the conduct of 
elections surpasses the monopoly of the electoral body, complementary and supportive 
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roles are required from relevant institutions towards attaining fair elections. For 
instance, the role of the security agencies such as the military that engaged the terrorist 
group (Boko Haram) during the elections remained significant. The police, civil 
defence personnel, civil society groups, National Youth Service Commission (INEC) 
and members of the academia were key supportive players during and after the 
elections. Based on this, the utility of the structural functionalism theory in anchoring 
this study is imperative. 
 
2.3   The Liberal Democratic Theory 
The origin of liberal democratic ideology can be traced to the 17th century when the 
importance and dignity of man came to be recognized, though it became known in the 
Europe during the ‘Age of Enlightenment’ in the 18th century after disruption of 
classical antiquity where the Monarchs were seen as God ordained. But as a result of 
enlightenment intellectuals, the principle of human liberty and equality defeated the 
primordial sentiment of ordained power that restricted man’s freedom.  This evolved 
from the ideas of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704) and John 
Stuart Mill (1806-1873) whom placed emphasis on the principle of social institutions 
for the betterment of man as an individual. Such notion laid the foundation for the 
emergence and development of liberal democratic thinking. Hobbes for instance 
proposed that state was created by the people through a social contract for the 
preservation of man’s personal interests. Locke also made his contribution to the 
theory of liberal democracy by regarding the consent of the people as the basis of 
political power. His contention was that political power was the trust of the people in 
the hands of government. The ideas of Locke were clarified and given practical shape 
by the thinkers of succeeding centuries such that by the 19th century, systematic ideas 
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in the liberal theory of democracy had begun to develop. Bentham and Mills (2000) 
advocate the right to vote in a representative government, thereby laying the theoretical 
foundation of adult franchise. By the 20th century, the liberal theory of democracy was 
strengthened on account of the extension of franchise to women and lowering the age 
of voting to 18years thereby making liberal democracy more egalitarian (Moveh, 
2015).  
 
Liberal democracy is a political ideology as well as a style of governance in which 
representative democracy operates under the principles of liberalism. It is 
characterised by fair, free, and competitive elections. The political philosophy of 
liberalism also believes in multiplicity of parties system, separation of powers, the rule 
of law and human rights. To liberal democracy constitution is required (either codified 
or not) to delineate the powers of government and enshrine the social contract. After a 
period of sustained expansion throughout the 20th century, liberal democracy became 
the predominant political system in the world. To buttress this, Netanel (2000) sees 
liberal democracy as a political system with representative government elected 
through popular majority but with the notion of protecting individuals and minorities’ 
rights. It also entails an autonomous economic principle that is largely free from 
government control 
 
A liberal democracy may take various constitutional forms: it may be a constitutional 
republic (France, India, and the United States) or a constitutional monarchy (Canada, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom). It may also have a presidential system (United 
States), a semi-presidential system, (France, Taiwan), or a parliamentary system 
(United Kingdom). Liberal democracies usually have universal suffrage, granting all 
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adult citizens the right to vote regardless of race, gender or property ownership. The 
liberal democratic constitution defines the democratic character of the state. 
Nevertheless, Larry Diamond believes in constitutional liberalism which makes 
government to be limited by the rule of law. To him, liberal democracy is combination 
of democracy and constitutional liberalism. In view of this, liberal democracy simply 
indicates: 
Regular, free and fair elections but also a strong rule of law, 
buttressed by an independent judiciary and other institutions of 
accountability that check the abuse of power, protect civil and 
political freedom and thereby, help to foster a pluralistic and 
vigorous civil society (Diamond, 2002). 
 
Generally, liberal democracy can be viewed from two phases. Firstly, it restricts 
government scope due to the preservation of individual’s freedom. Secondly, it also 
emphasises an element of popular sovereignty that calls for majority rule. It is on this 
basis that modern theorist on liberal democracy like Larry Diamond outlines eleven 
points as basic intellectual foundations for the Liberal Democratic Theory thus: 
1. Electoral outcomes are uncertain, opposition vote is significant and no group 
that adheres to constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party and 
contest elections. 
2. The military and other democratically unaccountable actors should 
be subordinate to the authority of elected civilian officials. 
3. Citizens have multiple channels for expression and representation such as 
diverse independent associations and movements which they have the freedom 
to form and join. 
4. Individuals have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, 
publication, assembly, demonstration and petition. 
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5. There are alternative sources of information (including independent media to 
which citizens have politically unfettered access). 
6. Executive power is constrained by the autonomy of the government institutions 
such as an independent judiciary, parliament and other mechanisms of 
horizontal accountability. 
7. Civil liberties are effectively protected by an non-
discriminatory, independent judiciary whose decisions are respected and 
enforced by other centres of power. 
8. Citizens are politically equal under the law. 
9. Minority groups are not oppressed. 
10. The rule of law protects citizens from human rights abuses. 
11. The constitution is supreme (Diamond, 2002) 
 
Indeed, the forerunners of liberal democratic theory like Hobbes and Locke did not 
have explicitly substantiated the synergy between elections and democracy, their 
works remain the foundation for subsequent democratic theorists whose write up have 
demonstrated the inextricable link between the quality of the election administrative 
process and the qualification of a regime as democratic. In the submission of Ball 
(1989), the characteristics of liberal democratic theory include the following: more 
than one political party competing for political power, competition is open and not 
secretive, it is based on established and accepted procedures, entry and recruitment to 
positions of political power are relatively open, there are periodic elections based on 




Similarly, Schumpeter (1975 notes that liberal democracy is a political method to 
ensure “a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political – legislative 
and administrative- decisions”. Schumpeter further defines the democratic method as: 
“That institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the peoples vote 
(Schumpeter, 1975:214)”. However, Schumpeter does not stop at this; he goes on to 
clarify that: “the kind of competition for leadership which is to define democracy 
entails a “free competition for a free vote” (Schumpeter 1975: 217). Buttressing this 
view, Przeworski describes democracy as “a regime in which governmental offices are 
filled as a consequence of contested elections” (Przeworski, 1996:43). He suggests 
further that only “if the opposition has the chances of winning and assuming offices is 
a regime democratic” (Przeworski, 1996:46). In his own submission, Huntington 
asserts in the Schumpeterian tradition and defines democracy as: 
A political system that exists to the extent that its most powerful 
collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and 
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes, and 
in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote 
(Huntington, 1991:12). 
 
Huntington also corroborates that liberal democracy also implies the existence of those 
civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble and organize that are necessary 
to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns In fact, Huntington 
summarises that liberal democracy entails ‘selection of most powerful decision makers 
through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for 
votes’. Di Palma also notes that liberal democracy is premised on free and fair suffrage 
in a context of civil liberties, competitive parties, selection of alternative candidates 
 
62 
and the presence of political institutions that serve as regulator by guaranteeing the 
roles of government and opposition (Di Palma, 1990:16).  
 
However, to Robert Dahl, the possibility of achieving the principles of liberal 
democracy is only obtainable in an ideal society. Given this, he suggests polyarchal 
democracy as the realistic form of government. The theoretical postulation of Dahl 
centres on the utopian nature of achieving some democratic claims and to him, 
attaining all attributes of democracy is a mirage. Dahl (1971) identified eight 
conditions required in any democratic arrangement which operationalized the 
definition of democracy2. The difficulty in maximising the eight conditions warrants 
Dahl’s analogy of polyarchy as the best terminology required for any political system. 
To Robert Dahl while analysing American politics, elections create room for political 
competition and distinguish polyarchal democracy from dictatorship. Though it might 
not actually lead to majority rule demanded by maximising modes of democratic 
theory, it widens the scope of political equality by increasing the number and 
preference of various minorities in the polity (Krouse, 1982) 
  
 From the foregoing intellectual postulations on the theory of liberal democracy, the 
significance of election remains the engine room of political transition in any 
democratisation. However, the contention is the level of liberalism in a democratic 
system. This has given room for intellectual debates on application of liberal 
democracy. Notwithstanding, the wave of democracy as noted by Hungtington (1991) 
compels different political systems to embrace electoral democracy, though the 
                                                          
2 The eight conditions have been highlighted in the previous chapter (See the third section of 
literature review of this thesis) 
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application of free and credible elections as entrenched in liberal democratic Theory 
varies from one system to another.  
 
2.4 The Theory of Electoral Authoritarianism (EA)  
Electoral studies have been assessed from different theoretical angles depending on 
the practice in any democratic arrangement. This informed the idea of Electoral 
Authoritarianism (EA) which has perceived by Schedler (2002) reflects an abuse of 
electoral democracy by the state and in most cases questions electoral integrity of the 
society. The theory of Electoral Authoritarianism has observed by scholars (Powell, 
2000, Schedler, 2002, Ghandi & Okar, 2009) is a perverted form of electoral 
democracy. Electoral Authoritarianism is adopted to stabilise authoritarian regime and 
this makes election to become the mechanism for democratisation of authoritarianism 
(Kaya & Bernhard, 2012). 
 
One of the assumptions of the theory is a game plan which allows operation of 
multiparty system and regular elections to be held for chief executive and national 
legislative assembly. However, the conduct and operation of electioneering politics in 
Electoral Authoritarian regime violate the principle of liberal democracy that preaches 
freedom and fairness. This element of Electoral Authoritarianism adopts elections as 
instruments of authoritarian rule rather than ‘instrument of democracy’ (Powell, 2000). 
Corroborating this assumption, Ghandi and Okar (2009) view Electoral 
Authoritarianism as means through which dictators’ hold on to power. Elections are 
introduced not for enhancement of popular preference but for sustainability and further 
perpetuation of Authoritarian rulers to remain in power. In this scenario, authoritarian 
election becomes an instrument that is often adopted by dictators to co-opt elites, party 
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members and the larger groups within the polity (Ghandi & Przeworski, 2006). Given 
this, elections may be used as tool of making effective power sharing among the rank 
and file that control the political atmosphere. In fact elections are used to recycle 
powers among the elites for further dictatorial tendency. This according to Magaloni 
(2008) revolves around power sharing and rotation among the authoritarian rulers with 
certain regularities. 
 
Not only that, the idea of third wave of democratisation which has penetrated the 
developing countries resulted to the modal type of political regime (Wight, 2008). The 
assumption here is that democracy is a political system with some basic features which 
invariably have areas of compatibilities and differences with the operational governing 
styles in Africa, Asia, South America and other parts of new democracies. However, 
this led to paddling of electoral system to pave way for state manipulation which 
created room for electoral authoritarianism. Under electoral authoritarian rule, 
elections are inclusive with application of universal adult suffrage, availability of 
minimal opposition parties, and widespread state dominance and control of the 
electoral system. Overall, elections are subject to state severe manipulation and 
systemic abuse of electoral process which are antithetical to ideal democracy. 
Authoritarian manipulation of election comes in different guises but with the purpose 
of retaining troubling uncertainty of electoral system. Electoral Authoritarian rulers 
devise discriminatory rules that would exclude the oppositions from assessing true 
picture of the electoral arena, infringe on their political and civil liberties, restrict their 
assess to media (particularly state owned media), coerce the opposition by dividing 
their camp, and redistribute votes and seats through fraudulent elections (Schedler, 
2002). The idea of electoral authoritarianism is to have a contradictory democratic 
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procedures and authoritarian regimes. In fact, EA centers on new trend of authoritarian 
rule that embraces routine and periodic elections but desists from electoral integrity 
and credibility. The practice of EA contradicts the fundamental notion of free and 
credible elections as entrenched in democratic tenets.  
 
In the contemporary world politics, a number of electoral authoritarian regimes  spread 
across North Africa and Middle East (Algeria, Egypt, Yemen), Sub Sahara Africa( 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambon, Guinea, Togo, Zambia), South East Asia 
(Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore) and in the former Soviet Union, Armenia, 
Arzerjaban, Kazakhstan, Russia) etc. However, in order to clarify the ambiguity with 
electoral authoritarian regimes, scholars have come up with dimension of EA which 
might be defective democracies, hybrid regimes or new form of authoritarianism 
(Schedler, 2002). With the clarification, countries can be categorised and placed on 
true reflection of where they belong in democratisation wave that becomes an 
embodiment of political arrangements with different applicability. 
 
Defective Democracies: The wave of democratisation particularly in the developing 
countries has led to the emergence of political regimes that try to fulfil minimum 
conditions of electoral democracy. However, despite the adoption of electoral system, 
the elections have always deviated from essential attributes of credible electioneering 
as entrenched in liberal democracy. Given this, scholars have tagged such political 
arrangement and electoral democracy as ‘diminished subtype’ (Colier & Levistky, 
1997). The structural deficits and weaknesses usually associated with elections under 
authoritarian regime denounce the principle of fairness and egalitarianism. To Zakaria 
(2003), defective democracy showcases lack of liberalism in the electoral system and 
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fails to uphold the principle of rule of law. The failure of a state to conduct elections 
that conform to best practices is an abuse of electoral democracy and as noted by 
Diamond (2002), defective democracies are antithetical dimension of liberal 
democracies. 
 
Hybrid Regimes: Any political setting that combines both democratic norms and 
authoritarian attributes has been categorised by scholars to be ‘hybrid regime’. In such 
scenario, the government has two phases of co-opting democratic and authoritarian 
features which makes expert on electoral democracy to confine such system to 
conceptual spectrum of ‘hybrid political system’. It is neither democratic nor 
authoritarian (Schedler, 2002). It is ‘semi- democracy’ (Smith, 2005), ‘semi-
authoritarianism’ (Otawa, 2002), ‘semi-dictatorship’ (Brooker, 2000) and a political 
gray zone could be genuinely adopted in describing hybrid regime which is situated in 
a messy ground of democracy and dictatorship. The combination syndrome of hybrid 
regime makes it to be subjected to scholarly perception of democratic authoritarianism 
and its pitfall invariably exposes substandard electoral regimes. Because such regime 
has elements of democracy and authoritarianism, scholars decided to conceptualise it 
as ‘hybrid regime’ (Sartori, 1984). 
 
New Authoritarianism: The third way of expressing new form of authoritarian 
regime that is believed to have instances of nondemocratic governance is represented 
as ‘New Authoritarianism’ (Schedler, 2002). In this direction, the government is 
characterised to be ‘pseudo-democracy’ (Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1995) or ‘disguised 
dictatorship’ (Brooker, 2000) and ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky & Way, 
2002). However, despite the authoritarian connotation in such polity, Schedler (2002) 
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believes it has some elements of liberal democracy. Though such political system 
projects high tendency of non - democratic practices as a result of non-substance 
effective political participation, it also lay claims to electoral democracy. In essence, 
it is a deception form of democracy which as rightly pinpointed by John Stuart Mill is 
a ‘representative institution without representative government’ (1991:89) 
 
Clearly, electoral authoritarianism is of the claim that many electoral regimes are not 
democratic nor democratizing but plainly authoritarian. Electoral authoritarian regime 
lacks some basic attributes of liberal democracy such as checks and balances, impartial 
judiciary, independent electoral commission and free and fair elections. The 
contention between electoral authoritarian regime and liberal democracy centers on 
credibility of electoral process. However, the authoritarian rule borrows some features 
of democracy by conducting periodic elections to ensure political transition of 
government on tenure basis. Nevertheless, elections under authoritarian regime can be 
qualified with what Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquie tagged as 
‘Elections without Choice’ (1978). But unlike authoritarian regime that believes in 
limited form of pluralism, EA regimes apply a step further and open up political 
society through multiplicity of party politics to allow some element of competition. 
Nevertheless, authoritarian rule tends to subvert the condition and principle of freedom 
democratic elections. In a similar vein, authoritarian elections cannot restrict rulers the 
way democratic elections do. This in the statement of Schedler (2002:6), is that ‘if it 
is not popular preferences but manipulative skills that determine elections outcomes, 
elections will fail to serve as mechanism of accountability’. It is on this note that if 
elections fail to respect popular wish, subversion of the electorates wish is not far-
fetched from electoral authoritarian regime. 
 
68 
2.4.1 The Applications of Electoral Authoritarianism and Liberalism to the 
Nigerian Context 
Beyond theoretical framework, it is important to recognize the electoral authoritarian 
regime wherever it is operated. Though it is easier to conceptualise than identify due 
to its complexity and complicated nature, this makes electoral authoritarianism to 
provoke intense debates about true reflection of countries that operate it. However, as 
rightly noted by Ghandi and Lust –Okar (2009), electoral authoritarian rule varies as 
it allows elections to be held to the offices of national, state and local councils.  But 
the area of divergent opinion among scholars is the context in which electoral 
authoritarian should be narrowed (either national, state or local) down to. As a result 
of the differences, electoral authoritarian regime is relative. It is against this 
background that Electoral Authoritarianism would be explored within the Nigerian 
political context. Several scholars that have examined Nigeria’s electoral framework 
did so using the yardstick of liberal democracy (Sylvester, 2009; Ojo, 2008, Omotola, 
2009; Ajayi, 2015). Of course, Nigeria attempts to adhere to liberal democracy through 
its constitutional and electoral framework but the missing link is her inability to 
comport and conform to the rules of liberalism. In fact, the idea of equality with liberal 
democracy is not the reality in the modern democratization process in Nigeria (Allen 
& Ojakorotu, 2009).  
 
From the antecedent of political transition in Nigeria, elections conducted have 
suffered major setback of fraudulent and flawed exercise due to state control and 
manipulation of the electoral system, denial and subversion of public will through 
intimidation and imposition of parties and candidates (Omotola, 2009, Ibrahim & 
Obiano, 2007). By implication, the series of political instability resulting to military 
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dictatorship and seizure of power led to longer years of authoritarian and autocratic 
regime. With this experience, Nigeria has suffered from military authoritarianism 
which suspended all forms of democratic arrangement. Although the next chapter of 
this thesis gives historical accounts of Nigeria’s political transition, the menace of 
electoral malpractices and violence right from the first republic served as stumbling 
block not only to political stability in the country but also to nurture democratic 
system. The party politics, voting patterns and government structures have always 
exposed the division and disunity among the diverse groups in the country (Bello, 
2015). 
 
Given a prelude to electoral authoritarianism in Nigeria, the last elections under the 
auspices of the colonial authority (1959 elections) aimed at institutionalising an 
indigenous government was an expository of how British undermined democracy 
(Harrold, 2005). The elections were pre-set plan of the British colonial authority and 
total subversion of the election results justified the electoral authoritarian practice that 
set up the Nigeria’s independence. Not surprising that despite the independence of 
1960, the British Queen of England3 was still asserting the authority of ceremonial 
function and she was playing the role of head of state (Osaghae, 2011). As projected 
by the EA theory, dictators adopt election not for the purpose of free contest that will 
guarantee popular wish but to use it as mechanism of holding onto power (Schedler, 
2002; Ghandi & Lust-Okar, 2009).  
 
This was glaring in the conduct of 1959 elections under the British colonial authority 
who did not only subvert the electorates’ wish but also perpetrate its political control 
                                                          
3 The Queen of England was the exercising the power of head of state but later seized to enjoy such 
authority as a result of the republican constitution of 1963. 
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indirectly with the inherited parliamentary system of government. Similarly, despite 
Nigeria’s political independence in 1960, the Queen of England still performed the 
ceremonial role of a constitutional monarchy. From 1960-1963, Elizabeth II was the 
Queen of Nigeria with the power to assent to bills, approve appropriation and exercised 
some other ceremonial functions. However, the retention of constitutional monarchy 
was unpopular in Nigeria and after deliberations among all the political parties, it was 
agreed to change to republican constitution in 1963. This development paved way for 
Nnamdi Azikiwe to be the first President of Nigeria with the constitutional mandate to 
enjoy the privilege of head of state (Chika, 2003).  
 
However, the trend of EA continued as the political elites still exercised control of the 
state machineries to the extent that all the political parties were stronger and dominant 
at their various regions4. The application of EA during the regional power groups was 
domiciled in the coalition of elites to form national government during the 1964 
general elections. The three dominant political parties during the elections (NPC, 
NCNC and AG) were only strong and enjoyed large supports at their regional bases. 
The regional elites through alliances and counter alliances were interested in 
controlling the national government and due to desperation and lack of coordination 
among the key political stakeholders; the elections were flawed resulting the first 
military intervention through bloody coup of 1966. By interpretation, the idea of 
electoral authoritarianism that believes in the application of elections as way of 
managing elites coalition (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005; Ghandi & Lust-Okar, 2009), 
was the interplay during the Nigeria’s first republic particularly the 1964/65 general 
                                                          
4 See chapter three on the political transitions in Nigeria where the issue of regionalisation of political 
parties are discussed. 
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elections5. Since the intervention of military regimes in Nigeria, authoritarianism and 
autocratic arrangement was entrenched absolutely during the dictatorial rule of the 
military administrations.  
 
The subsequent civilian government in 1979 was a product of electoral 
authoritarianism conducted by the military regime which was out rightly abused by the 
state machineries and political elites (Uche, 2003). The 1983 elections failed in all 
ramification and military took over mantle of leadership for a decade before the 
electoral politics of 1993 which invariably was annulled by the military regime. Ever 
since the annulment of 1993 elections, Nigerians were denied general elections till 
1999 which began the current democratic dispensation in the country. In a nutshell, 
the idea of viewing electoral authoritarianism as a nondemocratic election or a kind of 
defective democracy (Schedler, 2002) has been ascertained by the series of 
misconducts in Nigeria’s electoral history (Omotola, 2009, Ojo, 2007). 
 
Since the emergence of the current fourth republic in 1999, elections and democratic 
practices in Nigeria have been more of force than fact (Ajayi, 2015). Admittedly, 
elections have been periodic and the jinx of power transfer from one civilian rule to 
another has been surpassed, Nigerians electorates have been forced to select among 
the anointed candidates nominated by the political elites. In this scenario, candidates 
selected for political offices are chosen by the elites and not by the people. This 
singular factor makes voting in Nigeria to be more of ritual performance than discharge 
of bounden duty.  The several elections conducted in the current dispensation largely 
                                                          
5 Chapter three gives account of how the political elites manipulated the 1964 elections 
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shares characteristics of what Lust-Okar (2006) refers to as ‘preselected candidates in 
a competitive clientelism’. This is well represented by Ajayi (2015:3) thus: 
It can be argued that elections and democratic practice in fourth 
republic characterized by electoral malpractices, political 
intolerance, economic mismanagement, using political office as 
gateway to personal enrichment, political thuggery, lack of intra 
party democracy, insecurity, manipulation of religion and ethnicity 
to achieve selfish political ambitions and other countless 
misdemeanors were order of the day 
 
 
 Although the 2015 general elections have been adjudged credible and fair to a large 
extent (AUEOM, 2015, EUEOM, 2015, TMG, 2015), the overall assessment indicates 
that the elections have elements of both electoral authoritarianism and liberal electoral 
democracy. In the area of candidate selections, party primaries, campaign finance, 
state control and manipulation, the 2015 elections did not free from some of those EA 
tendencies. The candidates selected for political contests ranging from the executive 
and legislative bodies, were mostly products of the political elites or the anointed 
candidates of ‘godfathers’. Politics of godfatherism is pronounced in Nigeria in which 
politicians seeking for elective offices become ‘godsons’ and must be blessed by 
‘godfathers’ in order to emerge as party flag bearers (Omotola, 2007). Borrowing a 
leaf from the Presidential election, none of the prominent candidates did not belong to 
the circle of elites that have been dominating Nigeria’s political atmosphere.  
 
The candidature of President Goodluck Jonathan who was the flag bearer of the 
incumbent party (PDP) in 2015 election was a product of godfatherism. Prior to the 
2015 elections, Goodluck Jonathan came into political limelight during the 2007 
general elections when he was imposed and handpicked by the former President 
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Olusegun Obasanjo as the running mate to late Umar Musa Yar’ Adua. Before his 
emergence as Vice Presidential candidate, Goodluck Jonathan had served as Deputy 
Governor and Governor of Bayelsa State respectively. But he joined the federal might 
due to the blessing he enjoyed as ‘godson’ to the former President Obasanjo, 
his‘godfather’.  
 
Similarly, Muhammadu Buhari that emerged as APC Presidential candidate has been 
in the cycle of Nigeria’s political elites for over three decades. He had ruled the country 
as military head of state from 1983-1985 and served in various political appointments 
under different past regimes. To buttress the idea of EA on elites coalition (Schedler, 
2002, Ghandi & Lust- Okar, 2009) one cannot deny the interplay of elitism during the 
electoral contest of the 2015 elections. The Nigerian electorates were left with option 
of choosing among the available political elites selected by powerful small group of 
people. This trend also cuts across the legislative elections and state gubernatorial 
exercise. The party primaries were offshoot of impositions of candidates as reflected 
in the conduct of primary elections by both ruling and opposition parties. Though the 
rancour within the party primaries of the ruling party (PDP) was rampart in terms of 
abuse of internal democracy (Hakeem, 2015), the opposition parties were not free from 
allegation of candidate substitutions and other related undemocratic way of choosing 
party flag bearers (Chidi, 2015). 
 
The operation of virtually all the political parties in the area of campaign finance 
justified the trend and trait of EA projection. None of the political parties adhered to 
party finance regulation and from the reports of local and international observers, the 
electoral commission failed to regulate the campaign finance of the major dominant 
 
74 
parties (EUEOM, 2015). The state abuse of resources and manipulation of government 
institutions which concurs with EA assumption also surfaced during the Nigeria’s 
2015 elections. The military was coerced by the ruling party and in some states the 
police men were accused of arresting members of opposition parties as a form of 
intimidation. This action and allegation contradicts the claim of liberal democracy but 
showcases more of electoral authoritarian rule (Schedler, 2002). The state owned 
media became a tool for authoritarianism to the extent that programmes anchored were 
of image and personalities assaults. In lieu of this, the trait of electoral authoritarianism 
was glaring during the 2015 general elections. 
 
Furthermore, the application of EA to the Nigeria’s 2015 general elections can also be 
linked to the proposition of Przeworski (2000:28) and Schedler (2002:8) that ‘electoral 
authoritarian regimes just like their democratic counterparts hold multiparty elections 
for presidents and legislative assemblies. Yet, as they subject these processes to 
systematic authoritarian control, they deprive them of their democratic substance’. 
Relating this to the issue of postponement of the 2015 elections from February 14 and 
28 to March 28 and April 11 respectively by the Independent National Electoral 
Commission, analysts and experts regarded such as a political interference which 
raised concern on the independency of the electoral body. Prior to the official 
announcement by INEC, the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) which is 
an appendix of the presidency issued a statement urging the electoral body to postpone 
the elections for six week. According to the National Security Adviser, six weeks is 




This recommendation from the NSA raised serious concern and critics that the 
presidency was trying to use state security apparatus as an excuse to interfere in the 
electoral process. Firstly, some political analysts accused the presidency of undue 
intervention in the activities of INEC based on the fact that security situation in the 
North East has been on ground for years which the government failed to address. The 
question is, why was NSA making such request as election days were closer? The 
Boko Haram insurgency which was the basis of security threat in the North East that 
could not be curtailed by the military since its inception, what was the possibility of 
curbing the activities of the sect (Boko Haram) within six week? These and many more 
were unanswered questions by the National Security Adviser and the Presidency 
(Omotola, 2015).  
 
The controversy on the postponement saga also generated tensions and concerns 
among the international observers which was seen as an attempt to interfere in the 
electoral process. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has the 
statutory power to conduct and postpone election and from the series of engagements 
and interactive sessions with local and international observers, the commission never 
raised any alarm regarding its preparation to conduct elections in the North East. In 
fact, the commission set up polling units for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
in order for the affected electorates not to be disenfranchised (Ibeanu, 2015). In a 
statement issued by the United States Secretary of State, John Kerry, he described the 
postponement of the elections to be a political interference with INEC which according 
to him was ‘unacceptable’. The United States official statement warned the Nigerian 
government not to use security as a pretext for impeding democratic process in the 
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country (Premium, March 5, 2015). Such showcases the authoritarian tendency on the 
part of government using security threat to achieve its selfish interest. 
 
On the other hand, the 2015 general elections embraced some elements of liberalism. 
According to Laakso and Cowen (1997:717), ‘liberal democratic theory and practice 
involves electoral system which includes the possibility of both criticising a 
government’s policies and actions  and offering alternatives, thereby enabling a choice 
to be made between one set of leaders and another and, more generally holding 
politicians accountable for their decisions and actions’. The present political 
configuration in Nigeria was a product of alternative leadership choice which resulted 
to transfer of power to opposition party showcasing new set political leaders. Unlike 
the position of EA that makes election results to be secretive with less accessible to 
public inspection (Schedler, 2002), the Nigeria’s 2015 election results were made to 
declare publicly at every polling units. As part of the INEC guidelines which was 
adopted during the electoral process, counting, sorting and declaration of results were 
done at the presence of electoral observers, voters, security personnel and other 
relevant stakeholders (INEC, 2015). This particular approach was a paradigm shift 
from the previous elections where announcement of results were done at the office of 
the electoral commission. Like the case of 2007 elections, instances were mentioned 
in some polling units visited by election observers, voting did not hold and yet INEC 
declared results. No doubt, the 2015 elections made remarkable progress in the area of 
public inspections (TMG, 2015). 
 
Put differently, the Nigeria’s democratic system though pretends to embrace 
liberalism, its dimension of electoral democracy encompasses both attributes of 
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electoral authoritarianism and liberal democratisation. In view of this, the suitable 
conceptualisation of Nigeria’s democracy is ‘Hybrid Democracy’. By hybrid 
democracy, this thesis identifies the workability of characteristics of authoritarianism 
in some aspects of Nigeria’s electoral democracy which negates the principle of liberal 
democratic system. Also, the elements of liberal democratic practice such as freedom 
of speech, alternation of power and constitutionalism have been entrenched in the 
modern political scenario in Nigeria. The constitutional provision that guarantees press 
freedom is a strong legal framework which was one of the strong holes the opposition 
parties used in exposing the lapses of the ruling party. As highlighted in the executive 
summary of European Union report on Nigeria’s 2015 general election, the passing of 
the Freedom of Information (FOI)6 bill into law widen democratic space in Nigeria 
(EUEOM, 2015). 
 
 Before and after the inception of the fourth republic in Nigeria, the political and 
electoral system have been recycled by the same set of political elites whom based on 
their differences and political affiliations select and impose party flag bearers for 
elective positions (Omotola, 2007). The rotational of elitism in Nigeria’s politics 
concurs with the principle of electoral authoritarianism and from all intent and 
purpose, the political system in the country maintains elitist cycle. On the other hand, 
the alternation of power or electoral turnover as experienced in the 2015 general 
elections conforms to Huntington (1991) cornerstone of successful democratisation. 
Opposition victories in elections according to Lindsberg (2004) is an ‘expression of 
                                                          
66 The Freedom of Information Bill was signed to law by President Goodluck Jonathan in May 2011. 
Since the presidential assent to the bill, the press and the general public have been empowered to share 
information regarding government activities in order to boost openness and accountability. The FOI bill 
has made it possible in Nigeria to make public records and information freely available to the public. It 
gives the populace ‘right to know’ what transpires in the government. 
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freedom and fairness of an election’.  The electoral turnover that resulted to power 
alternation from the ruling party (PDP) that had ruled for sixteen years to the 
opposition party (APC) confirmed Lindsberg electoral freedom. From this analogy, it 
is affirmed that the suitable theoretical framework that captures the practise and 
operation of Nigeria’s electoral democracy is ‘hybrid’ which can be likened to Smith 
(2005) conceptualisation of ‘semi- democracy’. In a nutshell, Nigeria’s democracy is 
neither fully authoritarian nor fully liberalized but ‘hybrid democratic system’ that 
revolves and mingles around both (authoritarianism and liberalism).  The below 








Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy Framework (Developed by the Researcher) 
 
The above diagram says it all and the attributes of both electoral authoritarian rule and 
liberal democracy capture the Nigerian scenario. Despite the improvement in the 2015 
general elections, pockets of state manipulation, suppression of opposition, outright 
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In contrast, the level of freedom of expression enjoyed by the opposition played 
significant role to the electoral turnover in the 2015 general elections. By allowing the 
popular wish of the electorates to prevail, the principle of majority rule was respected 
by the political stakeholders. 
 
However, there is absolute application of EA principles at the micro politics in Nigeria. 
The emasculation and subversion of people rights have been traced to state outright 
control of the electoral process at local level (Aliyu, 2004). Local government is the 
third tier of government established for rural transformation and development 
(Okechukwu & Obinna, 2013), and the constitution stipulates that State Independent 
Electoral Commission (SIEC) has the mandate to conduct local government elections. 
Given this, every state is responsible for its local government elections. With this, local 
governments in Nigeria lack autonomy paving way for the state executive Governors 
to manipulate, control and direct their affairs.  
 
Despite the constitutional provision that recognises local governments as third tier, the 
local administrations have not been able to extricate themselves from the ‘apron string’ 
of state and federal government (Osaghae, 2006). Since the inception of federalism in 
Nigeria particularly with the provision of 1979 constitution that changed the political 
structures of the country from parliamentary to presidential system, local government 
elections have remained avenue for state Governors to install their political stalwarts. 
Instances are abound in most of the local government elections conducted, the 
pendulum has always been shifted to the ruling party controlling the state government. 
For instance, in Kano and Lagos that are the most populated states with large numbers 
of local governments in Nigeria, elections to the offices of local government chairmen 
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and wards councillors have always been landslide victory in favour of the party 
governing the respective states. Even in a scenario where opposition managed to win, 
the state uses its machinery to upturn such victory (Vanguard, February 4, 2013). 
 
One of the factors hindering local government autonomy is the constitutional power 
that allows the state governors to operate grassroots governments with non - elected 
officials (Nkwocha, 2009). This singular reason has been abused by the state governors 
whom in most cases dissolved local government councils either the members were 
elected or selected. The case of Imo state remains a good example when Governor 
Rochas Okorocha took over power from the former governor of the state, Ikedi 
Ohakim, in 2011. Okorocha won on the platform of All Progressive Grand Alliance 
(APGA) when most of the serving local government chairmen and wards councillors 
were members of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Immediately Okorocha 
assumed office, he dissolved all the local government councils and imposed his party 
loyalists and members as caretakers. This has always been the trend in situations 
whereby another party takes over gubernatorial seat of state government. For the 
governors to capture local government and consolidate power at grassroots levels, 
there cronies would be installed as chairmen and councillors of local councils. 
Opposition parties at local governments have always been at the mercy of the state 
governors who dictate for elected officials and control the state electoral commissions 
(Okechukwu & Obinna, 2013). 
 
By and large, to understand the Nigeria’s political context, the issue of election can be 
viewed from divergent perception making the country’s electoral democracy to be 
complicated. As stated in the political transition of Nigeria, the military authoritarian 
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regime governed through decrees and constitutions became suspended. But various 
elections conducted under the auspices of military or civilian government suffered 
from legitimacy crisis which by implication caused political instability in the country 
(Ojo, 2007). However, since the current democratic trend that began in 1999, series of 
elections have been conducted which generated both positive and negative remarks. 
But from general overview and assessment of Nigeria’s electoral democracy, this 
thesis is of the view that the country democratisation shares sentiment of electoral 
authoritarian rule and liberal electoral system and by interpretation Nigeria’s 
democracy is hybrid in nature. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The issue of democratic election is a complex phenomenon which has been captured 
by scholars and analysts from divergent theoretical postulations. However, Nigeria’s 
democracy has witnessed series of configurations from parliamentary system to 
presidential political arrangement. In fact, the democratisation process has suffered 
major setback due to military incursions which contributed largely to political 
instability in the country. Nevertheless, the return of democracy in 1999 revived 
electoral politics in Nigeria and since then, five elections have been conducted but 
none has been adjudged credible as the 2015 elections.  Despite the improvement in 
the electoral process, Nigeria still recorded pockets of violence, intimidation, 
malpractices, buying and selling of votes and inflation of election results. These 
motivated the central argument of this study to examine the impact of election 
administration on the legitimacy of hybrid democracy in Nigeria. The adoption of 
structural functionalism, liberal democratic theory and electoral authoritarianism 
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boosted the theoretical base of the study. The former explores the collaborative and 
cooperation required in election administration which could not be monopolistic affair. 
 
However, the Liberal Democratic Theory and Electoral Authoritarianism theory are 
adopted for an overall assessment of Nigeria’s electoral democracy. The elements and 
assumptions of electoral authoritarianism have always been surfacing in series of 
elections conducted in Nigeria though in a different magnitude. This justifies its trend 
in the Nigerian context. Despite that, the country has been able to boost its democratic 
stance through regular elections and application of constitutional provision particularly 
on the issue of tenure. No elected leaders have ever remained in power beyond the 
constitutional time frame. The freedom of speech as guarantees in the country’s legal 
framework has also been improved coupled with party politics that paved way for 
opposition emergence as governing party. With the electoral turnover, Nigeria is on 
the path to democratic consolidation of Samuel P. Hungtington, though yet to 
experience the second turnover. The combination of both electoral authoritarianism 
and liberal democratic principles in the Nigeria context warrants the hybrid democratic 
politics in Nigeria which this thesis concurs to as the suitable theory for the country 
electoral democracy.   














This chapter captures political transitions and electioneering politics since the 
formation of Nigeria in 1914. The history of electoral politics in the country could be 
traced to the colonial era when different political structures were institutionalised. 
Though elective principles were adopted in appointing representatives to regional and 
central government under colonial rule, Nigerians were given limited opportunities to 
participate in the political arrangement of their country. This makes it significance in 
this chapter to discuss the historical overview of electoral politics in Nigeria which has 
been categorised into two caption namely; pre-independence and post-independence 
era. In doing this, the pre- independence period beginning from the amalgamation of 
1914 under the leadership of Lord Lugard up to the Macpherson period of 1952, 
coupled with the 1957 London conference covers the political history of Nigeria before 
her independence in 1960.  
 
On the other hand, the post- independence period witnessed the first ever elections 
conducted and supervised by Nigerians in 1964. Unfortunately, the elections were 
massively rigged and selfish interests of the acclaimed nationalists became prioritised 
which made the exercise to be similar to that of autocratic practise under colonialism. 
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The attributes of irregularities and malpractices which overshadowed the 1964 
elections served as an excuse for the first military coup in 1966. The long years of 
military interventions that denied and truncated democratisation process in Nigeria is 
adequately explored in this section. In view of this, transitional politics in Nigeria can 
be understood and how military rules last longer than democratic system before the 
present fourth republic in the country. In essence, apart from the 1964 elections which 
started on a wrong note, the 1979 elections that marked the beginning of second 
republic and the 1983 elections resulted to another military coup de’ ta  that collapsed 
the republic. Nigerians had to wait for a decade before the 1993 elections were 
administered under the auspices of Babangida’s military regime.  
 
Though the elections were applauded by observers, the inconclusiveness process of 
the elections as a result of annulment by the military president resulted to the aborted 
third republic having witnessed swearing in of civilian state governors and members 
of the legislators at both state and national levels. Since the annulment of the 1993 
elections and the pressure mounted on the Babangida’s regime to step aside, Nigeria 
was ruled by unconstitutional interim administration headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan 
that could not survive for long and the hijacking of mantle of leadership by another 
military general (Sani Abacha). The demise of Sani Abacha while in power created a 
vacuum for General Abubakar to fill and Nigeria witnessed the shortest political 
transition under the former (1998-1999). In a nutshell, the 1999 elections ushered in 
Nigeria back to the comity of democracies and began the journey to the fourth republic 




To cap it all, this chapter also contains the management and process adopted by the 
past electoral bodies ranging from the Electoral Commission of Nigeria that conducted 
the 1959 elections, the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) that managed the 
1964/65 general elections before it was dissolved as a result of military intervention. 
The Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) constituted by the military regime of 
Obasanjo in 1978 conducted the 1979 and 1983 general elections respectively. The 
National Electoral Commission (NEC) was established by the Babangida regime in 
1987 and the commission conducted the annulled 1992 Presidential election. In 1994, 
another electoral body was set up by the Abacha military regime named National 
Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) before the present Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) established in 1998 by the Abdulsalam administration. 
The first election under the auspices of INEC was the 1999 general elections that 
ushered in Nigeria into the present fourth republic. Since its establishment in 1998, 
INEC remains the longest serving electoral commission that has ever conducted series 
of general elections from 1999 till date.  
 
3.2  The Formation of Nigerian State and the Evolution of Elections (1914-
1959) 
The evolution and formation of Nigerian state as an entity is traceable to the 
amalgamation of 1914 when the Northern Protectorate and the Colony and Southern 
Protectorate were merged to become a country. Before the merger, the present Nigeria 
was not a united country. Like most contemporary African states, Nigeria was formed 
through the expedient action of the British colonial administration (Osaghae, 2011). 
Many of the modern African socio-economic and political integration began during 
the colonialism. Though African states were invaded by different colonies, the Berlin 
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conference of 1884-1885 formalised the partitioning of the continent by the 
Europeans7.  The decision of the British colonial authorities to amalgamate Northern 
and Southern Protectorates whose people were not having much in common was seen 
to be false and ill-fated marriage (Alaba, 2014; Eric, 2016). Though it was deliberately 
done to ease colonial rule, the people antecedents had little in common and this created 
commotion among divergent ethnic groups. The 1914 amalgamation was championed 
by the British authority under the leadership of Governor Fredrick Lord Lugard. The 
aim of the amalgamation was achieved by the colonial masters because it made the 
political subjugation and economic exploitation of the land easier while the affected 
people remained divisive. 
 
However, before the amalgamation of 1914, the British colonial administration 
introduced the policy of indirect rule in Nigeria. The system of indirect rule was 
necessitated due to the pluralistic nature of the societies.  By indirect rule, the 
traditional rulers were used by the colonial masters to control the entire colonies. But 
with the formation of Nigerian state, the British colonial authority initiated elective 
assemblies which allowed political parties to send representatives for effective 
administrative system. The British Western Parliamentary style of government was 
constitutionally installed. The administrative branch was divided to legislative and 
executive council. The former legislated while the latter played the role of advisory 
council. This led to the establishment of a small legislative council and out of the four 
unofficial members, two were Africans while all the official members were British 
(Utuk, 1975). The council had the legislative power to make laws for the colony of 
                                                          
7 The Berlin Conference was organised to settle the crisis among the European invaders of African 
continent and states were divided along the convention of the conference. Nigeria remained under 
British colony while some other neighbouring states were allocated to the French, Portuguese, and 
Belgium colonial masters respectively. 
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Lagos. The Governor- General controlled the government with the advice from the 
executive council. In fact, the style of governance during this period was parliamentary 
system and the Governor General could be likened to the modern Prime Minister. Also, 
there was court system in place that placed Supreme Court as the highest body of 
litigation in the country. 
 
By 1919, Sir Hugh Clifford replaced Lord Lugard as the Governor General. Before 
this, there was serious agitation by some Nigerians calling for the removal of Lugard 
whose administrative leadership did not favour the native. No single African 
Representative in the Executive Council and there was need for restructuring and re-
composition of membership of the Legislative Council.  The Nigerian Council under 
Lugard was considered inadequate and a mere debating forum that could not decisively 
deliberated on pressing matters affecting the people. There were pressures and several 
calls for change of leadership and constitutions. In 1922, Clifford introduced a new 
constitution. With this, the Nigerian Council was abolished and replaced with the 
Legislative Council that would be more effective. The Council had the power to make 
laws and legislate several matters. For instance, the Legislative Council was 
empowered to make laws for the Colony of Lagos, Western and Eastern Provinces. 
For the Colony and Southern Protectorate, all powers of the Council were retained 
except matters related to finance in the Northern territory. The Governor General 
retained the power to legislate other matters affecting the Northern territory. In the 
Legislative Council, there were thirty-one officials and twenty-one unofficial 
members. Ten Nigerians were part of the unofficial members and no Nigerian 




Despite the application of elective principle in the Clifford Constitution of 1922, it was 
restrictive and failed to embrace the universal adult suffrage. Rather, the condition was 
based on income and which only focused on the male adults alone. As stipulated in the 
electoral regulation, only adult male with evidence of having minimum of 100 pounds 
would be allowed to vote. This stringent regulation, refrained majority from 
participating in the voting which compounded the problem of marginalisation of 
Africans on their territory (Okafor, 1981). Apart from this, the right of voters was also 
restricted with the stipulated condition of 10 pound for any candidate to be nominated. 
Considering the financial status of most Nigerians in this period, the level of 
disenfranchisement became high and further strengthen abuse of power by the colonial 
authority.  
 
Nevertheless, the introduction and application of elective principle championed by the 
Clifford Constitution of 1922 did not only awaken the formation of political parties by 
Nigerians, it also enhance political process in the country. This argument as puts 
forward by Uche (2003), was noticed in the 1923 elections into the Legislative Council 
precipitated the establishment of the first indigenous political party known as the 
Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). The party was formed by Herbert 
Macaulay and other fellow leading nationalists in the country as at the time. The party 
was popular particularly within Lagos and maintained its monopoly in the Lagos 
Legislative Council by sweeping all positions in the axis for more than a decade. 
Though Webster (1975) describes the NNDP as a small cliques that could not penetrate 
beyond Lagos, the party contributed to the political consciousness of the people within 




Similarly, the Lagos Youth Movement was formed to check the monopoly of NNDP 
in 1933 and later renamed Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) in 1936. The agitation 
and aim of the NYM among others, was the introduction of universal adult suffrage 
pegging the voting age to 21. The party was able to break the monopoly of NNDP in 
Lagos politics and between 1938 and 1941, NYM won all elections for the Lagos 
Legislative Council. The popularity and strength of the party enhanced widening of 
political space in the region. However, the NYM later collapsed like a pack of cards 
due to the internal crisis among elites of the political party. The crisis in the party 
which had ethnicity and regionalisation inclination contributed to the uprising of 
ethno-religious politics in Nigeria (Uche, 2003). 
 
In 1947, another election was conducted under Arthur Richards Constitution. Richards 
replaced Clifford as Governor – General of the country and he introduced for the first 
time a Central Legislative body for the entire country. The total number of the 
members of the Central legislature was 24, out of which 4 representatives were elected 
from Lagos and 1 from Calabar. The rest were appointed or nominated either by the 
colonial authorities or the regional local authorities.  The power of appointing 
members allotted to the traditional rulers and regional local authorities could be seen 
as the major source of parochial and regional politics. The colonial leaders were 
hobnobbing with the traditional and native rulers whom seized the opportunity to 
appoint their cronies into the Central Legislative body. Not only that, the formation of 
political parties as mentioned earlier became conscious of ethno religious and regional 
sentiments. This led to the manifestation of ethnic hatred and prejudice which later 
dominated the political terrain of electoral politics in Nigeria (Nnoli, 1980, Uche, 
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2003). As rightly noted by Osaghae (2011), this idea was about British imperialistic 
policy of divide and rule properly entrenched in their application of Indirect Rule. 
 
Another prominent characteristic of the electoral system in Nigeria during this period 
was the limitation faced by the electorates and the elected African members. Most of 
the representatives from the native were unofficial members who could not fulfil the 
mind-sets of their people. The British that dominated the official membership had a 
bloc votes against the unofficial and limited elected African members. Indeed, the 
helplessness scenario in which the unofficial Africans found themselves led to series 
of complain which daily press captured thus: 
We have heard from the daily press that the eyes of Nigeria are on 
the unofficial members but we have just had an instance of how 
perfectly hopeless it is, and how perfectly helpless unofficial 
members are, when it is a question of our coming up against the 
official vote (quoted in Uche, 2003: 50) 
 
 
The frustration was growing and the intention of the British authority that introduced 
elective principle became known to the nationalists. The elective principle did not have 
significant positive effect for the Nigerian people and decisions taken by the 
government were British orientated policies which practically favoured them more 
than the native populace. For instance, when the African members in the parliament 
complained about their inability to have access to the financial estimates, they were 
simply told not be bothered by the Chief Secretary (Webster, 1975). With this and 
many more, it was glaring that the British colonial authorities did not have intention 
of carrying the African representatives along in key issues affecting the people. This 
also triggered pressures from Nigerian nationals to keep pressurizing the colonial 
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masters for an inclusive government that could guarantee the achievement of the 
people’s interest. 
 
The replacement of Richards by Macpherson in 1951 led to another constitutional 
development known as Macpherson Constitution. Though the government was 
promulgated 29 June 1951, the formal opening of its constitution started 11 March, 
1952. Since then, it was called Macpherson Constitution of 1922.  There was review 
of the electoral laws during the Macpherson era particularly on restrictions of voting 
that took place under the Richards constitution especially at the regional levels.  In 
other words, there were different electoral laws introduced by the Macpherson 
constitution. The division of the country into three regions for administrative purpose 
had now become the constituents of the federation. Basically, Macpherson constitution 
created House of Representatives that acted as the central legislative body with 136 
members and the Governor. The 136 members of the Central Legislative were chosen 
via the Electoral College system. The allocation of seats to the various regions was 
allotted thus: Northern Region- 69, Eastern Region, 28, Western Regions 34, while 5 
members were from Cameroon8. However, it should be noted here that Macpherson 
constitution did not formerly recognise political parties, but the leaders among 
Africans asserted themselves in their respective regions and ensured that party politics 
was not abolished. The allocation of seats to the Nigerian representatives were done 
through party affiliation. Though this led to imbroglio between the nationalists and the 
colonial government of Macpherson, the political parties became stronger in their 
respective regions (Uche, 2003). 
                                                          
8 During colonial period in Nigeria, Southern parts of the Cameroon were merged with Nigeria and 
consideration was given to them in electing representative to the legislative body. But later on, the 
region formerly joined Cameroon and cut off from Nigeria. The genesis of border dispute between the 
two countries could be linked to colonial policy. 
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Apart from the House of Representatives that played legislative role in the country, 
Macpherson constitution also created a Central Executive Council popularly referred 
to as Council of Ministers. The composition of the council was made up of the 
Governor, 6 official members and 12 Nigerian ministers (4 from each region). None 
of the ministers was given portfolio and their appointment was done by the Governor 
on recommendation form the three regions. Elections were conducted directly and 
indirectly. The direct election allowed the people to vote though with stringent 
conditions. For instance, only the male adult tax payers were allowed to vote in the 
North, whereas both male and female voted in the Eastern and Western region 
respectively. The central legislation had the constitutional mandate to make laws for 
the entire country while the regional legislation was subjected to the ratification of the 
House of representative. That is, the central legislation had the power to override the 
regional legislative bodies   
 
Like the previous constitutions, Macpherson constitution had its merit and demerits. 
One of the beauty of the Macpherson constitution was the provision of offices of the 
ministers. It also introduced revenue allocation formula for all the regions and the 
constitution has a nationalistic outlook. However, the constitution suffered setback in 
1953 due to clashes of regional legislation and central legislation. There was internal 
crisis within the political parties in almost at the three regions. In the Eastern region, 
the failure to elect Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe of the NCNC to the House of Representative 
generated a lot of tension and crisis. Secondly, the motion by Anthony Enahoro in the 
House of Representative requesting for Nigeria independence which was countered by 
the Northern legislators also contributed to the fall of Macpherson constitution. 
Enahoro, a representative from the Western Region, moved a motion on the floor of 
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the central legislative body in 1953 that Nigeria should be granted independence in 
1956. This motion was not supported by the Northerners on the grounds that Nigeria 
was not ripped enough for the proposed year and called for the change of date. In the 
same year, crisis erupted in Kano, Northern part of Nigeria, as a result of political 
differences. All these led to the collapse of Macpherson constitution and another 
government was constituted in 1954 (Okafor, 1981). 
 
The Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 therefore came on board to clean up the mess of 
the Macpherson era. The Lyttleton constitution was enacted in 1954 and introduced 
federal legislative body consisting of 184 members whose were elected directly and 
independently of regional assemblies. In fact, the evolution of federalism in Nigeria 
has been traced to Lyttleton Constitution (Ojo, 2006). Unlike the Macpherson 
constitution, Lyttleton council of ministers were reduced. The number of appointees 
were cut to three each from the three regions and one minister picked from the 
Southern Cameroon. It also retained the bicameral legislative system for both North 
and West while the East operated unicameral. The party leader in each of the regions 
became Premier. This paved way for Obafemi Awolowo of Action Group (AG) to 
become the Premier of Western Region, Ahmadu Bello of NPC as the Premier of 
Northern Region while Nnamdi Azikiwe of NCNC was the Premier of Eastern Region. 
It should be noted as well, that these various political parties where stronger in their 
respective regions which testifies to the initial argument that party politics in Nigeria 
was dominated with regional sentiment. 
 
However, the most interesting aspect of the Lyttleton constitution was its provision 
that paved way for Nigeria’s independence in 1960. The appointed ministers were 
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given portfolio with much responsibilities and the regional legislatures enjoyed 
autonomous power. By giving greater responsibilities to regional governments, 
Lyttleton recognized the diverse nature of Nigeria’s society and wanted all spheres to 
be autonomous. With this, it introduced separation of powers between the regional and 
central governments. The appointment of premiers in each of the zone enhanced socio-
economic development at the various regional settings. In fact, the Lyttleton 
constitution widen political space in the country and Nigerians were given more 
opportunities to participate in socio-economic and political matters affecting the 
people. Nevertheless, the bicameral system of Lyttleton constitution failed to make 
provision for second chamber at the central legislative body.  
 
The burden was placed much on the House of representative which could not handle 
all matters arising due to its limitation of membership. Also, the constitution only 
created post of Premier at regional level but could not create position of Prime 
Minister. Despite the fact that Lyttleton recognised the regional setting, the 
constitution also reserved veto power for the Governor General who utilised this for 
selfish British colonial interest. There was also lack of unified electoral system. For 
instance, indirect voting pattern was adopted in the North with the use of Electoral 
College. It also pegged voting of adults to male who have satisfied tax condition 
particularly in the Western region. So, it was a staggered electoral system and this 
arrangement questioned the sincerity of the British electoral policy in Nigeria. 
 
During the 1954 elections to the central legislative body, the party affiliation of 
candidates elected according to regions showcased the division in the political terrain 
as most of the winners’ belonged to regional stronghold of their parties. No political 
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party that could be singled out with national outlook. In the East, the NCNC won 34 
seats out of the 42 allocated to the region. In the North, out of the 92 seats, the NPC 
won 83 while in the West, AG won 18 out of the 42 seats and NCNC claimed 22. From 
the forgoing, except the dimension in the West, the politics of regionalisation and 
ethnicity was generally entrenched (Uche, 2003, Osaghae, 2011). The defeat of AG by 
the NCNC was an exception though scholars and analysts have attributed it to the 
nature of urbanization and volatile trend of the Western political environment. To 
Nnoli (2006), there was a policy summersault regarding initial free education 
embarked on by the Western region but which could not be sustained due to financial 
problems. This made the regional government to introduce a levy of 1.50 pounds per 
tax payer which the people frown at and perhaps affected the fortune of AG in the 
1954 general elections. 
 
3.3 The 1959 General Elections and Nigeria’s Political Independence  
The 1959 general elections were the last under the auspices and supervision of the 
British colonial authorities. The primary target of the elections was to institutionalise 
a government that would be controlled by the indigenous authority. This was a 
followed up to the 1957 conference held in London where the issue of self- government 
was deliberated. Parts of the agreement reached at the conference was the need to 
create a federal senate with 12 members from each geo-political zones.  It was also 
agreed that the number of members in the House of Representative should be increased 
to 312 elected members by universal adult suffrage in the East and West, and male 
adult suffrage in the North. However, the greatest achievement of the conference was 
the resolution on the creation of the office of the Prime Minister. The last constitutional 
conference was held in 1958 which the deliberations were centred on review of the 
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actual date for political independence and issue of additional regions. At this point, 
October 1, 1960, was chosen as the inaugural day for transfer of power to indigenous 
government (David, 1999). 
 
Prior to the elections, the first electoral commission in the history of Nigeria was 
established by the British authority in 1959. The electoral body known as the Electoral 
Commission of Nigeria (ECN) was assigned the responsibility of conducting the 1959 
general elections. However, the electoral commission was not properly constituted as 
the British colonial authority used it to perpetuate its political subjugation in the 
country (Barry, 2007). For instance, there was legal restriction that did not allow 
women in the Northern region to vote9. With the introduction of limited adult suffrage, 
it was glaring that British imperialistic tendency dominated the electoral process in 
Nigeria. The operation of the electoral commission was actually a continuation of 
British autocratic and dictatorial policies. It was therefore not surprising that the 
Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) was tailored to impose preferred candidates 
of the British authority ahead of Nigeria’s independence (Babalola, 2013). Table 3.1 
gives proper breakdown of the history of electoral umpires in Nigeria. 
Table 3.1 
 Election Management Bodies in Nigeria  
S/No Name of Election Management Body (EMB) Period of Existence 
1. Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) 1959-1964 
2. Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) 1964-1966 
3. Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) 1979-1983 
4. National Electoral Commission (NEC) 1987-1993 
5. National Electoral Commission of Nigeria 
(NECON) 
1995-1998 
6. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) 1998-date 
                                                          
9 Women in the Northern region of Nigeria were legally disqualified from voting until 1977 electoral 
decree that granted them suffrage. However, in other regions of the country, there was application of 
universal adult suffrage in 1958 which allowed men and women to partake in the 1959 general 
elections that led to Nigeria’s independence of 1960.  
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The political campaign took another dimension due to the fact that none of the political 
parties had national spread, the concern was which party would get the required 50 
percent to control the central government. Given this, the NCNC and AG, did intensive 
campaign trying to penetrate beyond their respective regions. However, the NPC 
confined its rigorous campaign to the Northern area believing that if it could win all 
seats within its region, there was high tendency of the party controlling the national 
government. Interestingly, this permutation worked for the NPC as it won 134 seats at 
the Federal House of Representative against its rivals, NCNC and AG that claimed 89 
and 73 seats respectively. The remaining 16 seats were won by independent 
candidates. Although some other smaller parties participated and alliances were 
formed, none could outsmart the formidable forces of the Northern region which 
maintained highest population in the overall number of people in the country (Uche, 
2003, Nnoli, 2006,). This also reflected the centrality of regional sentiment in Nigeria’s 
electoral politics. 
 
The NPC got the majority seats and the colonial Governor, Sir James Robertson, 
handed over mantle of leadership to the party to form the central government. The 
inability of the NPC to clearly have overall majority necessitated its alliance with the 
NCNC to form the national government. This placed AG as the official opposition 
political party in the federal House of Representative. As rightly noted by David 
(1999), the coalition government of NPC and NCNC was a child of necessity inspired 
by their mutual dislike for the AG. The loggerhead between AG and NCNC had been 
established prior to the 1959 elections. NPC capitalised on this and preferred to form 
a coalition government with the NCNC. Thus, the post -independence indigenous 
government started on sectional calculation and self- serving interest. The Prime 
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Minister was Tafawa Balewa, a Northerner, and he controlled the parliament. Though 
the Queen of England was still playing ceremonial executive role after the 1960 
independence, she seized to be when the country drafted another constitution in 1963 
paving way for Nnamdi Azikiiwe of NCNC to be the President. The government was 
controlled by Tafawa Balewa as the parliamentary constitution confers on Prime 
Minister as obtainable in Britain. 
 
However, as predicted by scholars and analysts, the coalition government of NPC and 
NCNC began to have a crack which led to the crisis between the two factions. Firstly, 
as noted earlier, the NPC maintained majority seats and in policy formulation, the 
Northerners usually have their ways. The publication of Nigeria’s 1962-68 
Development Plan concentrated more projects to the North than any other region. This 
development was not embraced by the NCNC who believed such would lead to 
marginalisation of its region and the people. Not only that, the NCNC began to 
restrategise on its initial cooperation and coalition. However, the AG was having 
internal clashes between the leader of the party, Obafemi Awolowo and Chief S.L. 
Akintola. The latter hobnobbed with the NPC. Chief Akintola favoured the AG to join 
the coalition government in order to enjoy federal patronage and this did not go down 
well with Awolowo and other loyalists (David, 1999). Things became uncontrollable 
when a factional leader of AG petitioned the regional Governor to remove Akintola as 
the Premier and countered argument emerging from Akintola loyalists in the Western 
Regional Assembly. Seizing this opportunity, the federal government declared a state 
of emergency in the West and proceeded to marginalise the region. The federal 
government as part of its move to disorganise the AG, a panel of inquiry known as 
Coker Commission was set up in July 1962 to probe the finance of AG.  
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The outcome of the probe indicted Awolowo and thirty other prominent members of 
financial misappropriation which resulted to treasury charges and were sent to ten 
years imprisonment. By January 1963, Akintola was reinstated as the Premier of 
Western Region. This was a political configuration that paved way for NPC leaders to 
have some influence in the Western region. Though the NCNC coupled with the 
creation of new mid- Western region, wanted to explore and hijack half of the South, 
the Akintola factor and his cooperation with the NPC led government dismantle the 
NCNC political calculation (Uche, 2003). The NCNC was unable to penetrate further 
and the absence of Awolowo created a better political structure for Akintola who 
favoured the NPC government. In fact, some members of the parliament who won their 
seats under the platform of AG later defected to the ruling party, NPC. The major 
beneficiary of the crackdown in the AG was the NPC. Based on this, the NPC did not 
bother to initiate peace move with NCNC due to its penetration of the divided AG. All 
these scenario and dichotomy was the political atmosphere ahead of the 1964/65 
general elections which needed to be conducted absolutely by Nigerians without the 
supervision of the British. The electoral commission released timetable and December 
30, 1964 was fixed for the House of Representative that would determine the control 
of the national government.  
 
The political campaigns exposed the divisionary tendency in the country amidst ethno 
religious differences and the political parties that determined the 1959 elections still 
maintained their regionalisation and formation of alliances and coalitions were 
witnessed with the emergence of some political parties. What necessitated this was the 
calculation and permutation by the political stakeholders on the party and individuals 
that would constitute the national government. Also, the failure of the coalition 
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between NPC and NCNC was key to the political configuration of the proposed 
1964/65 general elections.   
  
3.4 The 1964 General Elections and the Collapse of Nigeria’s First Republic 
The prelude to the 1964 general elections was the census crisis of 1962 and 1963. The 
NCNC and all Southern political parties believed the proposed census presented 
opportunity to actually know the real figure and population of not only the country but 
the regional strength. After all, the domination of the North was basically on numerical 
strength as claimed by the colonial authorities.  The calculation was that if the census 
figure favoured the South, definitely the permanent dominant from the North would 
be removed. This made the 1962 census to become a political issue as the South was 
suspicious of the Northern population which might have been inflated. Not only that, 
revenue allocation among regions was anchored on population size placing the North 
ahead of others by enjoying larger portion. Resource distribution generally seemed to 
be favouring the Northern region (Osaghae, 2011). During the head counts, reports 
from the field triggered tension due to the accusation that livestock were counted in 
some parts of the North as human population. 
 
 The result released was rejected by the South whom accused the North of politicising 
the population exercise. The outright rejection of the result led to the conduct of fresh 
census in 1963 which the outcome still placed the North over other regions (See Table 
3.2). The NCNC once again rejected the new figures but failed to get support from 
other neighbouring regions in the South. Other regions, West and Mid-West, 
reluctantly accepted the figure which according to the premiers of these two regions 
was done ‘for the sake of national unity’, though the NPC led government had issued 
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a threat of withdrawing federal aid to any non-compliance region (Uche, 2003, 
Osaghae, 2011). 
 
Table 3.2  
Figures of 1962 and 1963 Census 
Region 1962 1963 
North 29,758,875 29,777,986 
East 12,394,462 12,388,646 
West 10,265,846 10,278,500 
Mid-West 2,535,839 2,533,337 
Lagos 665,246 675,352 
Total 55,620,268 55,653,821 
Source Osaghae, 2011. 
 
It was against this background that the 1964 elections were conducted. It is pertinent 
to note here that all the indigenous political gladiators, despite their regional affiliation, 
struggled to free Nigeria from the shackle of colonialism which yielded positive result 
by granting independence to the country on October 1, 1960.  However, the lesson 
learnt by Nigerians due to colonial political subjugation and economic exploitation 
was not expected to resurface under indigenous government but reverse was the case. 
Regarding the 1964 elections that was ever administered by Nigerians, it was a flaw 
and scam electoral conduct. Most of the political parties that participated at the 
parliamentary elections were products of alliances and coalition (Saka & Solomon, 
2015). The party arrangement was more on regional security (Larry, 1972) and none 
of the political parties had national outlook. Based on regionalisation of party system, 
elections conducted for national representativeness were characterised with ethnic 
consciousness and the voting patterns reflected such sentiment. Unlike what was 
obtainable in 1959 elections that enhanced multiparty structure, most of the political 
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parties had to form alliance during the general elections of 1964 which enhanced the 
emergence of two political parties (NNA and UPGA).  
 
The alliances run thus:  the Nigerian National Alliance was a product of coalition of 
the Northern People’s Congress, the Midwest Democratic Front, the Niger Delta 
Congress, the Republican Party, the Lagos State United Front, the Nigerian National 
Democratic Party and the Dynamic Party. On the other hand, the United Progressive 
Grand Alliance was an amalgamation of the National Council of Nigeria and 
Cameroon, the Northern Progressive Front, the Action Congress, the Northern 
Elements Progressive Union, the Kano People’s Party, the Zamfara Commoners and 
the United Middle Belt Congress. However, the elections generally were marred with 
violence and manipulations (Nohlen & Thibaut, 1999)  
 
Prior to the 1964 elections, the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) that conducted 
the 1959 elections was dissolved in 1963 when Nigeria introduced republican 
constitution that stopped the Queen of England as Nigeria Head of State. This paved 
way for the establishment of Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) in 1964 with the 
obligation to conduct the 1964 general elections. After the formation of FEC, Chief E. 
E. Esua, a former Union Representative of Board of Education, was appointed as the 
Chairman of the electoral umpire (Babalola, 2013).  The electoral commission 
conducted the first ever elections under the auspices of Nigerians after independence.   
Unlike the previous elections that were administered by the colonial masters, the 1964 
general elections were managed by the indigenous government.  The commission 
managed the federal elections and the western regional elections. The electoral process 
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adopted direct secret ballot system10. However, the FEC was accused of favouritism 
and partiality.  The chaos that followed the elections were unprecedented and the 
electoral commission only lasted for two years (1964-1966).  
 
There was elections boycott in the West and the level of electoral violence was 
alarming (Adesola & John, 2014).  In fact, the experience of 1964 elections exposed 
lack of readiness on the political leaders to embrace unification and the election was 
characterised by Oyediran as ‘signposts to disaster’11 (cited in Uche, 2003: 56). This 
led to widespread violence in the polity. The violence this election orchestrated was 
one of the factors which paved the way for the first military incursion in the body 
politics of Nigeria. The counter coup which culminated in elite fragmentation in the 
rank and files of the Nigerian Military on the one hand and among the post -
independence nationalist threw the country into almost three years of civil war. 
 
In spite of the cross regional alliances, the political atmosphere presented two camps; 
North versus South forces. The mainstay of the NNA (evolved from NPC) was to boost 
the Northern hegemony by concentrating its strength on the region. Given the fact that 
winning all or almost all seats in the Northern region placed NPC the edge to control 
the federal government. Nevertheless, the NPC leaders recognised the expediency of 
spreading its tentacles to the South in order to counter the NCNC but with high level 
of consciousness of retaining its hegemony in the North. The UPGA (evolved from 
                                                          
10 The secret ballot system is a voting method in election or referendum introduced to protect the 
voters from revealing his/her votes to anyone during the process of casting votes. Also, it is 
introduced to forestall any attempt to intimidate voters or blackmail and to as well avoid vote buying. 
 
11 Oyeleye Oyediran was a Professor of Political Science at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He 
referred to the irregularities of 1964 election as a direction towards destruction by the term ‘signposts 
to disaster’  
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NCNC) which was formed to halt the Northern hegemony failed to penetrate because 
of its inability to get formidable alliance from the Northern region. The dichotomy 
between the South and the North was presented basically with the loggerhead between 
the NPC and the NCNC. Though the AG was an opposition from the South, it was a 
divided house which had been penetrated by the powerful elements within the NPC. 
Although there was an attempt by the movement loyal to Awolowo within the AG to 
form a progressive alliance with some minorities and marginalised groups in the 
Northern region, the forces within the Northern political setting ensured the dominance 
of NPC in the region (Osaghae, 2011). 
 
The political campaign was tailored along sentiment and divisionary tendency. The 
main theme of the UPGA, an offshoot of NCNC, during political campaign was 
restructuring of the country. As parts of its manifestoes, UPGA called for creation of 
additional states in order to strengthen the bond of unity (Uche, 2003). The target of 
the party was to break the domineering power of the North by ensuring creation of 
more states to widen the political space of other regions. On the other hand, the NNA, 
an offshoot of NPC, focused its campaign on national unity through ethnic 
representation at the central government particularly via job opportunities. Sincerely, 
the campaigns were bitter and acrimonious to the extent that each political camp was 
deploying everything within its disposal to eliminate opponents. This led to 
exploration of ethnic politics as the major platform and centre stage of the campaigns. 
Several charges of harassment and intimidation were made by opposition politicians 
in all regions which subsequently affected more UPGA leaders and party loyalists. The 




However, the election was conducted amidst tensed political environment leading to 
arrest and detention of some party nominees in the North and West. The UPGA 
boycotted the election. While the boycott recorded absolute success in the East, it was 
a partial success in the West and Mid –West and failed completely in the North. 
According to Osaghae (2011), the announcement of election boycott by the UPGA 
came too late when most of the party aspirants and supporters had already decided to 
partake in the elections. This situation created another constitutional crisis. The 
constitution stipulated that elections into federal representatives must be held same 
day, which could not stand due to the boycott, and also appointment of the Prime 
Minister should be the leader of the majority party, which the President12 refused to 
do. For three days, Nigeria was without government. However, after series negotiation 
and brainstorming, the President reappointed Alhaji Tafawa Balewa of the NPC as the 
Prime Minister and agreement was reached that fresh elections should be held all 
across areas that the boycott was affected. Also as part of the agreement was that the 
government should be a ‘broad- based government’ that must be all inclusive. In lieu 
of this, it was agreed that grievances were to be settled at the court of law and a 
commission was set up to review the constitution (Uche, 2003). Though the new 
government incorporated some members of the opposition as agreed, the fragile 
political setting remained noticeable (Osaghae, 2011). 
 
The Regional Assembly election in the Western region that was conducted in 1965 
also contributed to the chaos in the country and led to widespread electoral violence 
resulting to killing, looting, destruction of properties and total collapse of law and 
                                                          
12 Nnamdi Azikiwe of the NCNC/UPGA was the President and his party boycotted and rejected the 
election. The refusal of President Azikiwe to appoint NPC/NNA leader led to constitutional stalemate. 




order.  On the day of election, serious rioting was witnessed in many parts of the 
region. In some instances, police fired innocent civilians and the chaos was 
unprecedented. What triggered the unprecedented violence was the announcement of 
S.L. Akintola of the Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) by the Federal 
Electoral Commission (FEC) as the winner against the wishes of so many electorates 
who expected Chief Adegbenro of UPGA to have been declared victorious. With the 
recognition of Akintola as the winner by the federal government, the supporters of 
UPGA took laws into their hands and embarked on mass protests which led to violent 
demonstration. The demonstration which was tagged ‘operation wet e’ (Literally, wet 
with petrol and burn) witnessed a scenario whereby the angry protesters spraying 
houses, cars and even persons with petrol and setting fire on them (Adesola & John, 
2014). The spreading of the violence and protest later engaged the market women, 
students, artisans and people from other backgrounds denouncing the candidature of 
Akintola really caused social disorder and mayhem in the Western region resulting to 
total breakdown of law and order. Pressures were mount on the Prime Minister to 
declare a state of emergency in the Western region which he refused to do. This tensed 
political environment could not be controlled by the civilian government and thus the 
military capitalised on it.  The military had to come in 1966 by hijacking the entire 
political process and killed several personalities in a bloody coup (Uche, 2003). 
 
3.5 The First Phase of Military Incursion in Nigerian Politics (1966-1979) 
Nigeria first republic collapsed as a result of the first military coup of January 15, 
1966. It was a bloody one with several lives lost particularly among the big political 
wings. The politicians and personalities that fell as victims included the Prime 
Minister, Tafawa Balewa, the Premier of Northern region, Ahmadu Bello, the Premier 
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of Western region, S.L. Akintola and others. The intervention of the military as 
claimed by the perpetrators was to save the country from disintegration which the 
pendulum of the 164/65 elections was swinging to. As a result of this military incursion 
in governance, Nigeria political transition had always been at the mercy of the military 
(Dauda, 2003). It was believed to be masterminded by military men from the Eastern 
region whom were not comfortable with the political and administrative structures of 
Balewa’s (Northerner) government. To Professor Billy Dudly13 (1978), the coup was 
Igbo (Easterners) affairs though some analysts have countered this view of 
regionalising the January 15 military seizure of power (Obasanjo, 1987).  
 
The domination of military officers from the Igbo ethnicity as the main plotters and 
leading organizers is yet to be disputed. Also, the absence of Northern military officers 
in organizing the coup justified the sectional and ethnic interpretation ascribed to the 
Kaduna Nzeogwu led coup. Although as argued by Ukana (2000), the materialistic 
benefits accruing to most of the senior military officers from the North during 
Balewa’s government coupled with the background of the Prime Minister as a 
Northerner, participating in the overthrow of his governance would result to betrayal. 
Nevertheless, the high degree of corruption and repression under the government of 
Tafawa Balewa as an excuse for military intervention could not be denied (Ukana, 
2000). 
 
However, the main beneficiary of the coup, General Aguiyi Ironsi, only served as 
Nigeria  military head of state for few months as his regime was toppled with a counter 
military coup dominated by Northern military officers on July 26,1966 (Ukama, 2000). 
                                                          




Two reasons were accounted for the removal of General Ironsi. Firstly, his unification 
policy was seen to be anti-North and favoured the Igbo/Southern settings. Secondly, 
he was accused of being surrounded with his kinsmen from his tribes which tried to 
cut off the Northern elites from Nigerian politics. In view of this, a retaliation attack 
from the Northern military officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Muritala Muhammed 
that resulted to killing of General Aguiyi Ironsi, Colonel Adekunyi Fajuyi, the 
Governor of Western region, and some other officers. The successful coup produced 
Yakubu Gowon as the head of state. The counter coup did not go down well with the 
military officers from the East and the people of Igbo ethnic group and such led to the 
civil war between Eastern Region that was agitating for secession from Nigeria.  
 
The civil war led by Colonel Ojukwu calling for Biafra republic for the Eastern people 
was a serious battle that lasted for thirty months (1967-1970). Millions of lives were 
lost and properties worth billions damaged. In fact, the experience of the Biafra war 
happened to be dark days of Nigeria’s politics. Within this period, Yakubu Gowon 
regime was only battling for the survival of the Nigerian federation which became 
reality after the soldiers of Biafra surrendered to the military of the Nigerian army 
(Ojo, 2000). One of the success of Gowon was his ability to fight and sustain Nigeria 
nationhood which was consolidated by setting up programmes to ensure national 
integration. Also, the administration created 12 states. Interestingly, Gowon’s 
administration was able to settle down after the bloody war and the context of 
patrimonialism (Ukama, 2000) set in. Though the government announced after the 
civil war to embark on six years transitional programme, the same regime in 1974 




The reflection of patrimonial system became pronounced during Gowon regime with 
several allegations of corruption levelled against his government and revelations 
confirmed the impunity of the regime (Anazodo, Joseph & Emma, 2012).The pledge 
given by his administration to strengthen accountability and introduce anti-corruption 
degree was not fulfilled rather the regime protected corrupt individuals using state 
apparatus. This was well demonstrated when one of the Governors, Joseph Gomwolk, 
was accused of corrupt practices. The attitude and zeal from the Gowon’s leadership 
denouncing Joseph’s involvement in any corruption despite the trial in the court of law 
really showcased the administration impunity. Even one of his commissioners, Joseph 
Tarkar, who was indicted of corruption was not punished by the Gowon administration 
which made it clearer to people that the regime was condoling corruption (Ojo, 2000). 
 
The regime of Gowon was terminated by another military bloodless coup on July 29, 
1975.The bloodless coup that brought Murtala to power was organised and executed 
by officers mostly from the rank of lietenannt-colonel and colonel. Notable member 
of the group was Col. Joseph Garba who was Gowon’s Chief of Security and 
personally made public broadcast announcing the overthrow of Gowon government. 
It was a welcome coup as the populace were not comfortable with the increasing 
ineptitude of Gowon’s regime (Osaghae, 2011). The ineptitude characteristics of the 
Gowon administration became glaring to the extent that impunity was noticed in all 
the formation of his regime. Both central and state administrative bodies were accused 
of several allegations. Given this, the coup that brought Murtala to occupy the number 
one seat was as a result of mismanagement and corruption that surrounded the 
government of Gowon. This enhanced the emergence of Murtala Muhammed as the 
successor of Yakubu Gowon. Unlike his predecessor, Murtala regime was known for 
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his anti – corruption crusade and he set up ‘Assets Investigation Panel’ that later came 
up with several revelations of sharp corrupt practices of the previous administration 
(Anazodo, Joseph & Emma, 2012). The anti –corruption war of Murtala through the 
investigative panel indicted 10 out of 12 governors of Gowon’s regime and their assets 
got confiscated by the government. The war against corruption spread also to the civil 
services and more than 10, 000 corrupt officials were dismissed and public service 
workers became conscious of end to the era of impunity and recklessness (Anazodo, 
2009).  
 
Not quite long that Murtala hijacked power, he made public declaration to organise a 
four year transitional programme that would ensure democratically elected 
government to be swore in 1979 (Chidi, 2001). The transitional policy of the regime 
through Supreme Military Council approved programmes towards entertaining smooth 
transition. A constitution drafting committee was inaugurated by the head of state on 
October 18, 1975. The mandates given to the committee include the following: 
1.  The creation of political institutions which ensure maximum participation and 
consensus and orderly succession to political power 
2. The development of consensus politics and government, based on a community 
of all interests rather than the interests of sections of the country 
3. The elimination of over-centralization of power in a few hands and the 
decentralization of power as a means of diffusing tension 
4. The elimination of cut-throat political competition based on a system of winner-
takes-all 
5. The creation of a system of government in which the president and vice-president 
are elected with clearly defined powers, and are accountable to the people; and 
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6. The evolution of a free and fair electoral system which ensures adequate 
representation of the cross-section of the nation at the centre. 
7. A careful definition of the powers and duties of the leading functionaries of 
government (See, Chidi, 2001) 
 
Unfortunately, Murtala did not last longer than six months as the head of state and was 
unable to witness some of these agenda due to his assassination in an abortive military 
coup in February 1976. The February 13, 1976 coup was planned most by young 
officers from the Middle Belt region, who called themselves   ‘young revolutionists’ 
led by Colnel Bukar Dimka. The motive of the coup was alleged to have mix 
perceptions. Firstly, it was said to have been initiated due to the intra- military 
institutional problems leading to grudges of some officers in the army over promotion 
and appointment of General T.Y. Danjuma as the Army Chief of Staff. Secondly, there 
was a report of planning to restore General Gowon who by that time was a student at 
Warwick University, England. Before the coup, Col. Dimka met Gowon in London 
which led to suspicious of the latter involvement in the coup. Gowon and Dimka 
belonged to the same region, Middle Belt and in fact, both were related. This 
conspiracy necessitated Nigerian government to make a request for extradition of 
Gowon from Britain and was arraigned to face trial along other arrested individuals. 
Though Gowon denied any link to the coup, he was retired from the Nigerian army 
(Osaghae, 2011). 
 
The assassination of Murtala was condemned by most Nigerians. There were protest 
and demonstration by the Nigerian students who before the outcome of the failed coup 
had trooped to the street in solidarity for the regime of Murtala. Nevertheless, the 
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demise of Murtala warranted his deputy, Olusegun Obasanjo, to take over and 
followed the programmes as highlighted by his boss. Obasanjo who was the Chief of 
Staff at Supreme Headquaters, became the head of state against his personal desire 
(Obasanjo, 1990).   It was on this basis that qualified the administration to be known 
as Murtala/ Obasanjo regime (Osaghae, 2011). General Olusegun Obasanjo continued 
with the transition programme and by 1978, the report of the Constitution Drafting 
Committee (CDC) was ratified and the recommendations entailed adoption of 
American federal system of government, creation of bicameral legislature at national 
level and unicameralism at the state government. All these reflected in the 1979 federal 
republic constitution of Nigeria (Chidi, 2001). More importantly, the 
Murtala/Obasanjo administration in 1976 created additional 6 new states making the 
total of states in Nigeria to be 19.  
 
3.6 The 1979 General Elections and the Match to Nigeria’s Second Republic 
The first transition from military rule to democratically elected government was 
experienced on October 1, 1979, after the general elections that produced Alhaji Sheu 
Shagari as the executive president of the federal republic of Nigeria.  This began the 
Nigeria’s second republic14. Prior to the election of 1979, the administration of 
Obasanjo in 1978, in its transition lifted the ban placed on politics which enhanced the 
registration of about nineteen political parties by the Federal Electoral Commission 
(FEDECO). Out of the numbers, only five was adjudged to have met the requirement 
                                                          
14 The second republic started in Nigeria in 1979 after the military administration of Obasanjo 
transferred power to an elected president, Alhaji Sheu Shagari on October 1, 1979. The first republic 
was terminated as a result of the military coup of 1966 and since then, the country democratisation 




and criteria stipulating party membership in at least two third of the states in within 
the federation (Uche, 2003).  
 
The rational for this according to Kyari (1986) was to facilitate a party with national 
outlook and character. The five political parties that survived the hurdles include the 
National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), the Great Nigeria 
Peoples Party (GNPP), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and the Peoples Redemption 
Party (PRP). However, in a comparative analogy, it could be stated that unlike the 
brutal and violent practices that characterised the 1964/65 general and regional 
elections respectively, the 1979 elections were administered with a minimal rancour 
and violence (Uche, 2003). Although the elections were not free from accusations and 
counter- accusations due to reported cases of ballot snatching and rigging, these were 
settled legally at the elections tribunals. For instance, there was a report of systemic 
rigging due to the inflated figures recorded compared to the number of votes cast.  
 
The election was conducted by the electoral body recognised by the 1979 constitution. 
In fact, the setting up of Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) was promulgated 
in the constitution which reconfigured Nigeria’s political system from the 
parliamentary system of government to presidential system (Osaghae, 2011). Though 
the process of establishing electoral body that conducted 1979 general elections could 
be traced to the political transition of Murtala/Obasanjo regime which set up a 24-man 
committee of electoral commission headed by a senior public servant, Micheal Ani, 
the ratification of the 1979 constitution gave concurred with the decree of 1977 that 




 The Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) under the chairmanship of Micheal 
Ani organised voter registration across the 19 states in Nigeria. However, the released  
number of registered voters was estimated to be 47, 433,757 but the turnout for the 
election was less than 30 percent and at the long run the result declared (see Table 4) 
contradicted the real figures of voters that actually turned up to vote indicating that the 
FEDECO figure of registered voters was questionable (Micheal, 2010). This was the 
beginning of the controversy alleged on the sincerity of FEDECO and its members to 
conduct free and credible elections.  
 
The general elections were held by FEDECO in July and August 1979 into the offices 
of President, Governors and Legislators at both federal and state level. This was done 
in fulfilment of its constitutional power that stipulates that FEDECO is recognised to 
organise and supervise all elections to the National Assembly (Senate and House of 
Representatives) 19 state Assemblies and executive offices of the President and Vice 
President, Governors and Deputy Governors (Umar, 2015). However, the international 
observers raised concern about the massive rigging of the 1979 elections but Nigerians 
having waited for long under military dispensations managed to accept its outcome 
which averted electoral violence and crisis (People’s Daily, 2015). As rightly 
expatiated by Richard (1987), the departing regime of Olusegun Obasanjo failed to 
conduct an election that would be adjudged to have met international electoral 
practises, the only applaud enjoyed by the regime was the transfer of power to civilian 
administration. 
 
The 1979 elections were keenly contested and the focus was more on the presidential 
electoral tussle between the major contenders; Sheu Shagari of the National Party of 
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Nigeria (NPN) and Obafemi Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN).The other 
three political parties fielded Waziri Ibrahim as the Great Nigeria Peoples Party 
(GNPP) flag bearer, Aminu Kano for the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) and 
Nnamdi Azikiwe was the candidate of the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP). After 
rigorous campaign and series of political consultations, the presidential election result 
was in favour of Alhaji Sheu Shagari who became the first executive president of the 
federal republic of Nigeria. The reason was not far-fetched because the 1979 elections 
were tailored towards the 1979 constitution that had already adopted Presidential 
System of Government for the federation. Table 3.3 shows overall results of the 
presidential elections. 
  Table 3.3 
 1979 General Elections: Presidential Results 
Party Candidate Total Votes Percentage 
NPN Sheu Shagari 5,688,857   33 
UPN Obafemi Awolowo 4,688,857   29.2 
NPP Nnamdi Azikiwe 2,822,523   16.7 
PRP Aminu Kano  1,732,113    10.3 
GNPP Waziri Ibrahim 1,686,489     10.0 
     Source Uche (2003) 
 
The controversy aftermath the pronouncement of Sheu Shagari of the NPN as winner 
was on the issue of 25 percent in two thirds of the states. The constitution stipulated 
that for any candidate to emerge as the president of the federal republic of Nigeria, 
such person must be able to accrue 25 percent of votes cast in at least two third states. 
Meanwhile, Nigeria was having 19 states as at 1979 and the two third of 19 is believed 
to be 12.67 indicating that for a winner to emerge in presidential election, he must be 
able to accrue minimum of 25 percent in 12 states and 25 percent in his thirteen states 
or one sixth of the votes in that state (Richard, 1981). The declaration of Shagari by 
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the FEDECO met serious opposition and especially from the legal perspective of what 
really constituted two third. The case was drag to election tribunal and even up to 
Supreme Court but the ruling was in favour of Shagari.  
 
However, the voting strength in the House of Representatives and the senate indicated 
the pattern of party strong holes amidst ethnic groups. As a result of this, the ruling 
party NPN could not command working majority in the national assembly and was left 
with the option of forming alliance with the NPP (Keith, 1979). In other words, just 
like the experience of the first republic, the Shagari’s led government of the second 
republic had to rely on a coalition that is believed to be fragile to enhance the take-off 
of his administration (Uche, 2003).  
 
The contextual framework for the political institution in the second republic was 
embodied in the 1979 constitution. One of the paradigm shift in Nigeria’s 
constitutional development was the adoption of executive presidential system of 
government. To avoid problems associated with parliamentary system of the first 
republic, the 1979 constitution introduced an American style of Presidential System 
whereby the President enjoys the power of being the head of state and also head of 
government. As stipulated in the constitution, an elected president (with vice 
president) remained the head of the executive and entitled to wide range power which 
include fiscal appropriation and appointment of top government positions. The 
president shall appoint his ministers with the ratification of the National Assembly.  
 
The 1979 constitution placed the political configuration on the principle of separation 
of powers between the three arms of government, the executive, legislature and 
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judiciary. This was to ensure checks and balances. There was emphasis on legislative 
checks over the executive to avoid an untameable Leviathan (Osaghae, 2011). In 
addition to the power of ratification, the legislature can impeach a chief executive 
found guilty of gross misconduct and any impeachable offence in the performance of 
the function of his office (1979, Constitution, SS. 132, 170). This was applicable to 
the state government headed by an elective Governor who enjoyed the executive power 
of the component unit. Providing similar system in the states, Nigeria’s fully adopted 
the presidential system as applicable in the United States of America jettisoning the 
inherited parliamentary British style of government. 
 
Not only that, there was a bicameral legislature at the national level called the National 
Assembly comprised of the red chamber (upper house) and the green chamber (lower 
house). At the state government, it was a unicameral legislative body known as ‘House 
of Assembly’ with the power to promulgate law and checks the executive arm. 
However, unlike the first republic that senate members were appointed by regional 
governments, it was based on election as stipulated by the 1979 constitution of the 
federal republic of Nigeria. This period, the House of Representatives belonged to the 
Green Chamber whose members were elected from state constituencies on the basis of 
population. But the Red Chamber had equal representation of members regardless of 
state population. Though both chambers enjoyed similar power, the senate had the 
power to ratify appointment made by the executive. For instance, all ministerial 
nominees by the president must be ratified and screened by the Senate. This also 
applicable to appointment of Ambassadors that would represent Nigeria at the 




The similarity in the discharge of responsibilities of the both chambers led to agitation 
by some Nigerians to consider unicameralism in order to avoid the rivalry between the 
Senate and House of Representatives. As reported in the Political Bureau (1987), 
recommendation was made for the abolition of bicameralism to be replaced with 
unicameral legislative as obtained in the state government. The bicameral system was 
criticised for not only wasting cost of governance but also encouraged duplication of 
functions which caused delayed in passing of bills. 
 
Put differently, the 1979 constitution changed the political configuration of the country 
to presidential system of government and also recognised the existence of political 
parties for the first time in the history of Nigeria politics. The electoral decree and 
constitution gave an open membership to Nigerians in respective of their background 
to prevent proliferation of political parties (Ekeh, 1989). This empowered FEDECO 
as the only recognised body to register political parties in the country with specific 
requirement. As stated in guidelines of registration of political parties, FEDECO 
required that ‘a party must have a properly established branch office in each of at least 
two-thirds of the states in the federation’ and to also have branches in the local 
government areas which according to the opinion of the electoral commission would 
enhance political party to present its programme diligently to the electorates (Osaghae, 
2011). Furthermore, as deliberated by the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), 
the issue of rivalry for political power needed to be looked into with the intention of 
majority of the Southern delegates to check the monopoly of the North. There was 





The principle of Federal Character connotes a quota system where the diversity of the 
country must be reflected in the composition of government. The principle was to be 
applicable to appointment to ministerial and other top government officials. It was 
hoped that its application would enhance and promote national unity. Also, it would 
lead to commandment of national loyalty and ensure ‘that there shall be no 
predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional 
groups in government or in any of its agencies’ (1979 Constitution, S 14(3)). This idea 
of federal character was widely hailed as an important direction towards democratic 
stability in a divided society like Nigeria (Ekeh & Osaghae, 1989). Despite that, the 
federal character principle as entrenched in the 1979 constitution had two 
shortcomings. Firstly, the issue of minority and marginalisation might not be well 
taken care of especially in states where some small groups existed.  
 
The majority group would definitely continue exercising their dominance whenever 
appointments were to be made. Secondly, the federal principle was not really indeed a 
power sharing formula in as much as representative in the executive bodies were mere 
appointments which could not stop the control of the presidency. The idea of rotational 
presidency could have been more balanced in order to ensure equitable power 
distribution (Osaghae, 2011). The inability to resolve the issue of power rotation by 
the principle of federal character and the constitution itself was and still remains an 
issue that is yet to have legal backing in the Nigeria’s contemporary society. This is 
one the issues that Nigeria’s constitution maintains silence and it has always been at 
the discretion of political parties and stakeholders to employ the concept of ‘rotational 




3.7 The 1983 General Elections and the Collapse of the Second Republic 
The fundamental issue which became one of the greatest challenges for Nigeria’s 
democracy was the inability to transfer power from one civilian government to another 
(Uche, 2003, Suberu, 2007, Ojo, 2007). It was this problem coupled with other factors 
that led to the collapse of the Second Republic in 1983. The 1983 general elections 
could have served as a platform to break the jinx of political instability, regrettably it 
compounded the menace of electoral malpractices. In short, it was a dark era of 
political and electioneering contest in Nigeria (Oyediran, 1984). According to Uche 
(2003), the high tension created by the political scene on the eve of the elections was 
felt by the entire polity. The political atmosphere really drew the attention of foreign 
democracies to Nigeria and it was like all eyes were on the giant of Africa. 
 
Interestingly, the same electoral commission (FEDECO) that conducted the 1979 
general elections was also given the mandate of the 1983 elections. Though there was 
change of leadership of the electoral umpire which led to the replacement of Michael 
Ani (1976-1979) with Victor Orie Whilskey (1980-1983)15, the electoral commission 
retained all the major political parties that vied and contested the 1979 general 
elections in the 1983 exercise with only one additional party known as the National 
Advanced Party (NAP) championed by Tunde Braithwaire. Nevertheless, the party 
dominant still remained unchanged as the three domineering political parties (NPN, 
UPN and NPP) controlled the voting patterns and political firmament of the Nigerian 
polity (Uba, 1989). This could be likened to the political fragmentation dominated by 
the NPC, NCNC and AG in the first republic. Again, ethnic sentiment formed the 
                                                          
15  Justice Victor O. Whiskey took over the chairmanship of FEDECO and he claimed to be prepared. 
But it was obvious that the ruling political party (NPN) primed FEDECO with failure. See the 




political platform during the campaigns by the major political parties and supports 
were gathered on this basis. The electoral scenario across party lines was more of 
regional political viability rather than nationalistic politicking. 
 
In the conduct of 1983 general elections, the abuse of power of incumbency basically 
denied Nigerians a hitch free and smooth transition of power. The electoral body 
charged with the responsibility of administering free and fair elections became a tool 
of the ruling party and rigging was carried out openly to the extent that all political 
parties were manipulating the electorates’ mandates in their various political strong 
holes. Several cases of involvement of the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) 
officials in the election malpractices were reported and impartiality of the electoral 
management body was glaring (David, 2000).  
 
This according to Micheal (2010) signified the inability of FEDECO to brace to its 
legitimate responsibility. Prior to the elections, the opposition parties have questioned 
the appointment of the electoral commissioners, many of whom were alleged to be 
card carriers and loyalists of the ruling party. The appointment of Justice Ovie- 
Whiskey as the Chairman of the electoral commission was even challenged at the court 
but failed to stop him. The integrity and neutrality of the entire members of the 
commission was in doubt which gave serious concern on the possibility of 
experiencing free and fair elections. To reduce the scope of malpractices and 
irregularities, UPN and NPP proposed counting of results at the polling units and the 
National Assembly approved this despite its opposition by NPN and FEDECO 
(Osaghae, 2011). Unfortunately, the manifestation of fraudulent act became glaring 
when the voters’ registration could not be ascertained less than two weeks to the 
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elections while the compilation of registered voters became an avenue for 
manipulation that was directly influenced by the ruling party. It was not surprising that 
the 1983 general elections were flawed in as much as politicians could publicly make 
indicting statements before the elections to the extent that the NPN leader was boasted 
and quoted to have predicted ‘landslide victory’(total sweep of the polls) for his party 
. Notable NPN leaders such as Umar Dikko and Adisa Akinloye declared that only two 
parties were recognised which were the National People Party (NPN) and the army. 
Such statement really showcased lack of readiness on the part of the ruling party to 
relinquish power to any other political party except the military (Oyediran, 1985).   
 
Prior to the election’s day, several ballot boxes containing ballot papers were reported 
to have been recovered from politicians’ houses and on the day of election cases of 
missing and snatching of ballot boxes were rampart. This singular act exposed the 
partiality of the electoral commission which was accused of working for the interest 
of the ruling party to subvert the peoples’ mandate of free and fair election. For 
instance, the FEDECO staff were accused of aiding election irregularities in 
conjunction with the National Party of Nigeria to perpetrate some of the rigging 
techniques (Ayo, 2011). Elections were massively abused in states such as Anambra, 
Cross River, Oyo, Imo and Ondo. The rate at which thugs were sponsored during the 
1983 elections were unprecedented and in the caption of Alabi (2008), the experience 
of 1983 elections gave arsonists and assassins free hands to unleash violence on 
innocent Nigerians in the disguise of electoral contest.  The most unfortunate aspect 
of the election was the role of some stakeholders such as judges, police officers and 
other security apparatus, that were supposed to be pro – democrats but participated in 
the irregularities and flaw elections. The judges betrayed judicial trust of fairness by 
 
123 
upholding some fraudulent elections result on technical grounds while the police were 
used to harass people and intimidate any form of protest (Micheal, 2010).  The security 
agencies that could have been law enforcement agents transformed to be law brokers 
by openly displaying bias towards the NPN led government. Kyari (1986:15) 
descriptive analysis says it all: 
 It is very clear that the Nigerian Election of 1983 is a sham election. 
It was   massively rigged and nobody can honestly, truthfully and 
scientifically state that Shagari and his lieutenants in the state 
capitals were democratically voted into office. A massive collusion 
involving the NPN, the FEDECO, the Police and some sections of 
the judiciary had produced governments that could not claim 
legitimacy by dint of even the most rudimentary requirement of 
bourgeois democracy 
 
In the gubernatorial elections, results released by FEDECO initially indicated that 
NPN won in thirteen states but the electoral tribunal upturned the Ondo State result in 
favour of UPN. Actually, what actually triggered the ugly situation in the entire 
exercise was the Ondo State gubernatorial election that was keenly contested by Alani 
Omoboriowo of NPN and Micheal Ajasin of UPN. The initial result which put the flag 
bearer of UPN ahead was upturned and that of NPN candidate was inflated. This 
singular action generated serious heat and mass destruction of properties and lives. 
Supporters of the two parties were clashing until the actual results were declared in 
favour of the UPN popular candidates (Anifowoshe, 2002). The electoral violence 
generated by the Ondo gubernatorial election and coupled with irregularities of the 
general exercise became an excuse for another military officer to topple the Shagari’s 
led government on December 31, 1983. 
 
The problem of conducting credible elections by civilian government emanated from 
ethno-religious characteristics of party politics in Nigeria. Also, the composition of the 
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electoral commission had always been questionable which the partiality of the 
electoral body often leads to outright break of laws and orders. The abuse of state own 
media by incumbent powers and winners take all politics have been accounted as part 
of democratization hurdles in Nigeria (Ojo, 2006). All these and more created an 
avenue for the military to tactically capitalise on a state of virtually anarchy which the 
aftermath of the 1983 general elections presented. The fall-out of electoral 
irregularities and the dichotomy of Southern and Northern political stakeholders 
coupled with the divisions along ethnicity and religion, the second republic was 
terminated by another military dictator.  
 
The coup that ended the political and electoral violence of 1983 was led by Major 
General Muhammadu Buhari. This led to suspension of all political arrangement and 
the National Assembly was dissolved. With another military intervention, the second 
republic became history and ended in another dilemma. Nevertheless, like the previous 
electoral exercise, the 1983 as noted earlier also reflected the voting strength and 
pattern on primordial and ethnic sentiment. Table 3.4 indicates the seats allotted to 
party at the national assembly elections which buttresses the voting pattern on regional 
bases via party affiliation. 
Table 3.4 
Seats won by political parties after the 1983 Parliamentary Elections 
 
Political Parties Seats won at the Senate Seats won at the House of 
Reps 
NPN 60 306 
UPN    16 51 
NPP        12 48 
PRP    5 41 
GNPP     2 - 




3.8The Second Phase of Military Intervention in Nigeria’s Politics (1983-1993)  
The political instability in Nigeria resurfaced due to the collapse of the second republic 
which was facilitated by another military incursion in the country’s polity. This time 
around, it was the military regime of Buhari/Idiagbon that violently seized power from 
the non-performing administration of Sheu Shagari. Several factors were believed to 
have caused the losing of mantle of leadership by Shagari, the lack of credibility of the 
1983 general elections was a major stimulus to the emergence of Buhari/Idiagbon 
administration (Chidi, 2001). One of the excuses by this regime was also to salvage 
the country’s economy which was grounded by the civilian government of the second 
republic. The task before the Buhari regime was to improve the drilling oil price and 
to service loans incurred by the previous administration which many analysts believed 
were diverted by some personalities under Shagari’s government.  Dawodu (2000:1) 
qualifies the Shagari administration as “the abysmal downward plunge of the already 
battered economy, the unmitigated corruption, greed, avarice, lack of public probity 
and accountability, hunger and abject poverty, and the aimless drifting of the ship of 
state”. 
 
Meanwhile, Buhari’s regime arrested and investigated top politicians that participated 
in the government of Shagari holding them responsible for the country’s economic 
depression. The government promulgated decrees restricting indiscipline through the 
establishment of War Against Indiscipline (WAI) which was in phases namely; anti –
corruption and economic sabotage, nationalism and patriotism, work ethics, 
environmental sanitation and queuing (Dawodu, 2000). The administration was also 
responsible for the suspension of the 1979 constitution and all political activities were 
banned. During this regime, Nigerians were subjected to orderliness and due processes, 
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though with strict sanctions for any violator. This was a result of identifying 
indiscipline and corruption as the bane of development in the country (Max, 2002). 
The two ugly viruses have eaten deep in Nigeria’s socio- economic and political 
atmosphere. In fact, it was more of culture of impunity among Nigerians and the 
overthrowing of Shagari’s regime called for celebration. 
 
The response of Buhari/Idiagbon regime in curbing corruption was drastic due to the 
widespread allegation of corrupt practises pronounced in the previous administration. 
As a matter of priority, the military rule of Buhari set up tribunals mandated to try 
public officials accused of embezzlement under Shagari’s government. The tribunals 
were headed by senior military officers and enjoyed the power of imposing jail terms 
on indicted personalities (Max, 2002). Although there was a room for appeal, the 
hearing of such appeal could only be exercised by the Supreme for Military Council 
(SMC) being the highest ruling body. Also, the composition and membership of the 
SMC remained officers of the Nigerian army and the Inspector General of Police. Such 
scenario automatically made the military to be judges and prosecutors simultaneously 
which the Nigerian Bar Association frown at and compelled their members not to 
participate in the tribunals’ trial. It was not surprising when most of the verdicts of the 
tribunals sentenced indicted persons to twenty to two hundred years imprisonment 
which were more of life sentence. Despite the harsh nature of some of the sentences, 
it was argued that Nigerian public officials were tried and held accountable for their 
actions (Newswatch, 7 June 1985). Though the trials suffered legitimate crisis for not 
subjecting the accuse persons to civil courts and allowing open trial, the body language 




Apart from the anti-corruption war, the regime clamped down freedom of speech 
which according to the administration had been previously abused. This was 
promulgated by introducing decree 4 of 1984 that frowned against false accusation on 
public officers. It also denied the press from publishing any criticism engineered 
against the government and such led to charges of some prominent journalists for 
sedition. Two journalists of the Guardians Newspaper, Tunde Thompson and Irabor 
Nduka, were imprisoned having found guilty under the decree 4 of 1984. The 
restriction on press freedom according to Osaghae (2011) was antithetical to human 
rights and abuse of press freedom. 
 
However, as rightly observe by scholars and analysts (Uche; 2003, Ojo; 2006, 
Osaghae, 2011), it would be unfair to equate the performance and style of governance 
of all the military regimes. Though military rules were all authoritarian, the regime 
that terminated the second phase of Nigeria’s republic differed in characters when 
compared to the personalities of the military regimes in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Military 
authoritarian remains undemocratic that operated within the framework of ‘lawless 
autocracy’ (Nwabueze, 1994:4), the authoritarianism of the military administration in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s could not be equated with that of their predecessors. For 
instance, the Buhari led military rule came to power when the country was plagued 
with serious economic crisis caused by mismanagement and corruption of the civilian 
government. Although the military regimes of the 1980’s and 1990’s operated when 
the whole world was clamouring for democracy and outlawing military 
authoritarianism, the Nigerian political gladiators did not showcase welcoming 
attitudes towards democratisation. It is on this note Buhari regime was seen as a 
pathfinder in the military era of Nigeria. 
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The dominance of Nigeria’s political life continued as a result of another military coup 
led by General Ibrahim Babangida who ousted the Buhari /Idiagbon regime in 1985 in 
a bloodless coup. Babangida who was the Chief of Army Staff and member of the 
Supreme Military Council under Buhari’s regime has always been involved and 
participated actively in the previous coup. With the hijacking of power, Babangida 
promised to reverse abuse of human rights entrenched in Buhari’s regime and also 
affirmed that his transitional programme would end in 1990. Unfortunately, his regime 
was more prominent with the abuses of human rights than his predecessor (Shetima & 
Chukwuma, 2002) and the transitional programme exceeded the promised year. 
 
Babangida administration issued a referendum supporting austerity measures in his 
economic policy. The justification for this was to streamline Nigeria’s economy 
towards deregulation as proposed by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank. Based on this, the regime introduced Structural Adjusted Programme (SAP) in 
1986. SAP encompassed policies of deregulating agricultural sector through 
termination of markets boards and elimination of price control. The programme widen 
privatisation of public enterprises and also devalued Nigeria’s currency (Naira) with 
the intention of encouraging exportation and improving foreign investment (Lewis, 
1996). The thrust of the programme (SAP) was to redirect Nigeria’s economic policy 
from input driven to export promotion strategy (Bigben, 2012). However, SAP failed 
to address some of its stated objectives as Nigeria’s external debt became worrisome 
and the fiscal gap was wider than it was before the policy (Obasa, 2005). 
 
However, considering the domestic scene, the regime of Babangida embarked on some 
formidable steps intended to address chronic socio-economic and political problems. 
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During the administration of Babangida, there was a fairly organized population 
census, creation of additional states and local governments councils strengthened 
towards autonomy. It also set up agencies within the states to address unemployment, 
infrastructural decay and as well as providing soft loan for the poor. These were 
viewed by Osaghae (2011) as the obsession of the regime to create a new social and 
political order. The regime also revisited cases of human right abuses under Buhari by 
constituting a committee headed by Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe to review cases of 
violation of human rights. The outcome of the review was noticed via the reduction of 
jail terms and the release of most of the indicted persons during Buhari’s regime. 
Scores of detainees were free including the two journalists that were accused of 
violating decree 416 
 
 These were followed up by reconstituting and restructuring of key organs of 
government. The highest body was renamed from Supreme Military Council (SMS) to 
Armed Force Ruling Council (AFRC). The introduction of federal character principle 
with the intention of balancing composition of various geopolitical zones in 
government and to avoid North/South imbalances which the previous administration 
was accused of. Also, as part of the restructuring, the Presidential Advisory Committee 
(PAC) was set up with the mandate to formulate policy and directly responsible to the 
president. But the aspect which was believed to be crucial in the restructuring was the 
strength ascribed to the position of the president and commander-in-chief which made 
General Ibrahim Babangida to be the most powerful military ruler being referred to as 
president and not head of states like his predecessors’ (Osaghae, 2011). 
  
                                                          
16 Decree 4 is about protection against false accusation which the military regime of Buhari/Idiagbon 
used in restricting the media from making criticism about the government. 
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Having gained ground, what the regime blamed Buhari’s administration for most 
especially on the press also resurfaced in 1987 when an editor of Newswatch, Dele 
Giwa, was killed by a letter bomb delivered to the deceased from the presidency. 
Journalists also experienced closure of their newspapers outlet and detentions of 
members of the press. The Civil Liberties Organizations (CLO) headed by Olisa 
Agbakoba, Civil Rights Project (CRP) of Clement Nwankwo and some other human 
rights activists such as Gani Fawehinmi, Femi Falan, Alao Aka Bahorun were 
punished by confiscating their international passports preventing them from traveling 
outside Nigeria. In fact, the government became a tyranny which arguably surpassed 
that of Buhari’s regime (Momoh, 1995). 
 
The Babangida military transition programme promised Nigerians to hand over power 
to civilian government within four years promulgated 17 man political Bureau charged 
with the responsibility of organizing public symposium and debate on how to ensure 
smooth political transition. The bureau was given the mandate to consult and come up 
with blueprint for administration of the transition programme. After several 
consultations and wider public inputs, the bureau submitted its recommendation. 
Included in the recommendations were the radical proposals for a socialist ideology, 
nationalising the oil sector, denouncing privatisation policies and issuing political ban 
to the ‘old brigade’17 politicians (Koehn, 1989). However, a nine-member panel 
headed by General Paul Omu reviewed some of the radical recommendations, though 
it adopted the proposed two party system with little modification (Osaghae, 2011). 
This led to the formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National 
Republican Congress (NRC) by the regime. The two parties got membership across 
                                                          
17 The term old brigade indicates set of politicians that have been surfacing in Nigerian politics which 
the military regime of Babaginda banned from participating in politics 
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the country and happened to be the recognised platform for seeking elective offices. 
 
3.9 The 1993 General Elections and the Aborted Third Republic 
The military administration of Ibrahim Babangida lifted ban on politics in 1989, 
ushered in preparation for competitive elections starting from local, state and national 
levels. The series of elections were slated to cover the period of three years and the 
initial ban on previous politicians were as well lifted in 1991 (Peter, 1994). Elections 
were conducted to various elective offices from the local levels to state. And the main 
target was the Presidential seat which after several postponements was finally slated 
for June 12, 1993. The political battle field for the number one seat was between the 
two candidates of the two registered political parties (NRC and SDP). The Presidential 
flag bearer of the National Republican Convention was Alhaji Tofa Bashir from the 
North West of Nigeria while the candidate of the Social Democratic Party remained 
Chief Mashood Abiola from the South-Western part of the country. 
 
The election of 1993 was conducted by National Electoral Commission (NEC) set up 
in 1987 by the Babangida regime. In preparation for the elections, General Babangida 
appointed Humphrey   Nwosu, a Professor of Political Science, as the chairman of 
NEC. It is imperative to explain the voting procedure adopted by the National Electoral 
Commission (NEC) which was a departure from the conventional pattern of voting 
Nigerians were used to. The initiative and introduction of Option A4 was a unique 
voting procedure that required the electorates or voters to form a queue and line up 
behind the displayed photographs of the prospective candidates and political parties of 
their preference. This is followed up by votes counting carried out by the presiding 
officers in-charge of the polling units and results announced at the presence of the 
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voters at the particular spot (Uche, 2003). This process of voting which was also 
known as open ballot system changed the conventional secret balloting adopted by 
previous electoral bodies. Although the procedure was criticised for exposing the 
voters’ identity, it catered for certain irregularities and malpractices that marred the 
previous electoral system. Interestingly, Nigerians appreciated and abided by the 
procedure which invariably qualified the elections to have been free and fair by both 
local and international observers (Imam, 2010) 
 
However, after successful inauguration of the local and state government due to the 
completion of the first and second phases of the elections, the result of the Presidential 
election was annulled by the military. Such singular action aborted the third republic 
and plunged the country into another political instability. Based on the available results 
so far, the candidate of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Chief M.K.O Abiola, was 
generally acclaimed to have won the presidential election beating his rival with a wider 
margin across the country (Ibrahim & Abubakar, 2015).This scenario created more 
tension in the tensed political environment and several protests ranging from civil 
societies groups, political party and even condemnation of the act by international 
election observers and some other countries in the international communities. 
 
The unfortunate action of the annulment of the presidential election was a kind of 
catalyst into anarchy (Osahae, 2011) which dented Nigeria’s image more within the 
international arena. In fact, it set Nigeria in the eyes of the international democratic 
societies as pariah state18 and the western countries championed by the United States 
                                                          
18 Pariah state is a nation considered to be an outcast in the international community. Nigeria was 
referred as Pariah state because it was cut off from many international communities particularly the 
western super powers due to sanctions imposed on her.  
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imposed certain sanctions on the country. Initially, the western countries have made it 
clear not to support non-democratic regime in Africa and Nigeria suffered economic 
sanctions such as cutting off bilateral and multilateral relationship on economic ties 
which invariably reduced Nigeria sales of crude oil and some other goods abroad 
(Sylvester, 2009). The economic sanction was reaffirmed by Britain through its former 
Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, in his address speech at Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London, when he asserted that:   
Our economic assistance is no help to a country if its government is 
implementing policies which impede growth or allowing resources 
to be soaked   up by corruption. Nor can we ignore the suppression 
of legitimate opposition or abuse of human rights. In Nigeria, for 
example, the transition to democracy has been repeatedly 
interrupted. We cannot support this (Tell, 1996:10) 
 
Internally, the situation was devastating and country was nearly brought to standstill. 
This was as a result of protest, strikes, riots and demonstrations that crippled more the 
fragile economy of the country. As rightly mentioned by Peter (1994), the price paid 
for the annulment of June 12 Presidential election was higher than what the Babangida 
administration anticipated. The country really witnessed serious chaos that nearly 
resulted to disintegration and war. 
 
The reason given by the Babangida’s regime during his national broadcast of June 26, 
1993 was that the conduct of the election failed to meet the basic requirement for free 
and fair election. But this excuse according to Osaghae (2011), was a cover up which 
lack merit and justification. According to him, the military regime of Babangida could 
have allowed such irregularities to be proved by the competent election tribunal and 
the fact remained that the acclaimed winner of the presidency, Mashood Abiola, was 
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not acceptable by the cabals of the top military. This simply substantiated the viability 
of the phenomenon of military in Nigeria’s democratisation. And that any candidate 
without military support has the tendency of not attaining the presidency seat in the 
electoral democracy of Nigerian politics and government. In essence, reasons given by 
the military for annulment of June 12 election were not convincing and clearly 
indicated unending transitional programme of Babangida.  
 
The aftermath of the annulment coupled with both domestic and international 
pressures led the military president, General Ibrahim Babangida, to step aside and 
inaugurated unconstitutional Interim National Government (ING) headed by Chief 
Ernest Shonekan. The composition of the ING was organised by the departing regime 
of Babangida and this signified a kind of continuity of the regime as far as public 
perception was concerned (Nwabueze, 1994). Nevertheless, the interim government 
suffered from legitimacy crisis and was not recognised by Nigerians. The protests and 
demonstrations continued and the call for release of the June 12 Presidential election 
result intensified by many Civil Organisations, Student Unions, Labour Union and 
some other stakeholders within and outside Nigeria. Despite efforts by Shonekan’s 
interim government to gain popularity, the resistance was glaring in every nook and 
cranny of the country. After series of pressures and the inability of the Shonekan’s 
government to win the heart of the masses, coupled with hidden agenda believed to 
have been ignited by the previous regime, General Sanni Abacha on November 17, 
1993, announced his taking over of the mantle of leadership (Osaghae, 2011). Though 
Abacha being the Defence Minister right from Babangida’s regime claimed that Chief 
Shonekan voluntarily resigned his position, it was a deliberate coup which ended the 
illegitimate six months interim government. 
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3.10 The Abacha’s Military Regime and Nigeria’s Return to Democracy (1993-
1999)  
After hijacking political power through a palace coup, the Abacha’s military regime 
also came up with his transitional programme which was similar to that of Babangida’s 
transitional agenda (Chidi, 2001). He set up a constitutional conference in 1994 and 
by mid-term of 1995, a completed work of the conference was submitted. The regime 
introduced a political blue print aimed at returning the country back to civilian 
administration in October 1998. Elements of the programme released by the regime 
towards political transition included creation of more states, lifting of ban on political 
activities, establishment of political parties and handing over of power to a civilian 
government by October 1, 1998. The National Electoral Commission of Nigeria 
(NECON) established by the regime got legal backing in 1996 through Decree No 3. 
Unlike the previous electoral commissions, NECON did not conduct any general 
elections in the country. The chairman of NECON, Chief, Dagogo Jack, a Medical 
Practitioner, registered five political parties but none was led by credible politicians. 
The registered political parties were United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), Congress 
for National Consensus (CNC), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), National Centre 
Party of Nigeria (NCPN) and Grassroots Democratic Movements (GDM). The purpose 
was that Abacha would be a sole Presidential candidate that would be supported by all 
the political parties (Imam, 2010). Though the commission conducted election to the 
offices of local government councils and National Assembly, the acclaimed winners 
had not been inaugurated when Abacha died. 
 
However, right from the beginning of Abacha’s regime, he was faced with high level 
of hostility from the Western countries frowning at the return of military rule in 
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Nigeria. According to the British Foreign Secretary, Britain would not accept and 
tolerate Nigeria’s return to military rule and was ready to impose further sanction on 
the country (Osaghae, 2011: 274).  Part of the sanction included banning of Nigeria 
from Commonwealth of Nations and diplomatic relations between Britain and Nigeria 
became a stick affair. The United States also condemned the seizure of power by 
Abacha and the resurfacing of military regime. The US affirmed her readiness to 
impose economic sanction on Nigeria and was not ready to recognise undemocratic 
system in the country. In fact, several sanctions were imposed on Nigeria and the 
country has never witnessed dark days within the international community like that of 
Abacha era. 
 
The internal struggle continued with so many civil society organizations forming 
alliance with other notable bodies within and outside Nigeria to denounce the military 
rule and calling for revalidation of the June 12 presidential elections. By May 15, 1994 
precisely, National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) was formed struggling for 
installation of democratic system in Nigeria and calling for international support to 
revalidate the June 12 election (Idachaba, 2001). In response to this, Abacha’s regime 
declared NADECO illegal association and arrested most of the members. This ugly 
scenario forced notable members of NADECO to seek asylum and took the agitation 
to international community. The dimension of the struggle made Chief M.K.O Abiola, 
the acclaimed winner of the June 12 poll to declare himself as Winner and President – 
Elect of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on June 11, 1994. Subsequently, Abiola was 
arrested and detained by the military. 
 
The international dimension contributed immensely to the resistance of the military 
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rule of Abacha. NADECO later had an understanding with some foreign based groups 
such as the Association of Nigerians in Diaspora, Nigerian Democratic Alliance, and 
National Liberation Council of Nigeria/United Democratic Front led rigorous 
campaign against the military regime. This campaign was implemented through 
lobbying of several Western governments to impose sanctions on Nigeria and exert 
further pressure on the Abacha’s regime (Osaghae, 2011). Given this, Nigeria was 
becoming an isolated country in the world and even in the area of sport, the Junior 
World Cup that was supposed to be hosted by Nigeria was boycotted by other countries 
and had to be cancelled at the last minute (Newswatch, May 15, 1995). No doubt, the 
world attention was awakening by NADECO’s move and Nigeria became more of 
home-based country. 
 
It was becoming glaring that Abacha’s political transition might not be fruitful. 
Though elections were conducted at the local government levels, States Assemblies 
and National Assembly from 1997 to 1998, the presidential election was being delayed 
unnecessarily. And people suspecting Abacha’s interest in transforming himself 
automatically to civilian president. But Abacha died in a mysterious circumstance on 
June 8, 1998 and General Abubakar Abdulsalam succeeded him.  Abubakar unveiled 
the shortest transition programme in the history Nigeria. In his political transition, 
Abubakar declared May 29, 1999 as the hand over date to a democratically elected 
president. In order to fulfil this, he cancelled previous elections, dissolved the National 
Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON), freed some detainees and by August 11 
1996, he inaugurated 14 member of Independent National Electoral Commission 




3.11 The Nigeria’s Fourth Republic and Politics of Transition (1999-2011) 
The evolution of Nigeria’s fourth republic became realistic on May 29, 1999 when 
power was transferred to the democratically elected President, Chief Olusegun 
Obasanjo, by the former military head of state, Abubakar Abdulsalam. The emergence 
of Obasanjo this time was not through coup19 but electoral process that plunged 
Nigeria back to comity of democratic states in the international community. The 1999 
general elections were conducted amidst the zeal of agitation for the return of 
democracy. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established 
by section 153 of the 1999 constitution specifying its mandate as the recognised body 
to organise, undertake and supervise general elections in the country. The 
responsibility of INEC was not different from the previous electoral commissions 
(Moveh, 2013) except that the constitution made provision for the establishment of 
State Independent Electoral Commission (SIEC) to conduct and supervise local 
government elections20.  
 
 The constitution also specified that INEC would be led by Chairman and 12 National 
Electoral Commissioners. To ensure balancing, 2 National Electoral Commissioners 
were to be appointed from each of the six geo-political zones. Meanwhile, Resident 
Electoral Commissioner (REC) heads each of the state branches of the INEC.  As part 
of the pre – election activities, INEC registered three political parties in preparation 
for the 1999 general elections. The three political parties that participated in the 
                                                          
19 Olusegun Obasanjo was formerly a military head of state (1976-1979) but came to power in 1999 
through ballot which made him the first Nigerian to serve as military head of state and civilian president 
respectively. The present president of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari becomes the second person to have 
served as military head of state and also as democratically elected president. 
20 Section 197-205 of the Nigeria 1999 constitution made provision for the establishment of State 
Independent Electoral Commission (SEIC) in every state of the federation. Since the formation of SEIC, 
local government elections have been managed by the state electoral body while INEC manages general 
or national elections. 
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elections were the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the Alliance for Democracy (AD) 
and All People’s Party (APP). The AD and APP later formed an alliance to present 
one candidate for the presidency in person of Chief Olu Falae while the PDP 
presidential candidate was Retired General Olusegun Obasanjo. At the end of the 
general election, the PDP candidate emerged as the winner of the presidential election 
and was sworn in on May 29, 1999 marking the beginning of Nigeria’s fourth republic 
(Uche, 2003). 
 
 However, the 1999 election was not free from the deceptive, manipulative and 
malpractice conduct attributed to the previous exercises, it was characterised by 
systemic rigging.  The political scenario that produced Obasanjo to the realm of power 
in 1999 was a kind of civilian coup in which the cabals in Nigerian polity plotted to 
ensure continuity under democratic disguise. As it can be recalled, the beginning of 
transition programme of Abdulsalam to civilian rule enjoyed the backing of the 
powerful Northern power brokers led by former military head, Ibrahim Babangida, 
who negotiated state pardon for Obasanjo after his release from prison and as well 
plotted his emergence as flag bearer of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) for the 
1999 presidential election (Omotola, 2007)  
 
Unlike the previous political transitions that were tactically prolonged, the Abubakar 
Abdulsalam transition programme that led to the current forth republic was the shortest 
in the history of military – civilian power transfer in the country (Uche, 2003).  
The 1999 general elections shared similar attributes with that of the 1979 elections in 
terms of boycott, thuggery and other forms of malpractices associated with Nigeria’s 
electoral process. The acceptance of the 1999 general elections by Nigerians could be 
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attributed to several factors. Firstly, there was a kind of general feeling, though not 
documented, that any protest of the outcome may be an excuse for further military 
establishment to hold on to power. Secondly, the two major contenders of the 
presidential election, Chief Olu Falae of AD/APP accord and retired General Olusegun 
Obasanjo of the PDP, were not only from the same geo-political zone but also from 
the same ethnicity (Yoruba). This perhaps freed the country from the agony of ethnic 
jingoism that usually associated with Nigeria’s electioneering politics. Though the 
elections were not free from petitions, most of the complaints, if not all, were handled 
by the election tribunals set up for such purpose. In the long run, the declared winner 
of the contest, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, was sworn as the second executive president 
since Nigeria adopted presidential system of government21.  The PDP did not only win 
the presidency but also got comfortable majority in the National Assembly. Also, the 
party swept 24 states out of the 36 states and controlled the majority seats in the state 
parliaments. With this, the party controlled the national government. 
 
Another opportunity was presented for Nigerians to vote in 2003 general elections 
which served as an avenue to ensure transition from one civilian government to another 
having failed to achieve this in 1964 and 1983 elections as a result of rancour that 
trailed the electoral processes (Uche, 2003). Meanwhile, after initial hesitation, the 
Independent National Electoral Commission registered additional three political 
parties to participate in the 2003 elections. The newly registered parties were the All 
Progressive Alliance (APGA), the United Nigeria People’s Party (UNPP) and the 
National Democratic Party. Later on, there was a pronouncement from the Supreme 
                                                          
21  Nigeria abandoned the inherited British parliamentary system of government and adopted the 
American style of presidential system in 1979 during the country’s second republic when Sheu 
Shagari was sworn in as the first executive president in Nigeria 
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Court of Nigeria precisely on November 8 2002 that INEC has no mandate to issue 
guidelines for formation of political parties outside the country’s constitutional 
requirement. This ruling became a landmark that resulted to formation of more 
political parties and a total number of twenty-nine (29) of them contested the 2003 
elections. This was an unprecedented in the political history of Nigeria. However, the 
elections witnessed a lot of rancour to the extent that political assassinations were 
recorded in some states (Okorie, 2003). As noted by Nwolise (2007:165), the 
incumbency power was exploited by the ruling party (PDP) to the fullest through 
deployment of every available state machineries including the security personnel to 
retain its power. The election rigging in 2003 was directly involved by the Independent 
National Electoral Commissioner and the electoral umpire was functioning like a 
department under the presidency having jettisoned its impartiality. Again, the 2003 
elections were reflection of ethnic politics and the Yoruba controlled AD was accused 
of forming alliance with the PDP to ensure the return of President Obasanjo, a Yoruba 
man (Uche, 2003:71).   
 
As part of the initiative to strengthen INEC, a key institution within the electoral body 
was formed (Electoral Institute) in July 2005 for the purpose of ensuring 
professionalism and to enhance capacity building for the electoral officials.  The 
agency was an appendix of INEC tasked with training and enlightenment of electorates 
for effective political participation. Also, the Electoral Institute was empowered to 
carry out research and documentation on behalf of INEC. All these were introduced to 
boost electoral process in the country. However, the hope for better election in 2007 
also suffered serious setback and its conduct remained a worst outing in the annals of 
series of electoral exercises in the country. The 2007 elections were conducted by 
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Professor Maurice Iwu, a Professor of Pharmacognosy, and the outcome was faced 
with a lot of criticism. During the preparation for the 2007 elections, the president 
(Olusegun Obasanjo) made a shocking pronouncement that the election would be ‘a 
do or die’ affair and indeed it was a terrible electioneering contest. The word of the 
president could be seen as a motivating factor that set a paste for electoral violence 
surpassing the events of the previously rigged elections. The manifestation of 
malpractices in the 2007 general elections cut across all the phases of electoral 
processes ranging from voter’s registration, nomination of party flag bearers, 
intimidation of voters on Election Day, announcement of results even in areas where 
elections did not hold. (Jibrin & Bamidele, 2009).  
 
The voters registered were manipulated to accommodate over registration of certain 
people and groups and under-registration of other persons and groups believed to have 
belonged to the opposition. The partisanship of the electoral body posed serious threat 
to the possibility of sustaining democracy in Nigeria. In many states across the country, 
no elections took place and INEC declared results. The case of Anambra state for 
instance, in most polling stations visited by various election observers, voting did not 
hold and yet INEC announced result. This problem was also noticeable in Edo, Ogun, 
Ondo, Ekiti, Osun and Oyo where partial voting took place. The elections were 
characterised by snatching of ballot boxes, burning of ballot boxes, harassment of 
voters by security agents and indiscriminate shootings (Agbor, 2007). 
 
The elections were condemned by both local and international observers. In a strong 
statement, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI), among others, perceived the elections as not credible. The 
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European Union Election Observer Mission (EUEOM) made a remark that the 
Nigeria’s 2007 elections were largely marred with violence, disenfranchisement of 
voters, lack of transparency and widespread irregularities. The submission of the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) on the 2007 elections tagged Nigeria’s electoral 
democracy as a backward system showcasing weak institutions especially the electoral 
umpire. The Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) on behalf of domestic election 
observers qualified the 2007 election as a charade with the level of irregularities far 
from the requirement of democratic election. In fact, the summary of 2007 elections 
was represented in a statement issued by the Joint Action Forum22 that INEC 
completely liaised with the PDP to rob the mandates of the people by conducting a 
scam election (Royal African Society, 2007).  
 
No doubt from various reports and perceptions on the 2007 general elections, the 
subversion of popular sovereignty remained the outcome of the whole exercise. The 
elections actually generated the highest rate of election petitions at the Election 
Tribunals across the country. A total number of 1,290 cases filled following the 
outcome of the 2007 elections (INEC Report, 2011).  It was on this outlook that the 
main beneficiary of the election, the president elects, Umar Musa Yar’Adua of the 
PDP, concurred by admitting the fact that the electoral process that brought him to 
power was flawed in all ramification.  Osita (2013) concludes that Obasanjo hijacked 
the PDP structure and imposed Umar Musa Yar’Adua with the support of other 
Godfathers within the party. However, Yar’Adua did not only acknowledge the flawed 
process, he immediately inaugurated a 22-man Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) to 
review the country’s electoral system. The committee was headed by the former Chief 
                                                          
22 Joint Action Forum was a non-governmental body comprising 50 civil society organisations 
accredited to monitor the 2007 election 
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Justice of Federation, Muhammad Uwais, and after series of consultations and 
meetings, the committee submitted a report which contains numerous 
recommendations on how Nigeria’s future elections can be improved. 
 
The subsequent 2011 general elections came with some improvements when compared 
to the experience of the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections (Osita, 2013). Towards the 
preparation for the 2011 exercise, one of the members of Uwais committee, Professor 
Attahiru Jega, a renowned Professor of Political Science was appointed in 2010 as the 
Chairman of the INEC. He replaced Professor Maurince Iwu that supervised the 2007 
elections. Jega came on board to conduct 2011 election and the major departure under 
his administration was the sanitation of the voters register through a credible biometric 
registration of voters. Also, there was a reduction of over 50 percent cases recorded at 
the election tribunals following the 2011 elections. Unlike in the 2007 elections that 
were followed up with more than 1,200 petitions, the election tribunals cases were 
reduced to 731 aftermath the 2011 general elections.  Despite the efforts made in 
sanitising the voters register, series of complains still surfaced and although it was 
better than the 2007 register, the issue of multiple registration was pronounced in the 
voters’ register used in conducting the 2011 elections. This was one of the challenges 
encountered in the management of the 2011 election (INEC Report, 2011).  
 
Although there was a significant improvement in the 2011 elections which served as 
hope for Nigeria’s democracy having witnessed a worst scenario in 2007, the post-
election violence was an ugly trend that claimed a lot of causalities (NDI, 2011). This 
reflects a kind of parochial political culture in the country and created a much concern 
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for Nigeria’s electoral democracy.  As reported by Dorina Bekoe (2011)23, the 
Nigeria’s 2011 elections were better run but most violent by claiming over 800 lives 
and displacing more than 65,000 people. This made the post – election violence to 
have been the worst in Nigerian political history. What triggered the violence was an 
expectation largely from the Northern region that Muhammadu Buhari of the Congress 
for Progressive Change (CPC) should have won the presidential election that was 
declared in favour of the incumbent President, a Southerner, Goodluck Jonathan of the 
People’s Democratic Party. In the report of Human Rights Watch (2011), what began 
as a form of protest in 12 northern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, 
Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara later degenerated into 
violent acts that resulted to the killing of innocent lives. The conclusion of Corrine 
Dufka, Senior West Africa Researcher of the Human Rights Watch, is that ‘the April 
elections were heralded as among the fairest in Nigeria’s history, but they were among 
the blodiest’ (Human Rights Watch, 2011:1). 
 
3.12 Conclusion 
Nigeria’s electoral politics is a phenomenon that has a long antecedent to pre-
independence era. But the elective principle introduced by the British authorities was 
more of political subjugation paving ways for the colonial masters to decide the fate 
of Africans on socio- economic and political issues affecting the colony. This led to 
series of agitations resulting to constitutional development from one Governor- 
General to another not until the date of Nigeria’s independence was finalised at the 
London conference of 1958.  However, the struggle and agitation of the Nigerian 
nationalists later produced independence on October 1st, 1960 and since then, the 
                                                          
23 Dorina Bekoe was a former senior programme officer with the United State Institute for Peace 
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country has been ruled by indigenous government. Despite the attainment of self-
government, the history of electoral conduct has been in a similar terrain with the 
experiences of the British administered elections. Having traced the first election 
conducted and supervised by Nigerians to that of the 1964 general elections, it was 
glaring that its outcome led to the first military intervention in Nigeria politics as a 
result of the irregularities associated with the elections. Since the inception of military 
incursion in Nigeria’s politics, the struggling for political transition has been an issue 
which invariably threaten the country’s political stability. Though there was 
transferred of power, the first ever, from military to civilian rule in 1979, the country 
did not witness civilian – civilian power transition until 2003 general elections.  
 
The subsequent 2007 general elections that followed remained the worst 
electioneering outing in Nigeria as reported by both local and international observers. 
Nevertheless, several elections conducted since the beginning of the fourth republic 
highlighted earlier shared similarities in the area of malpractices, intimidation and 
violence, the 2011 elections could have been remarkable provided its aftermath did 
not come with electoral violence that claimed several lives and properties. The next 
chapter features some technical planning injected into the electoral commission which 






THE ADMINISTRATION OF NIGERIA’S 2015 GENERAL 




The centrality of this chapter captures the process and preparation of the Electoral 
Management Body (EMB) towards the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. In view of 
this, the internal mechanism and quality controlled measured introduced by the 
election commission in preparation for administration of the 2015 general elections 
would be explored in this segment. The internal restructuring embarked on by the 
EMB, the technological innovations such as the Card Reader introduced and the 
adoption of Permanent Voters Card (PVC) for the first time in the history of the 
electoral umpire and some other efforts made in the administration of the 2015 general 
elections. 
 
The role of other relevant stakeholders, particularly the inclusion of some noble 
individuals within and outside the EMB accounted for robust reports provided by 
various technical committees. The partnership with seasoned election management 
experts and the collaboration in sustaining peaceful atmosphere for the conduct of the 
elections awakened the formation of Inter Agency Consultative Security on Election 
(IACSE) set up and met regularly in analysing the possible security risk towards the 
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2015 elections. As a matter of fact, conducting election in Nigeria actually poses 
serious risk not only to the election administrators but also to security personnel, 
election contestants and the general electorates. The apprehension and tension which 
Nigeria’s election has always been posed necessitated a collaboration between the 
electoral umpire and security agency which led to the formation of a committee known 
as Electoral Risk Management (ERM). In essence, the Independent National Electoral 
Commission actually enjoyed good relationships with many stakeholders and more 
importantly cooperation from the Nigerians that have been yearning for free, fair and 
credible elections. 
 
Given this, this chapter discusses the internal measures introduced by the Independent 
National Electoral Commission towards the preparation for the 2015 general elections. 
The setting up of the Election Strategic Plan (2012-2016), the Registration and 
Electoral Review Committee (RERC), the Election Management System (EMS), the 
Election Project Plan (EPP) among others in boosting the process of Nigeria’s electoral 
democracy particularly the 2015 elections were a landmark achievement for the EMB. 
 
 
4.2 INEC and the Preparation for the 2015 General Elections: Policies and 
Initiatives 
In the aftermath of the 2011 general elections, the EMB came up with a range of 
policies and programmes towards improving the 2015 general elections. According to 
the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Attahiru 
Jega, the innovations were necessary to reposition the electoral umpire as one of the 
best electoral management bodies in the world. In order to sustain the gains of the 2011 
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elections, INEC tried to build an institutional memory as the basis for enhancing future 
elections. This informed the rational while most of the policies were largely engineered 
from the review of various reports got from the outcome of the 2011 general elections.  
 
The commission having realised some of its weaknesses and the need to develop a 
sustained planning culture and expand its skills optimally in order to deliver a credible 
election in a country with complex political environment, initiated a number of 
election project plan (INEC Report, 2015). According to Babatunde (2015), INEC 
learnt lessons from the 2011 general elections and which propelled its readiness and 
early preparation for the 2015 elections.  Some of the programmes and initiatives 
introduced were Election Strategic Plan (2012-2016), Registration and Election 
Review Committee, Election Management System, Election Project Plan, Election 
Risk Management, INEC Citizens Contact Centre and a Communication Policy.  
 
These initiatives and a number of innovations introduced, formed the basis for take-
off activities for administration of the 2015 general elections. As rightly pinpointed by 
Attahiru (2014), for Nigeria’s democracy to be sustained, the Election Management 
Body (EMB) must conform to the best practices of ensuring fair and credible elections. 
Indeed, such vision and mission of delivering credible elections to the Nigerian people 
and the international democracies at large necessitated the repositioning and 
restructuring of the electoral commission. This position is justified by Alexander 
(2015) background analysis of the Nigeria’s 2015 election that was characterized as a 
dilemma of opportunity and crisis. However, though the electoral commission initiated 
some policies that led to a kind of paradigm shift, the 2015 elections still had its 
shortcomings. In lieu of this, broad information on the aforementioned programmes is 
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needed for better understanding of what actually happened in the 2015 general 
elections.  
 
4.2.1 The Election Strategic Plan 2012-2016 
The guiding principles which invariable are the basis of the EMB core values of 
autonomy, transparency, integrity, impartiality, dedication, equity, excellence and 
teamwork really propelled the commission under the leadership of Professor Attahiru 
Jega to draft a strategic plan. The strategic plan (SP) which was launched in November 
2013 is actually the backbone of the entire activities of the commission towards the 
2015 general elections and beyond (INEC Report, 2015:37).  In fact, it was a blueprint 
that is expected to guide the electoral umpire in discharging its activities within a legal 
framework. It came up with five strategic objectives to be adopted by the commission 
within the context of its vision aiming to be among the best EMB in the world and also 
meets the aspirations of Nigerian populace. The five objectives are: 
i) Development of electoral operations, systems and infrastructure to support 
free, fair and credible elections 
ii) Improvement of voter education, training and research 
iii) Registering political parties and monitoring their operations 
iv) Enhancement of stakeholder Engagement nationally and internationally 
v) Reorganization and repositioning of INEC for the sustained conduct of free, 
fair and credible elections (INEC, 2015)  
 
The composition of the strategic planning committee includes the following: Barr. 
Mike Igini (REC, Cross River), Prof. Istifanus Dafwang (REC, Gombe), Prof. Okey 
Ibeanu (Chief Technical Adviser to Hon. Chairman), Mustapha M. Kuta (Director, 
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Internal Audit), Margaret Ejeh Ikwunja (Director, Civil Society & Gender), Engr. 
Emmanuel Akem (Director, Voter Registry), Okey Ndeche (Director, Operations), U. 
F. Usman, (Director, Logistics & Transport), Augusta Chinwe Ogakwu (Director, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution), Emmanuel Umenger (Director Public Affairs), Engr. 
Chidi Nwafor (Director, ICT), Eyum Ode (HOD, Research & Documentation), 
Thomas W. Afanga  (Deputy Director, Finance and Accounts), Mohammed S. 
Mohammed (Assistant Director, HRM) and last but not the least Torgba Nyitse 
(Director, CPM) who served as the Secretary to the Committee (INEC, 2013). 
 
However, in order to achieve the outlined goals, the strategic plan committee organised 
different retreat comprising of relevant stakeholders from the staff of the election 
commission, members of political parties, civil society organizations, security 
agencies and some other professional bodies. After series of consultations, the 
committee resulted to breaking down each of the objectives to two phases; key action 
and key outcomes (See Appendix B).The implementations of those objectives were 
coordinated and executed from the office of the Chairman of the electoral commission 
(Strategic Plan Report, 2013). Though most of the activities delegated to relevant units 
and departments within the commission, directive was centralised for the purpose of 
uniformity in terms of achieving the targeted goals which proportionally were 
achieved. 
 
Nevertheless, the strategic plan encountered some challenges mostly in the area of 
logistics management. This hindered absolute application of the key strategic plan 
which invariably challenged INEC preparation towards the general elections. The 
shortcomings in the deployment of ICT hindered smooth operation of the electoral 
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commission plan to digitilise the voters’ registration process and at the long run the 
EMB could not ensure sufficient application of technology.  
  
4.2.2   The Registration and Election Review Committee (RERC) 
The issue of voters’ registration has always been a challenge in the history of Nigeria’s 
electoral democracy. The previous elections were battered with irregularities and lack 
of coordinated voters register. Such was one the inherited problems the leadership of 
Attahiru Jega faced when he became the Chairman of the electoral commission in 
2010. With the inception of Jega’s team in July 2010, the two central assignments were 
to compile a new register of voters and also conduct 2011 elections. However, despite 
the introduction of Data Capture Machine in registering prospective voters for 2011 
elections, the commission was confronted with many challenges in the registration of 
voters and during the elections. Having realised this, the commission had to engage 
seasoned experts in the area of election administration outside the EMB who have 
better understanding of electioneering politics in Nigeria. This actually gave rise to the 
setting up of Registration and Elections Review Committee (RERC) with the mandate 
of reviewing voters register (RERC Report, 2012). The mandate of the RERC is 
captured in its overall goals which include the following: 
i. Evaluation of the registration exercise and general elections with the aim of 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the electoral umpire 
ii.  To embark on repositioning of the commission in order to ensure more efficiency 
in meeting some of its challenges 
iii. To assist in creating a standard and reputable Electoral Management Body that 




The task given to the RERC also encompasses operational processes for voters’ 
registration and elections. This entails planning, organization, coordination and 
evaluation of the commission activities in the area of logistics procurement and 
material delivery vis vis deployment of personnel. Such assignment must be carried 
out within the legal framework with the purpose of addressing legal related issues 
arising from both registration of voters and elections. The committee also enjoyed 
some overlapping roles such as auditing of the commission’s relations with other 
external bodies like the security agencies, the NGOs and other development partners. 
Interestingly, the overall responsibility of the RERC was to identify and address all 
other outstanding issues that were likely to have impact on the 2015 general elections 
(RERC Report, 2012). 
 
Having considered the task ahead for the committee, it was glaring that a 
comprehensive and open mandate in respect of registration and election has been 
allocated to RERC. As clearly stated by the Chairman of the electoral commission, the 
RERC composed of renowned personalities in the area of election management and 
was given a free hand and therefore nothing was either ruled out or ruled in (Attahiru, 
2012, RERC, 2012). The RERC consisted of chairman and seven members whom are 
persons of integrity with cognate experience in electioneering research and policy 
making. The composition of the committee was as follow: 
1. Professor Adele Jinadu (Chairperson), a Professor of Political Science and 
former member of National Electoral Commission(NEC) 
2. Professor Festus Ijayi (Member), a Professor of Business Administration 




4. Hajiya Saudatu Mahdi(Member), Women Rights Activists and Director 
WRAPA 
5. Professor Abdulhamid Ujo(Member), a Professor of Political Science  
6. Professor Anthonia Taiye Simbine (Member), Research Professor, NISER, 
Ibadan. 
7. Hajiya Bilikisu Yusuf (Member), Journalist and Human Rights Activist. 
 
In the discharge of its responsibility, RERC came up with an elaborated methodology 
which included requesting submission of position papers from staff of the Independent 
National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other relevant stakeholders, conducting of 
oral interviews, organising Focus Group Discussion, assessing INEC facilities, 
reviewing of documents and as well as receiving commissioned papers from experts 
and consultants. Meanwhile, during this exercise, the committee was getting moral and 
kind support from bodies such as the EU, UNDP and IFEC. In fact, IFEC really 
provided technical support to the RERC to the extent of recommending one of its 
consultants, George Carmona, to work with the committee (RERC Report, 2012). 
 
However, after the rigorous field trips and other source of data, the RERC highlighted 
the problems relating to voter’s registrations and made recommendations in tune with 
its mandate. In the area of operational processes for voter registration and elections, 
the findings of the RERC indicated that inadequate personnel training has been a 
challenge towards achieving effective registration of voters. The inadequacy of 
personnel which could be attributed to insufficient time for training and deployment 
of the personnel and in some cases, those trained personnel were not selected for the 
exercise. Also, from the findings of the committee, the issue of late arrival of 
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registration materials and delay in distribution of materials compounded to the 
problem of voter’s registration. In addition to that, there were technical challenges in 
terms of the ability of many ad hoc staff to operate the DDC machine. Cases of under 
age and multiple registration were also detected coupled with inadequate publicity to 
the members of the public. In all, logistic challenges contributed to the lapses 
experienced in registration of voters and elections (RERC Report, 2012:12). Despite 
all these, the years between the 2011 elections and the 2015 general elections were 
sufficiently for the electoral body to tackle some of those challenges (Siyan & Saheed, 
2015). 
 
Although the RERC did not just highlight the problems associated with the process of 
voter registration and election, it came up with recommendations on how the 
anomalies could be corrected. Firstly, RERC suggested a strategic operational plan 
that would provide a blue print for voter registration and electoral activities before the 
2015 general elections. The content of the plans encompasses   all activities and timing 
for voter registration and election. In the strategic plans as recommended by the RERC, 
the electoral commission should outline clearly roles to be assigned to both permanent 
and ad hoc staff in the registration of voters and elections. More also, INEC needed 
restructuring to enhance professionalism and efficiency in election administration and 
implementation of strategic plans. Part of the plans was to ensure prompt posting of 
electoral officers to respective local governments areas under their coverage. In order 
to achieve these, INEC should liars with respective government agencies and 




Not only that, continuous voter’s registration was suggested with a permanent 
administrative structure within each of the 774 local governments. This was expected 
to reflect the demographic structures and the number and places of registration centre 
must be made known to political parties and other stakeholders. The DDC machine 
was a welcome development and more of it needed to capture the large numbers of 
prospective voters. Also, the committee applauded the use of NYSC members as ad 
hoc staff and called for memorandum of understanding between INEC and NYSC. 
And lastly, the total figure of registered voters must be harmonised before final 
publication in order to avoid the confusing figures as experienced in the 2011 general 
elections. Finally, INEC should collaborate with relevant bodies to undertake 
extensive voter education for the electorates to have better understanding of the 
electoral process and their political obligations (RERC Report, 2012). 
 
On the legal framework for electoral conduct, RERC appreciated the provision of the 
law regarding voter registration and the timing. Meanwhile, the issue of party 
primaries was the major concern and from the findings of the RERC, the electoral body 
on several occasions faced difficulty in ensuring strict compliance of the political 
parties with the section 87 of the Electoral Act that stipulates candidature of political 
parties through primaries that must be monitored by the electoral body (Electoral Act, 
2010). Based on this, the committee recommended an effective means of deploying 
INEC staff to observe and monitor party primaries and ensure compliance with the 
provision of the Electoral Act in case of disputed primaries. This is achievable with 
early notification from the electoral umpire before elections could be conducted. The 
RERC concurred with the idea of ninety days’ notice ahead of election in order for 
political parties to organise their primaries and submit names of their various 
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candidates to the election management body. Such would also boost the chance of 
adequate monitoring of party’s primaries by the electoral commission. Similarly, 
INEC is expected to monitor political parties finance by ensuring periodic publication 
of parties’ finances (RERC, Report, 2012: 17). 
 
Considering the organizational structure of the electoral umpire, a number of problems 
were encountered during the 2011 voter’s registration exercise as a result of over 
delegation power, lack of integration, overlapping of function, poor formalisation of 
departmental functions, indiscipline among staff and communication problems. The 
RERC having identified the aforementioned problems also suggested way forward 
which include: substance and robust style of leadership, competence and committed 
staff, proper coordination from the Chairman’s office to other subordinates and 
streamlining number of department and units. With this, there would be solution to 
overlapping problem and duplication of responsibilities among units and departments. 
In the area of indiscipline, INEC was advised to review its rules and regulations and 
ensure that sanctions are provided for violators among the staff. For disciplinary 
actions to be effective, the leadership of INEC must embrace courage and commitment 
to do so (RERC, 2012: 26). 
 
The use of ad hoc staff in the conduct of elections has always been significant but the 
experience of the 2011 elections was worrisome due to attack and killing of some 
members of the National Youth Service Corps that participated in the exercise (The 
Nation, March 23, 2011). In order to avert the ugly experience of the 2011, the RERC 
recommended a review of inter-agency relationship between INEC and NYSC. The 
synergy must entail provision of tight security not only for members of the National 
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Youth Corp Services but also other personnel that would serve as ad hoc staff for 
conduct of subsequent elections. RERC concurred with the idea of using members of 
the NYSC as ad hoc staff but requested for a more robust partnership between INEC 
and NYSC. The engagement of NYSC members as Presiding Officer (PO) and 
Assistant Presiding Officer (APO) needed to be strengthened and also any corps 
member that should be involved must have a length of service period. This becomes 
imperative so that during election petition tribunal, the members of the NYSC that 
participated in election could assist in providing relevant information to aid the 
electoral litigation process (RERC, 2012:45). 
 
The display of voter’s register deserves wider publicity and as rightly suggested by the 
RERC Committees, there is need for rigorous and systemic publicity to enhance this. 
The key role of all media organizations both print and electronic media is required to 
be deployed. As adverts are done in the print media for the lettered to read and share 
across, the electronic media should employ constant announcement via the radio and 
televisions. Also, the modern social media such as facebook, tweeter, and other forms 
of contemporary information gadgets should be deployed to reach the populace. 
Generally, the voters’ education system must be improved if proper understanding of 
what constitutes electoral exercise need to get across to the masses. 
 
The effort of the committee was noticed through its submission of blue print but the 
electoral umpire failed to address all the issues raised by RERC. Firstly, there was 
delay in the display of voters register and the electorates suffered mixed up of names 
in some polling units (Daily Trust, May 21, 2014). Also, the inability of the electoral 
commission to properly educate voters on transfer of voters’ card to capture the 
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electorates locations for those that have changed location (accommodation area) 
between the period of registration and voting day.  This singular issue contributed to 
disenfranchisement of large number of affected voters. As reported in some media 
outlets, a lot of prospective voters could not locate their names on voters register list 
which could be seen as another blow to the conduct of the 2015 elections. Such 
indicates the lapses in the registration of voters and lack of harmonization of the voters’ 
register. Nevertheless, the recommendations of the RERC assisted INEC in improving 
the process of voters’ registration when compared to the previous trend of shadow 
voters’ register (INEC, 2015) 
 
4.2.3 The Election Management System (EMS)    
Management of elections in Nigeria has always been a peculiar task that required 
effective and vibrant planning. However, despite years of democratic dispensation in 
the country, conducting free and credible elections has been a major setback in the 
electoral history of Nigeria. In order to avert irregularities in 2015 elections, the 
Election Management System (EMS) which was derived from the strategic plan 
became imperative. The target of the EMS was to address the critical areas of logistics, 
training, staff management, procurement management and management of political 
parties’ candidates.  The fact remains that EMS was a tool used by the electoral 
commission with active collaboration from the International Foundation for Electoral 
System (IFES) to provide management framework that would support the planning, 
execution and monitoring of activities outlined within the projected Electoral Circle 




Figure 4.1 The Electoral Cycle 
Source INEC Report (2015) 
 
The decision of the commission to introduce and deploy an EMS tool in managing the 
2015 elections arose from the challenges of the 2011 elections in operational and 
logistic areas. That is why the EMS was basically designed to focus on the following: 
1. To study and develop an operational plan for implementation of infrastructural support 
needed in election management with focus on three key areas: 
• Recruitment and Training of ad hoc staff 
• Deployment, monitoring and retrieval of elections materials used on Election 
Day 
• Management of Political party candidate  
2 To map out the key business processes related to the aforementioned three key areas 
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3 To address other issues arising from the focal areas above such as development and 
documentation of relevant tools to support the identified key areas 
4 To work strictly within the time span as specified in the strategic plan (INEC, 2015) 
 
 
In the long run and for fulfilment of the task ahead, the committee identified seven 
principal business areas which actually enhanced the success of the 2015 general 
elections. These areas include Election Day Logistics (EDL), Election Staff 
Management (ESM), Political Party and Candidate Management (PPM), Election Day 
Training (EDT), Election Day Procurement (EDP), Continuous Voter Registration 
(CVR) and Election Day Support (EDS). While dealing with those seven points’ 
agenda, the committee mapped out all the high and low-level tasks involved in 
achieving them (EMS Project Report, 2015). The EMS was deployed to the field 
during the 2015 general elections and worked rigorously to sustain its target which 
also assisted the credibility of the conduct in the administration of the elections. Table 
4.1 summarizes the seven principal areas. 
 
 
Table 4.1  




TASK OWNER  ANTICIPATED BENEFITS 
1. Election Day Logistics 
(EDL)  
Director, Election Operations Timely deployment and 
retrieval of personnel and 
materials  
 Effective quality and quantity 
control of personnel and 
materials  Adequate safety of 
personnel and materials 
 
2.Election Staff Management 
(ESM) 
 
Director, Human Resources 
 
 Enhanced recruitment, 




 Timely and adequate staffing 
for elections 
 Enhanced performance 
monitoring and evaluation 
 
3. Election Day Training 
(EDT)  
Director, Training (TEI)  Improved election day 
personnel understanding of their 
roles and responsibilities 
  Improved quality of election 
day activities 
  Improved INEC’s election 
day image 
 
4. Political Party 
Management (PPM) 
 
Director, Election & Party 
Monitoring 
 
 Improved compliance with 
the legal framework 
 Improved internal candidate 
and party agent management 
 Improved monitoring of 
campaign period and party 
financing 
 
5. Election Day Support 
(EDS)  
Chairman  Improved delivery of election 
day activities as planned 
  Increased stakeholder 
confidence in INEC’s ability to 
deliver its plans  
 Reduced high cost, fire 
fighting activities. 
 





 Full adherence to all required 
checks and balances in the spirit 
of procurement rules 
 Approved routine and fast-
tracked procurement processes 
which remove the need for 
INEC to “bend” the 
procurement rules to carry out 
its constitutional mandate 
 Timely delivery of goods and 
services which meet the 
requirement regardless of the 
political climate and 
unanticipated events 
 
7. Continuous Voter 
Registration (CVR)  
Director, Voter Registry  Increased stakeholder 
confidence in the voter register  
 Increased accuracy of the 
voter registers  
 Increased public awareness of 
the voter registration process 




4.2.4 The Election Project Plan (EPP) 
Although the conduct of the 2011 general elections could be seen as an improvement, 
certain aspects most especially planning was a concern and which necessitated the 
formation of Election Project Plan (EPP) targeted towards 2015 elections and beyond. 
Giving recognition to planning was one of the major lesson learnt from the review of 
the 2011 elections (Attahiru, 2015). As mentioned earlier, the establishment of 
strategic plan that guided the activities of the electoral umpire (INEC) also resulted to 
the formation of EPP committee which was set up in July 2013. The 14-man committee 
was tasked with the responsibility of developing an EPP for the 2015 general elections 
(INEC Activity Report, 2014). The committee was headed by Professor Okechukwu 
Ibeanu who was the Chief Technical Adviser to the Chairman of the electoral 
commission. The aim and priority of the EPP committee was to institutionalize 
planning in the conduct of Nigeria’s election so as to ensure activation of timeline of 
election activities whenever a date is set for election. During the inauguration of the 
committee on 9th of July 2013 precisely, the committee was charged with the following 
tasks: 
i. To come up with a comprehensive draft showcasing plan for the 2015 elections 
ii. To clarify and specify business processes and activities of the plan to ensure 
timely achievement 
iii. To produce timeline for implementation of the plan 
iv. To liaise with relevant partners for inclusive and implementable plan 
v. To work with African Union consultant in the development of the plan 




The specification of the tasks given to the EPP was in clearer terms and actions and 
programmes of the committee were subjected to approval of the electoral commission 
(INEC, 2015). Interestingly, the committee worked in conjunction with the EMS to 
achieve the seven goals business areas. The plan actually conforms to the commission 
strategic plan and harmonises roles, activities and timelines with the view of achieving 
an operational efficiency that would guarantee cost minimization and eventually 
deepen Nigeria’s democracy (TCEPP, 2015). 
 
The plan identified thirteen cardinal factors that needed to be considered for a 
successful election. These factors were captured in the roles and responsibilities of 
various units and departments of the Independent National Electoral Commission. For 
initiative and formidable plan to be achieved, the committee emphasised the role of 
relevant stakeholders such as voters, civil society organisation, specifically the abled 
people, vendors, service providers and development partners. However, the principal 
responsibility for proper monitoring of the EPP was anchored by the Directorate of 
Planning and Monitoring (DPM). Meanwhile, the Implementing Department and 
Directorates also played a vital role in ensuring the sustainability of the EPP towards 
the 2015 elections. 
 
Lastly, the EPP report entails a number of suggestions that serve as critical 
recommendation for the 2015 general elections. As a matter of fact, for successful 
implementation of the EPP, the following could be seen as the principal requirements 
for better electoral plan as stipulated in the recommendations of the Technical 
Committee of the Election Project Plan: 
1     Ensuring that procurements are timely 
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2 The Budgetary Process must be improved 
3 Constant monitoring of equipment at national and state offices 
4 Strengthening the capacity of the Directorate of Planning and Monitoring 
5 There must be improvement of cordiality between the headquarters and other 
field offices of the commission (INEC, 2015) 
 
4.2.5 Election Risk Management (ERM) 
The implementation and adoption of Election Risk Management (ERM) tool was an 
exemplary innovation targeted at reforming the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) under the leadership of Attahiru Jega. What actually warranted 
the formation of ERM was due to the fact that elections in Nigeria have been violently 
anchored. Since the inception of Nigeria’s current democratic dispensation in 1999, 
violence has been become a virus that threatens electoral process in the country. As 
noted in the previous chapter, the post - election violence in 2011 was alarming. 
Innocent lives were lost and the damages of properties worth billions destroyed. This 
ugly trend of electoral violence triggered the idea of mapping out areas that were prone 
to violence aftermath of the 2011 experience. 
 
 In addition, the tension emanating from prospective parties’ loyalists and supporters 
coupled with hate campaign speeches form aspirants, the 2015 election was at stake. 
Given this, actions were required if peaceful elections must be achieved. The eagerness 
of the electoral commission to tame the monster of electoral violence led to its 
proactive approach by introducing ERM tool as a measure to curb the ugly 
phenomenon. The ERM tool was a collaborative effort of the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC), the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
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(IDEA) and the African Union (AU). This came into limelight by signing a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) by the three key players. Consequently, INEC, 
IDEA and AU agreed on April 3rd, 2015, to implement the ERM tool ahead of the 2015 
general elections (ERM Report, 2015). 
 
The ERM team comprised of eight individuals from the electoral commission having 
the Chief Technical Adviser to the Chairman, Prof Okechukwu Ibeanu, as the Project 
Supervisor. The ERM tool was designed to enable the users to understand risk factors, 
analyse risk data and also know how to prevent election related violence or any other 
form of electoral insecurity. With the aid of the tool, one can understand the possibility 
of violence in any stage of electoral cycle and thus devise appropriate means in 
curtailing or averting such threat. The EMS tool was customised and could only be 
assessed by the Election Management Body, Security Agencies and other key players 
involved in administering free and credible elections. 
 
Following the success recorded from the pilot survey in Colombia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
Bosnia- Herzegovina and Kenya, the ERM tool became a global outlet for public usage 
in October 2013. Based on this, INEC, IFED and AU organized a national workshop 
held in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria from December 10 to 11, 2013. The caption of 
the symposium was entitled ‘Mapping Electoral Risks in Nigeria’ drawing over 100 
hundred participants from INEC, Security Agencies, Civil Society Organization and 
delegations from the Kenya electoral commission (Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission) who applied the ERM tool in 2013 Kenya elections. 
Deliberations at the workshop were more on identification of possible electoral risk 
regions and possible preventions to avert such violence (ERM Report, 2015:2). 
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The partnership and collaboration enjoyed from the IFED and AU by the Electoral 
Commission revolved around advisory and technical support towards the use of the 
ERM tool software. Not only that, in the area of training, both IFED and AU organised 
adequate training for INEC personnel drawn from various departments such as ICT 
unit, Research and Development, Security and Voter Registration units were involved 
in the training. Interestingly, INEC deployed the ERM tool during the Gubernatorial 
Elections in Osun and Adamawa States respectively in 2014 which served as a test run 
approach before the general elections of 2015. Subsequently, the ERM introduced and 
set up Desk Offices in all the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. 
 
With the adoption of other useful methodologies in gathering information on the 
possibility of violence in 2015 elections, the ERM team came up with risk levels in 
different states of the federation. The risk was tagged in three phases namely; high, 
medium and low. From the field work embarked on by the ERM team, it was gathered 
that the level of risk ahead of 2015 general elections was high in Yobe, Borno, Plateau, 
Nasarawa, Rivers, Delta, Osun, Ekiti and Ondo states respectively. But the level of 
risk was at medium stage in Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba, Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Kano, 
Kaduna, Zamfara, Oyo, Ogun, Lagos, Bayelsa, Edo and Imo States while it was at low 
level in Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina, Jigawa, Bauchi, Niger, FCT, Enugu, Ebonyi, Cross 




Figure 4.2 Nigerian Map (Election Risk Management Committee) 
Source Electoral Risk Management Committee (2015)  
Note: Red represents high risk, Yellow for medium and Green for low. 
 
The responsible factors that posed electoral risk in the six geo political regions of the 
country were categorised to be internal and external. Internally, within the North East, 
the major concern was the issue of boundary delimitation while the external dimension 
include ethnic conflict, incursion of foreigners from neighbouring countries and the 
declaration of state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa due to Boko Haram 
insurgency. In the North Central, the issue of ethnic rivalry was identified and with 
particular reference to Plateau State. However, the South South zones were faced with 
deficient information, lack of trust among the stakeholders, unethical behaviours 
among politicians, corruption of EMB officials, and undue influence of money in 
campaign and disregard for political financing guidelines surfaced as part of internal 
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electoral risks in the region. While the issues of state interference and unethical 
behaviour of security agents were ascribed to external dimension of electoral risk in 
the South South. The South-East region was polarised along community conflict and 
boarder disputes as basis of external factors for electoral risk in the region. But the 
South West generally was prone to electoral risk due to difficult geographical terrain 
(ERM Report, 2015:36). 
 
Having identified different levels of risk in various states of the federation, the ERM 
team came up with action point recommendations in the six geopolitical regions of the 
country. Beginning with North East and North West, risk associated with legal issue 
should be solved through establishment of trusted electoral dispute resolution and 
judicial reform to avoid conflicting judgments. In order to address unfit electoral 
system, the ERM team recommended the formation of collaborative mechanism for 
coordination between the EMB and other relevant agencies. In the South South and 
South-East regions, issues regarding poor performance of EMB should be tackled 
through effective continuous training of staff, ensuring merit based recruitment of 
INEC staff and enforcement of sanctions for deviant staff. While adequate and prompt 
release of funds could assist in resolving some of the challenges faced by the EMB in 
the South South region. Meanwhile, inadequate funding was a serious threat to almost 
all the offices of the EMB in the North East, North Central, South West and South 
South. So, as part of recommendations of the ERM team, funding of all offices of the 
EMB beyond the listed regions should be prioritized. 
 
On matters relating to inadequate security arrangement during elections, the ERM 
suggested effective training of security personnel on election matters. Also, there 
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should be frequent conduct of inter- agency exercise to foresee any unwanted scenario. 
With inter agency exercise, there would be room for joint security planning that 
involve multiple security outlets collaborating with the EMB at national and sub 
national level. 
 
However, the recommendations of the ERM could not stop the ugly trend of election 
violence in the country. Several cases of election violence were reported particularly 
the scenario whereby the incumbent president campaign team was attacked by some 
youths in Bauchi state.  The violent youth also clashed with the security personnel that 
tried to control the situation (News Times, January 25, 2015). There was similar 
experience when the president visited Katsina state, the home town of his predecessor. 
The teeming youth displayed their displeasure with President Jonathan resulting to 
attacks on his convoy, though no casuality recorded unlike the Bauchi attacks that got 
six security guards injured and hospitalized.  In essence, cases of violence during the 
preparation for the election threaten the significance of the ERM tools and 
substantiated legitimacy of hybrid electoral democracy in the country.  
  
Nevertheless, there was controlled of electoral violence in the 2015 general elections 
when compared to the previous ugly trends of political assassination, killings and 
destruction of properties as witnessed in 2007 and 2011 respectively. But the electoral 
system is yet to reach the accepted stage whereby election administration does not 
equate to preparation for warfare (Alade, 2016). Though the 2015 general elections 
was a watershed that came with very low level of violent due to the projections and 
proactive measures taken, it did not free from cases of electoral violence.  This makes 
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it imperative for the electoral commission to strengthen its partnership with security 
agencies so as to avert cases of electoral violence in the subsequent future elections. 
  
4.2.6 INEC Citizens Contact Centre (ICCC) 
As part of the effort towards conducting a more robust and citizen centered elections, 
INEC established Citizens Contact Centre to ensure a flow of information between the 
electoral body and the Nigerian citizens. The task of the ICCC was to provide a 
platform that would enhance an enabling communication link between the EMB and 
the citizens for the latter to be aware of a responsive and transparent electoral process 
(INEC, 2015). After all, information is paramount for any meaningful action to be 
taken. The more informed the electorates, the better for election administration in any 
democratic state. Basically, the electoral management body under the leadership of 
Attahiru Jega strengthened INEC-Citizens communication forum in order to build 
confidence among the populace and other relevant stakeholders. The centre became 
active for public use during the continuous voter’s registration programme in Anambra 
State on August 13, 2013. Since then, the contact centre has been active and which 
was effectively explored during the 2015 general elections (INEC Report, 2015). 
 
The ICCC was designed to be a situation room that would serve as a channel of 
continuous communication where information could be exchanged with the electorates 
and other stakeholders. The centre offers opportunities for the people to be updated 
and getting real time information about the electoral process. With the formation of 
the centre, enquires, complains and incident cases were reported by the members of 
the public for immediate actions. The commission made provisions for contact 
numbers through which INEC staff stationed for enhancement and advancement of 
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free flow information in respect of the electoral process could be reached.  It also 
served as an avenue for the general public to make enquiries regarding the forthcoming 
elections. Before the 2015 general elections, the operation of the centre (ICCC) was 
restricted to office hours on a daily work hour basis from Monday to Friday, 9am to 
5pm. However, during the elections, the operation of the centre scaled up to a 24hrs 
basis as an incident and information centre. In this period, the use of social media like 
Facebook, Twitter and INEC website assisted more in updating Nigerians on the 
preparation and programmes of the electoral body. Also, the traditional media 
platforms such as the television, radio and newspaper were fully utilised in reaching 
out to the public on sensitisation of the process of the 2015 general election (INEC, 
2015) 
 
In as much as the centre achieved in boosting citizens information consciousness 
towards the 2015 general elections, the electorates at the rural settings were not 
adequately carried along with the modern communication trend. The use of social 
media was pronounced among the urbanites boosting their awareness on electoral 
matters, the people in the rural communities only relied on traditional mode of 
communication. This was abused by the desperate politicians to penetrate the rural 
people via vote buying and selling. The phenomenon of vote buying and selling as 
rightly observed by Ojo (2008) remains a weapon adopted by the politicians to deceive 
the less informed electorates. It has been a routine practice among political office 
holders in Nigeria to influence voters’ choice with money and other materials resulting 




4.2.7   National Inter- Agency Consultative Committee on Voter Education and 
Publicity (NICVEP) 
 The setting up of the NICVEP was one of the far-reaching task the electoral 
commission embarked on while preparing for the 2015 general elections. The major 
concern of this committee was to improve voter education and publicity. Being an 
inter-agency consultative committee, the members were drawn from the National 
Orientation Agency; Federal Ministry of Communication; Federal Ministry of 
Education; Federal Ministry of Information; Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and 
Social Development, National Broadcasting Commission; Nigerian Communication 
Commission; Nigerian Television Authority, News Agency of Nigeria, Nigeria Labour 
Congress, Nigerian Union of Journalist and Federal Ministry of Youth Development. 
 
The committee in discharging its responsibilities undertook a comprehensive review 
of voter education and publicity programmes in Nigeria. Based on this, it was able to 
proffer solution through its advisory policy on effective strategy for public 
enlightenment and voter education. It also developed a framework that would serve 
for longer period on civic and voter education. The committee also network beyond its 
membership and partnered with other organizations and agencies capable of 
participating in voter education (INEC Report, 2015). 
 
In order to sustain and achieve some of its goals, the NICVEP embarked on monitoring 
the implementation process of the voter education strategies. Such gesture was 
replicated at the state level with inauguration of State Inter Agency Committee on 
Voter Education and Publicity (SICVEP). For the benefit of the people at the 
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grassroots, the programme was extended to local government under the umbrella of 
Local Government Inter Agency Committee on Voter Education (LICVEP). 
 
It is glaring from the role of the three layers of the committee, the issue of voter 
education and publicity during the 2015 general election was at topmost. The level of 
enlightenment reflected in the citizenry coordination and participation before, during 
and after the elections. The impact of the inter-agency collaboration in dissemination 
of information gave the populace the leverage to be active not only during the voting 
exercise but also in collation and announcement of results. As noted by Omotola 
(2015), the electoral turn over syndrome in Nigeria’s 2015 general elections could not 
be detached from the partisanship of the populace who were determined despite all 
hurdles to exercise their civic and political rights. Indeed, the populace having gotten 
wide range of sensitisation through various programmes and strategies employed to 
improve voters’ education at the urban and rural communities, were able to display 
high level of commitment before and after the election days (TMG, 2015).  The public 
enlightenment involved series of radio programmes and television adverts championed 
by INEC with the supports of government and non – government agencies.  
 
No doubt, there was an improved and robust awareness, cases of null and void votes 
were also rampant. The major responsible factor for this was inadequate understanding 
among the electorates on voting procedures. The issue of double thumb printing was 
reported by the electoral officials in some polling units which prompted invalidation 
of several votes could be linked to insufficient awareness on the part of the voters. 
According to Mahmud (2015), the electorates’ behavior tells on the sociological 
perspective of elections and considering the rise of nullified votes in Nigeria’s 2015 
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elections, one can affirm that much needed to be done to enlighten citizens on political 
and civic rights.        
 
4.3    Technological Innovation and the 2015 General Elections  
In the global arena, the adoptions of technological know out have strengthen 
electioneering process of different democracies. The use of electronic in daily 
activities of governance necessitates the idea of ‘E-Government. This trend has 
become a global phenomenon that any serious democratic arrangement wants to 
imbibe. In view of this, Nigeria’s electoral system could not be cut off from the 
demands of an improved election administration which technological innovation 
cannot be undermined. With the comprehensive review of the 2011 general elections 
which resulted to some of the policies and initiatives highlighted above, the actual 
preparations for the polls began with the release of election time table on January 25, 
2014. This really captured the schedule of the electoral commission regarding the 2015 
elections. However, the electoral body embarked on major activities in preparation for 
the 2015 elections ranging from an in-depth internal restructuring, distribution of 
permanent voter’s card and procurement and deployment of smart card readers. In 
essence, INEC concurred with the clamour and agitation from the populace to embrace 
digitalisation which automatically placed the use of technology more imperative in the 
conduct of the 2015 elections (INEC, 2015). 
 
The need to optimise and upgrade registration of voters could be seen as one of the 
basis for injecting technology to the conduct of the 2015 elections so as to ensure 
integrity of the register. In order to achieve this, the commission ICT department 
initiated a process of register optimisation.  This process comprised of four stages 
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namely; Data Consolidation, Use of Automated Fingerprints Identification System 
(AFIS) for elimination of multiple registration, Production of Permanent Voter Cards 
(PVCs) and lastly, Manual Verification of Register to eliminate any duplicate that 
might have arisen through the AFIS (INEC Report, 2015). The optimisation of the 
register eventually resulted to update of the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory 
through an exercise tagged Continuous Voter Registration (CVR). The CVR was 
conducted in three phases which involved state grouping after it was undertaken in 
Osun and Ekiti ahead of their Gubernatorial Elections. The remaining 36 states and the 
FCT followed the heels of PVC distribution. At the end of the exercise, it was certified 
by the commission that 68,833,476 voters registered for the 2015 general elections 
(The Punch, January 15, 1015). 
  
The commission during the CVR adopted Direct Data Capture Machines (DDC) and 
were used in the phases of the registration exercise. The CVR was intended for three 
categories of people. Firstly, persons who turned 18 after the last registration exercise. 
Secondly, persons who have not registered before despite their eligibility during the 
last registration and thirdly, persons who registered but could not find their names on 
displayed registered list. But the reality which also posed challenges to the exercise 
was that many people outside these categories turned out for the CVR. Nevertheless, 
due to technological improvement and the use of Automated Fingerprints 
Identification System (AFIS), the issue of de-duplication was tackled (INEC Report, 
2015). 
 
However, having resolved that prospective voters can only use PVCs during the 2015 
elections, the commission produced the cards and were made available to registered 
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voters maintaining the same phases as indicated in the CVR exercise. The ICT 
department deployed the Permanent Voter Cards to all the states of the federation and 
the federal capital territory. From the record, the PVCs collected before the March 28 
National Assembly and Presidential Elections was 56,460,968 out of the 68,833,476 
registered voters. This simply represented an average of 82.03 percent (Abubakar & 
Ibrahim, 2015, INEC Report, 2015). Table 4.2 below indicates the distribution of 
PVCs as at March 21, 2015. 
 
Table 4.2  
Distribution of Permanent Voters Cards by INEC as at March 21, 2015 
 






1 ABIA 1,396,162 1,183,127 84.74 
2 ADAMAWA 1,559,012 1,381,571 88.62 
3 AKWA-IBOM 1,680,759 1,587,566 94.46 
4 ANAMBRA 1,963,173 1,658,967 84.50 
5 BAUCHI 2,054,125 1,967,081 95.76 
6 BAYELSA 610,373 548,585 89.88 
7 BENUE 2,015,452 1,607,800 79.77 
8 BORNO 1,934,079 1,407,777 72.79 
9 CROSS RIVER 1,175,623 983,968 83.70 
10 DELTA 2,275,264 1,939,952 85.26 
11 EBONYI 1,074,273 848,392 78.97 
12 EDO 1,779,738 1,230,566 68.81 
13 EKITI 732,021 522,107 71.32 
14 ENUGU 1,429,221 1,223,606 85.61 
Table 4.2 (Continued)     






15 FCT 881,472 569,109 64.56 
16 GOMBE 1,120,023 1,070,725 95.60 
17 IMO 1,803,030 1,707,449 94.70 
18 JIGAWA 1,831,276 1,757,658 95.98 
19 KADUNA 3,407,222 3,174,519 93.17 
20 KANO 4,975,701 4,112,039 82.64 
21 KATSINA 2,827,943 2,620,096 92.65 
22 KEBBI 1,470,648 1,372,630 93.34 
23 KOGI 1,350,883 926,013 68.55 
24 KWARA 1,142,267 889,067 77.83 
25 LAGOS 5,822,207 3,799,274 65.25 
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26 NASARAWA 1,242,667 1,048,053 84.34 
27 NIGER 2,014,317 1,682,058 83.51 
28 OGUN 1,829,534 1,125,657 61.53 
29 ONDO 1,524,655 1,118,479 73.36 
30 OSUN 1,407,107 1,033,229 73.43 
31 OYO 2,415,566 1,639,967 67.89 
32 PLATEAU 2,001,825 1,508,585 75.36 
33 RIVERS 2,537,590 2,127,837 83.85 
34 SOKOTO 1,611,929 1,527,004 94.73 
35 TARABA 1,340,652 1,270,889 94.80 
36 YOBE 1,099,970 824,401 74.95 
37 ZAMFARA 1,495,717 1,435,452 95.97 
 Total 68,833,476 56,431,255 81.98 
 Source INEC (2015) 
 
The major obstacle associated with the distribution of PVC was the delay in the 
process. As pinpointed by Nwankwo (2015), there was a confusing report that trailed 
the distribution of PVC from almost every part of the country which hampered the 
sincerity of the electoral commission to conduct free and fair polls. Before the 
postponement of the election days, less than 60 percent have received their voters’ 
card. This could have questioned the outcome of the elections in terms of majority 
votes.  In fact, the delay in the pattern and dimension of distribution of the PVC led to 
the accusation from some elders’ statesmen from the Southern part of the country that 
INEC Chairman deliberately wanted to embark on political gerrymandering. In the 
long run, the process of distribution of the PVC frustrated some electorates to abandon 
their voters’ card which invariably denied them the right to vote. By and large, the use 
of PVC in the 2015 elections drastically reduced multiple voting (INEC, 2015). 
 
4.3.1 Deployment of Smart Card Reader and the 2015 General Elections 
Card reader was one of the technological innovations introduced by the electoral 
commission to curb irregularities associated with voters’ card. The gadget was 
purposely adopted to authenticate and verify the Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) issued 
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to the electorates by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). In fact, 
the Smart Card Reader was introduced in 2015 general elections for the first time in 
the history of Nigeria’s electoral democracy (Osita, 2015). The verification and 
authentication of PVC through the Smart Card Reader is to know the legitimacy of the 
holder of the card in compliance with the details of such prospective voter. Ahead of 
the 2015 elections, INEC deployed 182,000 units of the Smart Card Readers (SCR) to 
various polling units across the country. 
 
However, the introduction of SCRs really generated a lot of debate among stakeholders 
before and after the 2015 elections in the country. Issues such as the legality of the 
card reader and operationally of the gadget during elections were seriously contended. 
For instance, a civil society group, Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre, argued that 
before the smart card reader can be legalised, it must be recognised by relevant section 
of the electoral act24.  On the other hand, the Independent National Electoral 
Commission countered such that as electoral umpire, it has the discretion to introduce 
any modality that can ensure credibility of the electoral process. This was the 
contention of Femi Falana, Human Rights Lawyer and a Senior Advocate of Nigeria, 
that card reader has constitutional backing and does not contradict any section of the 
electoral act. In fact, the use of card reader was to strengthen the standards and 
guidelines during accreditation and not meant for voting. This debate was also a 
serious contention between the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the strong 
opposition party, All Progressive Congress (APC). The former was not comfortable 
with the idea of card reader while the latter accused the ruling party of preference to 
                                                          
24 Section 52 sub section 2 of the electoral act 2010(as amended) prohibits electronic voting and the 
argument against the use of card reader was that it’s a form of e-voting. But the electoral umpire 
emphasised that smart card reader would only be applicable for accreditation of voters to determine 
genuine PVC and finger print of prospective voter. 
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manipulation rather than transparency and accountability. Though the PDP Deputy 
National Chairman, Uche Secondus denied the allegation, the stance of the ruling party 
according to him is that INEC should test run the card reader before using it for main 
election (The Guardian, March 5, 2015). The debate and controversy generated by the 
proposed card reader necessitated the invitation of Professor Attahiru Jega, INEC 
Chairman, by the National Assembly to justify why the gadget should be introduced.  
The INEC Chairman took up the challenge and demonstrated on the floor of the senate 
the capacity of the smart card reader to eliminate fraud and it was on this basis that the 
National Assembly endorsed its use and subsequently passed a bill (Electoral 
Amendment Bill, 2015) which sought to legalise the Smart Card Reader. The Bill was 
as well assented to by President Goodluck Jonathan on March 20, 2015.  
 
 
 The fundamental point for introducing the card reader was to prevent electoral fraud 
that has always been attributed to multiple voting. Meanwhile, it was also introduced 
to reduce the number of litigations relating to electoral fraud. There were two factions 
based on the finding of Osita (2015), one calling for the adoption of the card reader 
with the belief that such innovation would drastically curb malpractices arising from 
multiple voting while the counter motion was that the card might have been 
programmed to favour a particular party by disenfranchising other parties’ members. 
But it was also proved that the allegations were baseless and the concern of the 
electoral umpire by introducing the smart card reader was to deliver credible elections 
to Nigeria that would be in conformity with the international best practices. In another 




Nigerians have sacrificed all they can to obtain their PVCs, which 
are now their most-prized possession. They have also hailed the plan 
by INEC to use the card reader to give Nigeria credible polls. Only 
dishonest politicians, those who plan to rig, those who have engaged 
in a massive purchase of PVCs and those who have something to 




In corroboration, Attahiru Jega, the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral 
Commission insists that it was only those that have been nurturing fraudulent plans 
towards the 2015 elections were crying foul over the introduction of the biometric 
technology. Despite several contentions among different stakeholders on the rationale 
behind the card reader, the commission having conducted a public demonstration of 
the SCRs in twelve states-two states from each of the six geopolitical zones in the 
country on March 7, 2015, went ahead to deploy the gadget during the conduct of the 
keenly contested 2015 elections. Though during the test run in 12 states25, which was 
carried out after postponement of the general elections that were initially scheduled 
for February 14, 2015, some challenges were encountered which would have 
embarrassed the electoral commission if the card readers were used without the test 
running. The rescheduling of the election to March 28 assisted the electoral body to 
revisit some of the issues detected during the test running exercise across the selected 
states. The electoral commission admitted that the smart card reader recorded 41 
percent failure of finger prints during the test running but promised to improve beyond 
the 59 percent success in the main election (INEC, 2015). 
 
                                                          
25 INEC did field test run in 225 polling units and 358 voting centres across 12 states of Nigeria. The 
states are Anambra, Bauchi, Delta, Ebonyi, Ekiti, Kano, Kebbi, Lagos, Nassarawa, Rivers, Taraba and 
Niger. Party representatives, civil society groups and members of the public were invited by the INEC 
to observe the exercise.  
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The application of the SCRs according to Aremu and Aluko (2015) exposed the 
irregularities in the numbers of qualified voters as the number of voters shrunk from 
the 78 million in 2011 elections to 68 million in 2015 elections. Surprising, rather than 
experiencing an increment of voters, the 2015 election with the aid of card reader to 
authenticate the PVCs exposed the barrier of multiple registration and irregularities 
associated with temporary voters’ card. As rightly observed by Chikodiri (2015), 
adoption of SCR served as an anti- rigging biometric device that boosted 
electioneering conduct and verification of true identity of voters without giving room 
for ghost voters which largely dominated the previous elections in the country.  
 
However, the biometric device though assisted in curbing election rigging and multiple 
voting, there were cases of malfunctioning of the gadget in some polling units most 
especially during the March 28 Presidential and National Assembly Elections. From 
the report of NDI based on field experience, it was stated that: 
Electronic readers of biometric PVCs failed to verify fingerprints in 
many instances and resulted in delays in voter accreditation in a high 
number of polling stations. Where fingerprint scanning failed, there 
did not appear to be uniform understanding of contingency planning 
among polling officials, including requirements for large-scale 
manual verification of voters' identities against the printed voter 
registry and the issuance of Incident Forms. When Incident Forms 
were diligently completed by INEC officials, accreditation was often 
delayed even further due to the time required to fill out a form for 
each voter whose fingerprints could not be read (NDI, 2015:3). 
 
 
The commission realized these hitches and was able to correct its mistakes as 
experienced in the April 11 Gubernatorial and State House of Assembly Elections. 
From the report of several monitoring groups, there was an improvement in the 
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functionality of the card reader and such actually testified to the credibility of the 
elections (Election Monitor, 2015). The post assessment statement of the INEC 
chairman says it all that despite the challenges, especially in fingerprint verification, 
the card readers contributed in curbing electoral fraud and malpractices. He maintains 
that: 
We have made rigging impossible for them (electoral fraudsters) as 
there is no how the total number of votes cast at the polling unit could 
exceed the number of accredited persons. Such discrepancy in 
figures will be immediately spotted. This technology made it 
impossible for any corrupt electoral officer to connive with any 
politician to pad-up results. The information stored in both the card 
readers and the result sheets taken to the ward levels would be 




In the final analysis, Osita Agbu (2015), a Research Professor at Nigeria Institute of 
International Affairs, concurs with the disposition of the electoral commission in the 
adoption of card reader which according to him has added value to Nigeria’s electoral 
integrity. He argues further that inclusion of the smart card reader in the 2015 exercise 
did not violate the electoral act 2010, as amended, or the 1999 constitution of the 
federal republic of Nigeria, as amended, in any way but strengthen the country’s 
electoral democracy. The beauty of the SMC is that it was configured to function on 
Election Day only and specific cards allocated to particular polling units, meaning that 
the card reader cannot be swapped (Osita, 2015:11). Also, INEC introduced what was 
called ‘Incident Form’ for those the card readers failed to read their finger prints in 
one way or the other. Those categories of electorates were accredited manually by the 
INEC officials. The failure of the card reader as mentioned earlier was pronounced 
during the March 28 Presidential and National Assembly Elections to the extent that 
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the sitting President, Goodluck Jonathan and his wife, were accredited manually due 
to the inability of the SCR to recognise their fingerprints (Odiakose, 2015). 
 
 
4.4 INEC and the Phenomenon of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the 
Conduct of 2015 Elections 
The electoral commission realised the need to carry the internally displaced persons 
along in the conduct of the 2015 general elections, such warranted the arrangement 
made for the IDPs to participate in the electoral process in line with the international 
treaties and conventions. But the scenario and dilemma the commission had to contend 
with was the security threat of the environment where the IDPs are allocated posed 
due to Boko Haram insurgency. Conducting elections in arrears affected with 
insurgency in the North East (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa) really posed danger not 
only to the electorates but also the electoral personnel and other participants (INEC 
Report, 2015). How elections could be conducted in those areas became a dilemma 
and according to Ibeanu (2015) the place of internally displaced persons in electoral 
process raises a question of right and refuge. Which one is more important, right or 
refuge? The issue before the electoral body was the modality to be employed in 
protecting the civic rights of the IDPs without exposing them to further attack and also 
ensuring the protection of the personnel to conduct elections in the zones affected by 
insurgency. 
 
The phenomenon of rights and refuge according to Ibeanu (2015) in the context of 
democracy is inconclusive. After all inconclusiveness is a fundamental factor in the 
principle of democracy. The issue for democracy is a process by which substantial 
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increasing segments of the societies become included in a politically and 
constitutionally polity.  This makes the call for inclusion of the IDPs in electioneering 
context to be contested. The need to expand franchise in any democratic community 
is relatively at the discretion of the constitutionalism of the society. The irony has 
always been the issue of political instabilities despite the call for increasing 
individuals’ right to vote. Like what was obtainable during the preparation for the 2015 
general elections in Nigeria, the security threat of the Boko Haram in the North-East 
region posed serious challenge to conducting elections in those areas. The rising 
number of deaths as a result of insurgency between 2011 and 2015 was above 30,000 
in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states (Nigeria Security Tracker, 2015).  
 
Also, over three million people have been displaced due to the insurgency in the above 
states. However, the least expected of the violence was denial of voters’ right to vote 
despite the displacement. This became a cardinal point for the electoral commission in 
the 2015 elections and to address this, INEC on December 22, 2014, set up a Task 
Force on Internally Displaced Persons. The Task Force Committee headed by one of 
the National Commissioners, Mrs Thelma Iremiren, was given the following terms of 
reference: 
i. To examine the legal, political, security and administrative issues in achieving 
IDP voting during the 2015 elections 
ii. To evaluate the emerging trends of the voting rights of IDP with consideration 
to its international dimension its applicability to Nigerian context 
iii. To evaluate the adequacy of the existing laws for resolving the challenges of 
IDP voting in the 2015 elections 
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iv. To determine and advice the commission on what to done to incorporate the 
IDP in the elections in order to avoid disenfranchisement  
v. To determine the scope of IDP participation in the election exercise 
vi. And finally, to submit a comprehensive report that contains specific 
recommendations on IDP involvement in the 2015 general elections (INEC, 
2015). 
 
The task force came up with significant observations on issues related to legal, 
operational, political and security matters in the process of pushing to incorporate the 
IDP in preparation for the 2015 general elections (INEC, 2015). From the legal 
perspective, there was a lacuna in the existing Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999, as amended and the Electoral Act 2010, as amended, that specifically 
makes provision for IDP voting. This posed a serious challenge to the commission on 
the implementation of IDP voting within legal framework. However, Ibeanu (2015) 
clarifies that Section 78 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) guarantees every 
Nigerian to vote and several sections in the 2010 Electoral Act (as amended) empower 
INEC to manage registration of voters, allocation of polling units and management of 
electoral procedures. Not only that, Section 77 (2) and 117 (2) of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution grants every Nigerian who has attained the age of 18 the rights to register 
and vote in an election. Such fundamental right is not supposed to be denied due to 
displacement caused by insurgency. In view of this coupled with the fact that the 
electoral body is empowered to use its discretion to create and transfer polling units, 




Nevertheless, one of the major bottlenecks the commission faced on legal backing for 
inclusion of IDP in the voting exercise was the issue of registration. Before the 
displacements, most of the affected individuals have registered in their various 
residents and Section 58 of the Electoral Act stipulates that nobody shall be allowed 
to vote at any polling unit other than he/she is allotted. This section also serves as a 
kind of stumbling block for some of the IDP who became refuge in a state different 
from their indigenous states. For instance, members of the IDP who are indigenes of 
Yobe State but camped in Adamawa State were to participate in Gubernatorial Election 
of their respective state, the question was, how would votes be transferred from Yobe 
State to Adamawa State during the Gubernatorial Election?  Meanwhile, Section 72 of 
the 1999 Constitution specifies that no Senatorial District or Federal Constituency 
shall fall beyond one state. By implication, despite the fact that INEC can transfer or 
relocate polling units and wards (Beyond Registration Areas) to suit the IDPs, there 
must be consistency in constituency boundary to guarantee that election results are 
returned for respective candidates via respective constituencies. Having noticed all 
these, the task force suggested that the electoral act needs to be amended for future 
sake to specifically make provisions for the IDP voting and also ensures that such laws 
are flexible to enable transfer of votes beyond the boundary of the voters. 
 
Politically, the issue of IDP voting became more politicised to the extent that political 
parties and their supporters viewed it as partisan rather than a right based phenomenon. 
The interest of the commission might be rights based by trying to explore the 
possibility of involving the IDP in the 2015 elections through legal and administrative 
measures, a partisan interpretation would definitely imped the process. From the 
partisanship perspective, voting rights should not be limited to IDP within the North-
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Eastern states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa respectively that such gesture should be 
extended to all displacement across the country. This really heat up the polity with 
some stakeholders in the ruling party (PDP) accusing the Chairman of the Independent 
National Electoral Commission of using the IDP voting issue to favour the opposition 
party (APC) with the calculation that majority of the IDPs would have sympathy for 
the latter. Though Omotola (2015) affirms that majority of voters including the IDP 
clamoured for alternation of power due to the perception that Nigeria was not secured 
under the PDP administration. However, the task force recommended that voting of 
IDP should start with the insurgency affected three states and that in the subsequent 
future elections, provision should be made for displacement of persons across the 
country (Ibeanu, 2015). 
 
The security concern within the North-East region was another issue the task force had 
to contend with. As at December 2014, the insurgency was so devastating to the extent 
that Boko Haram was controlling almost 18 local governments within Borno, Yobe 
and Adamawa. In Borno state alone, out of the 27 local government areas in the state, 
11 were controlled by the Boko Haram insurgency displacing 31 percent of voters. In 
Adamawa, the Boko Haram insurgency was able to displaced 356, 650 registered 
voters while in Yobe state, though two local government areas were being controlled 
by the Boko Haram, the number of displaced voters was 115,771 which represented 
12 percent of all registered voters in the state (Ibeanu, 2015, INEC Report, 2015). 







 Areas Most Affected by Insurgency and Registered Voters 
 




















Madagali 66,054 18.52 
356,650 1,518,129 23.49 
Michika 82,291 23.07 
Mubi North 103,038 28.89 
Mubi South 58,049 16.27 




Abadam 33,479 5.96 
561,999 1,799,669 31.23 
Bama 118,961 21.17 
Dikwa 38,689 6.88 
Gwoza 99,047 17.62 
Kala Balge 31,482 5.60 
Chibok 37,798 6.73 
Kukawa 40,289 7.17 
Mafa 40,248 7.16 
Marte 40,013 7.12 
Mobbar 31,661 5.63 
Ngala 50,332 8.96 
Yobe 
 
Gujba 61,941 49.25 
115,771 1,077,942 11.67 
Gulani 53,830 42.80 
Total 1,034,420 - 1,034,420 4,395,740 
 
23.53 




In the long run, the task force drew its framework for IDP participation in the 2015 
elections from two major protocols. Firstly, the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement (1998) and the Kampala Convention known as the Africa Union 
Convention on Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(2009). Nigeria ratified the Kampala Convention that promotes several rights for IDP 
including the right to vote. In view of this, the commission reviewed its voting 
guidelines and manuals to accommodate voting, collation and announcement of results 
for the IDPs voting centres. Modalities were mapped out for all constituencies affected 
by the insurgency to ensure the IDP voted in the 2015 elections. During the process, 
the commission embarked on intensive voter education, enlighten the IDP and the 
Electoral Risk Management team also carried out a specific security measure to protect 




The contest of the 2015 general elections has come and gone but its lessons remain 
phenomenon in the history of Nigeria’s electoral democracy. Generally, administration 
of elections in Nigeria is a constitutional mandate enjoyed by INEC. However, the 
same electoral commission that conducted the previously flawed elections surprised 
the world with some remarkable progress in the administration of the 2015 elections. 
Thus, the improvement under the Attahiru Jega led INEC could be linked to certain 
innovations and mechanisms adopted in tailoring the affairs of the Election 
Management Body (EMB). As discussed in this segment, the internal restructuring of 
the electoral body, coupled with several reports of unique committees played positive 
roles as shown in the outcome of the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. Despite this, 
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there were a lot of shortcomings which testify to the combination of liberalism and 
authoritarianism in the Nigeria’s electoral system. This indicates that Nigeria’s 
electoral democracy is not yet consolidated. 
 
The phases of reform in the 2015 elections of course became reality due to the lessons 
learnt from the previous elections, though the EMB embraced a lot of criticism after 
the 2011 general elections and actually worked on many of the reports submitted based 
on the evaluation of the election. Meanwhile, the controversy generated with the 
legality of the card reader and other form of technological innovations has been put to 
rest with the passage of the bill by the National Assembly26. However, the pass remark 
awarded to the Independent National Electoral Commission in respect of the 2015 
general elections would not have been ascertained, if other relevant election 
stakeholders failed to complement the effort of the Commission. In order to have a 
balanced analysis of the 2015 elections, the next chapter of this study explores the role 
of other relevant players such as the political parties, civil society groups, domestic 
and foreign observers in the conduct of the 2015 general elections. By and large, have 
significant impacts on the outcome of the 2015 general elections. 
  
                                                          
26 The National Assembly has officially passed the bill legalising the use of card readers and other 




THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF THE 
NIGERIA’S 2015 GENERAL ELECTIONS:  EXAMINING THE 
ROLE OF OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The Nigeria’s electoral system has always attracted internal and external interests. This 
can be ascribed to the uniqueness of the country within the African continent. Unique 
in the sense that Nigeria happens to be the most populous black country and coupled 
with her sizeable number of people, international community has always shown 
interest in Nigeria’s political transition and democratic process. Meanwhile, the 
relative peaceful atmosphere enjoyed by Nigerians during and after the 2015 general 
elections was not accidental, the fact remains that all hands were on deck to enhance 
such peace which needed to be sustained during the electioneering exercise. From the 
internal arrangement, Rtd General Abubakar Abdulsalam, a Former Nigeria Military 
Head of State, organised a ‘National Peace Committee’ that brought together the two 
leading contenders of the 2015 Presidential Election, Jonathan and Buhari, to sign a 
peace accord to enable their supporters to follow path.  
 
The external interventions witnessed setting up of ‘Peace Accord’  headed by the 
Former Secretary General of United Nations, Kofi Annan, and the peace move made 
by the United State Secretary of State, John Kerry, the Video Message from the U.S 
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President, Barrak Obama and several calls from British Prime Minister and other 
Western Communities encouraging the electoral commission and Nigerian 
government to ensure peaceful and credible electoral exercise remain significant in 
assessing the  conduct of the 2015 Nigeria’s elections. 
 
Given this, it becomes imperative in this chapter to explore the role of other key players 
in the conduct of the 2015 elections. This will be done by examining the influence of 
the Abuja Peace Accord, the National Peace Committee and other peace move 
initiatives introduced towards the 2015 elections. Also, the Political Parties that served 
as the main players particularly the ruling party (PDP) and the opposition party (APC) 
would be discussed in this chapter. The Election Observers comprising both local and 
international monitoring groups such as the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), 
Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room 
(NCSSR), National Democratic Institute (NDI), the European Union Election 
Observation Mission (EUEOM), African Union Election Observation Mission 
(AUEOM), other relevant monitors during the 2015 elections actually get a caption in 
this section. In a nutshell, the collaborative roles of those agencies were key to the 
outcome of the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. 
 
5.2 The Move for Peace Pacts and Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections 
The history of Nigeria’s electoral contest has been a kind of warfare preparation. This 
informed the assertion of Alade Fawole, a Professor of Politics that Nigerian 
politicians prepared for elections as if they are going for war. The country since her 
freedom from colonialism has never conducted a peaceful and credible election. The 
first election conducted and supervised by Nigerians after independence was that of 
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1964 but it remained one of the ugly trends of the country’s electoral democracy. It 
was dogged by acrimony, violence, manipulations and controversies. The consequence 
was the loss of several lives. Such actually planted a bad legacy which the subsequent 
elections followed suit (Alade, 2016). Since then, elections have been synonymous to 
violence and irregularities. The beginning of current democratic dispensation in 
Nigeria in 1999 that could have reshaped the electoral system also toed the line of 
electoral malpractices. The 2003 elections were systematically rigged and the 2007 
remained the worst elections the country has ever witnessed (Omotola, 2007, Alabi & 
Sakariyau, 2013). It was not surprising because the President Olusegun Obasanjo that 
was in power during the 2007 election, actually asserted that the national elections 
would be ‘a do or die affair’ (Nwolise, 2017:165) and indeed the level of political 
intimidation and violence was unprecedented. Though there was an improvement in 
the 2011 general elections, the post electoral violence that escalated aftermath recorded 
the highest loss of lives and properties in the decades of Nigeria’s electoral contest 
(Osita, 2015). The nature of Nigeria’s electoral contests as observed by Alade (2016) 
has taken the dimension and character of warfare. This is because, capturing political 
power of the state is an ultimate objective that needed to be fought for. Based on this 
context, electoral contests have become and regarded as mortal combat activities for 
which the opposing gladiators are willing to fight, kill or be killed. 
 
In order to avert the trend of political violence which has been a threat to conducting 
peaceful elections in Nigeria, the former United Nations Secretary General, Kofi 
Annan, and the former Secretary General of the Common Wealth, Emeka Anyaokwu, 
introduced the Abuja Peace Accord27. This was done to curb the tension being spread 
                                                          
27 The Abuja Peace Accord was an idea that emanated from Koffi Annan and Emeka Anyaokwu to 
bring the aspirants together for peace undertaking. 
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across the country due to the various hate messages and speeches emanating from the 
campaign teams of the two leading Presidential aspirant, Goodluck Jonathan and 
Muhammadu Buhari of the People Democratic Party and the All Progressive Party 
respectively. In fact, there had been cases of clashes among party supporters. Initially, 
before the formation of the Abuja Peace Accord, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, a former 
External Affairs Minister, had written an open letter to the main contenders advising 
them and their supporters to desist from the hate campaigns (Alabi, 2015). To follow 
up this, was the invitation of the Peace Accord team anchored by Kofi Annan and 
Emeka Anyaokwu to all the 14 Presidential Aspirants and their Party Chairmen for the 
2015 elections. The aspirants were asked to sign a declaration of peace and worked 
out modalities for their various political parties on how to sensitise the public more on 
the need to embrace peaceful electioneering campaigns that would-be issue based 
rather than spreading accusation and counter accusation which may degenerate to 
crisis.  
 
The declaration was an undertaken by the aspirants assuring the general populace of 
their readiness to abide by the rule of the game and to also centre their campaigns on 
issue based for proactive electoral contest. In addition, the candidates reassured 
Nigerians on a violent free electioneering contest during and after the elections. Such 
commitments from the political gladiators made them to have agreed and decided to 
place national interest above their selfish desire of acquiring power by all means 
(Lucky, 2015). This move could be seen as the basis for hitch free electioneering 





The acceptance of the contestants to desist from a campaign that could awaken 
sentiment and intolerance among the diverse ethno religious setting in Nigeria is part 
of the declaration made under the auspices of the Abuja Peace Accord. In order to 
sustain this, all government agencies and the Electoral Commission were advised to 
maintain neutrality and impartiality.  The terms and conditions of the Peace Accord 
entails mass sensitisation of the public and monitoring of the electoral process so as to 
ensure compliance by the relevant stakeholders that have endorsed its declaration. This 
according to Ben Obi, the Special Adviser to the President on Inter Party Affairs, 
comprises of sensitization, awareness and orientation which must be spearheaded by 
the political, religious and traditional leaders (The Punch, January 23, 2015). 
 
The complementary role of the National Peace Committee (NPC)28 is also vital in 
enhancing peaceful conduct of the 2015 elections. The membership of the NPC 
comprised notable individuals who happened to have enjoyed one form of reputation 
or the other among Nigerians realised and forecasted the tension the 2015 general 
elections generated. Among the respected figures is the Former Military Head of State, 
Retired General Abdulsalam Abubakar, who organised a team tagged ‘National Peace 
Committee’ aimed at bringing the contenders together and endorsed a peace move. 
The membership of the Abdulsalam Abubakar group cut across notable individuals 
which include religious leaders such as the Sultan of Sokoto, Saad Abubakar and 
Reverend Father Martin Kuka among others. It was set up to midwife the Peace 
Accord.  
 
                                                          
28 The National Peace Committee was organised to complement the Abuja Peace Accord declaration. 
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The committee target was to come up with modality that could guarantee a peaceful 
electoral exercise in the national elections of the 2015.  The NPC actually persuaded 
the two-main rivalry political groups and urged the aspirants to respect the accord 
made with the Abuja Peace Accord committee. During the inauguration of the National 
Peace Committee, the focus was on the two leading presidential aspirants, 
Muhammadu Buhari of the APC and Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP, on the need for 
them to renew their commitment to the declaration of the peace accord signed on 
January 14, 2015.  The caption and pledge of the renew accord supervised by the 
National Peace Committee on March 26, 2015 exactly two days to the Presidential 
Election scheduled for March 28, 2015, goes thus: 
You may recall that on 14th January 2015, both of us, along with 
nine other party leaders signed what has now come to be known as 
the Abuja Accord. The substance of that Accord was our 
commitment to free, fair and credible elections in our dear country. 
In the Accord, we agreed to, among other things, run an issue-based 
campaign and pledged that our electoral campaigns will not involve 
any religious incitement, ethnic or tribal profiling, both by ourselves 
and all agents acting in our names. Now that the campaigns have 
come to an end, we meet today to renew our pledge for peaceful 
elections. We therefore call on all fellow citizens of our dear country, 
and our supporters, to refrain from violence or any acts that may in 
any way jeopardize our collective vision of a free, fair and credible 
election. In addition, we call on INEC and all security agencies to 
ensure strict adherence to their constitutional roles. We also pledge 
to respect the outcome of free, fair and credible elections. Today, we 
again renew our commitment to a united, democratic and prosperous 
Nigeria. We want all Nigerians to stand together at this critical phase 
of our nation’s history (The Punch, 27 March, 2015:5). 
 
The impact of the peace initiatives, both the Kofi Annan and Abdulsalam Abubakar 
led committee, was significant to the relative peace enjoyed during the 2015 elections. 
The gesture which later extended to the component units witnessed high level of 
cooperation among different Gubernatorial Candidates vying to govern their 
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respective states (Ojo, 2015). Considering the declaration and signing of the Abuja 
Peace Accord by all the fourteen Presidential candidates which was followed up with 
a renew pledge by the main rivalry for the contest under the umbrella of the National 
Peace Committee, the mediating role of the NPC really sustained peaceful 
electioneering contest on March 28, 2015. For the first time in the history of Nigeria 
election, incumbent president lost to the opposition and the loser conceding defeat was 
an achievement for the initiators of the Peace Accord and the National Peace 
Committee (Lucky, 2015). The role of the NPC before and after the election was 
unprecedented. The committee was able to meet the stakeholders that could guarantee 
free and fair elections and pledged for their support in fulfilling a conducive political 
atmosphere. The NPC held a meeting with Chairman of the Electoral Commission, 
Professor Attahiru Jega, and also with the Security Agencies on securing peoples vote.  
 
During the Election Day, the committee went around to observe and immediately after 
the voting ended, the members of the NPC also paid a courtesy visit to the leading 
contestants, Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari, reminding them of their 
pledge and to also seek their cooperation whatever be the outcome of the expected 
results. Interestingly, as the Presidential Election results were being announced and it 
was glaring from the released results so far that Muhammadu Buhari of the APC would 
eventually emerge as the winner, the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan placed 
a phone call congratulating the former on his victory. Such singular act from the 
President really played a significant impact in sustaining peace aftermath of the 2015 
elections (The Punch, March 30, 2015). And such gesture was the beginning of the 
peaceful transition Nigeria witnessed in 2015 being the first-time ruling party would 
hand over mantle of leadership to opposition party (Kissy, 2015). 
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The concerted efforts from the local and international actors helped in averting the 
scale of crisis that would have degenerated during the 2015 general elections. The 
intervention of some of the Western countries in Nigeria’s 2015 national election also 
played significant role in the peaceful exercise. One of the moves from the external 
countries was the official trip of the Secretary of State of the United State of America, 
John Kerry, to Nigeria ahead of the 2015 elections. He met separately with the 
candidate of the PDP who was the incumbent President, Goodluck Jonathan and also 
the candidate of the strong opposition, Muhammadu Buhari of the APC. The essence 
of his visit was to canvass for peaceful elections and implored the party leaders to 
embrace court system if there is any grievances on the outcome of the elections rather 
than resulting to violence (Micheal, 2015). During his conversation with the main 
contenders, Kerry urged them to enlighten their supporters on the implication of 
electoral violence on any democratic arrangement. The U.S Secretary of State also 
spoke to the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission to pass 
across U.S readiness to partner the electoral body in discharging free and peaceful 
elections. As reported in the Reuters News, January 25, 2015, John Kerry was quoted 
to have said that ‘perpetrators of electoral violence would be denied visa to the United 
State of America’ (The Punch, January 25, 2015). Such warning was targeted more on 
the political actors who are believed to have been the sponsors of violence in the 
country’s previous elections. 
 
Apart from the official visit of John Kerry to Nigeria, the United States President, 
Barrack Obama, through his video tape message to Nigerians encouraged the 
electorates to come out in mass and vote for candidates of their choices without any 
form of intimidation and harassment. Obama in his short message specifically 
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encouraged Nigerians and the leaders to shun violence in the election which according 
to him does not have a place in a democratic system (360 Reporters, March 23, 2015). 
In a similar vein, David Cameron, the U.K Prime Minister wrote a letter to the 
President of Nigeria and urged him to ensure that the 2015 elections is held in a 
peaceful atmosphere. In a statement made available to the media, Cameron was quoted 
to have said: 
As Africa biggest democracy, successful elections in Nigeria are 
important not only for Nigeria’s future, but as a signal to the rest of 
Africa. Delivering a credible election will be a lasting credit to you 




Acknowledging the role of the electoral commission, Cameron testified to the 
improvement and readiness of the body by ensuring that over eighty percent voters 
have received the Permanent Voters Card and by and large the broad successful of the 
test running of the Smart Card showcased the technological dimension the 2015 
elections would adopt. He also called for the support of international community to 
assist Nigeria in delivering peaceful election. According to Cameron, ‘with the 
hundreds of lives lost after the last election, the eyes of the international community 
will be focused on Nigeria’ (Vanguard, March 22, 2015). The United Nations 
Secretary General, Banki Moon, on the eve of the Presidential and National Assembly 
Elections called on Nigerians to vote in mass and desist from any act of violence. With 
reference to the peace pacts signed by the aspirants and their renew pledge towards 
peaceful conduct, Mr Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations Secretary General, 
commended the two-main political rivalry and asked their supporters to follow suit 
that whatever dispute arising from the election can be resolved through the rule of law 




No doubt, the level of input and pressure within and outside Nigeria during the 2015 
had significant impact on the elections, the polity was heated up by the politicians. The 
level of violence recorded in the gubernatorial elections in states such as Rivers, Akwa- 
Ibom and Delta was antithetical to the peace accord undertaken by the political 
gladiators in the affected states. Nevertheless, demonstration of political maturity by 
the incumbent president via telephone conversation also saved the country from 
unwanted chaos. As noted by a PDP Chieftain29, ‘any failure on the part of President 
Jonathan to concede defeat might have led to another bloody civil war in the country’.  
To corroborate this claim, Goodluck Jonathan, usually affirms that his political 
mission does not worth sacrificing any Nigerian blood (The Punch, January 15, 2015). 
 
5.3 The Political Parties and Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections: Assessing their 
Role and Performances 
Nigeria’s political system is complex and gives room for multi-party arrangement. 
Before the 2015 elections, the registered political parties recognised by the 
Independent National Electoral Commission were 26 in numbers, though it was 
drastically reduced to this size due to deregistration of some political parties by the 
electoral commission. Prior to the 2015 elections, the electoral commission 
deregistered 28 political parties that were unable to have offices in all the 36 states of 
the federations and also failed to contest and win seat in the 2011 general elections. 
The electoral commission has the mandate to register and deregister political parties 
in compliance with the Constitution of the country. However, the inability of some 
                                                          
29 The Respondent (4) is   a Professor of Political Science and served as Minister of National Planning 
under Jonathan’s government. He made the statement during the interview session with the 
Researcher on 14th July, 2016. 
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political parties to meet up with the conditions as stipulated in the electoral laws 
(Electoral Act, 2010) led to de-registration. During the preparation for the 2015 
national elections, the 26 recognised political parties were published in the dailies for 
Nigerians to know the legitimate and recognised parties for the forthcoming electoral 
exercise. Table 5.1 shows the names of the legalised political parties as at 2015. 
 
Table 5.1 
Names of political parties in Nigeria as at 2015 
 
S/N                             Name            Abbreviation 
1 Accord (A)     
2 Action Alliance (AA) 
3 Advanced Congress of Democrats (ACD) 
4 Allied Congress Party of Nigeria (ACPN) 
5 Alliance for Democracy (AD) 
6 African Democratic Congress (ADC) 
7 African People’s Alliance (APA) 
8 All Progressives Congress (APC) 
9 All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) 
10 Citizens Popular Party  (CPP) 
11 Democratic People’s Party (DPP) 
12 independent Democrats  (ID) 
13 Kowa Party  (KP) 
14 Labour Party (LP) 
15 Mega Progressive Peoples Party (MPPP) 
16 National Conscience Party (NCP) 
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17 New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP) 
18 People for Democratic Change (PDC) 
19 Peoples Democratic Movement  (PDM) 
20 Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 
21 Progressive People’s Alliance  (PPA) 
22 Peoples Party of Nigeria   (PPN) 
23 Social Democratic Party   (SDP) 
24 United Democratic Party   (UDP) 
25 Unity Party of Nigeria   (UPN) 
26 United Progressive Party   (UPP) 
Source INEC (2015) 
 
However, out of these political parties, only 14 of them fielded candidates for the 
Presidential elections and in other subsequent Parliamentary and Gubernatorial 
elections. Despite the participation of different political parties in the electioneering 
contest, the swing of the pendulum was between the two domineering and gallant 
political parties (PDP and APC). This significant factor would divert the attention of 
this segment more on the said two powerful political parties. Since the beginning of 
the present fourth republic in 1999, the People’s Democratic Party had been in power 
as the ruling party and extended its dominance in the parliaments at national and state 
level (Omotola, 2015). The party was formed in 1998 when Nigerians were preparing 
for a new democratic system after long years of military rule in the country. The big 
wings in the political arena set up the People’s Democratic Party and since its 
inception, the party has been ruling from 1999 till 2015. All the four general elections 
conducted (1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011) before 2015 were won by the PDP at the 
national level with more reference to the Presidency (Herbert & Udeogu, 2015). With 
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the control of power for sixteen years, the party’s confidence for victory in the 2015 
was resounding, though there was a strong opposition. The party dominance coupled 
with the incumbency power led to the assertion of its National Chairman, Vincent 
Ogbulafor, that PDP would rule Nigeria for sixty years. This is captured by Odivwri 
(2013:15) thus: 
The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) had operated like an imperial 
monarch, throwing its weight around with somewhat reckless 
flourish believing that its days and years are many, almost eternal. 
What with the fact that its dominance in the political space has 
remained unchallenged for fourteen unbroken years. Not only had 
its presided over governance at the federal level, it has dominated 
even the state governments, with the local governments in tow in 
fact, so confident was the belief that the party was born to rule, that 
its former national chairman, Vincent Ogbulafor, once declared that 
the PDP rule Nigeria for a maximum of sixty years. Yes, sixty years  
 
The People’s Democratic Party started preparation for the 2015 elections with a lot of 
disparity among the members on which zone should produce the Presidential candidate 
after all, the party zoning formula was on board before it was jettisoned due to the 
emergence of Goodluck Jonathan in the 2011 election. Most of the individuals within 
the party that agitated for pro zoning formula are Northerners that wanted power to 
shift back to the North. But the interest of the President Goodluck Jonathan, a 
Southerner, to continue in his bid for another tenure really created infraction within 
the ruling party (Omotola, 2015). It was glaring from the permutations among key 
players that President Jonathan was likely to get the ticket of the party for Presidential 
election and this was achieved by clipping the wings of all other prospective candidates 
within the party. Not surprising, the President controls the party and its structure. The 
internal crisis within the People’s Democratic Party forced some notable members out 
who later formed a parallel party called the New PDP. The split within the PDP 
occurred with five State Governors and other big names walking out from the Party’s 
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convention on exact date the party was marking its fifteen years anniversary 
(Vanguard, September 1, 2015). 
 
The formation of the ‘New PDP’30 within the PDP served as a blow that weaken the 
strength of the ruling party. Among the big wings that left the PDP was the former 
Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from 1999 to 2007, Alhaji Atiku 
Abubakar, former Governor of Kwara State, Bukola Saraki and former Governor of 
Osun State, Olagunsoye Oyinlola to mention but few. The main complain of this group 
was lack of internal democracy in the PDP. Though as rightly pinpointed by some 
political analysts, those individuals left the PDP having realised that the party structure 
has been hijacked by the serving President, Goodluck Jonathan, and his loyalists 
(Omotola, 2015). The inability of the New PDP to register as political party due to 
short timing ahead of the preparation for the 2015 elections made it to form alliance 
with the All Progressive Congress (APC). However, despite the division within the 
PDP and coupled with the dumping of the party by the aggrieved members, the PDP 
organised its primaries to pick candidates for the general elections. President Goodluck 
Jonathan became the sole candidate in a ‘closed primary’ due to the fact that no other 
persons were allowed to access the nomination form from the party secretariat, even 
candidates who signified interest and paid were not given (Omotola & Charles, 
2015:6). Eventually, President Goodluck Jonathan became the party flag bearer for the 
second time for the 2015 Presidential Election31. Table 5.2 indicates PDP strength from 
1999. 
 
                                                          
30 The aggrieved key members left PDP and formed another party called ‘New PDP’, though failed to 
register it as substantial political party 
31 President Jonathan won the primary in 2011 and also became the sole candidate of PDP in the 2015 




 Electoral Performance of PDP Since 1999 
Date 
 
No. of Seats in the 
House of 
Representatives 
No. of Seats in the 
Senate 
Party’s 
Performance (%)  
February 27th, 
1999 
Not Available 65/109 62.78 
April 12th, 2003 223/360 76/109 61.94 
April 21st, 2007 260/360 85/109 69.60 
April 9th, 2011 195/308 59/92 58.89 
April 11th, 2015 125/360        49/109 45 
Source Herbert, C. and Udeogu, C (2015)  
 
The build-up for the 2015 general elections and the need to challenge the monopoly of 
the ruling party enhanced the emergence of the All Progressives Congress (APC). The 
APC is a mega party that was formed on 6th of February 2013, from four political 
parties that merged to pave way for a formidable stronger political association. The 
APC was a product of defunct Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for 
Progressive Change (CPC), the All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP) and a faction of 
the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), led by Rochas Okorocha, the Governor 
of Imo State (The Nation, May 29, 2015). As mentioned earlier, the aggrieved 
members of the PDP under the umbrella of New PDP later joined the APC and such 
compounded to the problem of the sickly ruling party (PDP). This dimension was a 
booster to the All Progressive Party to the extent that the People’s Democratic Party 
lost its control of the House of Representative to the opposition due to massive 
defection from the ruling party to the formidable opposition party. There was also a 
mass defection of some Senators from the PDP to the APC. In fact, majority of the 
legislators from both chambers (Green and Red) that defected to the APC were 
representatives from the five states (Kano, Kwara, Sokoto, Rivers and Adamawa) 
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whose their Governors have initially alleged their membership to the opposition All 
Progressive Congress (Herbert & Udeogu, 2015). According to Rochas Okorocha, the 
Executive Governor of Imo State, defection of five Governors from the People’s 
Democratic Party to the All Progressive Party marked the consolidation and assurance 
of landslide victory for the later in the 2015 elections (Premium Times, May 20, 2015). 
 
The emergence of the All Progressive Congress as a strong opposition really brought 
about a real competition in Nigeria’s political processes (Omotola & Charles, 2015:6). 
Unlike the PDP Presidential primary that was completely organised and solely for the 
sitting President Goodluck Jonathan, the APC primary was keenly contested by five 
Presidential candidates. The aspirants comprised the former Vice President, Atiku 
Abubakar, the Governor of Kano State, Rabiu Kwankwaso, the Governor of Imo State, 
Rochas Okorocha, the former Military Head of State, Muhammadu Buhari and lastly, 
the Publisher of the Leadership Newspaper, Sam Nda Isaiah. Muhammadu Buhari was 
eventually declared the winner having polled the larger number of votes, though there 
were allegations of vote buying and selling ahead of the primaries (Adibe, 2015). 
 
At the state level, party primaries appeared to be worst with serious allegation of 
manipulation and highest bidders emerging as candidates at various levels which 
enhanced the deployment of money bags by the so called ‘big boys’(Ejike, 2014). 
There was manifestation of factionalism within political parties during the state 
primaries. With this, different splinter groups were emerging within the two major 
political parties. This challenge cuts across the PDP and APC, though seemed more 
pronounced within the ruling party, PDP (Omotola & Charles, 2015). The scenario led 
to several petitions from aggrieved members vying for Governorship positions who 
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were dissatisfied with the outcome of the parities primaries to formally write appealing 
letters to the national secretariats of their parties. The lack of injustice within the 
internal mechanism of the ruling party forced some aspirants to threaten to collectively 
dump the party ahead of the 2015 general elections (Nigerian Eye, February 22, 2015). 
As rightly pinpointed in the briefing of Omotola and Charles (2015), the issue of 
injustice and manipulation of party primaries was an unprecedented move in the 
history of Nigeria’s politics and such has been serving for the basis why demands for 
openness and transparency in party primaries became rampant among the populace.  
 
After the party primaries in which the interest of most analysts and political observers 
is the tussle between the PDP and the APC, the two political parties maintained a 
balanced joint ticket of Muslim/ Christian candidatures especially at the Presidential 
level that is always generating mass concern. The PDP retained his team of 
Jonathan/Sambo joint ticket as it were in the 2011 Presidential elections while the APC 
fielded Buhari/Osinbanjo for the 2015 Poll. One fact remains in Nigeria’s politics, the 
sentiment of most electorates is usually tailored towards background of the candidates 
and that is why voting pattern in the country has always been on ethno religious bias. 
As witnessed in the previous elections, the 2015 general elections also showcased the 
dichotomy between the North and the South. This fact attests to the rational for 
politicians lobbying the traditional and religious leaders so as to appeal to their 
followers’ during electioneering campaigns. Such according to Ojo (2007) is the bane 
of Nigeria’s democracy and not until candidates are voted in on capability basis, 




In the long run, the real contest was a serious one between the PDP and APC at both 
federal and state level. The level of political propaganda employed by both parties was 
unprecedented and various candidates attacking personalities of one another despite 
the declaration of the Abuja Peace Accord. Unfortunately, the utterances of some 
politicians during political campaigns were decisively creating unnecessary tension 
and heating up the polity. However, the level of consciousness among Nigerians 
actually enhanced a level playing ground observed in the 2015 general elections. The 
citizens displayed improved level of patriotism and turned out in mass to vote for their 
respective candidates not minding the threat and tensions generated by the elections. 
As Omotola and Charles (2015) recall, the controversial change of the election 
timetable by postponing the poll was a kind of interference which threaten democratic 
process. It also created a psychological violence amidst the available fear and tension 
in the polity.  
 
The electoral commission through its Chairman affirmed that the postponement of the 
election by six weeks was informed due to security advice and not lack of readiness of 
the electoral umpire (Attahiru, 2015). Despite all the hurdles, the Presidential and 
National Assembly elections were conducted on March 28 while the Gubernatorial and 
House of Assembly elections were held on April 11, 2015 respectively. The candidate 
of the All Progressive Congress emerged as winner of the Presidential election beating 
his closest rivalry of the People’s Democratic Party. Table 5.3 indicates the 
performance of the political parties in the Presidential election. Also, the dominance 
of the APC over the ruling party (PDP) reflected in the outcome of the National 
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Performance of Political Parties in the 2015 Presidential Election 
    Source INEC (2015) 
 
5.4 Election Observers, Development Partners and Nigeria’s 2015 General 
Elections 
Election in any democratic setting is not a monopolistic affair, it is usually a joint 
venture involving different players. While the electoral commission serves as the 
regulator, political parties are the interest driven players and the election observer’s 
vis a vis development partners are like whistle blowers. Borrowing a leaf from the 
assertion of Herbert and Udeogu (2015), electioneering contest can be likened to 
                                                          
32   APC won most of the seats in the National Assembly. In the House of Representative, out 360 
members, APC won 211 while PDP claimed 142 seats with other parties winning remaining seats. In 
the senate, APC got 64 while PDP won 45 seats. 
CANDIDATE GENDER PARTY VOTES 
MUHAMMADU BUHARI M APC 15,424,921 
GOODLUCK EBELE JONATHAN M PDP 12,853,162 
AYENI MUSA ADEBAYO M APA 53,537 
ALH. GANIYU O. GALADIMA M ACPN 40,311 
CHIEF SAM EKE M CPP 36,300 
RAFIU SALAU M AD 30,673 
DR. MANI IBRAHIM AHMAD M ADC 29,666 
ALLAGOA KELVIN CHINEDU M PPN 24,475 
CHIEF MARTIN ONOVO M NCP 24,455 
JCI SEN. TUNDE ANIFOWOSE-KELANI M AA 22,125 
CHIEF (DR.) CHEKWAS OKORIE M UPP 18,220 
COMFORT OLUREMI SONAIYA F KOWA 13,076 
GODSON MGBODILE OHAENYEM OKOYE M UDP 9,208 
HIGH CHIEF AMBROSE N. ALBERT OWURU M HOPE 7,435 
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soccer game whereby the linesmen alert the referee of any foul play. The election 
observers and development partners play the role of linesmen that regularly alert the 
electoral body (referee) whenever a foul play is committed. Basically, Nigeria’s 2015 
general elections was keenly monitored and observed not only by local election 
observers but also international election monitoring groups. As the political parties 
were busy campaigning and strategizing for electoral victory, the election observers 
and development partners were focusing on how the elections would be conducted to 
meet international standard 
 
In line with international best practises, the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) accredited both local and international election observers ahead 
of the 2015 general elections. This is done in line with the guidelines laid down by 
INEC for any interested observer of the elections. Having screened all the applicants 
for election observation and monitoring, a total number of 88 election observers and 
development partners were approved by the electoral umpire with the consent of the 
federal government (Okoye, 2015). From the list released by the INEC, over 100 
groups were accredited to observe the 2015 general elections (INEC, 2015). The list 
of the accredited election observers reflects in Appendix C of this study. 
 
The international agencies supported the electoral commission in the conduct of the 
2015 elections with some of them acting as donors in financing part of the projects 
embarked on by the electoral body during the preparation for the 2015 national 
elections (See Appendix D). Such donors which are majorly international 
organisations rendered technical and financial support to the Electoral Management 
Body. Mostly, the support of the development partners was to ensure and sustain an 
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atmosphere for free and fair elections. The foreign development partners such as the 
United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) collaborated with INEC in the area 
of Youth sensitisation by organizing a summit tagged ‘INEC/Youth Forum’ targeting 
on youth involvement in attaining credible elections. Such arrangement testified to 
partnership role played by the development partners before the election days (Herbert 
& Udeogu, 2015).  
 
The delegation of National Democratic Institute (NDI) led by Mr Goerge Moose, a 
former Assistant Secretary on African Affairs, also visited some parts of the country 
as preliminary survey before the election days. It was a five-day pre- election mission 
which the findings from the field were able to assess the level of INEC preparation for 
the general elections. The attention of the commission was drawn to areas that needed 
urgent remedy especially the issue of distribution of Permanent Voters Card and urged 
the electoral umpire to speed up the exercise. The delegation also advised INEC to be 
more proactive in voters’ education for the electorates to be enlighten on the use of the 
proposed Card Readers as a new technological innovation in Nigeria’s electoral system 
(Onyemaobi, 2015). 
 
As part of observatory role before the main election days, the European Union Election 
Observation Mission (EUEOM) deployed an advance team led by Mr Satiango Fisas, 
a member of the European Parliament, to observe the Presidential Primary Elections 
of the two leading political parties (PDP and APC) conducted in November and 
December 2014 respectively. This team was on ground before the arrival of the core 
team comprising of 30 observers deployed for the main election (Onyemaobi, 2015). 
However, as the main election days were approaching, the Independent National 
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Electoral Commission in conjunction with the United Nation Development 
Programme/Democratic Governance for Development (UNDP/DGD) organised a 
national briefing for all the accredited election observers on March 15, 2015, at the 
National Conference Centre, Abuja. The essence of the briefing was for the electoral 
body to interact with the domestic and international election observers and to also 
enlighten them on their operations which must be done within the ambit of the electoral 
law (INEC, 2015). 
 
5.4.1 Public Perceptions of the 2015 General Elections: Analysing Reports from 
Local Observers 
From available report, out of the 108 accredited election observers, 83 of them were 
domestic observers (INEC, 2015). However, for the purpose of this study, three 
notable and renowned local observers that participated in the 2015 elections would be 
examined. Though other observers also played prominent role, this work tries to dwell 
much on reports provided by the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), the 
Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) and the Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room 
(NCSSR). The rational for this is to examine election observers’ reports with national 
coverage regarding the process and outcome of the 2015 national elections in Nigeria. 
The Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) was established as a coalition of civil society 
in 1998 when Nigeria was planning to transit from military rule to democratic system. 
It was basically set up to serve as watchdog of Nigeria’s democratic process. After the 
country’s transition from military dictatorship to democratic governance, TMG 
became an organisation that has been participating in observing Nigeria’s election 
since the inception of the fourth republic (Premium Times, 2015). In fact, TMG is 
known as Nigeria’s Premier Citizen Observer Group with a coalition of over 400 civil 
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society organizations (TMG Report, 2015). During the preparation for the 2015 
elections, TMG deployed citizen observers to all the six geo-political zones33 of 
Nigeria in order to cover the entire 36 states and the federal capital territory. Majorly, 
the TMG usually based its report from data gathered from the field officers with the 
adoption of an approach tagged ‘Quick Count Methodology’.  
 
The Quick Count Methodology which is also known as Parallel Vote Tabulation is a 
method adopted by TMG in observing election results using nonpartisan citizen 
observers deployed to random sampling of polling units across the federation. The 
observer via text messages which are coded report back to the coordinating centre in 
each state. The trained observed participated by witnessing the election process such 
as distribution of materials, arrival of poll officials, accreditation of voters, voting and 
sorting, counting and result announcement (TMG, 2015, SCIDEV, 2016). This was 
possible due to the fact that every vote in all polling units must be counted at the 
presence of electorates, observers, security agencies and other accredited groups 
(INEC, 2015). 
 
The rational for the Quick Count Methodology is to monitor the consistency of election 
results that would be officially released by INEC officials. Such arrangement is done 
to checkmate the electoral officers and ensured that results announced at the central 
collation centres tally with the posted results from the TMG’s citizen’s observers. 
From the report of the TMG, the Presidential elections result released by the 
Independent National Electoral Commission at the collation centre in Abuja 
                                                          
33 Nigeria as a country is divided into six geopolitical zones namely; South West, South East, South 
South, North Central, North East and North West. Each of the zones is made of 6 states except South 




conformed to the available election results observed by the TMG in its Quick Count 
approach (TMG, 2015). Though despite the consistency and correlation of the official 
results with that of the TMG estimated results, there were areas of inconsistency of 
voters’ turnout and results announced.  
 
According to TMG report, out of the six geo–political zones in Nigeria, the estimated 
results from the field observers conformed to INEC official results in five geo-political 
zones, while there was inflation of figures in one zone. The inflated figures were 
detected in the South South geo-political zone. The TMG Quick count shows that 
results were inflated in Akwa Ibom, Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states in the South 
South region while that of Edo and Cross River official turnout results consisted with 
TMG estimated figures. This observation was noticed in the results of the Presidential 
and National Assembly elections held on 28th March, 2015. Also from the report of 
TMG, elections started late in some polling units in the South South region and voting 
could not be completed due to cases of malfunctioning of the card readers and violence 
(TMG, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, the Gubernatorial and State House of Assembly Elections scheduled for 
April 11, 2015 were conducted and the TMG observed the process and applied its 
Quick Count Methodology in all the 36 states. Although Gubernatorial Elections were 
only conducted in 29 states, the State Assembly elections were held in all the 36 
states34. The approach was not different from the previous Presidential and National 
Assembly Election and the outcome from the official results released by INEC was an 
                                                          
34 The State Assembly election was conducted in all the 36 states while Governorship elections were 
held in 29 states. The seven remaining states were exempted in the gubernatorial elections as tenures 
of the sitting Governors were yet to elapse.  The exempted states are Edo, Bayelsa, Anambra, Ondo, 
Ekiti, Osun and Kogi. 
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improvement in terms of consistency of election results. According to the Chairman 
of TMG, Ibrahim M. Zikirullahi, the glitches of the Smart Card Readers were not 
significant enough to undermine the credibility of the 2015 elections (INEC, 2015). 
The TMG affirmed that the Smart Card Readers worked in majority of the polling units 
which stands at 88 percent while the few polling units that witnessed malfunctioning 
of the gadget was at 11 percent (TMG, 2015). 
 
In the final aspect of the TMG report, the electoral commission was advised to look 
into the issue of inflated figures as witnessed in some states of the South South geo-
political zones. Also, some of the logistic challenges needed to be tackled in order to 
avoid such lacuna in future elections. The delay in deployment of election materials 
and insufficient staff in some polling units served as barrier in the 2015 general 
elections. Nevertheless, the TMG gave INEC a pass mark and urged the electoral body 
to strengthen Nigeria’s electoral process more for future elections. The 2015 election 
being an important milestone in Nigeria’s democratisation, TMG pleaded with all 
aspirants and their supporters to adhere to the electoral law and embrace peaceful 
means of settling any electoral dispute. The winners should be magnanimous in victory 
and the losing parties to accept defeat so as to widen political maturity among 
politicians and Nigerians at large. On this, the TMG commended the courage of the 
incumbent president in conceding defeat and urged fellow politicians to learn from 
such legacy (National Election Coalition, 2016). 
 
In a similar vein, Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) was actively 
involved in the observation of Nigeria’s 2015 general elections. The CDD was 
established in the United Kingdom in 1997 as a non-profit organization that involves 
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in capacity building and research training on how to enhance democratic development 
in West Africa. The organization was aimed at mobilizing global resources and 
opinion to improve democratic space in the sub region of West Africa. Since its 
establishment as an independent non-profit organization, CDD has been playing 
prominent role among several civil society groups in Nigeria on democracy and 
development. The first roundtable discussion organized by CDD was in UK and 
deliberation was centred on the future of Nigeria’s democracy. This discussion was 
held in 1997 when Nigeria was under military regime. But since 1999 that Nigeria 
returned to democracy, CDD has been mobilising resources and organizing series of 
programmes on sustainable democracy and development not only in Nigeria but the 
entire West Africa (CDD, 2015). 
 
However, from the field experience during the 2015 elections in Nigeria, CDD being 
one of the accredited observers issued a comprehensive report on the conduct of the 
national election. From the Preliminary report of the CDD which was made available 
to Nigeria dailies, the general turnout of voters was satisfactory and the manners in 
which electorates conducted signified citizenry commitment to democratic virtues. 
According to CDD, the accreditation of voters started around 8:00am, though some 
few polling units had delayed, the patriotism displayed by prospective voters in 
trooping out in mass to be accredited and even waited for main voting scheduled for 
1:00pm on the same day was impressive (Sahara Reporter, March 28, 2015). In some 
polling units, feedback from the field observers indicated the delay in accreditation of 
voters to late arrival of logistics and election officials, while in another instance, 
election officials also waited for party agents before commencement of voters’ 
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accreditation. Nevertheless, the electorates eagerly waited to ensure exercising their 
civic rights (CDD, 2015).  
 
The controversial aspect from the field feedback revolved around lack of functionality 
of the Card Readers in some polling units. According to CDD reports, cases of 
malfunctioning and time wasting in detecting potential voters’ fingers prints were 
reported in Bayelsa State, Akwa Ibom, Lagos, Katsina and Anambra. One of the ugly 
trends of the controversy of the card reader was the inability of the sitting President, 
Goodluck Jonathan, to be accredited with the gadget and after a lot of trial, the INEC 
had to give instruction to the polling officials to adopt manual accreditation for the 
President and other voters with similar cases (Sahara Reporter, March 29, 2015). Such 
scenario caused tension but the Independent National Electoral Commission tried to 
curtail it with the option of manual accreditation in polling booths where the card 
readers failed. The failure of the card readers was a major blow that caused national 
embarrassment and questioned the sincerity of the electoral commission to organize 
credible election. 
 
Although the conduct of the 2015 general elections was generally peaceful, few cases 
of electoral violence were recorded. The few incidents were reported across the geo 
political zones. There was a bomb blast in Awka, the capital of Anambra State in the 
South East at Ward 1 around 7:30am before commencement of accreditation. Also, the 
Nigeria Police Force detonated a bomb explosive placed in Honda car at Women 
Training Centre, Enugu State. In Nafada Local Government area of Gombe State in 
the North East, an attack from suspected members of Boko Haram was carried out 
killing two persons including a police man in Biri Bolewa and Biri Fulani polling units 
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respectively. In the South West, an n incident was reported in Ile Ife, Osun State, which 
led to the death of one person and houses were burnt (CDD 2015, Sahara Reporter, 
March 28, 2015). All these occurred during the March 28, 2015 Presidential and 
National Assembly elections. 
 
The coverage and observation of the CDD was not limited to the Presidential and 
National Assembly elections but also captured the April 11, 2015 Gubernatorial and 
House of Assembly elections. Out of the 36 states, the CDD deployed observers and 
reporters to 21 states cutting across the six geopolitical states. According to Idayat 
Hassan, the Director of CDD, the coverage of the election was aimed at assessing the 
quality of the entire process and to also inform the electoral commission and the 
general public on any shortcoming observed. With this, transparency and credibility 
of the exercise can be enhanced (Premium Times, April 12, 2015). Unlike the 
experience of the Presidential election, arrival of election materials and logistics and 
functionality of the Card Reader recorded substantial improvement during the 
gubernatorial election (CDD, 2015). Arrival of INEC officials and political parties’ 
agents was timely and contributed to the early accreditation of voters which was done 
in a peaceful atmosphere. The report of CDD commended the security agencies for 
their presence in the polling units, however, this could not stop few cases of hitches in 
some polling booths. Despite the improvement in distribution of election materials, 
CDD field observers noticed late arrival of voting materials and INEC staff in some 
polling stations in Rivers, Abia, Delta and Imo states. Contrary to the INEC 2015 
guideline, accreditation and voting took place simultaneously in few polling units of 




No doubt accreditation exercise was smooth in most of the polling units across the 
country, election related violence erupted in some wards and units which led to 
suspension of voting in the affected areas. For instance, election was suspended in 
Essan PU 004, Dokota Ward, Niger State and also in Eku Community of Delta State 
due to unrest leading to death of two persons in the latter (CDD, 2015). Furthermore, 
Lagos State witnessed clash of supporters of APC and PDP in Osokoro area and ballot 
boxes were reportedly snatched and threw into the lagoon (Premium Times, April, 29, 
2015). The high rate of electoral violence erupted in Rivers state and as voting was 
going on in some places within the state, protests were being carried out in other parts. 
Clashes involving party supporters were ramparts and houses and several properties 
were destroyed. 
 
Generally, CDD commended the electoral commission for the improvement witnessed 
in the gubernatorial election which indicated a better process than the Presidential 
election, however, voters’ turnout was low compared to the experience of the March 
28 election. Nevertheless, CDD urged INEC to be more responsive and proactive. 
Though the complaint on the functionality of the card reader was minimal during the 
governorship election, cases of election violence was higher resulting to abuse of 
human rights in some quarters. The security agencies need to be more alert and ready 
to prevent violence rather than trying to quench it. Also, the party leaders and 
supporters need to desist from any act that violates electoral law and preparation for 
election needs not to be taken like warfare. In a nutshell, as noted by one of the 
respondents during the researcher’s field work, ‘the citizens’ involvement and 
readiness to uphold Nigeria’s electoral system serves as a better hope for sustaining 
democracy and development in Nigeria’(Respondent 9). 
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The interwoven and interrelated role of the Civil Society Groups regarding Nigeria’s 
2015 general elections was showcased with the formation of Nigeria Civil Society 
Situation Room (NCSSR). The NCSSR represented a broad platform of civil society 
groups under the auspices of the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC). The 
Situation Room was actively involved in the 2015 elections through field observation 
and also by monitoring the electoral process. The essence for the creation of the 
Situation Room was to provide an avenue for information sharing, analysis of election 
observers’ field report, objective insights of election management and rapid response 
to any challenge associated to electioneering conduct. This was done by liaising with 
the Electoral Management Body (NCSSR, 2015).  
 
From the report based on observation and analysis of the Situation Room, the 2015 
general election was a consolidation of the gains achieved in the 2011 national 
elections. This signalled a sign of improvement on the part of the Independent National 
Electoral Commission and the Situation Room acknowledged the fact that the 2015 
general elections was remarkable in the series of Nigeria’s elections since her return 
to democratic governance. According to NCSSR, the postponement of the 2015 
general election from February 14th to March 28th has a political influence. Although 
the claim of the electoral body was basically on security report, the Situation Room 
was of the opinion that such postponement posed threat to smooth electioneering 
conduct (NCSSR, 2015).  
 
However despite the postponement, the enthusiasm displayed by prospective voters 
was quite interesting and the field observers reporting direct to the Situation Room 
confirmed large voters’ turnout during the March 28 Presidential and National 
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Assembly elections. The Situation Room also pinpointed the difficulty experienced by 
voters due to malfunctioning of the Smart Card Readers in some polling units and 
logistic challenges. But as noted in the earlier report of TNG and CDD, the Situation 
Room field analysis also affirmed the peculiarity of such difficulties to the Presidential 
and National Assembly elections (NCSSR, 2015). Meanwhile, resolving to manual 
accreditation of voters was a discretion by the electoral body which was not part of the 
initial arrangement as stipulated in the guidelines. Though this was introduced to 
expedite actions, it created room for manipulation and according to the Situation Room 
field observers; there were evidences of systematic rigging. 
 
As rightly noted in the report of the Situation Room, the process of collation and 
announcement of result is often the most fragile stage in Nigeria’s election, INEC was 
able to keep a close watch on this process. The politicians attempted to disrupt 
counting and collation of results in some polling units but the security agencies in 
partnership with the electoral commission really ensured transparency and 
accountability during compilation of election results at every polling units. In view of 
this, Respondent 135, affirms that ‘the collaboration enjoyed by INEC with the security 
agencies served as the basis for hitch free electioneering conduct in the 2015 general 
elections’. 
 
In spite of the genuine attempt by the electoral commission to deliver exemplary 
elections, the politicians, in some states, tried to subvert the electoral process during 
the gubernatorial elections. From extraction in the report of the Situation Room (2015), 
violence erupted in few states such as Rivers and Akwa Ibom which resulted to loss 
                                                          
35 Respondent 1 made the assertion in an interview session with the Researcher on 19th July, 2016. 
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of lives and properties as a result of desperation among political stalwarts. However, 
INEC was able to manage and guide the voting rights of the Nigerian people despite 
the challenges. There was a progress in the entire conduct of the 2015 elections.  With 
reference to some of the hindrances observed, the Situation Room recommended 
possible solutions to improve future election in Nigeria. The Situation Room urged 
INEC to immediately commence re-arrangement of constituencies and polling units. 
Also, full implementation of the Election Project Plan (EPP) and the Election 
Management System (EMS) reports need to be given priority by the electoral umpire. 
The electoral commission is advised to sustain and strengthen the policy of Inter-
Agency Partnership which was believed to have aided a lot of positivity in the outcome 
of the 2015 general elections. This can be improved through regular and periodic 
consultative meeting with stakeholders particularly the political parties and civil 
society organizations. The issue of electoral offenders should top INEC legal 
prosecution and individuals found guilty deserves severe punishment (NCSSR, 2015). 
 
5.4.2 Foreign Observers and the Conduct of Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections: 
Assessing the External Perceptions 
No doubt, the Nigerian 2015 general elections attracted interests beyond her national 
boundary, external pressure played a significant role during the entire process. As 
noted by Respondent 1, ‘the involvement of foreign players in Nigeria’s 2015 elections 
cut across the area of advocacy, peace building and sensitization of the public’36.  The 
electoral body accredited a total number of 25 foreign observers to participate in the 
2015 national election (See Appendix C) and statements and reports were issued by 
various international participants on the general assessment of the electoral process. In 
                                                          
36 Extraction from the transcribed interview conducted with the Respondent, on 19th July, 2016. 
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order to strike a balance, this study analyses reports of African Union Election 
Observation Mission (AUEOM), European Union Election Observation Mission 
(EUEOM) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). 
 
 The subjection of Nigeria’s 2015 election to international scrutiny was an indication 
that the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Independent National Electoral 
Commission were evenly prepared to embrace democratic virtues (AUEOM, 2015). 
The African Union Election Observation Mission deployed 84 observers comprising 
both long term and short term observers to cover 5 out of the 6 geo political zones and 
20 out of the 36 states of the federation37. The rational for deployment of long term 
and short term observers was anchored on AU’s principle of impartial and critical 
assessment of membership countries election in order to determine the extent of 
compliance to regional, continental and international best practises for democratic 
elections. To achieve this, the AUEOM did a wider consultation with key stakeholders 
in Nigeria. The AU mission observed the Nigeria’s 2015 election in conformity with 
the regional, continental and international principles of credible elections with 
cognisance to the national legal framework of Nigeria.38 The AUEOM was actually 
involved in the three stages of pre, during and after the elections which guided the 
overall report of the AU mission. 
 
According to AUEOM report, which was premised on the field observation, the 2015 
Nigeria’s election constituted an important opportunity for deepening democracy in 
the country. Being the fifth consecutive elections since the country returned to 
                                                          
37 Long term observers were deployed from 2 to 23 February, and redeployed from 14 to March 16 
while the Short term observers were on ground between 20 to 31st March 
38 This is based on 2007 African Union Charter on Election, Democracy and Governance. With 
reference to 2002 AU Guidelines on Election Mission Observation 
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democracy, it created an avenue for democratic consolidation in the polity. The AU 
mission viewed the emergence of a viable opposition political party (APC) in 2013 as 
the basis for reconfiguration of electoral contest in 2015. However, the pre- election 
environment was tensed and concern was placed on security particularly in the North 
East of Nigeria.39 There was also issues of political uncertainties as a result of legal 
cases challenging the eligibility of APC and PDP Presidential candidates.40 The 
postponement of the election date initially slated for February 14 to March 28, the 
introduction of biometric voters registration and verification gadgets (Permanent 
Voters Card and Smart Card Readers) that generated hot debates among political 
parties, all contributed in heightening the already tensed political environment 
(AUEOM, 2015:8). 
 
The AUEOM commended the Independent National Electoral Commission for 
introducing the biometric voters’ registration and verification technologies which 
according to the AU mission enhanced the integrity and credibility of the electoral 
process. From available statistics, a total number of 15, 718,756 representing 14.8% 
of multiple registration was detected and removed. This singular act sanitised the 
voters’ registration exercise and according to a respondent, ‘the electoral body 
embraced ICT in the 2015 elections to reduce human errors’41. On the Election Day, 
the field experience and reports from observers of the AUEOM on the comportment 
of the electorates was simply put thus:    
                                                          
39 The North East was the area battling with the Boko Haram insurgency 
40 The APC Presidential Candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, was sued for academic qualification 
(Secondary School Certificates) while the PDP candidate, Goodluck Jonathan, was sued for trying to 
run for third term having completed the joint ticket that brought him and late President Yar’ Adua to 
power in 2007. Yar’ Adua died in 2010 and Jonathan took over who later re-contested and won the 
2011 Presidential election. But the two cases were later thrown out in the court of law. 




The people of Nigeria largely demonstrated patience and resolve to 
have a peaceful democratic process, in spite of the uncertainties and 
apparent delays that characterised the election. Although most of the 
polling units visited by AU observers opened late, mainly due to late 
arrival of polling personnel and election materials, there were long 
queues of voters waiting patiently to be accredited, thus manifesting 
the resolve to exercise their franchise (AUEOM, 2015:8). 
 
 
The polling process was generally peaceful and the report of the AU mission isolated 
few cases in Bayelsa and Enugu states were election violence was reported.  The 
AUEOM praised the security agencies for ensuring a peaceful atmosphere throughout 
the electoral process. According to the AUEOM report, the polling process which 
involved accreditation, voting and counting was generally transparent and carried out 
in the presence of foreign and domestic observers, party agents and the populace at 
large. The AUEOM however noted that in some polling units, political party agents 
were not available to effectively observe the process of sorting and counting of votes. 
Nevertheless, the openness in terms of the space and process allowed voters to observe 
with keen interest sorting and counting of votes (AUEOM, 2015). 
 
However, the approach of two-step voting process42 , comprising of accreditation and 
voting, was challenging as voters had to wait for a longer time after being accredited 
before casting their votes. This as noted by the AUEOM might have contributed to low 
turnout in some polling units observed. Also, some electoral personnel were faced with 
challenges of operationally of the electronic devices coupled with the failure of the 
machines in some polling units. It was also observed by the AU mission that the 
                                                          
42 The INEC Election Guideline stipulated that accreditation should commence by 8: am and Casting 
of votes by 1:00pm after all eligible voters must have been accredited. 
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procedures for manual accreditation in situations where the Smart Card Readers failed 
were not adequately followed by some electoral officials. The use of incident form as 
the basis for manual registration was neglected in some cases and names of accredited 
voters were recorded on plain papers. 
 
The AUEOM commended the large turnout of women in the polling process and from 
the available report based on visited polling units, 38.9% were women polling 
personnel while 39.5% were made up of citizens’ observers. But the number of women 
serving as party agents reduced drastically to 18%. This showcased the barrier of 
women representation in the parties’ arrangement. The reflection of this also 
manifested in the outcome of the elections where only 14 women out of 360 seats made 
it to the House of Representative and only 1 female out of the 14 Presidential aspirants 
contested for the number one seat (Akpan, 2015). The issue of gender disparity in 
Nigeria’s political participation and representation regarding the 2015 election might 
be due to limited consideration of women in political party (AUEOM, 2015). 
 
The postponement of the elections was a blessing in disguise according to AU mission 
because as at February 7, the day pronouncement of postponement was made, only 
66.8% had collected the Permanent Voters Card. Ordinarily, many people could have 
been disfranchised if INEC did not postpone the election date. Though such to 
Informant 2 during the first session of FGD, was a political interference43, the 
postponement allowed INEC to be more prepared and avoided the consequence of 
mass disfranchisement (AUEOM, 2015:9). On the legal framework, the AUEOM 
acknowledged that the 2015 elections were conducted within the provision of the 
                                                          
43 The Informant is a Professor of Political Science and made the remark during the first session of 
FGD conducted by the Researcher on 14th July, 2016. 
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1999(as amended) constitution and 2010 Electoral Act (as amended) which both 
concur with the AU Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in 
Africa.  The Nigerian constitution allows direct universal adult suffrage, such as noted 
by the AUEOM limited to resident citizens and excluded those in diaspora. This could 
not raise any alarm as stakeholders at home never bothered on it. 
 
The post electoral context as observed by the AU mission was peaceful and after the 
announcement of the APC candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, as the winner of the 
Presidential election, no outburst of violence as experienced in the 2011 election. 
However, to AUEOM, the gubernatorial elections conducted aftermath were as well 
peaceful, except the isolated few cases of violence in few states. In view of this, the 
AU mission concluded that the 2015 general elections, most especially the March 28 
Presidential election, was conducted peacefully and satisfactorily in a manner that it 
met the required standard for democratic election. The AUEOM appreciated the 
political leaders and Nigerian populace for their strong commitment in upholding 
democratic governance despite the internal challenges in the country. The mandate 
given to INEC was successfully delivered and according to AU observers, the electoral 
body has led by example in the African continent. 
 
Finally, the AUEOM made some recommendations for better electioneering process 
in the future. The AU mission urges the Nigerian government to sustain electoral 
security at all times. The delay in distribution of PVC was as a result of slow paste of 
disbursement of funds to INEC and in lieu of this, AUEOM proposes financial 
autonomy for the electoral body. The National Assembly should fast rack work on 
pending legal reforms that needed to improve the electoral system. Also, the AUEOM 
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called on political parties to put in place measures to improve women participation and 
representation in politics and lastly, the inclusion of technological innovation in the 
2015 elections was a welcome development that must be strengthen (AUEOM, 
2015:11). 
 
The European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) was involved in the 
2015 election having gotten invitation from the Independent National Electoral 
Commission. The mission was led by Chief Observer, Santiago Fisas, a Spanish and 
Member of European Parliament. The EU team observed the party primaries of the 
two major contenders (APC and PDP) and sent 30 long term observers across the 
geopolitical zones with a core team of 9 analysts. However, due to security threat in 
the North East, the EUEOM did not deploy observers to the zone but only attended 
few rallies in some of the states (EUEOM Report, 2015). For the main election, the 
March 28 Presidential election, the EU mission was made up of 90 members from 25 
EU member states.  Also, as part of the mission was a seven man delegation from 
European Parliament headed by a Spanish, Javier Nart. On March 28 of the 
Presidential election, the EU mission visited 357 polling units comprising of 97 local 
government across 19 states. On April 11 gubernatorial election, the mission visited 
351 polling units of 71 local government area across 18 states. Security challenge was 
the excuse for the limited samples. 
 
According to the EU mission report, before the main voting, the campaign 
environment was highly tense with incidents of over 160 people killed in election 
related crisis. The campaign activities was done concurrently for federal and state 
elections with large scale of rallies, town hall meeting, visits to traditional and religious 
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leaders by aspirants and party members. Issue based campaign was overshadowed by 
hate speeches and propagandas from the two dominant parties (PDP and APC) to the 
extent of each using government resources and tools at their disposal. The government 
owned media at both federal and state level became a political resource to favour 
incumbent government. The PDP and APC were abusing incumbency powers at 
federal and state levels without any sanction on non-compliance to democratic virtues 
(EUEOM Report, 2015:5).  As observed during campaign, the federal incumbency 
used the two government owned media, Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) and the 
Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) to publicise the PDP activities at 84% 
compared to 11% attention given to APC programmes. In the state owned media 
outlets, incumbent Governors, seeking re-elections, were extremely covered at 95% 
and this cuts across PDP and APC ruling states. The private owned media became the 
saving grace where elements of neutrality was observed to some extent in the coverage 
of party campaigns and programmes (EUEOM, 2015).  
 
However, voters displayed a commendable commitment on 28 March election day. In 
the overall reports of the site visited by the EU mission, the polling exercise was 
peaceful with appropriate performance by the security agencies. Though there were 
cases of delayed and the process was prolonged, the EU mission during its briefing 
shortly after the election maintained that no evidence of systematic manipulation by 
any of the stakeholders.  
 
According to the EUEOM Chief Observer, Santiago Fisas, “INEC appears to have 
performed impartially in difficult circumstances while stakeholders at a local level 
report have confidence in its work” (EUEOM, 2015:6). Based on this, the EU mission 
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commended INEC’s effort in ensuring impartiality despite the tension the 2015 
elections generated. The adoption of card reader deterred fraud because it detects the 
validity of PVC in every polling units. However, it was regrettable that the failure of 
the biometric voter identification (Card Reader) in some polling units resulting to 
manual accreditation increased opportunity for fraud. Also, it was observed from field 
reports of the EU mission that over 2.3 million prospective voters that were accredited 
in the morning did not wait for subsequent vote cast and this was as a result of timing 
between the accreditation and real voting (EUEOM Report, 2015:7). 
 
During the governorship election of April 11, the security incident was high with 30 
people reported to have died predominantly from inter party clashes and attacks at 
various elections site. As reported by the EU mission, election related problems were 
pronounced in Rivers and Akwa States. However, EUEOM observed no evidence of 
centralised systematic fraud and from overall experience, the process was more 
efficient, though with few cases of prevailing fingerprint verification problems. The 
system of sorting and counting of voting which was done at every polling units could 
not be safeguarded in some few cases as a result of interruption. But INEC was 
commended for publishing result forms at a later day which indicates path to 
transparency and accountability (EUEOM Report, 2015). 
   
The EUEOM observed that the citizens’ observer network enhanced the transparency 
of the entire process and acknowledged the TMG’s ‘quick count’ approach that 
confirmed official results. The political neutrality exercised by the civil society groups, 
though there was mixed level of confidence by some political parties, the general 
overview signalled a positive direction in cross examination of the electoral process 
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by the CSOs. Meanwhile, the EU mission pin-pointed the negative trend of women 
representation in the 2015 election. The proportion of women elected during the 2015 
general elections was far below the 30% proposed target at the Beijing Declaration44. 
At state level, no woman was elected as Governor with just few making it to the State 
House of Assembly. This remains a bad signal towards gender equality showcasing 
the politics of patriarchy in Nigeria’s electioneering. 
 
The EUEOM came up with recommendations that must be given priority. The 
parliament needs to work on legalising independent candidate for elective positions. 
Accreditation and voting should be done simultaneously to ease the process for the 
electorates while the biometric verification of voters deserves to be sustained. Political 
parties’ policies should be women friendly in order to encourage their partisanship in 
politics. The National Broadcasting commission (NBC) needs to be strengthen, 
including power to grant licenses, monitor and sanctions when applicable. The 
broadcasting commission must be neutral and free from being used as a tool of the 
ruling government (EUEOM Report, 2015). 
 
The National Democratic Institute (NDI)45 fielded international observer delegation 
for the Nigeria’s March 28 Presidential and National Assembly elections comprising 
of 24 delegates from seven countries. The delegation was co –headed by Johnie 
Carson, former U.S Assistant Secretary of State of African Affairs and a Member of 
the NDI Board, Mahamadou Danda, former Prime Minister of Niger, Bill Ritter, Jr, 
                                                          
44 Nigeria ratified the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) that proposed 30% for 
Gender Affirmative 
45 NDI is a non-partisan organization with its headquarters in U.S established to support and 
strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through citizen participation, openness and 
accountability in government.   
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former Governor of Colarado (U.S) and Christopher Fomunyoh, Senior Associate for 
Africa and Regional Director of NDI. The NDI team made a visitation to Nigeria from 
March 24- 30, 2015 and observers were deployed to over 100 polling units in 25 local 
governments of 9 states in all the six geo-political zones and the Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja. In addition, the NDI team was working closely with the Transition 
Monitoring Groups (TMG) that deployed over 4,000 citizens observers to the field 
during the 2015 elections. It also collaborated with other international observers (NDI 
Report, 2015). 
 
The strong enthusiastic among the Nigerian voters was noticed as highlighted in the 
report of the NDI. This was informed by the determination of the people to vote for 
their leaders through credible, peaceful and transparent election. According to NDI 
(2015:2), “Nigerian voters committed themselves in a peaceful and orderly manner on 
Election Day and politicians at all spectrum are urged to recognize and respect this 
public manifestation of citizens’ commitment to democratic process”. To Respondent 
6, ‘the commitment was a result of national consensus by the citizens to have free and 
credible election’46. 
 
On the administration of election particularly on voting day, the NDI noticed that poll 
workers really exhibited extraordinary patience in overcoming delays associated with 
accreditations which must be completed before voting. This patriotic move from poll 
officers was one of the factors that distinct the 2015 election administration from the 
previous electoral conduct. The National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) who 
participated as ad hoc electoral staff displayed high level of professionalism and 
                                                          
46 The Respondent made the remark during interview   session with the on 25th July, 2016. 
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effectiveness in handling various polling units. The NDI revealed that women were 
well represented at the polling units as INEC and NYSC ad hoc staff. The use of 
universities lecturers as returning officers was a noble idea that contributed to smooth 
collation and announcement of results from wards to states level (NDI Report, 2015). 
 
Many polling units observed by the NDI team realised delays of over 2 hours before 
commencement of accreditation due to late arrival of materials and electoral staff. As 
stated in the report, delay of the process was pronounced in Enugu, Edo, Kaduna, 
Lagos, Kano, Nassarawa, Rivers and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) while there 
was timely opening in Adamawa and Niger States. Most of the frequent materials that 
were brought late included accreditation tags, incident forms, card readers and results 
forms (NDI Report, 2015). The failure of electronic readers of biometric to verify 
fingerprint and voters card (PVC) was noticed in many polling units visited by the 
NDI. This contributed to delay of the voting process and in most cases some polling 
units did not receive the incident forms supposedly needed for manual accreditation. 
But the NDI observers acknowledged the significant of the card readers in curbing 
electoral fraud. Also, there was overall adherence to the INEC specified procedures 
during closing and counting in most of the visited polling units. Overall, the NDI 
observers commended the INEC officials for successfully sorting and counting despite 
the challenges. 
 
In the area of participation, the NDI noticed a moderate turn out involving male and 
female voters. Women rate at the polling units visited was between 30 to 50 percent 
and youths were well represented. The observers realised and witnessed special 
consideration allotted to pregnant and nursing women, people with disabilities and 
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elderly persons by the poll workers with understanding of the general public (NDI 
Report, 2015). The NDI observed voters turn out at the Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDP) in Adamawa state and it was noticed that the level of apathy was high with 
variation in different polling units mapped out for the IDPs. 
 
On security, the NDI team observed professionalism among the security agencies at 
various polling units. The Police and the Civil Defence Corps were able to coordinate 
voters and poll workers in an orderly manner. The incidents of violence in few states 
such as Gombe, Adamawa, Yobe, Anambra and Rivers were not witnessed by the NDI 
but got second hand information from sisters’ foreign and local observers. The NDI 
observers did not witness any interference from the military during the electioneering 
process (NDI Report, 2015).  
 
 The ugly trend of money politics was also reported in few polling units where by some 
party loyalists were seen sharing money to voters on queue which violated the INEC 
guideline and the electoral law. The security men were able to chase away such 
deviants in some polling units according to feedback from the NDI field observers. 
However, the April 11 gubernatorial election was well managed in terms of timely 
arrival of materials and strict adherence to election guideline. The major challenge was 
security issue and desperate politicians tried to disrupt peaceful conduct as a result of 
their inability to manipulate the biometric reader that denied multiple voting. 
 
The suggestions for better management of future election were also outlined in the 
report of the National Democratic Institute. The causes of widely delay of elections 
materials must be reviewed and the Independent National Electoral Commission 
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should strategize on availability of relevant materials in time. Provision of more 
voters’ education to the Internally Displaced Persons to avoid low voters turnout in 
their centres. The partnership enjoyed by INEC with other stakeholders in the 2015 
elections must be expanded. The political parties should maintain legal process in 
seeking redress regarding electoral issues. The government and the legislative body in 
particular should work on pending electoral issues that need to be amended. The civil 
society really did well in the area of advocacy and such gestures need to be intensified 
in subsequent electioneering process in the country (NDI Report, 2015). 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The administration of Nigeria’s 2015 elections was an exercise that involved multiple 
players within and outside the country. The significant of those players cannot be over 
emphasised and the fact remains that Nigeria’s electoral democracy has its pros and 
cons based on the analysis of the various reports from both local and foreign observers. 
Meanwhile, as highlighted earlier, the move for peace accord initiated by the former 
Secretary General of United Nations, Kofi Annan and his counterpart from Common 
Wealth of Nations, Emeka Anyaokwu, served as the basis for peace undertaking by 
politicians in Nigeria’s politics. Since the introduction of the Abuja Peace Accord 
which was consolidated by the National Peace Committee supervised by Retired 
General Abdulsalam Abubakar, the phenomenon of signing ‘peace accord’ by 
aspirants has come to stay in the country. It has been applicable in series of staggered 
elections conducted after the 2015 general elections. The Edo State gubernatorial 
election that was conducted on September 28, 2016 and that of Ondo state held on 
November 26, 2016 witnessed signing of peace accord by various contenders47.The 
                                                          




power tussle was between the two dominant political parties as observed in the 2015 
elections. The PDP having ruled for 16 years was shocked with a defeat by APC, being 
a strong and formidable opposition party formed in 2013 ahead of the general 
elections. The present political arrangement places APC as the ruling party after 
dislodging the incumbency power at the federal election. Not only that, the APC 
controlled states outnumbered that of the PDP which became a reality aftermath of the 
2015 general elections. This makes Nigeria’s electoral politics to have made history 





THE 2015 GENERAL ELECTIONS AND THE LEGITIMACY OF 
HYBRID DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is to consider rigorous analysis of the 2015 general elections 
based on the field reports and findings. The Researcher developed themes and sub 
themes from the filed responses. The evaluation of the findings and reports is captured 
in a thematic assessment paving way for diverse opinion of the administration of the 
Nigeria’s 2015 elections. As it is known that democracy is a contested concept, the 
interpretation of the pattern and dimension of the 2015 election testifies to the 
affirmation of this thesis that places Nigeria’s electoral democracy on hybrid. The 
contention is that Nigeria’s democracy is neither authoritarian nor liberalized but 
combination of both. Similarly, this section also adopts the ‘Electoral Integrity Project’ 
as a complementary framework to assess the conduct of Nigeria’s 2015 general 
elections.  The EIP framework looks into why elections fail and what can be done to 
strengthen electoral democracy. It was a project championed by Pippa Norris of J.F 
Kennedy School of Government of the Harvard University. The project has gained 
momentum globally and it remains an acceptable framework to determine if elections 




6.2 Theme 1: The Impact of Election Administration on Nigeria’s 
Democratisation 
The linkage between election and democracy remains the basis for legitimacy of any 
civilian administration. And Nigeria’s democratisation has faced series of hurdles most 
especially in the area of election administration, though the 2015 general elections was 
a watershed. In view of this, the researcher was prompted to ask question on the impact 
of election administration on Nigeria’s democracy. In justifying the place of election 
administration on Nigeria’s democracy, a respondent’s caption of the issue is that: 
One needs to look at the centrality of election to democratic process 
of any society. Election administration has to be provided to conduct 
election that will give way for change of government from one 
administration to another, from one party to another, from one 
individual to another. So the role of election umpire is to manage, 
regulate and at the same time conduct free and fair election. This 
role cannot be detached from the wider role of electoral process. The 
process contains a lot of stages for example, the registration and 
update of voters, the necessary information that needs to be provided 
to the electorate, also it encompasses the role of INEC in printing 
electoral materials and the same time the way and manner in which 
election material are handled. In other world, you can now say the 
role of election administrator is to monitor, conduct, supervise and 
release credible election result (Respondent 3)48 
 
The argument of the respondent is on the effective administration of elections in 
sustaining democracy placing much emphasis on the role of the electoral umpire to 
deliver free and credible elections. This could be linked to the finding of Babatunde 
(2015) that captures the administration of election as a strategic measure for 
enthronement of democracy in Nigeria. The study views election administration as a 
major yardstick to democratic sustainability in Nigeria. In a similar vein, another 
                                                          




respondent’s perception on election administration towards democratic sustainability 
revolves around stabilisation of the political system in the country. His remark is 
simply puts thus: 
There is an obvious correlation but before that, one needs to 
understand what democratic sustainability entails. It is an argument 
that is made to explain what will happen to new democracies. 
Scholars became concern about how sustainable the new democratic 
regime. It is all about regime stability. When you look at election 
administration by the concept of democracy itself, you will discover 
that election remains a major determinant of democracy anywhere 
in the world. Election administration is crucial to survival of any 
democratisation (Respondent 5).   
 
 
However, political stability cannot be attained in any democratic society without 
acknowledging the crucial role of elections in sustaining this. The history of elections 
had actually ended up in a controversial manner which became a tool for military 
hijacking of power. This has resulted to constant change of electoral commissions and 
the rules guiding elections in the country (Obianyo & Emesibe, 2015). 
 
Several factors have been alluded to the impact of election administration on Nigeria’s 
democracy which has been the basis for political instability in the country. The 
electoral umpire has been subjected to series of changes and controls ranging from 
leadership, political interference and legal framework. During the field work, the 
aforementioned attributes emerged as contributory factors to Nigeria’s election 
administration which invariably has implication on the country’s democratisation. For 
clarification, the following sub themes emerged from the issue on impact of election 





6.2.1 Leadership Style 
The issue of leadership is significant to the administration of elections. Series of 
elections conducted in Nigeria have been attributed to the nature and pattern of 
leadership style. As rightly pinpointed by an Informant during the FGD session, the 
phenomenon of leadership cannot be undermined in the administration of elections in 
Nigeria which influences the EMB decision in conducting credible elections. In his 
remark, the Informant relates the paradigm shift in the administration of 2015 election 
to leadership factor particularly the political leadership. This claim is simply puts thus: 
Nigerians were worry of past electoral fraud and they were eager to 
see the best coming out from the election. More importantly, the 
president played a major role because if he had interfered like other, 
we would not be talking of finest election. We all know the prediction 
before the election that Nigeria may collapse by 2015. The president 
showed good leadership trait and resolved to support the electoral 
umpire in the administration of the acclaimed credible election in 
2015. If he had failed, it could have been a different story (Informant 
1) 
 
 The issue of leadership has been the bane of maladministration in the previous 
elections and which resulted to series of military intervention using electoral fraud as 
a yardstick for hijacking political power (Omotola, 2009). Using the instance of the 
2007 general elections, President Olusegun Obasanjo categorically called for ‘do or 
die’ elections which actually were conducted like a battle field. This prompted Alade 
(2016) to make reference to Nigerian leaders as warriors when it comes to 
electioneering conduct. Though the change in the leadership style could be attributed 
to personality, the former president that pronounced do or die affairs had a military 
background. This could have influenced his perception and attitudes unlike President 
Jonathan that is a civilian man without any military profile. However, the perspective 
of leadership remains a basis for determining the partiality and impartiality of the 
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electoral commission. Elections conducted under the military administrations have 
always been flawed and lacked best practices as entrenched in the international norms 
(Uche, 2003).   
 
The phenomenon of leadership is acclaimed to be one of the leading factors in election 
administration. A discussant during the second session of FGD raised the leadership 
factor and was unanimously agreed by others. According to her, ‘ the administration 
of elections requires unique leadership with the political will to allow a free level 
playing ground which was missing in the shackle previous elections’ (Informant 7)49. 
With this, the significance of leadership contribution remains a determinant in the 
administration of elections in any democratic system. The paradigm shift enjoyed by 
INEC would not have been achieved if not for political will to adhere to some basic 
principles of election administration. 
 
6.2.2 Political Interference  
  The partiality and impartiality of electoral commission is anchored on the level of 
political interference. This remains the claim of Agbor (2007) in his remark on the 
conduct of elections in Nigeria. The electoral umpire during the electioneering exercise 
of the 2007 really displayed partisanship to the extent that the ruling party collaborated 
with the electoral commission to subvert the peoples’ sovereignty (Ibrahim & Ibeanu, 
2007). However, the departure in the 2015 general election rekindled the hope for 
democratic sustainability on the basis that the level of political interference was 
minimal during its conduct. This was revealed by a respondent during an in-depth 
interview is a welcome development for Nigeria’s electoral democracy.  The 
                                                          
49 Informant 7  made the remark during the FGD II session held on 27th July, 2016 
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respondent simply identified reduction in political interference in the 2015 general 
elections thus: 
 The extent of impartiality determines how administration of election 
could be qualified. The scenario of the 2015 largely created hope in 
sustaining democratization process in the country. With the display 
of INEC in the conduct of 2015 elections, the politicization of the 
electoral umpire had drastically reduced and confidence among 
Nigerians became high in sustaining electoral democracy. The de- 
politicisation of the structure of INEC was an achievement of 
Jonathan and the appointment of Jega was celebrated due to his 
track record as a man of integrity. This act indicated political will 
to allow an independent electoral body (Respondent 5) 
 
 
Substantiating this claim, an Informant justified the level playing ground as the basis 
for INEC to be proactive in the conduct of the 2015 elections. The informant during 
the FGD II highlighted the fact that INEC as an institution was stronger under the 
leadership of Jonathan coupled with the restructuring of the body’s leadership. The 
institution was encouraged via amendment of electoral laws and guidelines. In her 
remark, 
The role of the Election Management Body is very important and 
without it neutrality, there cannot be fair game. No one can take 
away the personality of Jonathan as a supportive factor but the EMB 
also became more determined and focused due to the reputation and 
background of the electoral commission Chairman. He made the 
agency to be strong in order not to jeopardize the good will from the 
masses. The activity of the commission really determined the 
strengthening of electoral democracy (Informant 5 FGD II)  
 
However, the postponement saga of the general election from its proposed previous 
date February, 14 to March 28, 2015 by the electoral commission was a tug of war 
among various stakeholders. The announcement and reason by the INEC chairman for 
the polls rescheduling generated a lot of debate. The opposition party accused the 
electoral commission of conspiracy while the ruling party defended the action. The 
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rational for the shift according to Jega was as a result of security report. In his address 
to other key stakeholders on the postponement, Jega pinpointed that: 
We invited you here today to make known the position of the Independent 
National Electoral Commission (INEC) on the timetable for the 2015 
general elections. Let me state from the outset that the Commission’s 
position was reached after carefully weighing the suggestions from 
briefings held with different stakeholders in the electoral process. The 
conduct of elections in a country like Nigeria is invariably a collective 
venture that involves not just the Election Management Body (EMB), but 
also a diverse range of stakeholders, notably security agencies, political 
parties and their candidates, voters, as well as interest groups, such as the 
civil society organizations and the media. To guarantee successful conduct 
of elections, there are things that are wholly the responsibility of the EMB. 
But there are other things critical for the success of elections, which fall 
outside the control of the EMB. In other words, while INEC must work 
hard to perfect its systems and processes for conducting elections, and take 
responsibility for any imperfections thereof, whatever the Commission 
does may not by itself be sufficient to guarantee the success of elections. 
There are a number of issues in the preparation and conduct of an election, 
the most critical of which is security, which is not under the control of 
INEC (Ogala, 2015:2). 
 
The security reason that warranted rescheduling of the election time table became an 
issue that generated different views. This raised concern of political interference and 
according to an informant: 
 The postponement of the election for over a month, was a political 
interference in the name of security risk but the presidency 
interfered. It started from the speech of Dasuki former National 
Security Adviser, in the Chatham house lecture in London and the 
Senate President, David Mark, also raised it in the senate. The 
security agencies had meeting with INEC and chairman and said 
they could not guarantee security which the INEC Chairman 
acceded to (Informant 2 FGD I)   
 
Sharing this perception of interference, another respondent during an in-depth 
interview session with the researcher accused the presidency of political interference 
and that the postponement of the elections could be seen as a compromise on the part 
of the electoral commission. In his submission on the issue, he maintains that: 
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It was not very apparent what happened was that because it became 
impossible to compromise the electoral umpire. Compromise was 
sought in other direction. For example in trying to use security, as 
an excuse to postpone the election in trying to agitate against the use 
technology and in trying to agitate against the use of electronic 
voters register, so the interference was not towards the direction of 
the electoral umpire but in trying to alter the political landscape to 
make sure that the elections were not conducted in free and fair 
manner and despite the six week postponement the election still went 
the way the people wanted  and they voted the way they did 
(Respondent 8)  
 
 
Meanwhile, a respondent, affirms that despite the political connotation resulting to the 
postponement of the 2015 elections and the denial by the electoral commission about 
external interference in any way, the fact remains that INEC was not fully ready for 
the initial date. The low paste of distribution of the PVC was significantly the major 
threat that could have possibly hindered the election slated for February 14. To 
Samson, postponement of the election was imperative and his statement on either the 
presidency lured INEC to postpone or not is clearly stated thus: 
Of course, as much as Jega would say there was no political 
interference but there was blackmail on the security situation of the 
country that led to the postponement of the election for six week. 
Jega said the security agencies said they could not guarantee safety 
but before that pronouncement the then National Security Adviser 
was quoted to have made such assertion at the Chatham house which 
led to the postponement though the electoral commission too was not 
ready. Despite the fact that Jega argued that the main reason for the 
postponement was a result of the security report, but to me the 




However, the idea of linking the postponement to political interference and pointing 
accusing fingers on the presidency was denounced by a Public Affair Analyst and a 
member of the People Democratic Party during the second phase of the Focus Group 
Discussion organised by the researcher. The security reason given by INEC was 
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paramount and as at the day of postponement, the level of security threat in the North 
East was worrisome after all the Boko Haram insurgency controlled a quite number of 
communities in the region. Also, the electoral commission was not fully ready and it 
was glaring that the election needed to be shifted. To him: 
There was about 18 local government that could not guarantee 
peaceful environment for election to be conducted. The security 
adviser did well. Also, the commission itself was not ready. From the 
polling units, the EMB has not finalised where elections would not 
be held in some places. The commission did not have a finalised list 
of polling units. The split of polling units was another issue. In the 
North East, there was no response. So, the preparation of the 
commission was not favourable and the security issue was not 
guaranteed. The crisis in Gombe testified to that. The postponement 
did not favour the government (Informant 9, FGD II) 
 
 
Similarly, a representative of the People Democratic Party (PDP), concurs with the 
position of Respondent 9 position on lack of political undertone to the postponement 
of the elections. It was even an opportunity for the commission to have extra time so 
as to avoid high level of political apathy looming from problem of collection of the 
PVC. He stated this: 
Politically, there was no interference. Though if the objective was to 
give INEC more time, good. If it was to rig then bad. Then most 
people have not gotten PVC and other challenges. The security 
implication also paramount. There was no evidence that the 
postponement was to rig or manipulate the election. Though the 
PDP could have done worst if the elections had been conducted on 
the 14th of February. It helped the electoral process in terms of 
security (Informant 6 FGD II) 
 
 
In the final analysis, the contention on either there was a political interference or 
otherwise remains an issue that cannot be undermined which significantly justifies the 
theoretical assertion that Nigeria’s electoral system embraces hybrid democracy. The 
claim that INEC was free from political interference could be attributed to liberal 
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democratic theory that believes in independent of electoral body while the electoral 
authoritarian theoretical principles align with the views of politicization of INEC 
decision.  Nevertheless, the postponement saga has its pros and cons but no one can 
deny the benefit of such adjustment to the electoral commission and the electorates at 
large. The postponement allowed INEC to double its effort in the distribution of 
Permanent Voters Card (PVC) and the security particularly the military was able to 
curtail the activities of the insurgent groups during the election days. 
 
6.3   Theme 2: The Responsible Factors for Failed Elections in Nigeria 
The irregularities and malpractices of electoral politics have been revealed to predate 
current democratic dispensation (Uche, 2003, Omotola 2007, Hassan, 2015), such ugly 
trends were not surfacing in a vacuum. There were underlying factors leading to flawed 
elections in Nigeria as predominantly in 2007 elections downward. Of course, the 
consequences had been faced severally and the inability of the political class to ensure 
credible and fair elections caused the major setback in Nigeria’s political transition 
(Uche, 2003). Based on this disturbing phenomenon of failed electioneering politics 
in Nigeria, this study was prompted to ask why the country’s electoral democracy has 
always been marred with irregularities. A general response to the issue of flawed 
elections in Nigeria is highlighted by a respondent thus: 
Nigeria is a complex political environment. It has so many social 
groups who have their interest at stake when it comes to who leads 
the country. And the way elections were conducted before 
independence and after independence allowed electoral rigging, 
regional conflict and the winner takes all syndrome. The state in 
Nigeria polity is high and at the end of the day, elections are what 
to be contested rigorously. On one hand, there is electoral umpire, 
on another hand, there are staff that conduct election, likewise there 
is political party and other stakeholders. Also the class interest with 
interest in candidate. So by bringing all these together, elections 
became a big issue. In Nigeria election operates for long time and 
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that is why releasing of results take time.  So the multi various 
political interest and the unbecoming of some of the INEC official in 
the past made election to be a charade where a winner is not clear 
and whoever wanted to pay the highest bidding will get it at the end 
of the exercise (Respondent 3). 
 
 
 The aforementioned view actually generalizes the trend of electoral irregularities in 
Nigeria which could be attributed to different roles played by several stakeholders. 
However, this study finds out based on field responses and available literature that 
election malpractices in Nigeria has always been flawed due to numerous factors 
ranging from politicization of the electoral umpire, lack of political will, low level of 
political culture, money politics and abuse of electoral laws among others.  In fact, as 
stated in the third chapter, the disrupted level of political transition in the country has 
been alluded to shackle nature of electoral conducts (Ojo, 2000). This has resulted to 
series of political instability in Nigeria paving way for military incursion in the 
county’s polity. Elections in Nigeria have always been held in a controversial manner 
resulting to electoral violence, snatching of ballot boxes and intimidation of voters in 
some cases by the security agencies that were supposedly assigned to protect the 
polling units (Agbor, 2007). 
 
 The fundamental issue which series of election malpractices has subjected Nigeria’s 
political scene to was the inability to transfer power from one democratic system to 
another. However, the return to democratic governance in 1999 changed the political 
landscape of Nigeria and several leaders have been changed due to relative political 
stability enjoyed in the current fourth republics. Though elections have been marred 
systematically and outright riggings reported, the country has witnessed uninterrupted 
civilian administrations since 1999 till date. But the responsible factors for failed 
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elections in Nigeria can be understood via the following cogent reasons derived from 
the field work. 
 
6.3.1 Politicization of the Electoral Umpire 
The characteristics of Nigeria’s elections have been fierce competition with disputed 
results which could be attributed to partiality of the electoral commission as a result of 
political interference and control of the electoral umpire by the political class (Agbor, 
2007). This has always questioned the sincerity of the electoral commission to 
administer credible elections that would serve as genuine wishes of the electorates. 
But the inflation of figures and systemic rigging have been successfully executed in 
Nigeria’s electoral contests due to control of the electoral body by the ruling party 
(Mustapha, 2007). It is not surprising that several literature have traced electoral 
irregularities in Nigeria to partisanship of the electoral management body (Omotola, 
2015; Ojo, 2011). 
 
 Analysing the politicization of the EMB beyond previous literature, the perception of 
INEC National Commissioner, on the previous flawed elections collaborates the 
partisanship of the body. According to her ‘there was no commitment on the part of 
the EMB to deliver free and fair elections and the composition of the commission has 
always been dominated by members of political parties (Respondent 1)’. Similarly, 
linking flawed elections to politicization of the electoral commission was a resounding 
factor in the view of another respondent who said that:  
Actually, the history of election in Nigeria has always been 
controversial right from the 1959, but when you look at the period 
you are considering, the Fourth Republic, administration of election 
in the country has been politicised. We claimed to have an 
independent electoral commission, it was independent in name 
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particularly from 1999 to 2007.  INEC was like an appendage under 
the presidency. In such situation, the presidency determined the 
activities of the electoral body. During my field work, I visited 
commission where at state level and discovered that even the plate 
numbers carried presidency. So the major problem was 
politicisation of election administration, election not free and fair. 
Although beginning from 2011 till 2015, there have been significant 
process of de-politicisation of election administration and that is 
why we have the kind of outcome in 2015 election (Respondent 5) 
 
 
The trend of politicizing the electoral commission has historic link to the colonial era 
when the first electoral umpire established was set up to strengthen political 
subjugation of Nigerians (Uche, 2003). But such trend that was expected to be stopped 
by the Nigerian nationalists became more pronounced after the country’s 
independence and elections under the auspices of indigenous leaders were similar to 
the practice under colonial rule. Substantiating this claim could be noticed in the 
remark of a respondent that stated that: 
The business of conducting elections in Nigeria has always resulted 
to raising a question separating government activities from electoral 
commission. Right from the inception of different electoral bodies, 
the practice has always showcased hobnobbing of members of the 
electoral commissions with the ruling party. This problem has led to 
crisis in different regions whereby the government handpicked 
candidates for elective positions and the electoral umpire 
announced such personalities without any recourse to the 
electorates’ mandates (Respondent 9) 
 
No doubt, the previous elections in Nigeria showcased outright abuse of electoral 
process and politicisation of the electoral body overwhelmed the activities of various 
election agencies in Nigeria. With this, the argument of Schedler (2002) that captures 
electoral authoritarianism as abuse of electoral democracy that paves way for the elites 
to perpetuate themselves in power. The political control of the electoral umpire 
remains a mechanism for democratization of authoritarian rule as entrenched in the 
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theoretical assumption of Electoral Authoritarianism (Kaya & Bernhard, 2012). In a 
nutshell, the politicisation of the election agency affirms the observation of Powell 
(2000) on perverted electoral democracy which collaborates the claim of electoral 
authoritarianism.  
 
6.3.2 Lack of Political Will 
Nigeria’s electoral politics empowers the incumbency government to determine and 
influence electioneering processes. This is due to the fact that ruling government has 
the budgetary power to allocate resources to the electoral body (Moveh, 2015). Put 
differently, the constitution also enables the control of the election management body 
by the executive power given to the presidency to constitute the members of the 
election agency (Jinadu, 2011). The Nigerian President enjoys the constitutional 
mandate to constitute the board of electoral commission. Given this, elections can only 
be fair and credible if the ruling party has the political will to do so. 
 
The submission of an informant during the second session of the FGD which was 
unanimously supported by other participants was an abuse of executive power. The 
abuse of executive power had resulted to dictatorship of the political leaders to 
intimidate the electoral commission towards subverting the wish of the electorates. 
This according to the informant is simply lack of political will to conduct free and 
credible elections. His narration is that: 
Since the inception of democratic system in Nigeria with much 
emphasis on the country’s return to civilian administration in 1999, 
the ruling class have not shown the political will to ensure a free 
level playing ground. Right from the 1999 elections till 2015, the 
political will to conduct credible elections has always been missing. 
Regrettably, the 2007 elections could be classified as being the worst 
experience considering the level of irregularities and the 
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pronouncement of President Obasanjo that the elections would be do 
or die. This singular statement was an indication that the political 
leaders lack the will to support credible elections in the country 
(Informant 4 FGD II) 
 
 In another dimension, a respondent relates the lack of political will to denial of 
political rights of the people. According to him, Nigeria’s political setting was moving 
towards authoritarian system and the electorates were beginning to show some level 
of political cynicism due to lack of trust of the ruling class. His submission is that: 
In the previous elections, Nigerians have witnessed several abuse of 
political power to the extent that results of elections were often 
determined by the government in power. That is why voters became 
pessimistic about electoral system of Nigeria. The belief of many 
voters is that either they vote or not, the results have already been 
made. This actually caused a lot of political apathy in 2007 elections 
and likewise elections conducted by the military regimes were seen 
to be coercive and that the winners had already been predetermined 
(Respondent 7) 
 
Similarly, Jibril and Bamidele (2009) link why Nigeria’s elections always fail to the 
excessive abuse of power of incumbency. The incumbency factor remains a huge 
phenomenon in determining elections outcome in Nigeria. The use of state apparatus 
and even the treasure to ensure retaining of power by the incumbent government is an 
indication of lack of political will to conduct free and fair elections. In a situation 
whereby the incumbent government has maximize his constitutional required tenure 
of two terms, he makes sure a successor emerges from him. This would be done 
through the use of all available state machineries ranging from security agencies, the 
media and other resources to impose his preferred candidates. This justifies the 
prebandal politics in Nigeria (Suberu, 2013). The scenario of winners take all makes 
Nigeria’s political situation to be warfare (Alade, 2016) and which conforms to the 
electoral authoritarian perspective of democratization. The Nigerian politics has 
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suffered from electoral irregularities largely due to lack of political will to create room 
for a free level playing ground and such questions the virtue of Nigeria’s democracy. 
To sum it up, Micheal (2015:5) gives insight into the history of electoral fraud thus: 
The conduct of free and fair election is crucial to the future of 
democracy in Nigeria as well as ensuring political stability. This is 
because the failure of the first three political dispensations in the 
history of the country can be traced to the inability of the political 
class to organise credible elections. Regrettably, elections from the 
first through the fourth republic were characterised by electoral 
malpractices. The political class exhibited high level of political 
indiscipline and freely perpetrated wide ranging electoral illegalities 
and deep rooted corruption that eventually led to the collapse of 
democracy, civilian rule and the consequent emergence of military 
rule in Nigeria 
 
6.3.3 Money Politics and Vote Buying  
The phenomenon of money politics and violence remains the centre stage of electoral 
irregularities as puts by Adetula (2015:1) which has been the barrier to conducting 
credible elections in Nigeria. Buying and selling of elections contributed to the flawed 
electioneering exercise in Nigeria’s electoral contest became a game for the highest 
bidder. The inability of the electoral body to monitor and regulate party finance and 
campaign actually created room for such unlawful act (Jide, 2015). Although vote 
buying and selling might not be a major determinant in the 2015 elections, it was 
explored by the politicians to the fullest. In fact, one of the disturbing factor that needs 
attention in Nigeria electoral politics is the abuse of money. During the 2015 election, 
in one of the polling units at Bwari Area Council within the Federal Capital Territory 
where the researcher served as Ward Collation Officer50, party agents were distributing 
money to electorates on the queue at the point of voting and such similar scenario was 
                                                          




reported by an informant who happened to be a Journalist, in some polling booths in 
Kogi State thus: 
In Kogi where I observed elections, APC agents were giving money 
and some other materials to voters. The PDP also involved in money 
sharing to canvass for votes. Well, the issue of unemployment among 
the teeming youth actually warranted this. Though such excuse is 
against the law, the fact was that both PDP and APC spent a lot of 
money to influence voters’ behaviour. In as much as money is 
required for elections, using it to influence voters is a virus that has 
eaten deep in Nigeria’s politics. The issue of stomach infrastructure 




Not only that, elaborating the concept of stomach infrastructure as a yardstick for vote 
buying and selling in Nigeria’s elections, another informant concurred with the 
previous assertion that some electorates exchanged their voting power with money and 
materials. To him, this tells on the psychological well-being of the citizens which 
cannot be ignored in an electioneering exercise. According to him: 
The issue of stomach infrastructure cannot be overlooked. It is a 
powerful tool which determines how citizens perceive a government. 
This affects electioneering process because the voters tend to vote 
for highest bidders. Issues based voting would not be considered and 
the people prefer to support candidates on material influence. This 
supports the bias nature of Nigeria’s elections (Informant 5 FGD II)  
 
Obviously money politics and vote buying have dominated the political atmosphere of 
Nigeria. This is because political parties and candidates have displayed that 
manifestoes alone cannot guarantee electoral success (Ovwasa, 2013). While it may 
be difficult to eliminate this practice in Nigeria’s electoral politics, it poses serious 
threat to democratization paving way for politicians with highest bid to emerge as 
leaders. The legitimacy of government is also questioned whenever vote buying and 
selling determines the success of contestants for public elective offices. To Davies 
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(2006), the devastating impact of vote buying and selling reflects in the phenomenon 
of bad leadership resulting to governmental instability via bad policy options and 
implementations. 
 
Meanwhile, it is pertinent to note that money is required for election particularly to 
cater for sundry services, logistics such as printing of flyers and posters, mobilization 
of party members and political campaigns, however, its abuse is worrisome. No 
election can be organized without huge amount involved but despite regulations stating 
the sum required for elections, stakeholders hardly comply and the electoral 
commission also failed to regulate party finances. The abuse of money politics 
warrants the statement of former President Olusegun Obasanjo that says: 
With so much resources being deployed to capture elective offices, 
it is not difficult to see the correlation between politics and the 
potential for high level corruption. The greatest losers are the 
ordinary people, those voters whose faith and investment in the 
system are hijacked and subverted because of money, not their will, 
is made the determining factor in elections. Can we not move from 
politics of money materialism to politics of ideas, issues and 
development (Obasanjo, 2005) 
 
The statement of Olusegun Obasanjo remains an ideal assertion but surprisingly he led 
the government that conducted the 2007 elections which both local and international 
observers acknowledged to be worst in the annals of Nigeria’s elections (EUEOM, 
2007; Agbor, 2007). Money politics and vote buying were pronounced under his 
leadership to the extent that Ovwasa (2013) reports the abuse of money to influence 
the election tribunals. The instance of Osun state election tribunal justifies Ovwasa’s 
claim when some Judges were reported to have collected bribe to upturn the judgment 
in favour of the PDP candidate who happened to enjoy the blessings of Obasanjo as a 
political godfather.  
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By and large, it is obvious that money politics has frequently been abused in Nigeria’s 
elections which serves as a bane to democratization process in the country. It also 
supports the claim of electoral authoritarianism that sees the elites as circle of dictators 
that only adopt elections as cover up to remain in power. This is one the justifications 
for the application of theory of Electoral Authoritarianism within the Nigerian context. 
The politics of money and vote buying have actually been used as weapons for the 
political elites to influence the electorates most importantly the less informed citizens. 
 
6.4 Theme 3:  Factors that Shaped the Conduct of the 2015 General Elections 
Having established the fact that previous elections were fraudulent, the factors that 
accounted for the change in the 2015 general elections got attentions during the field 
work. Several factors accounted for the paradigm shift in the conduct of 2015 elections 
and as rightly observed by Hakeem (2015), the outcome indicated some level of 
improvement in the Nigeria’s electoral system which rekindles the hope for democratic 
sustainability. Generally, the 2015 elections were celebrated among Nigerians not only 
because it was the first time an opposition party defeated incumbent power, the quality 
control mechanism introduced to the conduct of the elections made it to stand out 
compared to the previous exercise. In lieu of this, for better understanding of the 2015 
general elections, an informant made an observation that: 
It is important we celebrate the 2015 elections and our concern 
should not be either it is the best election or not. The focus should 
be on international standard in terms of integrity and credibility. 
When we look at the basic features of the past elections in Nigeria, 
one can affirm that indeed there was less report of issue of electoral 
violence, ballot snatching and multiple voting. Sincerely, the major 
election reports in 1999, 2003 and 2007 were worrisome. Then the 
specific features of the 2015 that made the elections to have been 
given pass mark by local and international observers would make us 
to see that the election was far better. Certain factors necessitated 
the change beginning from Yar’Adua regime and the 
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recommendations. INEC was like an appendix of the presidency but 
with electoral reform, the commission now enjoys being independent 
and its budgetary allocation is charged from consolidated account 
(Informant 2 FGD I) 
 
 
The 2015 general elections provide an opportunity towards entrenching a new political 
culture (Maduagwu, 2015). If the bane of consolidating democracy is anchored on free 
and credible elections, the electoral conduct of 2015 indicates Nigeria’s readiness to 
stick to democratic rule. In the argument of Maduagwu, the 2015 elections could be 
seen as a reference point of new era of political culture in the country. In his 
submission, few basic parameters accounted for the improved political culture. Firstly, 
elections will no longer be do or die affair. According to him, the electoral process 
under Jega led INEC ensured that votes count which basically is a welcome 
development in the administration of elections in Nigeria. Secondly, another notable 
remark in the conduct of the 2015 elections was eschewing electoral violence. This 
could be attributed to the effort of other stakeholders particularly the peace accord 
principle discussed in the previous chapter. Elections have always been characterized 
with violence but the piece initiatives assisted in curtailing electoral violence in the 
2015 exercise (Hamalai, Egwu & Omotola, 2017). 
The faith in democratic system is another factor that served as departure from 
irregularised elections to a fair electioneering. As pinpointed by Maduagwu (2015), 
both Nigerian elites and the military have realised that military regime is not 
alternative to democracy. And for Nigeria’s democracy to be sustained, elections must 
be credible. In addition, the courage to concede electoral defeat by politicians as 
experienced in the 2015 elections indicates improved   political culture. The good 
legacy of concession of defeat by Jonathan is not only unprecedented in the electoral 
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history of Nigeria but also save the country from civil war (Omotola, 2015). The report 
of a journalist at the State House, John Agba (2015) views the concession as follows: 
  The exemplary concession of defeat by President Goodluck 
Jonathan was a demonstration of maturity that had earned him not 
only the respect of Nigerians but that of the international 
community. Mahama who is chairman of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) spoke at the 
Presidential Villa, Abuja after a closed-door meeting with 
Jonathan. He told journalists that he was in the country to salute his 
Nigerian counterpart on the role he played to bring about the 
needed peace and tranquility at all stages of the 2015 general polls. 
He said, “I paid this visit in my capacity as the chair of the 
ECOWAS to extend our commendation and congratulations to the 
people of Nigeria following a very successful elections that you had 
recently. “If you recall, before the elections, on behalf of the 
authority of ECOWAS, I gave a solidarity Message to Nigerians to 
step up and consolidate your democracy by having a peaceful, free 
and transparent election. “And I believe that the whole world is 
congratulating you on the peace and stability that has continued to 
endure both before, during and after the election. “I also took the 
opportunity to commend him for the statesmanship that was 
displayed after the election. We all knew that he congratulated 
president-elect, Buhari after the election and he conceded defeat. “I 
feel that was a very, very great sign of maturity and has earned the 
respect of all Nigerians and the respect of the international 
community for all what he did. 
 
On the issue of conceding of defeat by the incumbent president which to some analysts 
saved Nigeria from ‘unwanted civil war’ that could have plunged the country to 
disintegration and political instability, field responses differed on what prompted 
Jonathan not to behave otherwise To Informant 1 and Respondent 4, the singular 
gesture of conceding defeat by President Goodluck Jonathan was as a result of his 
aspiration and commitment to make things work. His personality as a true democrat 
that beliefs in protecting the interest of the Nigerian people led to his submission to 
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the will of the masses. However, another respondent denounced the ‘willingness 
notion’ and argued that the President after trying every means to disrupt the collation 
of result process through Orubebe’s, PDP stalwart51, action had no option than to 
accept defeat. To him, ‘the President was coerced to concede defeat having seen the 
dimension of people’s voice through huge campaign on social media asking Jonathan 
to accept the results which the winner was already known’ (Respondent 8).  
 
In another perception, INEC National Commissioner, relates Jonathan’s phone 
conversation with the President Elect to the peace accord signed agreement by the two 
candidates. Meanwhile, Respondent 7 is of the view that President Jonathan accepted 
the outcome of the results due to pressures from external forces. This to a PDP 
Chieftain, could not be proved and that Nigeria is a sovereign state, so the extraneous 
forces that failed to intervene in Burundi, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Cote’ d voire did not 
have input regarding Jonathan acceptance of the result. Nevertheless, an informant 
acknowledged that ‘the acceptance of defeat by Jonathan is a vital point because if he 
had failed to concede defeat, the work of Jega might not have been seen’52. It becomes 
important to celebrate this factor. 
 
Indeed, those factors cannot be undermined in analysing the 2015 general elections. 
However, there are some other fundamental reasons alluded to the watershed of the 
2015 national elections. These as generated from the field reports during the in depth 
interview and focus group discussions organized by the researcher are factors ranging 
                                                          
51  Mr Orubebe was a former Minister of the Federal Republic and served as the PDP agent during the 
collation of presidential results. On the day of collation of result, Orubebe disrupted the process and 
accused the INEC chairman of being biased. But the situation was later calm and the collation 
continued. 
52 Informant 2 remark during the FGD organised on 14th July, 2016. 
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from robust planning and leadership style, improved collaboration and partnership, 
introduction of technological innovations, emergence of formidable opposition and 
citizens’ consciousness are vital for better assessment of the 2015 elections. 
 
6.4.1 Robust Planning and Leadership Style 
Prior to the conduct of the 2015 elections, INEC introduced some measures (see 
chapter 4) that served as quality control to boost the electoral process. This actually 
generated wide range of discussion during the interview sessions. The response of the 
key players regarding the administration of the 2015 elections showcases a robust 
planning by the electoral commission. Clarifying this, a respondent, affirmed   that ‘the 
2015 elections being applauded to be credible began with the robust and implicit 
strategic plan adopted by the commission. This strategic plan became imperative to 
checkmate some of the lapses observed by the commission and other development 
partners in the 2011 election’ (Respondent 2). It was a four year plan (2012-2016) 
targeted at ensuring the vision of the commission and to also improve on the gains of 
the 2011 elections. Similarly, another respondent, emphasised on the planning initiated 
by the commission and according to her: 
It was a careful planning and the fact that we had good elections in 
2011 and we had a review and brought outside committee and within 
that we were able to look at internal structure and how it affected 
the election. Then we began to look at restructuring and 
reorganisation of the commission by putting the right people in the 
right place and also recruiting competent hands. We tried to improve 
on staff quality and did a lot of verification on our quality of polling 
units officers and EO and we ensure promotion of staff as at when 
due and balanced the staffing with federal character. We had enough 
planning and clean up the register being e - register and to ensure 
that correct names are used. We began planning for PVC and also 
deployed the Smart Card Reader. Basically, these are the facts that 




Giving his stewardship as the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral 
Commission, Professor Attahiru Jega talks about the new measured introduced by his 
team which he simply puts thus: 
We introduced a number of new measures aimed at addressing the 
issues and concerns that we identified. For example, we added some 
security features and introduced unique serial numbering and 
identification of the ballot boxes, such that we knew which ballot 
box was taken to which of the 119,973 polling units. Then, we 
introduced additional security features, serial numbering and colour 
coding of ballot papers. Indeed, we produced the ballot papers 
mostly on a constituency-by-constituency basis, reflecting the 
specific number of political parties contesting in each of the 
constituencies. In the past, elections were characterised by 
politicians hijacking ballot papers from one constituency and taking 
them to another constituency-say, a constituency where they did not 
have a strong following- to stuff the ballot boxes there. If they did 
such a thing this time, it would be easily exposed because the ballot 
papers were coloured coded (Attahiru, 2015:56).53 
 
However, though planning is the bedrock of effective performance of any institution, 
the appraisal of the electoral commission for the conduct of 2015 general elections 
could not have been attained if the leadership of the electoral umpire compromised in 
the area of integrity and transparency. This argument has been forwarded by several 
scholars and analysts that Jega’s leadership style transformed and redeemed the image 
of the electoral management body (Babatunde, 2015, Siyan & Saheed, 2015, EUEOM, 
2015). As rightly noted by an informant, during the FGD session, ‘the background of 
Attahiru Jega as an academia with high reputation played vital role in the conduct of 
the 2015 elections’(Informant 5 FGD II) On the note of leadership style, the INEC 
Director of Planning and Implementation has this to say: 
In any strategic plan, the leadership matters and Jega leadership 
style coupled with his experience as part of the Uwais Electoral 
                                                          
53 Extraction from Attahiru Jega’s lecture titled “Improving Elections in Nigeria: Lessons from 2011 
and Looking Towards 2015” at the Chatham House London on July 4th, 2012. 
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Reform Committee actually brought a lot of changes to the 
commission. There was restructuring of the commission. The 2015 
election was Pro-IT to reduce human errors. This was done to give 
credibility to the entire process. One thing is that, the personnel of 
INEC did not change but the changing of leadership reflected in 
what transpired in the 2015 election. Jega built on experience of the 
2011 election and engaged different stakeholders to ensure that 
things work. For the first time, Internally Displaced Persons were 
allowed to vote. Template was laid down for IDP to be 
accommodated in the 2015 election. Also the revised guideline of the 




Buttressing the leadership phenomenon, a PDP Chieftain, is of the opinion that ‘though 
Jega initiatives enhanced some level of credibility in the administration of the 2015 
elections, the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan facilitated this and deserved all 
praises for having the political will not to interfere like some of his predecessors’( 
Respondent 4). This perception is also the centre point of a discussant during the first 
session of the FGD conducted, that ‘the president played a major role because if he 
had interfered like others, we would not be talking of finest election. We all know the 
prediction before the election that Nigeria may collapse by 2015. The president refused 
to dance to the tone of the people by conceding defeat to the opposition’54. But the 
dimension of leadership as a contributory factor to the success of 2015 elections should 
be centred on both the President of Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Chairman of 
the Independent National Electoral Commission. This is the view of another informant 
who sees ‘the cooperation between the two figures as symbol of democracy which 
transformed to conducting free and fair election’55. Meanwhile, it is agreed that the 
personality championing the affairs of election matters and the contribution of  a Public 
Affair Analyst, is that: 
                                                          
54 Quotation from Informant 1 during the first session of  FGD conducted on 14th July, 2016. 
55 Extraction from Informant 5 during the FGD conducted on 14th July, 2016. 
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If we look at the composition of INEC, we can see that the person 
who was acquitted into the institution has huge experience. In the 
past, election in Nigeria was not constituted in a proper way, it was 
a problem of an individual that was brought into the institution. For 
instance, Maurince Iwu was good in medical line but in election 
administration, he was grossly compromised. When Jega was 
appointed, there was confidence among people based on his 
antecedent, being former ASUU president during the military rule. 
The credibility of individual appointed to administer election counts 
(Informant 9 FGD II) 
 
 
In a similar development, a respondent, concurs with the leadership variable as one of 
the turning points in the history of Nigeria’s election. To him, the previous regimes 
had always been hobnobbing with the electoral commissions. Since the country 
attained independence in 1960, the electoral umpires have been alleged of dancing to 
the tone of the ruling party and which made people not to have confidence in the 
electoral exercise believing that the outcome had been predetermined. Two factors 
have been accounted for this, firstly; the lack of political will and insincerity on the 
part of government not to interfere in the electoral process. Secondly, the members 
and leaders of the electoral commissions often belonged to one political party or the 
other, particularly the ruling party. With these, conducting free and credible elections 
became a mirage. However, the political will on the part of the incumbent President 
Jonathan influenced the appointment of Professor Attahiru Jega whose integrity was 
not questionable. Both worked assiduously in delivering credible and transparent 
elections that called for celebration. In a nutshell, the respondent puts the issue of 
leadership thus: 
If we look at the regime under which the EMB function in 2015, it 
can be said that one of the greatest achievement of Jonathan 
administration in spite of the negative adjective was election. The 
de-politicisation of the structure of the INEC was an achievement of 
Jonathan and the appointment of Jega was celebrated due to his 
integrity. His appointment was the first indication that government 
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was ready for free and fair election and he was given independent to 
operate. He brought many initiatives such as the PVC which I 
believe despite the challenges, the PVC was significant. We used to 
conduct a fresh voters registration since 1999 up till 2011 which 
cumulatively cost administration of election so much and 
highlighted the crisis of voters register where the vote rigging begin. 
But the decision to issue PVC as opposed to temporary voters’ card 
was a major development towards establishing a credible voter 
register. The funding of INEC which was used to be charged to the 
ministry of finance is now being charged directly from the 
consolidated reserve. INEC did not need to meet the ministry of 
finance. So, the funding of INEC was improved and so many 
innovations introduced by the chairman also contributed to a kind 
of credibility in the 2015 elections (Respodent 5) 
 
 
The planning of the 2015 general elections could be categorized as a paradigm shift 
from the previous administrations. The INEC under Attahiru Jega embraced some new 
innovations to boost the electoral process. This was possible due to free hand enjoyed 
by the leadership of the EMB coupled with the integrity enjoyed by the INEC 
Chairman. In fact, this corroborates element of liberalism in Nigeria’s democracy as 
the electoral body is no more seen as appendix of the presidency. No doubt, high level 
of liberalism was applicable in the pattern and manner the electoral umpire was 
independent in managing the 2015 general elections. 
 
6.4.2 Technological Innovations 
 The introduction of technological innovation in the administration of the 2015 election 
was seen as a departure that curtailed electoral irregularities. In justifying this, a 
Research Fellow with the National Institute for Legislative Studies, affirmed that the 
Permanent Voters Card and the Smart Card Reader really assisted in showcasing the 
actual figures of prospective voters. According to him, ‘the use of electronic devices 
reduced the outrageous numbers that used to be quoted’ (Informant 3 FGD I). The 
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deployment of technology in the Nigeria 2015 election no doubt enhanced a 
remarkable change in electoral process in the country and such gesture is a welcome 
development.  Though it was not a new phenomenon, Agbata (cited in Odeyemi, 
2015:11) clarifies that: 
The deployment of platforms of ICTs in general, and the social 
media in particular, gave a new lease of life to Nigeria’s electoral 
process in 2015. The INEC, political parties, candidates, media and 
CSOs all made the most of technology in carrying out their activities. 
This, however, was not a 2015 phenomenon as social media had 
been used in the preceding general elections of 2011. However, the 
level at which ICT platforms were used in the 2015 elections was 
unprecedented in the country’s electioneering history 
 
The issue of technology became imperative in order to reduce human error and 
improve transparency and accountability of the electoral process. That was why the 
voters’ registration exercise adopted the use of Direct Data Machine to capture eligible 
voters and the use of Automated Fingerprints Identification System (AFIS) software 
to detect and eliminate multiple registration (INEC 2015:43). Such really strengthen 
the pre- election stage and to substantiate the relevance of technology, a respondent, 
concludes that: 
 Arising from the issues in 2011 we brought in technology to improve 
the 2015. I think the technology does have a lot to do, it gives the 
public the feeling of fairness and integrity that the commission is 
ready to provide a level playing field for all parties. The Nigerian 
people were assured that the commission was impartial and not 
willing to do the bidding of anybody. And if you see our testimony 
after the election, my testimony that this was an election that actually 
held by the people and supported INEC in conducting the election. 
The people supported the commission by making sure that rigging 
did not take place. The public is larger than the commission and the 
guidelines that we approved for the public to watch the collation, 
counting and pasting of the result and even tracking the result was 
well conducted by the people cooperation which helped to improve 
the process because the election is for the people and they actually 





The 2015 general elections embraced technological know-how which to some extent 
enhanced the electoral process. As mentioned by a respondent, ‘the 2015 election was 
Pro-IT to reduce human errors. This was done to give credibility to the entire process’ 
(Respondent 2). This view concurs with the submission of an informant during the 
second phases of the focus group discussion that says: 
The card reader actually helped to reduce malpractices. Actually, 
the card was deployed before election to test run. I was in Delta state 
during the election. But the failure of the card reader in some 
instances to recognise finger print created room for incident forms. 
I strongly believe the card reader assisted and just need to work on 
it. Because of the card reader, there was reduction in the level of 
ringing but like the case of Kano state where incident forms were 
filled, it resulted to over voting. In Enugu state, over 900,000 voters 
got PVC but less than 500,000 people voted (Informant 4 FGD II) 
 
 However, the malfunctioning of the technological gadgets as reported in some polling 
units during the presidential elections embarrassed the electoral commission forcing 
the umpire to adopt manual accreditation of voters in the affected areas. According to 
an informant, ‘the card reader was not sufficiently proved as it was expected. There 
was not enough time to code the smart card reader and it was not deployed on time. 
No sufficient training for INEC staff’(Informant 6 FGD II).Nevertheless, the use of 
technology is a welcoming development in the administration of Nigeria’s elections 
and with the legalizing of electronic voting by the National Assembly, future elections 
stand to be better off. 
 
6.4.3 Emergence of Formidable Opposition 
Another important factor that shaped the 2015 general elections was the emergence of 
a formidable opposition that challenged the monopoly of the 16 years rule of the 
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People’s Democratic Party. The formation of All Progressive Congress (APC) created 
an avenue for Nigerians to try an alternative political party and this according to 
Omotola (2015) is an unprecedented feat eulogised by majority of the people as the 
final arrival of democracy. The changing of power from one political party to another 
at the national level positions Nigeria’s democracy towards prospect of Huntington 
(1991) turn over syndrome. Although it is still contested among scholars and experts 
of democracy if alternation of power actually facilitates democratic consolidation, the 
principle of electoral turnover boosts the centrality of the people in any democratic 
arrangement.  
 
Nevertheless, the prevalence of a vibrant opposition is one of the key features of 
democratic system and the establishment of APC in 2013 changed the configuration 
of Nigerian politics (Ben, 2015). But the concern of many Nigerians was not only to 
have a stronger opposition but also a vibrant candidate that could challenge the ruling 
PDP. This notion as presented by Omotola (2015) led to the candidature of 
Muhammadu Buhari who emerged victorious at the APC presidential primary. Buhari 
was a former military head of state and known for his integrity and courage to fight 
corruption which was believed to have endangered Nigeria’s socio- economic and 
political development. Substantiating Omotola’s view, a respondent was of the opinion 
that ‘the candidature of Buhari in which the people belief could turn around things 
positively contributed more to the troubles of the PDP’ (Respondent 8). The thrust of 
opposition (APC) and its emergence as governing party after the election supported 
the argument of Lindberg (2004) that believes in the unlikeliness of fraudulent election 
to be won by opposition.  On this note, the opposition role in sustaining democracy is 
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very key and in fact it is argued to be a cornerstone and signifiers of successful 
democratisation system (Hungtington, 1991, Omotola, 2015).  
 
The alternation of power which became possible due to the emergence of strong 
opposition was the point of a party stakeholder in his response to the dynamism of the 
2015 general elections. To him, the All Progressive Party came on board to challenge 
the monopoly of the People’s Democratic Party. This to the respondent contributed 
largely to the reconfiguration of Nigeria’s electoral politics. According to him: 
The 2015 general election made Nigeria’s democracy more mature. 
Before now, elections have been written from 1999 that the true 
winner would not be declared. There was no strong political parties 
to seize power from the PDP and not what the people voted for. So, 
APC gave PDP good battle and the fact that President Jonathan felt 
that there should be free and fair election. Today PDP becomes 
strong and this makes democracy to be stronger. In the previous 
elections, the PDP used to relax and knew they could rig election 
without any serious challenge from the opposition (Respondent 7) 
 
 
Basically, the 2015 election was keenly contested as a result of formidable alternative 
political party that challenged the monopoly of the ruling party for the first time. The 
level of party manifestoes was competitive paving way for the electorates to freely 
choose among the prospective candidates. Given this, one can understand the present 
political configuration in Nigeria’s party politics.  
 
6.4.4 Citizens’ Commitment for Change 
The commitment of Nigerian citizens to change also contributed to the outcome of the 
2015 general elections. Not minding the tension that heated up the polity, the 
citizenship consciousness and resolution to exercise their civic rights ranked political 
culture among Nigerians higher compared to the previous elections where intimidation 
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and imposition survived. The outcome of the 2015 elections was entrenched in the 
resilience of Nigerians who had suffered from perverted democratic governance or 
what Ayo Olukotun56 refers to as ‘sub-standard and tropicalized version of democracy’ 
(cited in Adelaja, 2015:2).  
 
The slogan for change became popular and this to the majority of the people could 
only be materialised through power of balloting allotted to the masses in a democratic 
society. Therefore, the 2015 general elections was an opportunity for ordinary 
Nigerians to come up with a referendum not just for determination of political 
leadership, but also to reinvent the idea of citizens’ democracy (Adelaja, 2015). Such 
resolution by the citizens was spread across every nook and cranny through the power 
of social media adopted by majority of the youths to sensitise the populace. This 
indicates peoples’ readiness to hold leaders accountable for their actions and also to 
use their mandate of voting power to change any unwanted political leaders. In 
summary, the unprecedented level of citizenship engagement in the election was born 
out of peoples’ interest to peacefully change of government through free and credible 
balloting and which invariably served as a positive remark for the administration of 
the 2015 general elections. In the perspective of a respondent, the issue of citizens’ 
commitment is stated thus: 
So many factors shaped the credibility of the elections such as the 
innovation of card reader to validate the originality of the PVC. But 
the citizens’ commitment towards change actually triggered the 
massive support enjoyed by the opposition. The resilience of the 
electorates to ensure that their votes count could be seen as the 
engine room of the success recorded in the 2015 elections. Unlike 
what was obtainable in the past elections where voters did not bother 
to do follow up, the 2015 counting and sorting of votes were 
seriously monitored by voters at their respective polling units. Such 
                                                          
56 Ayo Olukotun is a Professor of International Relations with Leeds City University, Ibadan, Nigeria 
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action signified the level of commitment towards change of 
government through balloting (Respondent 6) 
 
In a similar perspective, discussants during the first and second phase of FGD sessions 
pinpointed that INEC programs which were made known to the populace actually 
enhanced their commitment towards partisanship. By and large, INEC also enjoyed 
commitment from relevant stakeholders in ensuring a better conduct (Informant 10 
FGD II).  The collaboration and partnership enjoyed by the electoral commission from 
other stakeholders substantiate the postulation of ‘Structural Functionalism’ that views 
the function of the parts for the survival of the whole (Olaniyi, 2001). The relevant 
roles of other stakeholders which were supportive contributed to the conduct of the 
Nigeria’s 2015 elections. 
 
6.5 Theme 4: Strengthening Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy: Way Forward  
As noted earlier, the 2015 elections came with some shortcomings which needed to 
be addressed ahead of future elections. It was agreed by the participants at the first 
session of Focus Group Discussion that the Independent National Electoral 
Commission needs to be unbundled. By unbundling of INEC, an informant wanted 
issues such as party registration and party finance to be handled by another agency 
(Informant 2 FGD I). As suggested by the Uwais committee, Political Parties 
Registration and Regulatory Commission and Electoral Offences Commissions 
should be established (ERC Report, 2008). Not only that, the media coverage needs 
to be more responsive. The media becoming political tool in the hands of political 
class is worrisome and to another informant, ‘the earlier objectivity is entrenched in 
media reports, the better for political communication in Nigeria. Such could enhance 
strengthening of democratic values in the country’ (Informant 2 FGD II). 
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In another development, a respondent called for pegging of political parties to 10 so 
that competition for power would be stream line (Respondent 3). This can bring about 
vibrant and strong oppositions. He also talked about electoral litigation which 
requires separate courts. The delay in the trail of electoral offenders is due to the use 
of conventional courts but if special courts are established, judgement and justice can 
be fast rack. Similarly, this view of independent court for electoral offenders is what 
another respondent tagged ‘judicial activism’ (Respondent 6). According to him, the 
judiciary must increasingly embrace electoral reform that would bring about severe 
penalties for electoral offenders. Meanwhile the present trend of inconclusive 
elections generated a debate aftermath of the 2015 elections and this can be resolved 
as pointed out by an informant by paying attention to the political class. To him, 
politicians have been the bane of inconclusive elections by distracting and frustrating 
the efforts of the electoral body in conducting free and credible elections (Informant 
9 FGD II). On the remark of inconclusive elections, a respondent viewed the tempo 
of credible elections the 2015 displayed as the major factor to be attributed to the 
inconclusiveness in the staggered state elections. She has this to say: 
Positively speaking that tempo is what led to the inconclusive election. 
Because, the elections are now more transparent and closer. We have two 
major parties that field very strong candidates that can compete on the 
same footing and the fact that the use of card reader does not allow 
dumping of large slide victory for a party. And the ugly trend of violence 
is because they know the body cannot be reached to compromise, they 
result to violence and forced INEC staff to write result, but unless we 
confirm through the card reader, we cannot announce a result. That is why 
there is cancellation and we have to go back to the polling units so as not 
to disenfranchise the people. We make sure all votes count and if the gap 
is too tight we cannot declare a winner. If we have a landslide, we can 
cancel half of the state and declare result of the other half.  But now the 
election is fairer and transparent and accountable that is why there is 
inconclusive election. But if you look at the electoral act, section 23 of the 
electoral act, we are being accused for obeying the law. But we will 
continue doing our best and we will continue to improve from the last 
election. Kogi was a good election except for the death of a candidate 
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Bayelsa was good the turnout was impressive. The turn out to party was 
like 35 to 30 percent turnout and the election was close. We track election 
from our pie chart on line and we can know election that can be 
inconclusive. Our target now is that the voter education should be on 
avoiding violence. Series of mediation is set up to talk with people from 
those areas (Respondent 1) 
 
 
Early preparation and early appropriation of funds are germane for the electoral 
commission to improve on the success recorded in the 2015 elections. In order to 
fulfil this, INEC has started designing another strategic plan (2017-2021).  As puts 
by the Director of Planning and Implementation, ‘with the revision of the plans that 
captured previous election, INEC is working on proactive way on how to improve 
2019 general elections’(Respondent 2). This concurs with the statement of another 
respondent   when asked on way forward in sustaining Nigeria’s electoral democracy 
and according to her: 
We are coming up with strategic plan for 2019 election. We are 
going to restructure and also bring it right people and resources. We 
need younger and vibrant people at various level. We are also 
looking at diaspora voting and begin our plan from next year. 
Logistic procurement on time. We want to make distribution faster 
and we are brainstorming on how to improve. Overall, we are 
exploring the possibility of E - voting once the law embraces it. We 
are trying to review the lacuna in the electoral law. Workshops have 
been done by the two committee at the national assembly on 






6.6 Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections and the Question of Integrity and 
Credibility: An Assessment  
The impact of credible election in any civil society is vital to the sustainability of 
democracy and this informs the idea of placing countries democratisation process on 
integrity test. But in order to have a clear picture of any country’s electoral democracy, 
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it is paramount to consider what constitutes international best practises. Electoral 
administration requires to be subjected to public scrutiny and this was emphasised by 
the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, on the floor of the UN General 
Assembly thus: 
The notion of integrity in elections – referring to adherence to 
international obligations and commitments – and to professionalism, 
impartiality, accuracy and transparency in electoral administration – 
has developed into an important and useful reference point in 
electoral administration. The United Nations continues to encourage 
and support the efforts of Member States to promote electoral 
integrity by complying with their international commitment, 
including, as relevant, those set out in the Universal Declaration of 
Human rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Woman (Ban Ki -moon, 2015:11). 
 
The assessment of Nigeria’s 2015 elections has been carried out by various interested 
observers within and outside the country. However, despite the positive remarks on 
the Nigeria’s 2015 elections, analysts and scholars would agree that the integrity of 
election cannot be judged only on Election Day and that certain criteria are needed to 
assess the integrity of electoral process which cuts across the stages of before, during 
and after election (Hakeem, 2015). In view of the divergent opinions on what measures 
to be used in assessing the integrity and credibility of elections, the proponents of the 
‘Electoral Integrity Project’ given their extensive research in the area have been able 
to come up with a framework that can be used in assessing electoral integrity and 
credibility and which has increasingly gained momentum among scholars and 
practitioners. The Electoral Integrity Project started as an independent academic study 
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conducted by Nippa Norris57 and her team which later metamorphosed to a widely 
acclaimed project in assessing elections in every part of the world.  
 
In view of the debate on electoral integrity and electoral fraud, the EIP framework of 
analysis captures the electoral cycle involving every relevant stages of electioneering. 
This framework is premised on the international norms and conventions regarding 
election and democracy. From the EIP framework, the pre-election stage revolves 
around five criteria and each of it must be considered in assessing credibility and 
integrity of election anywhere in the world. More importantly, the assessment is done 
in this study by considering the pros and cons in order to open up analytical debate on 
the 2015 general elections. The five criteria include: 
 
1. The Electoral Laws: Going by the EIP, three issues need be considered here (i) 
if the electoral laws are fair to all parties (ii) if the laws favoured the ruling or 
governing party (iii) if the laws have restrictions on citizens’ rights 
2. The Electoral Procedures: The EIP is concerned on (i) if the elections are well 
managed (ii) if the procedures of voting are known to the public (iii) if the election 
officials are fair in discharging their responsibly and acted in accordance with the 
electoral laws 
3. Boundaries: The territory in which voting would be done needs not be (i) 
discriminatory (ii) favourably to the incumbency(iii) impartial  
4. The Voters Registration: In line with the EIP perception, the voters’ register 
needs to be assessed (i) if some citizens were not captured in the register(ii) if the 
register was accurate or inaccurate (iii) if ineligible voters were registered 
                                                          
57 Nippa Norris lectures Comparative Politics in Harvard University and also a visiting Professor at 
the University of Sydney, Australia. She is the Director of the Electoral Integrity Project 
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5. Party Registration: The issue of party registration according to EIP can be 
viewed from the perception that (i) if some oppositions were prevented from 
contesting (ii) if women have opportunities in vying for positions in electoral 
contest (iii) if there is equal chance for all ethnic groups to contest (iv) if selection 
of candidates are done by few leaders (v) if some parties and candidates were 
denied the right to campaign (see, www.electoralintegrityproject.com) 
 
6.6.1 The Electoral Laws 
Analysing Nigeria’s 2015 election in the first phase of pre-election period, the legal 
framework was largely derived from the Federal Republic Constitution of 1999, the 
Electoral Act 2010 (As amended) and the Guidelines Procedure provided by the INEC 
for the election. Unlike what was obtainable in the previously flawed elections 
whereby the composition of the electoral body was compromised (especially the 
National Commissioners and Resident Commissioners), the 1999 constitution (as 
amended) and the electoral act 2010 (as amended) barred any party card carrier 
member from being a member of the INEC team. According to section 156 of the 1999 
constitution (as amended), members of INEC ‘shall not be a member of a political 
party’. This has clearly distinguished and excused partisan politicians from holding 
position within the electoral commission. Such is legally prohibited to enhance the 
impartiality of the electoral umpire. The section is believed to have altered the previous 
conditions that stipulated that “no person shall be qualified for appointment as a 
member of any of the bodies (INEC inclusive) aforesaid……. if he is not qualified or 
if he is disqualified for election in the House of Representatives”. By interpretation, 
this indicates that no one can be a member of INEC without being a party man because 
to be qualified for membership of House of Representative, one must belong to a 
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political party (Jinadu, 2011: 157).  The amendment of the constitution has actually 
created space for fairness to all political parties due to the fact that none can ascribe 
composition of INEC to any of its membership. 
 
However, there was a constitutional lacuna on the issue of legalising the card reader 
as an acceptable gadget to be used in conducting 2015 general elections. This really 
generated a lot of debates which from some analysts’ perspective flawed the entire 
electoral process. Initially, the test running of the card readers according to Osita 
(2015) was significant enough to justify the lack of workability of the electronic 
machine. As reported one of the dailies (Premium Times, March 10, 2015), INEC itself 
admitted 41 percent failure of the Smart Card Reader during the test running and some 
political parties such as United Democratic Party (UDP), Action Alliance (AA), 
Alliance Congress Party of Nigeria (ACPN) and Alliance for Democracy challenged 
the application of SCR in the court of law. Though the Abuja High Court dismissed 
their request on the basis that INEC has the discretionary power to make use of 
necessary equipment towards election management (Thisday March 3, 2015), the 
Smart Card Reader as electronic gadget was not tailored in during the amendment of 
the 1999 constitution and the 2010 Electoral Act (as amended). With this, the legality 
of Smart Card Reader was questioned and the lacuna could not be filled ahead of the 
2015 general elections. Such as stated by Uzzi (2015) was an abuse of rule of law and 
posed threat to the legitimacy of the 2015 elections which to him returned Nigeria back 
to authoritarian and autocratic system.  
 
In a contrary view, Kayode Idowu, Chief Press Secretary to the INEC Chairman, 
affirms that the legal issue of card reader was uncalled for. To him, the card reader did 
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not violate the electoral law because it was only used for accreditation which could not 
be categorised as electronic voting. In fact, the innovation was introduced to boost the 
process. The voting properly was the recognised manual system whereby the voters 
thumbprint in an open secret balloting (Idowu, 2015). 
 
Nevertheless, the argument and debate on the legality of Smart Card Reader still 
resurfaced aftermath of the 2015 general elections. For instance, the Supreme Court 
upheld the election of the Rivers State Governor, Wike Nyesom, which had been 
nullified abinitio by the Election Tribunal and Court of Appeal. The candidate of APC, 
Peterside Dakuku, challenged the victory of Wike Nyesom of PDP on several grounds 
but with particular emphasis on lack of correlation in the number of votes cast against 
the number of accredited voters (Premier Times February 12, 2016). The figures were 
believed to have been inflated and led to the calling for nullification of the result by 
the APC candidate. After series of legal tussle in the court of law, the Election Tribunal 
and the Court of Appeal nullified Wike’s elections but their judgements were set aside 
by the highest court, Supreme Court. According to the Supreme Court, though the card 
reader was adopted to strengthen the electoral process, it could not replace the voter 
register recognised by the constitution. The proof that the number of votes allocated to 
Wike superseded the total number of accredited voters as exposed by the Smart Card 
Reader was inconsequential as the list of registered voters was more than the recorded 
votes (Daily Trust February 12, 2016).   
 
The debate on the adoption of card reader posed serious legitimate question which 
supports the finding of this study on the hybrid nature of Nigeria’s electoral 
democracy. With the Supreme Court pronouncement on Wike Nyeson victory, it 
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testifies to the legality of card reader for the 2015 elections.  Given this, the legality of 
card reader became national issue that required urgent attention. In the long run, to 
avoid such legal battle in the future elections, the National Assembly had to consider 
and pass a bill to legalise the Smart Card Reader and Electronic Voting in Nigeria 
(Vanguard 31, 2017).  
 
Not only that, the electoral laws have been reformed to enhance the electoral 
commission to enjoy financial autonomy which was made possible due to the 
amendment of section 84 of the 1999 constitution. Previously, the financial status and 
revenue of the INEC was allocated from the Presidency and such was grossly abused. 
The control of INEC financial purse made it an easy avenue to control the electoral 
body by the executive arm of government. But the power of executive financing the 
electoral umpire was stopped and INEC now enjoyed direct finance from the country’s 
consolidated account. The recurrent expenditure of the electoral body is being 
channelled and sourced from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (Hakeem, 2015). 
Similarly, the electoral body as stipulated in relevant section of the electoral act has 
the discretionary power to determine its own procedures and guidelines towards 
conduct of elections in the country. Also, part of the reform in the electoral law is the 
issue of election litigation and petition. Section 285 of the electoral laws gives specific 
time span for handling election petitions by the election petition tribunals. All election 
cases must be dealt with by the tribunal within 180 days from the date of filling of 
petition and appeals arising from tribunal judgment should be determined within 60 
days (Electoral Act, 2010). In a nutshell, the electoral laws passed through major 




Despite all these reforms, there are still issues bordering on sincerity of the 
government. The power of the president to appoint the membership of INEC questions 
the integrity and sincerity of the government to free the electoral umpire from 
executive control and manipulation. This practice conforms to the theoretical 
postulation of ‘Electoral Authoritarianism’ that creates avenue for state manipulation 
of the electoral system. The constitution gives the Nigerian president the authority to 
constitute the board of INEC which invariably curtails the independence of the 
commission. As noted in the report of the European Union (EUEOM, 2015), the 
constitutional provision that empowers the executive to determine who heads the 
electoral commission might not guarantee absolute independent for the Election 
Management Body (EMB).  The Uwais panel’s (Electoral Reform Committee) 
recommendation regarding the appointment of the INEC chairman and other 
commissioners is yet to be implemented58. Also, the issue of unbundling of INEC, 
introduction of independent candidate, diaspora voting, e voting, disqualification of 
convicted individuals from contesting election, setting up of a special courts to 
prosecute election offenders among others are still missing in the country’s electoral 
laws (EUEOM, 2015, Hakeem, 2015). Unfortunately, INEC has failed in its mandate 
to monitor and audit political party finances by not scrutinising the parties’ expenditure 
which ordinarily should be published for public consumption (Hassan, 2015). 
 
 6.6.2 The Electoral Procedure  
On the procedural context employed by INEC for the 2015 general elections, there was 
a departure from the previous arrangement particularly on voting guidelines. The 
                                                          
58 The Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) led by former Chief Justice, Muhammed Uwais, 
recommended that the INEC chairman and the commissioners should seize to be appointed by the 
President. The National Judicial Council should advertise, screen and shortlist names to be forwarded 
to the State Council. 
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Independent National Electoral Commission made copies of the guidelines for the 
conduct of the 2015 general elections to the public and also embarked on elaborate 
publicity using the media outlets to reach to the populace on procedures for the 
exercise (INEC, 2015). The publicity was done largely through collaboration with 
National Orientation Agency (NOA)59 and various Civil Society Groups with the aid 
of both print and electronic media. Such was a reflection of the ‘Structural 
Functionalism’ whereby the main structure and other sub structures collaborated and 
partnered towards achieving a goal. The positive remark recorded in the administration 
of the 2015 elections could be attributed to effective and supportive functions of other 
stakeholders that collaborated with the election commission during the conduct of the 
2015 elections. No doubt, the engagement of other relevant stakeholders checkmated 
INEC (EUEOM, 2015). Similarly, the electoral commission strengthen its institutional 
framework towards complying on the election guidelines60.  
 
However, though the 2015 elections was anchored on some notable procedures as 
highlighted earlier, there were cases of abuse of election guidelines. The pre-election 
stage recorded deviant practises from the political parties during primary elections. 
INEC has the constitutional mandate to monitor and regulate parties’ primaries but 
failed in this direction. One of the challenges to party politics in Nigeria is the issue of 
internal democracy. According to Hakeem (2015), the scenario that produced 
Goodluck Jonathan as the Presidential flag bearer of the People’s Democratic Party 
was a coercive approach forcing all other aspirants to step down for the incumbent 
power. Such as qualified by the opposition party was a coronation rather than an 
                                                          
59 NOA is a governmental agency charged with the responsibility of citizens awareness on civic and 
political educations 
60 Section 25(sub sections 1-8) clarify on the procedure of conducting elections  
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election. This lack of adherence to internal democracy surfaced at the primaries of the 
National Assembly aspirants and State House membership. In fact, it was an 
overwhelming controversial primaries in Lagos, Ogun, Adamawa, Imo, Ebonyi and 
Enugu States (The Sun, 19 December, 2014, Hakeem, 2015).  
 
The opposition party (APC) was not free from the allegation of imposition of 
candidates at primaries level in some states, though its Presidential primary election 
was conducted and keenly contested. In Imo State for instance there was an allegation 
of substitution of candidates by the All Progressive Grand Alliance Party (APGA) 
during the party primary of one of the three senatorial districts (Chidi, 2015:1). 
Obviously, all these expose the legitimacy of hybrid democracy in Nigeria via election 
administration. The credibility of the elections was challenged by lack of internal 
democracy within political parties as well as the inability of the INEC to effectively 
monitor and regulate parties’ primaries which led to substitution of names and 
imposition of candidates in a dubious circumstance (EUEOM, 2015:4). In a nutshell, 
INEC predisposition on the election procedures testifies to the hybrid nature of 
electoral democracy in Nigeria. On one hand, the electoral commission engaged 
stakeholders in the area of patterns and procedures to be adopted for voting and 
declaration of result, while the same electoral umpire failed to regulate political 
parties’ affairs particularly during their primaries. 
 
6.6.3 Boundaries 
The notion of boundary as one of the yardstick for electoral integrity did not arise in 
Nigeria’s 2015 general elections and such might not be applicable in this study as the 
country geo political zones have already catered for boundary dispute. Although there 
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was an initial plan by the electoral body to create additional constituents and polling 
units, this was later suspended as it generated an eyebrow with the accusation that such 
might likely favour one particular region over another (AUEOM, 2015). The proposed 
additional polls generated controversy which made some elders from the Southern 
parts of Nigeria to accuse the INEC chairman of working against their region. The 
elders comprised of former Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Alex 
Ekwueme, Femi Okunrounmu, a former Senator, and Edwin Clark, former Minister. 
According to the elders, Professor Jega has lost his credibility and should not be 
allowed to preside over the 2015 elections. In a statement issued by the ‘Elders of the 
Southern Nigeria People Assembly’, they stated that: 
We call on President Goodluck Jonathan to without further delay 
reorganize the composition and structure of INEC to provide 
Nigerians the platform for free and fair elections. There was no basis 
for the increase when in actual fact, the number of registered voters 
has reduced from 70 million to 57 million .As plausible as these 
reasons may sound to the architects of this voodoo and arbitrary 
allocation of polling units, the People of Southern Nigerian and 
indeed the Southern Nigerian Peoples Assembly view this invidious 
act as a script perfectly crafted for Prof Jega to implement, in 
continuation of the well-known hegemonic agenda, by the enemies 
of our hard won democracy (Vanguard, September 11, 2014:2) 
 
 In the long run, INEC realised the debate on additional polling units was not healthy 
for a divided country like Nigeria and suspended the plan. The major accusation was 
that if additional voting units were to be created as projected by the commission, it 
would be advantageous to the Northern region than its Southern counterpart. The 
pressure forced INEC to cancel the plan. In a press release by the electoral commission, 
the proposed reconfiguration and creation of additional 30, 000 polling units had been 
suspended. According to the Secretary of the commission, Augusta Ogakwu, ‘taking 
into consideration-especially the controversy over the creation of additional polling 
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units that has been overheating the polity, and the apparent inadequacy of time for the 
exercise-the commission took a decision to suspend the exercise until after 2015 
general elections’(Vanguard, November 12, 2014:4).  
 
6.6.4 The Voter Registration  
On voters’ registration, the electoral commission reviewed the previous registrar 
through the input of the Registration and Election Review Committee (RERC) that 
suggested a blue print for voters’ registration. The introduction of Direct Data Capture 
(DDC) machines beginning from the 2011 elections and subsequent sanitisation of the 
voters register by issuing Permanent Voters Card in preparation for 2015 elections 
which authenticity could be easily determined by the Smart Card Reader voters’ 
register. With the aid of biometric technology, INEC was able to detect some multiple 
registration and cleaned up its voters’ register. From record, INEC registered 
68,833,476 voters while about 4 million names that were dubiously registered were 
detected with the aid of Automated Fingerprints Identification System (AFIS) that 
eliminated multiple registrations (INEC, 2015:43). Not surprising that number of 
voters in 2015 reduced when compared to the previous elections that have been 
perverted due to inflation of figures, the electoral was keen at providing valid voters’ 
register that would actually present the real figure of substantial registered electorates.  
 
However, the registration exercise came with its own shortcoming. One major 
challenge of the registration exercise was the poor working condition of the DDC 
machines which the electoral body ascribed to ageing. It was also realised that some 
unqualified voters were registered which resulted to under age voting during the 
election days. The poor distribution of the PVC was another setback in the pre-election 
stage. As stated earlier, if the elections were not postponed, millions of eligible voters 
would have been denied their civic rights. Few days before February 14, 2015 (the 
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earlier scheduled date) presidential elections, less than 65 percent voters’ card were 
distributed (Hakeem, 2015).   The biometric machine failed to function effectively. 
This has highlighted by Hamidi, Egwu and Omotola (2017) ranged from limited or 
non-verification of fingerprints, slow accreditation process due to poor internet server 
and the inability of some electoral officials and the electorates to understand the usage 
of the biometric machine. All these problems were rampart during the March 28 
Presidential and National Assembly elections as most of the electoral staff were 
handling the electronic gadgets for the first time. The report of the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) exposes the problems associated with the introduction of 
the biometric machine in the 2015 general elections. According to NDI, the situation 
was characterized thus: 
Electronic readers of biometric PVCs failed to verify fingerprints in 
many instances and resulted in delays in voter accreditation in a high 
number of polling stations. Where fingerprint scanning failed, there 
did not appear to be uniform understanding of contingency planning 
among polling officials, including requirement for large scale 
manual verification of voters’ identities against the printed voter 
registry and the issuance of Incident Forms. When Incident Forms 
were diligently completed by INEC officials, accreditation was often 
delayed even further due to the time required to fill out a form for 
each voter whose fingerprints could not be read (NDI, 2015:3). 
 
 
Despite the six weeks postponement, the overall collection of the Permanent Voters 
Card was less than 90 percent. This indicates there was lapses regarding provision of 
reliable voters register. Though according to one of the INEC National 
Commissioners, ‘the numbers of under - age voters were much more than what was 
experienced at the field, INEC scrutinised the register which led to the reduction of 
under-age’61, the issue of voters’ register needs more adequate attention. However, the 
overall assessment indicated an improvement on the issue of voters register. Unlike 
the previous experience when voter registration was basically on manual, outrageous 
                                                          
61 Extraction from the interview with the INEC National Commissioner, held on 19th July, 2016. 
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figures and vicious names were easily detected in the register. With the innovation of 
biometric machines, there was a positive remark in voter registration exercise. 
 
6.6.5 Party Registration  
Judging from the perception of Electoral Integrity Project on party registration, the 
Independent National Electoral Commission tried to maintain some level of 
impartiality by ensuring that any party that complied with the provisions of the 
constitution and the Electoral Act (2010 as amended)62 was registered. The emergence 
of the All Progressive Party (APC) as a coalition party became a reality as a result of 
INEC operationally of fairness and free level playing ground for formation of any 
political association. As rightly noted by Omotola (2015), the merger that led to the 
formation of APC created room for power alternation or turn over which serves as an 
improvement of Nigeria’s democratisation. From 2011 to 2014, about 63 applications 
for registration of political parties were received by INEC out of which 3 succeeded 
and the most notable among the three was the APC that was registered on 31st July, 
2013.  The registration of APC changed the political landscape of the country and 
presented viable options for the electorates to make a choice. It was obvious that such 
development contributed to the keenly contested elections in the 2015.  
 
However, the registration of APC came with a controversy. Two other groups namely; 
‘African People’s Congress’ and ‘All Patriotic Citizens’ had initially jostled for the 
acronym of APC. This tussle led to litigation and propaganda to avert the formation of 
the mega party. According to INEC, African People’s Congress had initially proposed 
                                                          
62 Section 78 Sub Section 1 of the Electoral Act (2010 as amended) indicates that application for 
registration of political party shall be dully submitted to the Commission (INEC) not later than 6 
months before a general election. 
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for the acronym and there was no going back on this provided the guidelines were met.  
The controversy that trailed the acronym (APC) led to the accusation from the four 
merging political parties that INEC was working in the interest of the ruling party 
(PDP) to scuttle the registration process of All Progressive Alliance (Baffour, 2013). 
In a response to the allegation, PDP reacted that in as much as the acronym had been 
taken by a political party, the merging four political parties laying claim to be APC 
could not be recognised. The PDP referred to the mega party and its leaders as being 
‘politically naïve’ on requirement for registration of political party (Olori, 2013).  But 
INEC in its statement approving the coalition of the Action Congress of Nigeria, the 
All Nigeria Peoples Party and the Congress for Progressive Change into All 
Progressive Congress explained that the applicant parties fulfilled all the statutory 
requirement accordingly and therefore granted their request to form the APC. In 
addition, INEC de-registered more than 5O political parties. Two among them, Fresh 
Democratic Party and Hope Democratic Party got court injunction to be re-listed 
(INEC, 2015:84).  
 
6.7 Campaign Media and Campaign Finance 
Concerning the campaign media and campaign finance, the EIP framework looks into 
how balance does the media report news related to elections? Does the news on 
election give equal and fair reporting or it favours the governing party? Do party 
candidates have fair access to the media in terms of political broadcast and advert?  
The 2015 political campaigns were grossly abused by the political parties and their 
members. The mass media became a political resource and ownership of the media 
outlets involved in partisan politics by favouring one candidate over another. Both the 
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state owned and private media houses could not hide their preferences for candidates 
during the campaign (EUEOM, 2015)63.  
 
Also, during the campaign finance, none of the parties adhered to the guidelines of 
political finance as stipulated in the laws and despite the fact that INEC printed the 
party finance handbook, it was not applicable by majority of the political parties while 
canvassing for votes. The campaign finance was violated to the extent that state 
resources were deployed for personal use by the office holders and aspirants for the 
elections. This cut across all the parties that control power and resources of various 
states in one way or the other. Vote buying and selling became rampant. Reports from 
the field alleged some party aspirants violated electoral act by distributing money and 
other materials at the point of voting. At the federal level, there was revelation after 
the elections that money allocated to buy weapons for the military fighting insurgency 
in the North East was diverted to finance the campaign of the Presidential candidate 
of the People’s Democratic  Party. The probe and arrest of the former National Security 
Adviser, Dasuki Sambo, over 2.1 Billion U.S Dollars arms deal revealed the looting 
of public funds to finance the PDP campaigns for the 2015 election (Vanguard News, 
December 15, 2015). 
 
The ugly trend of abuse of media reflected in the 2015 general elections justifies the 
authoritarianism in the contemporary Nigeria’s electoral politics. Violation of 
campaigns regulation was reported ranging from hate speeches, misuse of incumbency 
through federal and state owned media houses. As reported by the European Union 
                                                          
63 The politicisation of the mass media in 2015 general elections has been captured in the report of 




monitoring group, both PDP and APC engaged in the abuse of media via power of 
incumbency (EUEOM, 2015). The federal and state owned media platform were 
involved in personality attacks as the case of Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) 
broadcasting a documentary denting the image of the opposition candidate. The similar 
instances were noticed from the states controlled by the APC whereby both the print 
and electronic media were used for political propaganda against the ruling PDP. The 
political campaigns adopted by the political parties were believed to be undemocratic 
and unconstitutional (Chibuike and Ernest, 2015). As a result of over zealousness and 
desperation of the political elites to acquire power, defamatory speeches and unguided 
utterances were unprecedented. In fact, a former Governor of Niger State, Aliyu 
Babangida was quoted to have said that ‘politics is all about telling lies and if one 
cannot tell lie, then he or she has no place in the game’(Ogidi, 2015:22). This concurs 
with the idea of immorality and lack of ethical values in electoral authoritarianism 
(Schedler, 2002).  
 
For instance, it was unethical and illegal for the government to use state resources in 
political campaigns (Electoral Act 2010 as amended), the PDP led administration used 
state resources in the bid for Jonathan/Sambo re-election. Section 95(2) of the 
Electoral Act specifically stated that ‘vulgar languages, propaganda and deceit against 
a candidate by other or a political party through publication, audio, audio visual means, 
as well as unequal of campaign activities for all political parties and candidate by 
public media houses should be prohibited’ But the reality in 2015 campaign exercise 
was outright violation of the stated rules as both leading political parties were involved 
in verbal attacks and propaganda (Baiyewu, 2015). The report of CLEEN Foundation 
on the Nigeria’s 2015 general elections also posits that political parties, particularly 
 
289 
PDP and APC, employed unethical means of campaigns thereby violating the National 
Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) regulations on political campaigns. 
 
Although the campaign coverage was dominated by the government owned media 
outlets, positively some private media provided overall balance and fair coverage of 
political campaigns during the 2015 exercise (EUEOM, 2015). The Channels 
Television which has been a notable private media house with wider coverage in 
Nigeria engaged all the political parties effectively without displaying bias and 
favouritism for one over another. The key contesting political parties were allotted 
equal opportunities to sell their manifestoes and the television station did not condole 
any form of personality attacks and abusive statements in its political adverts for 
respective candidates and parties. In fact, the private broadcast media was instrumental 
to the alternation of power as a result of wide range of options that the electorates had 
in sourcing for information (Olaoluwa, 2016).  
 
This was possible due to the implementation of the Freedom of Information Bill that 
widens the scope of Nigeria political communication. Such enhances multi-access and 
dynamic press freedom which shares similarity with the liberal democracy. However, 
the Nigerian context encompasses system whereby the state manipulate and control 
government owned media outlets to oppress the opposition (Authoritarianism) and the  
private owned media enjoy freedom of expression (Liberalism) giving the populace  
the liberty to get free flow information. By interpretation, Nigeria’s political 
communication on one hand is authoritarian while it also projects liberal tendency on 
the other hand. This simply places the country’s democratisation on hybrid perspective 
as maintains in this thesis.  
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6.8 Election Day 
The third stage as outlined by the Electoral Integrity Project covers the Election Day. 
This stage is viewed from two perspective namely: voting process and vote count. The 
voting process examines the level of fraudulent at voting point and if the electorates 
are threatened with violence at the polls. Also, how easy was the process of voting? 
And if election materials are made available at the polls? Does the process create 
special attention for the disable people? Is there room for diaspora voting and 
electronic-voting? On the other hand, the vote count as specified by the EIP framework 
looks into the safety of ballot boxes and announcement of results without undue delay. 
How transparent and fair is the process of votes counting? And do the international 
observers and local election monitors have access or are restricted to observe the 
counting of votes? 
 
In response to the voting process and vote count exercise, the INEC guidelines 
emphasises the adoption of open secret ballot system. Accreditation of eligible voters 
was slated for morning (8am) and ended by noon (1pm). The requirement for 
accreditation was a physical presence of prospective voter with the Permanent Voters 
Card where he or she registered or designated by the commission. Nobody was allowed 
to vote except at his or her registration point, though the Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDP) were allocated designated centres for voting. The accreditation exercise 
involved verification and authentication of the prospective voter. Firstly, the electorate 
was screened through confirmation of his or her name on the voters register.  This was 
followed by requesting the voter to present his or her PVC which was read by the SCR 
to ascertain the information of the voter. Then, the voter was then required to place 
appropriate finger on the finger print at the port of the Smart Card Reader for 
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authentication. Voters that could not be authenticate through this process were required 
to use the Incident Form as a form of manual accreditation (INEC, 2015:60). 
 
After the closure of accreditation exercise, proper voting commenced and ballot papers 
have been coloured and separated based on the contested political offices. For instance, 
the ballot paper allotted for Presidential election was coded in a different colour from 
that of National Assembly balloting. Every prospective voters was to thumb print 
against the aspirants’ party logo and the Presiding Officer at the polling unit directed 
voters to ensure that ballots were deposited in appropriate coloured ballot boxes. At 
every polling units, each of the political parties requested to be represented via party 
agents and the presence of accredited local and foreign observers was needed for 
observation and monitoring of the process (INEC, 2015:61). Generally, the 
accreditation and voting went smoothly in majority of the polling units and reports 
from various field observers attested to this (AUEOM, 2015, EUEOM, 2015, TMG, 
2015). The patience and understanding displayed by the voters as noted by Samson 
Idoko qualified the 2015 general elections to be ‘citizens’ resolution for credible 
electioneering’64.  
 
The counting of votes at every polling units started after all prospective voters have 
casted their votes. This was ascertained by the polling officers by ensuring that the last 
person on the queue voted before sorting out of ballot papers. The sorting of ballot 
papers was done accordingly with regards to political offices. The ballot sorting for 
the Presidency post was separately done from that of the Senate which also distinct 
from the House of Representative members. It was an open sorting and during the 
                                                          
64 Interview Respondent 6 held on  25th July, 2016. 
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counting of votes; the voters, election monitors, press and other relevant players were 
allowed to observe the process. Meanwhile, after announcement of scores secured by 
prospective parties at every polling units, a copy of the result was pasted using 
designated form (EC60A)65 at the polling centre. Thereafter, results from different 
polling units were collated at designated Ward Collation Centre then to the Local 
Government Collation Centre and to the State Collation Centre (INEC, 2015). 
 
Though overall assessment by various assessors accepted and applauded the process 
to have been credible, coupled with the acceptance of the outcome by the incumbent 
president showcased an improvement in the electoral exercise at large (Hakeem, 
2015), the day of election had its ugly trend as well. As reported by accredited 
observers, notable cases of irregularities were observed which led to rancour in some 
states especially during the Gubernatorial Elections. In most cases, voters were 
delayed beyond speculated time resulting to late voting. The inability of diaspora 
voting and lack of provision for electronic voting served as impediment to the 
management of the 2015 elections. As stated earlier, the malfunction of the biometric 
machine on Election Day was disappointing despite its initial test running across few 
states within the six geo-political zone.  
 
Meanwhile, the hitches recorded during the test-run reawakened the rivalry between 
the two leading political parties (PDP and APC) which contributed more tension to the 
already highly polarized political climate (Ogbu, 2015). While the APC hailed the 
exercise that it would reduce manipulation of the general elections, the PDP dismissed 
it and asked INEC to shelve the plan of using Smart Card Reader for the national 
                                                          
65 EC60A was a result sheet allocated to every polling units and which must be pasted after counting 
and entering of scores at every polls. 
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elections. According to the National Publicity Secretary of PDP, Olisa Metuh, the 
outcome of the test “vindicates earlier widespread calls by stakeholders that the card 
readers should be thoroughly tested to ascertain their workability before the general 
elections.” (Thisday, February 9, 2015:7). To Ogbu (2015), the biometric device could 
have been subjected to quality assurance before the election days. The technical 
challenge posed by the Smart Card Reader during the March 28 Presidential and 
National Assembly elections and few cases of reported incidents of under - age voting 
accounted for the shortcomings observed on the Election Day (Premium Times, June 
30, 2015). 
 
6.9 Post - Election Stage 
The post-election period is the fourth and the last stage according to the Electoral 
Integrity Project perception. The framework of the EIP is concerned at this stage to 
explore the outcome of election. If the results of the elections were challenged by 
candidates and if the outcome led to peaceful protest or triggered violent protest. Also, 
did the electoral dispute get resolved through litigation? Apart from the outcome of 
the election, the EIP also examines the electoral authority charged with the 
responsibility of conducting free and credible elections. Was the electoral body 
impartial and were citizens informed and guided properly? Did the electoral 
commission allow public scrutiny and if the electoral body performed effectively 
(Pippa, Ferrano, Alexandro & Max, 2016)? 
 
The scenario of the post- election in Nigeria after the rigorous voting and emergence 
of winners was a watershed. Despite the tense political environment and the 
atmosphere, the outcome did not result to any form of protest either peaceful or violent 
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demonstration. In fact, it was high level of political maturity and understanding most 
importantly the singular action of the incumbent president Jonathan by conceding 
defeat to the opposition doused the tension. This action really neutralised the mind-
sets of some politicians that would have incited their followers and supporters to 
embark on protest. Unlike political violence that erupted after the 2011 elections, the 
2015 general elections enjoyed relative peace and this according to a PDP Chieftain 66 
‘was as a result of the personality of the leadership of Goodluck Jonathan’. Although 
the Chairman of Inter Party Advisory Council (IPAC) 67  believes that ‘the president 
conceded defeat due to pressures and previous peace accord arrangement that he 
endorsed’, the story could have been different if the president had failed to accept 
defeat. 
 
Not only that, the litigation cases aftermath of the elections was reduced drastically 
when compared to the flawed previous elections, it happened to be the first time that 
Presidential election result was not contested at the court of law. Such was as a result 
of transparency of the process. Over all, the number of litigation scaled down to 611 
compared to the 732 petitions filled in 2011 elections and 1290 in the 2007 general 
elections (INEC, 2015). Similarly, most of the verdicts from the Election Petition 
Tribunals regarding the 2015 conducts confirmed the results by declining to upturn the 
elections outcome. This significantly is an indication that the 2015 general elections 
were better coordinated than the previous exercises. 
 
                                                          
66 Extraction from an interview session with Respondent 4 r on 14th July, 2016.  
67 The Inter Party Advisory Council (IPAC) comprised all registered political parties. The statement 
was an extraction of interview session held on 8th August, 2016 
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The partiality or impartiality of   the Independent National Electoral Commission 
during the conduct of the 2015 election can be ascertained by considering the level of 
political interference in the entire process. Unlike the previous elections when INEC 
was accused of being a tool of the ruling party, the Jega’s led INEC demonstrated high 
sense of integrity and impartiality. The procedures and processes adopted were 
transparently applied through adequate engagement of relevant stakeholders and the 
general public at large. The leadership style of Attarhiru Jega enhanced the integrity 
and credibility enjoyed by INEC. This is substantiated by the INEC Director of 
Planning and Monitoring, that ‘Jega brought in a robust and strategic plan targeted at 
reshaping the dented image of the electoral commission and moreover being a member 
of the Justice Uwais Committee on electoral reform, he came with verse experience 
on repositioning the commission’68.  
 
In the final analysis, Obianyo and Emesibe (2015) are of the opinion that INEC 
programmes and preparations ahead of the 2015 elections gained momentum among 
the populace and which encouraged high level of confidence not only on the leadership 
of the commission but also on the process and measures invented by the institution. 
With regard to the EIP framework, it can be affirmed that   Nigeria’s 2015 election has 
its pros and cons justifying the legitimacy of hybrid democracy in the country. 
Nevertheless, the departure from do or die characterized election places hope for 




                                                          
68 Extracted from the interview session with the INEC Director of Planning and Monitoring conducted 




The administration of Nigeria’s 2015 elections remains a topical issue among 
scholars and analysts but centrality of the exercise indicates a paradigm shift. 
However, with the thematic evaluation, it is glaring that 2015 elections came with 
merits and demerits substantiating the hybrid democratic arrangement in the country. 
Both the field reports and EIP framework adopted concur to the improvement in the 
administration of the 2015 elections as the EMB introduced some innovations to 
boost electioneering process in the country.  The variables of robust planning, 
leadership, technology and citizens commitment served as the major yardsticks that 
boosted the 2015 exercise. On the other hand, the elections had its shortcomings as 
issues of under- age voting, pockets of electoral violence, failure of the electronic 
gadgets in some instances and the lacuna in the legalizing of card reader. These 
challenges showcase the weaknesses and challenges associated with the 2015 
elections. 
 
In lieu of this, the administration of the 2015 elections has implication on Nigeria’s 
democracy. The dynamic nature of the elections places Nigeria’s democracy on 
hybrid which is neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian but reflection of both. 
It is on this note that this study categorises Nigeria’s electoral democracy to be 
hybrid. With this, the dimension of electoral authoritarianism and liberal democracy 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Summary 
Election is an indispensable tool in a democratic system that facilitates legitimacy of 
governance. Generally, election gives an opportunity to the people to choose credible 
representative leaders of their choice. With this singular mandate, the people can enjoy 
sovereign power and also decide on who gets what during electioneering contest. 
Although Ojo (2007) posits that direct election is the only electioneering system that 
respects popular votes, indirect election gives room for Electoral College to take final 
decisions on the emergence of leaders and such limits the power of popular wish.  
 
However, Nigeria’s electoral system constitutionally adopts direct election that allows 
the people to freely choose representative of their choices. As highlighted in the 
previous chapters, elections in Nigeria have always been characterised with bloody 
violence, rigging, large scale of ethnic hostiles and all sorts of irregularities but the 
experience of the 2015 elections rekindled the hope for prospective democratisation in 
the country. By and large, the 2015 general elections were adjudged credible and fair, 
though with certain shortcomings. It is against this background that this thesis explores 
the impact of election administration and the legitimacy of hybrid democracy in 
Nigeria’s 2015 elections by digging deep into the prevailing factors, within and 
outside, that reshaped the political configuration of the country. In justifying this, the 
thesis is divided into seven chapters and each of the chapters is enriched with 
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significant issue regarding the subject of discourse. In a nutshell, the thesis concurs 
that Nigeria’s 2015 election was better compared to the previous exercise, yet the 
country’s electoral democracy still needs a lot of improvement.  
 
The first chapter of the thesis is an introductory part that dwells on background 
information required for the understanding of Nigeria’s electioneering politics since 
the era of colonialism. In as much as colonialism remains political subjugation, the 
electoral system introduced by the British colonial masters did not in any way serve 
the interest of the nationals. And selection into political offices was largely determined 
by the British rulers. The exploitative tendency in the electoral system during colonial 
administration triggered the agitation for self- government by the nationalist. The 
struggle and pressures on the British colonial administrators were not only emanating 
within the country alone, but also from Nigerians in diaspora who formed different 
groups to resist continuation of colonialism.  
 
With the formation of Pan-Africanism69, Nigerians and their African counterparts 
mounted pressures on their respective colonial masters which resulted to 
decolonization policy in the 1950’s and 1960’s across the continent. Like many other 
African countries, Nigeria attained independence in the 1960’s. Unfortunately, after 
independence on October 1, 1960, Nigerians that were assigned with mantle of 
leadership also followed the trend of electoral irregularities inherited from their 
predecessors. This informed the violence that erupted after the conduct of 1964/65 
elections. Subsequently, Nigeria faced difficulties in putting her house to order and 
                                                          
69 Pan Africanism was a movement formed in the twentieth century by Africans in diaspora aiming at 
strengthening the bond of solidarity among Africans. The movement played active role in the struggle 
for political independence and agitation against colonial imperialism. 
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elections were marred with violence, malpractices and irregularities. The inability to 
conduct free and fair elections had been an excuse for military interventions on several 
scenarios in the history of Nigeria politics. As highlighted earlier, Nigeria passed 
different phases of military regimes that disrupted political stability in the country.  
 
Notwithstanding, after long years of military regimes, Nigeria transited  to democratic 
government  in 1999 and since then, five elections have been conducted but none was 
adjudged to have been credible as that of the 2015 general elections. However, the 
administration of the elections seem to work towards legitimacy of hybrid democracy 
in the country. Given this, the problem statement is clear and this study explored the 
impact of the conduct on Nigeria’s democratization. The method adopted is qualitative 
which allows the study to look inward and from interviews and focus group 
discussions coupled with secondary data sourced from relevant literature, the thesis is 
sophisticated with useful information that shaped the administration of Nigeria’s 2015 
general elections. The significance of the study was to simply explore beyond previous 
literature on Nigeria’s electoral system and as conveyed in the thesis; underlying 
factors that necessitated the paradigm shift in Nigeria’s 2015 general elections have 
been highlighted. Not only that, the study would immensely contribute to enrich 
literary works on African election studies and Nigeria politics in particular. With the 
robust findings and submissions, policy makers and electoral stakeholders have 
sufficient information needed for policy formulation and implementation regarding 
effective administration of elections that can withstand international best practises. 
 
Not only that, the chapter also reviews relevant literature. In the caption of literature 
review, scholarly perceptions and arguments on the phenomenon of election 
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administration in Nigeria are extensively reviewed. The narration of Nigeria’s 
electioneering conduct that was believed to have been characterised with high level of 
irregularities and fraud is summarised by Micheal (2015) as an exhibition of 
undemocratic electoral system. Though this trend has a colonial heritage (Uche, 2003), 
most literature concur that post- colonial electoral managements also exhibited 
elections marred with violence and malpractices. Meanwhile this thesis agrees with 
the view of Elkit and Reynolds (2000) that holistically reveals the processes and stages 
of election administration which revolves around three key stages of electoral steps 
ranging from the pre-election, during and post-election. Each of the stages must be 
guided jealously in order to ensure credible, free and fair elections. And as it is stated 
in this study, the 2015 elections were carefully planned with a more robust quality 
control that led to a transparent and credible process.  
 
In fact, the Electoral Management Body was subjected to public scrutiny which has 
pinpointed in the previous chapter enhanced public trust and confidence on the ability 
of the electoral commission to deliver. Apart from reviewing election administration 
in Nigeria, further literary works on the centrality of election to democracy are 
reviewed. Scholars such as Alabi (2009), Ogunsanwo (2003), Omotola (2009) and 
others are of the stance that democratic variables revolve around elections and that no 
any other superior method in choosing democratic leaders than election. Actually their 
analysis reflects the viability of election to democracy. The connectivity and synergy 
of the two variables cannot be undermined in a civil society.  Based on this, this study 
places election as the pillar of democratic system but the fraudulent electoral exercise 
experienced in Nigeria’s previous elections questioned the legitimacy of the past 
democratic governments in the country. In view of this, the last segment of literature 
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review evaluates Nigeria’s Democracy beyond elections. This informed Mohammed’s 
(2011) claim that Nigeria can only be considered as a civilian society. To him, the 
country lacks certain democratic virtues and the long years of military regimes have 
destroyed democratic institutions in Nigeria. But this view is countered by Ojo (2011) 
and Omotola (2015) that though Nigeria’s democracy faces several constrains yet her 
belief in periodic change of government gives a brighter hope towards sustainability 
of democracy and after all democracy remains a process not an end. Having critically 
reviewed Nigeria’s democratisation from socio-economic, party politics, security and 
electoral system, the thesis submits that elections have become the hope for average 
Nigerians to select, retain or replace any performing or non-performing leaders which 
the atmosphere of the 2015 elections rekindled. 
 
The second chapter captures the theoretical framework namely; Structural 
Functionalism, Liberal Democratic Theory and Electoral Authoritarianism are 
employed to explaining the dynamism of electoral democracy in Nigeria and the 2015 
general elections in particular. As it is established in the thesis, structural functionalism 
gained popularity in Political Science in 1960 when it was adopted to study American 
and European Politics. From the assumption of the theory, understanding of any 
political system requires adequate knowledge of the different structures that make up 
the polity. The understanding of the structures must be complemented with basic 
knowledge of their functions towards the survival of the entire state. This to Olaniyi 
(2011:73) is the relationship between structures on one hand and their contributions to 
the political system on the other hand. With the scenario of the 2015 elections, the 
electoral body (INEC) remains a structure set up with the mandate to conduct free and 
credible elections, however, for the electoral commission to discharge its 
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responsibility effectively it requires the cooperation and support of other relevant 
stakeholders (structures). The complementary back up from other agencies such as 
security, civil societies, academia, and National Youth Service Commissions etc. 
contributed immensely to the success of INEC in the conduct of the 2015 general 
elections. This claim has been supported with the field report, as the leadership of the 
EMB also concurred to the significant impact of the partnership and collaboration 
enjoyed by the commission in shaping the outcome of the election.  
 
Put differently, the relevance of the Liberal Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism 
Theories to the analogy of Nigeria’s 2015 elections encompasses both the authoritarian 
rule and liberal democratic system within the Nigerian context. The theoretical account 
of Electoral Authoritarianism as highlighted by Schedler (2002) revolves around state 
abuse of electoral process which invariably questions the integrity of country’s 
electoral democracy. However, the theory as part of its elements and typologies has 
some reflections of liberal democratic practise such as conducting periodic and regular 
elections, existence of opposition parties and operation of multi-party system. 
Nevertheless, the theory dwells into abuse of state machinery to manipulate 
electioneering process and how political elites recycle power among themselves. In 
essence, the Nigerian context is a true reflection of both elements of authoritarianism 
and liberalism. It is against this backdrop that this thesis links Nigeria’s electoral 
democracy to be ‘Hybrid Democracy’ that shares characteristics of both 
authoritarianism and liberalism. 
 
The third chapter gives a historical account of Nigeria’s political transition. In this 
segment, the thesis considers two phases; colonial and post -colonial era. The 
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formation of Nigerian state dated to the amalgamation of 1914 when the Southern and 
Northern Protectorates and colony of Lagos were amalgamated by the British 
Governor General, Lord Fredrick Lugard. This was the beginning of constitutional 
development in Nigeria and the Clifford 1922 constitution introduced elective 
principle which enhanced the formation of the Nigerian first political party in 1923. 
However, the electoral politics of the British colonial administration was not 
favourable to the indigenous populace. It was an avenue to widen colonial exploitative 
rule which did not only subverted the people’s will but also subjected Nigerians to 
political subjugation and economic exploitation. With the aid of nationalist movement 
within and outside Nigeria, pressures were mount on the colonial authorities that later 
resulted to granting of independence in 1960. It is important to note that all the 
elections supervised and conducted by the British were fraudulent and did not reflect 
the wish of the masses. After all, electoral system was not a universal adult suffrage, 
several Nigerians were disenfranchised.  
 
However, self-government that was institutionalised in 1960 was a product of colonial 
supervision. But the first election conducted and supervised by Nigerians after 
independence was the national elections of 1964/65. However, it marked the beginning 
of political instability in the country as the elections were flawed and marred with 
violence. The ugly scenario led to the first military intervention in 1966 that resulted 
to killings of prominent leaders such as the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, Finance 
Minister, Chief Festus Okotiebo, Premier of Western Region, Chief S.L.Akintola, 
Premier of Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello and some other notable figures in the 
country. The bloody coup which was masterminded by few military officers from the 
Eastern part of the country also led to another counter coup within the same year by 
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some military cabals in the North. Subsequently, the country was plunged to civil war 
that lasted for thirty months (1967-1970). By 1975 a bloodless coup was staged and 
six month later another coup was carried out which consumed the head of state 
(Murtala Muhammed) but was not successful as plotters of the coup were arrested and 
sanctioned accordingly. This paved way for Obasanjo, the second in command to 
Murtala, to take over who later handed over power to a democratically elected 
government in 1979.  
 
The general elections of 1979 produced Sheu Shagari but its outcome was subjected 
to serious litigation. The lack of proper coordination and fraudulent conduct of the 
1983 general elections resulted to another phase of military regime of Buhari/Idiagbon. 
The regime of Buhari/Idiagbon was toppled by Ibrahim Babangida in 1985 and he 
ruled for eight years (1983-1993) before stepping aside. Babangida annulled June 12, 
1993 Presidential elections which signalled his unwillingness to transfer power to 
civilians. After series of pressures within and outside Nigeria, Babangida step aside 
and handed over power to an interim government headed by Chief Shonekan. Like his 
predecessor, the interim government of Shonekan also suffered legitimacy crisis and 
by November 1993, the Defence Minister of Babangida, Major General Sani Abacha, 
dislodged the interim administration in what was tagged as palace coup. The Abacha 
regime like other military counterparts also set up his transition programme but with a 
body language showcasing lack of readiness to relinquish power. However, Abacha 
died in a mysterious circumstance on June 8, 1998. Abacha’s demise necessitated the 
coming to power of General Abubakar Abdulsalam whose transitional programme was 
the shortest in the history of Nigeria politics of transition. This development accounted 
for the return of democracy in 1999 and since then, Nigeria has been opportune to 
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transfer power from one civilian rule to another. The current democratic dispensation 
which began in 1999 remains the longest in the country. 
 
Chapter four features the nitty-gritty of election administration on Nigeria’s 
democracy by examining the processes and preparation of the electoral commission in 
the conduct of 2015 general elections. The various policies and initiatives introduced 
by the Independent National Electoral Commission towards improving on the outcome 
of the 2011 elections are the focus in the fourth chapter. With the setting up of different 
committees within and outside INEC, the administration of 2015 elections kick started 
earlier. For instance, the Election Strategic Plan that was launched in November 2013 
served as the blue print that guided the activities of the electoral commission during 
the 2015 elections. Also, the Registration and Election Review Committee (RERC) 
was set up to evaluate and reposition the commission in creating a standard and 
reputable voters’ register. In fact, the composition of the RERC was entirely non INEC 
staff but seasoned experts on election administration. 
 
 The recommendation of the RERC reflected in the updated voters’ register adopted 
for the 2015 national elections. The Election Management System (EMS) was another 
mechanism introduced by INEC. It was a tool deployed to cater for operational and 
logistics requirements. The Election Project Plan (EPP) was another committee 
charged with the responsibilities of time table and other plans that would facilitate a 
robust election. The EPP was basically an in-house arrangement to reposition every 
units and departments of INEC with different cardinal objectives for effective conduct 
of the 2015 elections. The INEC Director of Planning and Monitoring, Okechuckwu 
Ndeche was given the responsibility to champion the course of the EPP. The Election 
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Risk Management (ERM) was another exemplary tool used in tracking areas that were 
prone to violence or what could be called flash points.  
 
With the aid of ERM, INEC was able to identity states with high, medium and low risk 
respectively. This informed security beef up in the affected areas. The INEC Citizens 
Contact Centre (ICCC) was established for the purpose of flow of information between 
the commission and the populace. The ICCC provided a platform to engage INEC staff 
on the preparation and modus operandi of the 2015 elections. In addition, the National 
Inter- Agency Consultative Committee on Voters Education and Publicity (NICVEP) 
created an avenue for INEC to partner with some other relevant agencies to ensure 
wide range programmes for publicity and orientation of prospective voters. Apart from 
the aforementioned technical issues addressed in the fourth chapter, the introduction 
of technological innovation as a boost for the administration of 2015 elections is 
captured. With the deployment of Smart Card Reader and Permanent Voters Card, the 
issue of multiple voting and inflation of voters’ number were controlled. The last 
section of the chapter, the tactics and approaches adopted in incorporating the 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to vote during the elections exposed the 
dynamism employed by INEC to ensure the affected electorates exercised their civic 
and political obligation. In a nutshell, the technical aspect of the 2015 elections is well 
captured in this chapter. 
 
The role of other key players also accounted for the success of 2015 elections which 
chapter five of the thesis addresses. The intervention of relevant stakeholders within 
and outside Nigeria has substantial influence on the whole exercise. Starting from the 
internal arrangement for peaceful election, the former Head of State, Retired General 
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Abdulsalam Abubakar headed a National Peace Committee comprising of seasoned 
Nigerians ranging from religious and traditional leaders, technocrats and members of 
human rights activists. The committee facilitated the signing of peace pact accord by 
the major contenders for the number one seat (Presidency). This was an undertaken 
solely taken by Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP and Muhammadu Buhari of the APC 
at the presence of their party chairmen and other prominent members. Both candidates 
pledged to support peaceful conduct and agreed to accept the outcome of the elections.  
 
Though the election petition allowed any aspirant to file a case, the violent approach 
in resolving election dispute was denounced by all the aspirants. Initially, the former 
Secretary General of United Nations, Kofi Annan and the former Secretary of 
Common wealth of Nations, Emeka Anyaokwu, came up with ‘Abuja Peace Accord’ 
urging all the 14 presidential aspirants to sign a declaration for peace. All the 
candidates signed and urged their supporters to abide by the rule of the game. Unlike 
the Abuja Peace Accord that extended invitation to all aspirants, the National Peace 
Committee concentrated on the leading two candidates that have the prospects of 
emerging as winner.  The significance of both Abdulsalam and Kofi Anna’s peace 
pacts to the peaceful atmosphere in the 2015 elections cannot be quantified. Also, the 
pressures from external countries and bodies played important role. The concerted 
effort of the United States started with the official visit of John Kerry, the Secretary of 
State, who personally had separate meetings with President Goodluck Jonathan (PDP) 
and Muhammadu Buhari (APC) and met the INEC Chairman thereafter. In his 
message to Nigerians, every stakeholders should cooperate to ensure delivery of 
peaceful elections and any perpetrator of violence would face stringent policy from the 
United States of America. Barrack Obama also sent a video message urging Nigerians 
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to come out in mass and vote for candidates of their choice without fear of harassment 
and intimidation.  
 
The Prime Minister of United Kingdom, David Cameron, also urged the Nigerian 
President to deliver a credible election for the most populous African country. Banki 
Moon, the United Nation Secretary General, called for violent free elections also 
justified strong interest from the international community. The African Union, 
European Union and Economic Community for West African States did not only issue 
statement but also send delegates to monitor the entire process. In addition, the 
political parties that shaped the contest of the 2015 were narrowed to the two major 
rivals; the PDP and the APC. The coalition of different parties that formed APC 
wrestle power from the dominant PDP that has ruled for sixteen uninterrupted years. 
Meanwhile, the perceptions and reports of selected local and foreign observers on the 
Nigeria’s 2015 elections feature in the last segment of this chapter. In fact, the chapter 
is expository and gives insight into the salient factors that prevailed on the outcome of 
the general elections.  
 
The chapter six captures the analysis of field reports using thematic evaluations.  Four 
major themes were highlighted with each having different sub themes that reflect the 
main report of the field work. The overall influencing factors that actually assisted the 
outcome of the entire exercise are discussed. Issues raised in this section include the 
leadership and personality factor, the embracement of electronic devices, the 
commitment of the electorates, the neutrality of the electoral body and the support 
from relevant stakeholders. All these and some other factors defined the atmosphere 
and political configuration that warranted election turnover for the first time in the 
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annals of Nigeria’s electoral democracy. Like in every other democracies, perfect 
election is not sustainable. Either capitalist, socialist or communist polity, elections 
cannot be absolutely free from human errors. Considering this, the Nigeria’s 2015 
elections, notwithstanding the applause from both local and international monitoring 
groups, also suffered certain setbacks. The phenomenon of  under-age voting, shortage 
of voters card, inconclusive elections in some polling units due to pockets of violence, 
logistics challenges and late arrival of electoral staff, failure of technological gadgets 
in few instances and other disturbing issues associated with the 2015 exercise have 
been extensively discussed and tagged  in the sixth chapter. 
 
To complement this, the chapter also looks at the assessment of Nigeria’s electoral 
democracy by adopting the renowned framework of Professor Pippa Norris and her 
team known as the ‘Electoral Integrity Project’. As argued in the chapter, the 
perception of EIP which started in 2012 has gained momentum among scholars and 
analysts of elections in the world. In fact, using its framework has assisted in 
determining the credibility and integrity of election in different continents of the world. 
It is based on this that the thesis also embraces the EIP in assessing Nigeria’s 2015 
national elections. Having identified the five criteria of the EIP, the thesis concurs that 
Nigeria’s 2015 election though has its shortcomings, it is at moderate level that gives 
more room for improvement.  The EIP captures issues revolving around the electoral 
cycle realising the fact that election is not a day job. Every section of election stages; 
pre-election, during election and post- election, is expected to conform to the 






There are several factors that accounted for the improvement of the Nigeria’s 2015 
general elections. These as expatiated in the thesis encompass internal and external 
dimensions and from the findings of this study; Nigeria’s electoral democracy has been 
improved which guarantees democratic sustainability in the country. By democratic 
sustainability in this context, the thesis realises that the change or shift in Nigeria’s 
political configuration as warranted by the outcome of the 2015 elections ensures 
political stability. If the post – election had failed to maintain a peaceful atmosphere, 
the tendency of united Nigeria and democratic sustenance might have been a mirage. 
But with the improved level of political culture from the leaders and the led, Nigeria 
has established herself in the comity of democracies that respect the sovereignty of the 
people through a credible and fair elections. This remains a plus for Nigeria 
democratisation. However, the alternation of power from the People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) to the opposition All Progressive Congress (APC) though has widen up 
democratic space in Nigeria, the country is yet to reach the ‘Eldorado’. There are 
pending issues that deserve attention in order to consolidate and improve on the 
experience of the 2015 general elections. 
 
Firstly, this thesis concurs with the call for the review of appointment of the Chairman 
and other members of the EMB. The present legal framework that allows the President 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to appoint the team of the Independent National 
Electoral Commission needs to be revisited. As recommended by the Electoral Reform 
Committee headed by Retired Justice Uwais, the Chairman of INEC and other board 
members appointment should be channelled through the National Judicial Council 
which needs be empowered to advertise the positions, shortlist and send names to the 
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National Council of state to select (ERC Report, 2008).  With this, the presidency 
would not be accused of interference in the affairs of the electoral body. Moreover, 
appointment of individuals into the board of INEC should be based on merit and 
individuals with questionable characters are not supposed to be frontier of election 
administration in the country. Associating members of the electoral commission to any 
political party does not auger well for Nigeria’s democracy and in order not to repeat 
the experience of the previous republics, composition of electoral umpire must be 
detached from statutory power of the presidency. The electoral act should be reviewed 
to free the membership of INEC from external political interference.  
 
Not only that, the Independent National Electoral Commission needs to be unbundled. 
Unbundling of INEC is required in the area of political party registration and party 
finance. Several scholars and analysts on election have been clamouring for the 
establishment of Political Parties Registration and Regulatory Commission (PPRRC) 
that should be an independent body separated from INEC. This idea was raised in the 
recommendation of the ERC committee with the calling for legal provisions that would 
ensure that PPRRC is given the mandate to register political parties and also regulate 
party finance. INEC should be concerned with conducting of elections while the 
PPRRC can handle matters regarding party registration, political financing and 
expenditure and party reforms.  
 
During the field work, Shola Omotola, a Professor of Political Science and expert on 
African Elections, also called for unbundling of INEC in this direction for effective 
regulations of party politics in Nigeria’s democratisation. This can easily enhance 
professionalism and reduce the syndrome of cross carpeting in Nigeria’s party 
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formation. The lack of effective mechanism to regulate political parties’ activities is 
being exploited by the politicians who cross carpet and defect to reigning party. The 
present political scenario in Nigeria whereby some PDP serving legislators defected 
to the ruling party, APC, without concrete reasons needs to be checked. Also, this 
thesis agitates for equal access to party nomination for the women and the youth. This 
can solve the disparity of men dominance and would also encourage the youths 
towards becoming leaders in the democratic setting. In fact, party nominees process 
should adhere to the principle of gender affirmative that allocates 35 percent of 
political appointment to women. This thesis suggests the affirmative formula should 
spread beyond political appointment but to be also incorporated in elective positions. 
 
Put differently, the religious and traditional institutions role should be specified and it 
would serve the country’s democracy better if those organisations are involved in 
public enlightenment, civic education and participation in the political process. 
Although their involvement should be on neutral and non - partisanship basis, they can 
educate the populace on active participation in electoral process. Religious and 
traditional leaders should not be campaigning for any politician seeking elective 
offices. The experience in the 2015 elections whereby religious and traditional rulers 
became affiliated to party and politicians by openly campaigning for prospective 
candidates negates communal and elderly role expected from people occupying such 
prestigious positions.  
 
Nigeria politics is already on sharp divisionary basis and voting patterns have always 
been showcased along ethnicity and religion, the religious and traditional leaders are 
supposed to be epitome of  unity and nation building  through public enlightenment 
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and advocacy for peaceful coexisted of divergent groups within the country. As it has 
become a public debate in Nigeria on the need for constitutional provisions specifying 
the roles of traditional rulers, legal framework should be made to restrict such leaders 
from becoming tools for political resource. The constitution should assign 
responsibilities to the traditional and religious leaders for them to be effective in peace 
keeping operation within and beyond their respective communities. The legal 
framework if provided will not only specify roles for the traditional rules but also 
create measures and penalties for any offender. This can serve as deterrent for any 
violator of laws and order not matter the status.  
 
The civil society organisations have always been supportive in the electoral process 
particularly in the area of voters’ education and sensitisation, yet there are legal 
restrictions that hinder their operation in some issues where their presence is upmost 
required. Electoral legislation should make provision for the civil society to monitor 
campaign financing, monitor abuse of public facilities for election campaign, monitor 
electoral violence, malpractices, and their perpetrators. If this is guaranteed, the civil 
society can have reasonable information and come up with all-encompassing reports 
that would assist relevant agencies to act accordingly. 
 
 The civil society organisations should not be restricted to election monitoring, their 
broad areas to be expanded to civic and voter education, and voter registration process. 
This thesis recommends that the National Orientation Agency (NOA) should rise up 
and partner with civil society groups on political sensitisation for the citizens’ 
engagement to be more vibrant. The voters’ turn out could have been more impressive, 
if the citizens were effectively reached at both macro and micro level. As rightly 
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pinpointed by the Director of Political, Civil, Ethics and Values (PCEV), Ngozi 
Ekeoba, of the National Orientation Agency, during an interview session,  voters 
education should be a continuous process that needs to be sustained beyond 
electioneering period. The people can easily engage the government, if their level of 
awareness improves. The collaboration and partnership between government agencies 
and non- government organizations would definitely strengthening the political 
atmosphere. The gains of 2015 exercise would be better off, provided a robust 
partnership involves the National Orientation Agency (NOA) and some notable 
NGO’s is achieved. The National Orientation Agency should extend hands of 
fellowship to local and foreign agencies so as to boost public sensitisation on political 
and civic education. 
 
One of the recommendations of the Registration and Election Review Committee 
(RERC) was that INEC should increase its engagement with critical stakeholders. 
Sincerely, the collaboration and partnership enjoyed by the electoral commission 
during the 2015 elections were key to the achievement of hitch free exercise, such 
engagements deserve to be continually improved on. The leadership of INEC should 
continue to be engaging other relevant stakeholders to boost the integrity and 
transparency of the electoral process. The failure of the previous electioneering 
exercise was attributed to lack of openness and partiality of the electoral commission. 
Election administration is not a monopolistic affair of the Election Management Body 
(EMB), complementary role from other relevant agencies is required in achieving a 
credible election.  With a robust inter- agency partnership, there would be a platform 




Like democracy, electoral process in Nigeria is a work in progress. Therefore, electoral 
reform remains a continuous exercise. Obviously, the application of technological 
innovation in the 2015 general elections added value and integrity to its conduct 
(INEC, 2015), it is important also for the electoral body to give consideration for 
Electronic Voting which needed legal backing. The recent amendment of the electoral 
act by the National Assembly legalising the use of Smart Card Reader and Electronic 
voting is a welcome development. INEC should consider putting logistics required 
together towards sustaining this. Though the SCR has come to stay in the electoral 
process, E-Voting is yet be ascertained. The EMB needs to work it out and ensures 
Nigeria is not isolated from the trend of Electronic Voting in the modern democracies. 
The legal imbroglio that the use of Smart Card Reader generated in the 2015 elections 
has been taken care of via the passage of bill to incorporate it in the electoral laws. The 
world is embracing digital and Nigeria democratisation cannot be left out. Given this, 
it is recommended that all forms of digitalization that would boost electoral democracy 
in the country must be embraced to consolidate on the improvement of the 2015 
national elections.  
 
In concert with the recommendation of the Uwais led Electoral Reform Committee, 
INEC should push for setting up of Electoral Offences Commission and Tribunal. 
Tracking electoral offenders can be ascertained if an independent Tribunal is 
established for prosecuting violators of Electoral Laws. INEC is faced with 
cumbersome responsibilities and trials of electoral offenders by the conventional 
courts have suffered unnecessary delay. But the agitation for the establishment of 
special tribunal for prosecution of deviants’ individuals that have been championing 
electoral violence and malpractices and other related offences would ensure severe 
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punishment for anyone found guilty. Putting this in place can enhance checkmating of 
impunity in the electoral process. More also, INEC will be relieved and concentrated 
on election administration and management. This thesis concurs with the various 
clamour among Nigerians for setting up special court to try violators of electoral laws. 
The ugly trend of electoral violence that was rampant in some states during the April 
11 gubernatorial elections can be decisively dealt with, if perpetrators are charged to 
special tribunals saddled with such responsibility. The rerun elections in Rivers State 
was conducted in highly tensed environment and yet, despite several arrests made by 
the police, no evidence of court trial. It is high time the idea of Electoral Offences 
Tribunal was transformed to reality in order to salvage Nigeria’s electoral system. If 
deviants of electoral law are punished accordingly, the tendency of reducing election 
violence is very high in the country. 
 
The mass media is key to the survival of any democratic system. The abuse of media 
outlets by the ruling parties at federal and state levels is antithetical to professionalism 
of media coverage and reporting. The National Broadcasting Commission needs to 
regulate media operation towards ensuring objective and investigative journalism. 
Though propaganda in politics cannot be eradicated, the mass media should be 
professional and objective in their coverage and report of political issues. There must 
be a balanced report for all political parties either ruling or opposition party. The 
experience of the 2015 elections exposed the mass media as a political resource. The 
level of hate speeches during campaigns as championed by some media outlets 
(broadcast and print) could jettison politics of ideology and issues. The media should 
desist from allowing politicians to promote their invectives utterances. In a nutshell, 
the media should abide by the code of ethics drawn from the Nigerian Press Council. 
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With this, a print or electronic medium is compelled to give access and equal 
opportunities to all political parties and their candidates. Even if the idea of 
independent candidate is promulgated by the National Assembly, the media must 
ensure equitable access of such candidate to the press irrespective of his/ her 
background. A denial of such access should be punishable accordingly. The debate for 
aspirants as introduced by the media is a welcome development that must be continued. 
It has remained a convenient avenue for the candidates to speak on their various plans 
on issues ranging from socio-economic and political related affairs which has been 
enabling the people to access the versatility of prospectus aspirants. The media at large 
should as well provide the electorates with an impartial and accurate voter education. 
Given this, the democratisation process can be strengthened with effective mass media 
that guarantees flow of genuine and reliable information as entrenched in the principle 
of investigative journalism.  
 
The political leadership needs to be proactive and accountable by ensuring good 
governance. As rightly noted by Chinua Achebe70, of blessed memory, the problem of 
Nigeria is leadership. The series of elections conducted and adjudged to have suffered 
from credibility crisis could be linked to leadership problem. The political leaders 
should desist from sit-tight syndrome and winners take all politics. Though the 
Nigerian constitution has stipulated period and tenure of elective leaders which 
invariably resolved the phenomenon of sit-tight syndrome, the politics of winner take 
all is not progressive. This has resulted to viewing politics as a ‘do or die’ affair, 
making politicians to be desperate in any electoral contest. But if any government is 
all inclusive, the level of desperation among the politicians and their supporters would 
                                                          
70 Chinua Achebe was one of the Nigerian foremost writer on African literature. 
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be reduced. The scenario in which benefits are restricted to party loyalists, it showcases 
politics as industry where human economic survival can be tapped. In view of this, self 
– centeredness would replace general interest and individuals’ become envy of the 
politicians resulting to desperation to grab political power.  
 
The government should note that effective leadership is all about catering for all, no 
matter the political differences and affiliations. The national interest of the country 
must supersede individual’s selfish interest for a country to ensure socio- economic 
and political development. The era of militarisation though not invoke anymore, the 
major excuse for military incursions in Nigeria’s political transition was the inability 
of the civilians to manage the affairs of the country efficiently resulting to electoral 
violence, economic and financial mismanagement and impunity as a result of bad 
leadership. The present APC led government won on the platform of change, Nigerians 
deserve the positive change. 
  
Nigeria, being the most populous country in Africa and the black world, has important 
role to play in the continent and beyond. The virus of corruption which has eaten deep 
the socio-economic and political system of Nigeria must be drastically reduced. 
Though there is a contention among scholars and analysts on the eradication of 
corruption, if it cannot be eradicated, it should be reduced. Successive governments in 
Nigeria have always been accused of corrupt practises and from the present scenario 
in the country, corruption nearly killed the survival of the country. The level of 
economic sabotage was unprecedented in the country and the corruption cankerworm 
has eaten deep not only in the public sector but also in the private organisations. In this 
current fourth republic, the manifestations of corruption have been proved in the 
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legislative, judiciary, executive and other institutions. In the National Assembly, 
several allegations and cases of corruption have led to removal of leaders of both 
chambers (Senate and House of Representative).  
 
The judiciary has also been accused of corruption to the extent that some judges were 
arrested on the allegation of bribery and money laundering. Judges have been sacked 
on indictment as a result gross misconduct and corruptions. In October 2016, some 
judges were arrested and interrogated on issues relating to money laundering and 
bribery (The Premium, 30 October, 2016). A number of members of the executive arm 
have also been allegedly of enriching themselves with the tax payers’ money with 
some standing trials till date. Though the government anti-corruption agencies (EFCC 
and ICPC) have been trying in fighting the menace, the peoples’ perception needs to 
change and Nigeria deserves patriotism from any citizen regardless of status and 
affiliation.  
 
The government anti - corruption should be strengthen and not be seen as selective 
crusade being used to fight opposition members. The fight against corruption should 
be all encompassing and justice needs to be equal as entrenched in the principle of rule 
of law. If Nigeria can reduce and tackle corruption effectively, the country stands to 
benefit from its abundant human and mineral resources. 
 
In the final analysis, the frequent logistics challenge need to be addressed. The 2015 
elections like the previous exercises witnessed delay of arrival of election materials 
and electoral officials in some polling units. All reports from local and international 
observers emphasised this problem and INEC needs to re-strategize to ensure timely 
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distribution of election materials vis a vis prompt arrival of electoral officials. The 
present INEC leadership has streamline the timing for accreditation and voting, this 
noble idea should be sustained to avoid subjecting electorates to untold hardship of 
waiting for longer period before they could cast their votes. However, the trend of 
inconclusive elections needs to be checked through adequate security for the 
electorates, electoral officials and authorised election observers. Voters and other 
stakeholders deserve adequate security and if this is put in place, postponement of 
election resulting to inconclusiveness can be tamed. Also, the electoral laws must 
recognise the rights of disability people and that of the Internally Displaced Persons. 
Provisions must be made for them to enjoy civic and political rights in the country. If 
the aforementioned suggestions are implemented, Nigeria’s electoral democracy has 
the prospect of advancement that can serve as a point of reference for other 
democracies. More so, future research should focus on voting patterns and dynamic of 
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Electoral Conducts from 1922 to 2011 in Nigeria 
ELECTIONS YEAR FEATURES          POLITICAL PARTIES  
Colonial era     
1st Election 1922 It was guided by Clifford 
Constitution of 1922 
 
Voting was by direct 
election but based on 
limited franchise 
 
Those who could vote or 
be voted for were only 
British citizens residing in 
the cities  
 
 British Protected Persons 
with a minimum gross 
income of 100 Pounds a 
year. Many Nigerians were 
thus disenfranchised.             
The Nigerian National 
Democratic Party led by 
Herbert Macaulay won the 
three seats for the Lagos 
Legislative Council while the 
Calabar Improvement League, 
won the only seat for Calabar 
 
2nd Election 1946 It was anchored on Richard 
Constitution of 1946. 
 
The Legislative Council 
had 45 members for the 
entire Country – 28 
members were Nigerians 
of whom four were elected 
and the remaining 24 were 
nominated.   
 
 
It witnessed introduction 
of regionalism 
 
The Political units were 
divided into 3: the 
Northern, Western and 
Southern Regions.   
 
Real Legislative power 
was still centralised 
National Youth Movement 
(NYM), National Council of 
Nigerian and 
Cameroon(NCNC) 
Nigerian National Democratic 
Party(NNDP) 
 
3rd Election 1952  . It was conducted under 
the auspices of 
Macpherson constitution 
of 1951. 
Action Group(AG) participated 
with other political parties that 





 Guaranteed greater 
regional autonomy.  
 
 Council of Ministers had 
18 members –12 Nigerian 
and six officials reflecting 
equal                   
representation by each 
region as nominated by the 
Regional Legislature.               
 
 The Houses of Assembly 
in each region was 
complemented with a 
House of Chiefs in the 
North and West. But the 
House of Representatives 
had 139 Nigerians out of 
the total of 142 members.   
 
It tied the regional 
government to the central 
government 
4th Election 1954 Guided by the dictates of 




election into the regional 
and central legislatures. 
 
It introduced three 
categories of legislative 
responsibilities 
(Exclusive, Concurrent 
and Residual lists) 
 
 Operated different 
electoral laws for the three 
regions as obtainable in the 
Macpherson constitution. 
 
For instance, in the Eastern 
Region, universal adult 
suffrage with the age 21 
was stipulated. In the 
West, only adults male that 
satisfied tax payment 
could vote while in the 
All the political parties that 





North, voting was by 
indirect college system and 
only adult male tax payers 
5th   Election 1959 Though the election was 
conducted by the British, 
Nigerians were greater 
involved  
 
Voting was by secret ballot 
and all registered adults in 
Western and Eastern 
Nigeria were eligible to 
vote. In Northern Nigeria 
only registered adult males 
were, however, eligible to 
vote.   
 
Voting strength of the 
political parties was based 
on ethnicity and 
regionalism. Those two 
factors (Ethnicity and 
Regionalism) still plays 
greater roles in Nigeria’s 
electoral behaviour.   
 
Out of the 312 federal 
seats, NPC won 134, 
NCNC grabbed 81 while 
AG won 73. Other political 
parties clinched  9 slots 
.Independent Candidates 
won 15 seats    
National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens (NCNC), the Action 
Group (AG) and the Northern 
People Congress (NPC) were 
the leading political parties. 
 
Other political parties were: 
Democratic Party of Nigeria 
and Cameroon (DPNC) 
Northern Elements Progressive 
Union (NEPU) United Middle 
Belt Congress (UMBC)  Borno 
Youth Movement (BYM)  
United National Independence 




    
1st Election 1964 The 1964 election was the 
first ever conducted after 
independence and was 




The elections were largely 
boycotted in the East, 
Midwest, Lagos and parts 
of the Western Region. In 
the North, (61) of the NNA 
candidates were returned 
unopposed. NNDP 
candidates in the West, 
From a multiparty structure 
which marked the 1959 pre-
independent elections, Nigeria 
was to witness the emergence 
of a two-party system in the 
1964 General Elections: The 
Nigerian National Alliance 
(NNA) and the United 
Progressive Grand Alliance 
(UPGA)   
 
The NNA was an amalgam of 
hitherto disparate political 




where S. L. Akintola was 
the Premier, were equally 
returned unopposed for the 
NNA. UPGA denounced 
the outcome, calling the 
election a “farce” 
 
The performance of the 
parties in the 312-member 
parliament was now:  NNA 
- 198 seats UPGA - 108 
seats   Independents - 5 
seats   Vacant          - 1 seat. 
 
 Intimidation and 
brutalisation of political 
opponents resulting to 
deaths including the 
vandalism of property 
were rampant. 
Manipulation of the 
political process was high. 
 
The military took over 
power through a bloody 
coup and suspended the 
1963 constitution.   
 
NNDP, MDF, RP, NDC and 
LSUF 
 
The UPGA was an alliance of 
NCNC, AG, NEPU, UMBC, 
NPF 
2nd Election 1979 The election was 
conducted after 13 years of 
military regimes 
 
The 1979 Constitution was 
a paradigm shift from 




The 1979 elections 
ushered in Nigeria second 
republic 
 
The elections were 
conducted for positions in 
the Local Councils, State 
Assemblies, 
Governorship, the Federal 
House of Representatives, 
the Senate and the 
Presidency.  
National party of Nigeria 
(NPN) won the presidential 
election. 
 
Other political parties include: 
Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN            
Peoples Redemption Party 
(PRP) Great Nigeria Peoples 
Party (GNPP)             Peoples 







from the First Republic 
was the existence of a 
Senate into which 
elections were conducted. 
 
The elections were 




The National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN) candidate, 
Sheu Shagari won the 




3rd Election 1983 The 1983 General 
Elections also showcased 
the trend of Nigeria’s 
flawed elections. 
 
The electoral irregularities 
plunged the country into 
crisis and protests in some 
parts of the country. 
 
In the Presidential 
Elections, Shehu Shagari 
of the NPN again was 
declared winner 
 
Again, ethnic issues and 
sentiments formed the 
major platforms of the 
electioneering campaigns 
during the 1983 elections 
(Uba, 1989) 
 
FEDECO was once more 
accused of working for the 
ruling party. 
 
Three months into the new 
Government, on 31 
December 1983, another 
military coup d’etat again 
All the political parties that 
participated in the 1979 
elections also involved in this 
election. The only additional 
party was the National 





process in Nigeria 
4th Election 1993 The 1993 General 
Elections appeared to have 
been a genuine attempt to 
break out of the jinx in the 
use of the electoral process 
to elect ethnic and 
sectional leaders in the 
1993 general elections. 
 
The election was adjudged 
to be free and fair; 
however, it was annulled 
by the military regime of 
Babangida. 
 
The annulment led to the 
abortion of the third 
republic 
 
The acclaimed winner was 
the candidate of SDP, 
Mashood Abiola. 
 
The annulment of the 
election result led to 
widespread agitation in the 
country and several calls 
were made to terminate the 
military rule of Babaginda 
Social Democratic Party(SDP) 
and National Republican 
Convention (NRC) 
 
5th Election 1999 The election ushered in 
another democratic 
dispensation after long 
years of military regimes. 
 
It was the beginning of the 
fourth republic. 
 
The results of the 1999 
Governorship elections 
indicated that the PDP had 
more national spread by 
winning in 21 states across 
the country. APP followed 
with nine states; while AD, 
which held sway in the 
Yoruba Southwest had six 
states. 
 
The People’s Democratic 
Party(PDP) 
The All Peoples Party(APP) 
The Alliance for Democracy 
(AD). 
 
The APP and AD formed 




The election was 
conducted by Independent 
National Electoral 
Commission(INEC) and 
was characterised with 
systemic rigging 
6th Election 2003 The 2003 general elections 
presented yet another 
opportunity of a transition 
from one civilian 
government to another. 
 
The 2003 general elections 
shared a lot with the 1964 
and the 1983 elections. 
 
Politicians did everything 
possible to satisfy selfish 
political interest including 
the kidnapping and 
assassination of opponents 
(Okorie,2003) 
 
It was flawed elections. 
Peoples Democratic Party 
(PDP), 
All Nigeria Peoples Party 
(ANPP) National Conscience 
Party (NCP)  
All Progressive Grand    
Alliance (APGA) National 
Democratic Party (NDP) 
United Nigeria Peoples Party 
(UNPP)   
 Progressive Action Congress 
(PAC) Peoples Mandate Party 
(PMP)  
`African Alliance Party (AAP)  
Alliance for Democracy (AD) • 
Nigerian People’s Congress 
(NPC) • Community Party of 
Nigeria (CPN) • All Peoples 
Liberation Party (APLP) • 
Better Nigeria Progressive 
Party (BNPP) • Masses 
Movement of Nigeria (MMN) • 
National Reformation party 
(NRP) • Party for Social 
Democracy (PSD) • Peoples 
Salvation Party (PSP) • United 
Democratic Party (UDP) • New 
Democrats (ND) • National 
Mass Movement of Nigeria 
(NMMN) • New Nigeria 
Peoples Party (NNPP)   
 
7th Election 2007 The general administration 
of the election was very 
poor 
 
The ruling party(PDP) 
exploited and took 
advantage of state 
apparatuses to manipulate 
the elections 
 
It was condemned by both 
local and international 
observers 
50 Political parties were 
registered to contest the 2007 
elections but the three dominant 
parties were:  Peoples 
Democratic Party(PDP), 
Action Congress(AC) and All 






2011 The conduct of the 2011 
General Elections was 
adjudged as transparent to 
a considerable extent 
 
The 2011 elections marked 
an important step towards 
strengthening democratic 
elections in Nigeria, but 
challenges remained 
 
The post elections violence 
was brutal and led to 
killings of innocent lives 
and destructions of 
properties 
 
It witnessed numerous 
petitions at the electoral 
tribunal  
63 political parties registered 
but 18 contested the 
presidential election, though 
the four notable parties were 
Peoples Democratic 
Party(PDP), All Nigeria People 
Party(ANPP), Congress for 
Progressive Change(CPC) and 




















Strategic Objectives and Key outcomes of the Election Strategic Plan (2012-2016) 
• Ensure a good constitutional and legal framework for conducting free and credible 
election 
• Ensure an adequate and comprehensive updated Register of Voters. 
• Ensure sufficient deployment of  ICT 
• Undertake proper constituency delineation in line with constitutional provisions. 
• Establish an effective and transparent election complaints and dispute resolution 
mechanism. 
• Improved electoral processes, procedures and systems. 
On the other hand, the strategic plan committee was able to address these key actions 
in its key outcome thus: 
• Constitutional framework that provides for adequate time for preparation for elections 
and allows INEC to be truly independent, including in its finances. 
• Comprehensive Register of Voters that is accurate and updated regularly and online 
publications of the Registered Voters 
• Effective ICT deployment and utilization at all stages of the electoral process including 
testing and certifying equipment prior to supply and deployment, software training for 
staff, video recording of all collation centres, IT based transmission of election results 
and publication of election results on the Commission’s website. 
• Introduction of effective election complaints and dispute resolution mechanism 
through the adoption Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism.  
• Constituency delimitation and delineation carried out in accordance with international 
best practice and in line with the Constitution and Electoral Act provisions. 
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• Development of Standard Operating Procedure for recruitment and deployment of 
electoral officials, and development of data base for election officials, including 
security personnel established. 
Strategic Objective Two: To improve voter education, training and research 
Key Actions 
• Formulate and implement voter education programme 
• Formulate and implement training programme 
• Formulate and implement a research agenda 
• Institutionalise the National Inter-Agency Committee on Voter Education (NICVE)  
• Formulate and implement policies to ensure participation of marginalized groups 
including persons living with disabilities as well as Out of Country Voting (OCV) 
       Key Outcomes 
• Strategies for improving voter education including voter education in school 
curriculum, early production of voter education materials including e-materials, 
advocacy and partnership with stakeholders 
• Conduct of training needs assessment and training programmes with a clear training 
calendar for all categories of staff and stakeholders 
• Developed civic education curriculum for primary and secondary schools and general 
studies for tertiary institutions 
• A research agenda based on the experience of the country on election management 
developed 
• Re-organised and refocused Electoral Institute 
• Publications and database on electoral issues in Nigeria 
• Increased voter turnout during elections 
• Policies on the participation of marginalized groups in the electoral process. 
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Strategic Objective Three: To register political parties and monitor their operations 
Key Actions 
• Register Political Parties 
• Monitor the  nomination of candidates  
• Monitor the finances of political parties, 
• Monitor  campaigns 
• Tracking of campaign finances of candidates and political parties 
• Monitor media access 
Key Outcomes 
• Easy process of registration of political parties with procedures of getting on the ballot 
with adequate time lag for registration of political parties before election.  
• Trained and empowered staff on the monitoring of nomination of candidates, finances 
of political parties, campaigns and media access.  
• Improved legal framework for the operation of political parties. 
• Establishment of framework for monitoring of nomination of candidates, finances of 
political parties, campaigns, campaign finances and media access. 
• Partnership with stakeholders on the monitoring of operation of political parties. 
• Improvement in the operation of political parties particularly in terms of nomination 
of candidates, management of finances, campaigns and campaign finances.  
• Adherence to code of conduct by political parties. 
• Established an effective mechanism for tracking of campaign finances of candidates 
and political parties, including sanctions. 
 





• Establish a mechanism for regular consultation with stakeholders and other EMBs; 
• Publish a newsletter;  
• Engage election observers;  
• Engage the media;  
• Institutionalise the Inter-agency consultative committee on election security (ICCES) 
 
Key Outcomes 
• Stakeholders forum meet regularly to share information and get input of stakeholders 
• Regular meetings and consultations with other EMBs for learning and experience 
sharing. 
• INEC newsletter published regularly and distributed widely through hard and e-copies 
for information, education and enlightenment 
• Election observers (both domestic and international) identified, screened and 
accredited at least one month before any election 
• Platforms established for engaging with key stakeholders including the executive, 
legislature, judiciary, political parties, candidates, the media, security agencies, civil 
society organizations, development partners, election observer groups (domestic and 
international) the electorate, traditional rulers, INEC ad-hoc staff, NYSC directorate, 
contractors/vendors, service providers including CBN, commercial banks and 
insurance companies, FBOs, Trade Unions, Professional bodies, National Orientation 
Agency (NOA), and persons living with disabilities. 
• MoU signed with civil society organizations on partnership 
• Effective dissemination of information about activities of the Commission through 
regular engagement, publications, website, social media and special programmes.  
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• Improved capacity of the Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on election security 
• MoU signed by INEC with various agencies represented on ICCES 
• Developed manual for engagement of security personnel on election duties and 
continually train them based on the manual. 
Strategic Objective Five: To re-organise and reposition INEC for sustained conduct 
of free, fair and credible elections 
 
Key Actions 
• To enhance institutional capacity for managing election operations smoothly, 
effectively and efficiently. 
• Improve capacity, communication, co-ordination, training and data gathering and 
management. 
• Improve the work environment for and enhance team work among the staff of the 
Commission. 
• Improve human resource management to meet current and future challenges of the 
Commission. 
• Improve gender equality and raise gender sensitivity throughout the Commission. 
• Budget and manage the financial resources of the Commission effectively and 
efficiently 
• Implant the new strategy 
• Implement the new strategy 
• Evaluate the strategy  
 
Key Outcomes 
• Improved staff capacity through training, proper placement, motivation and discipline.  
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• Improved capacity of management and staff through participation in the election of 
other countries 
• Improved communication between headquarters, States and LGAs and co-ordination 
through regular team meetings, video-conferencing, wide area network (WAN), new 
media (youtube, twitter, website, facebooketc) and team building exercises. 
• Improved work environment through the provision of well-furnished offices, 
operational vehicles, computers and staff welfare.  
• Improved database management through the building of capacity of staff and provision 
of infrastructure. 
• Improved human resource planning and management with open and transparent 
recruitment process, proper placement, regular promotion, training, discipline and 
welfare of staff. 
• Developed a robust gender policy for the Commission. 
• Institutionalised gender advocacy to check gender insensitivity and ensure gender 
mainstreaming. 
• Improved budget management with timely preparation of budget, release of funds and 
implementation of budgets. 
• Improved management of ad-hoc staff through direct payment from the Commission. 
• Improved understanding of the strategy through implantation activities including 
departmental discussions on the content of the strategy and plans for implementation. 
• Effective implementation of strategy through the preparation of elaborate work plans, 







LIST OF ACCREDITATED OBSERVERS (DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN) 
DOMESTIC OBSERVERS 
S/N NAME 
1 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
2 Centre For Strategic Conflict Management (CSCM) 
3 Global Agenda for Total Emancipation (GATE) 
4 Citizens Right and Leadership Awareness Initiative 
5 Justice Development and Peace Comission (Catholic Caritas Foundation 
Of Nigeria) 
6 Fundamental Rights League International 
7 Police Service Commission 
8 Centre For Grassroot Development and Crime Prevention (CGDCP) 
9 Centre For Civic Education (Aka) Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) 
10  Centre For Advocacy and Leadership Development (CPALD) 
11 Election Monitor 
12 Institute For Peace And Conflict Resolution 
13  Society For Equity, Justice And Peace 
14 Justice & Equity Organisation 
15 CLEEN Foundation 
16 West African Network of Election Observers (WANEO) 
17 National Institute For Policy And Strategic Studies, Kuru 
18 Youth Initiative For Advocacy Growth And Advancement (YIAGA) 
19 New Century Initiative 
20 Centre For Strategy Ethics and Value 
21  African Initiative For Sustainable And Positive Development 
22 Connected Development Initiative (CODE) 
23 Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room (Policy And Legal Advocacy 
Centre) 
24 Research Initiative For Sustainable Development And Gender Awareness 
(RISDGA) 
25 Global Network For Peace Building 
26 African Peace Foundation 
27 Community Life Project (CPL)/RECLAIMNAIJA 
28 Centre For Democracy And Development (CDD) 
29 Global Women Empowerment Association 
30 Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) 
31 Pan African Leadership League(PALL) 
32 United Forum For Grassroots Development 
33 Organisation Of Patriotic Youths For Development 
34 Committee For The Defence of Human Rights 
35 Rights Monitoring Group (RMG) 
36 National Association For Peaceful Elections In Nigeria 
37 CONAC (Church Of Nigeria Communion) 
38  Good Leadership For Community Development Initiative 
39 Great Vision For Citizens Rights Initiative 
40 Bright Way Enlightenment Initiative 
41 Gamji Members Association 
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42 Diaspora Advocacy For A New Down Initiative In Nigeria 
43 African Centre For Leadership Strategy And Development 
44 Centre For Human Protection And Development 
45 Independent Election Monitoring Group 
46 Human Right Monitor 
47 Alliance For Credible Election, Ace-Nigeria 
48 Centre For Excellence, Leadership And Development (CELD) 
49 Population And Environmental Monitoring Int’l 
50 African Youths International Development Foundation 
51 Nigerian Women Trust Fund 
52 Global Initiative For African Development 
53 Women Arise For Change Initiative 
54 Women Initiative For A Better Nigeria 
55 Nigeria Association Of Women Journalist (NAWOJ) 
56 Civil Resource Development And Documentation Centre (CIRDDOC) 
Nigeria  
57 Centre For Credible Leadership & Citizens Awareness 
58 Legal Aid And Self Development Initiative 
59 Youth Progressive Minds For Better Change Initiative 
60 Northern Youth And Elders Awareness Forum 
61 Coalition Of Democrats For Electoral Reforms 
62 Democratic Action Group (Dag) Dispute Resolution & Development 
Initiative) 
63 International Foundation Federation Of Women Lawyers (FIDA), Abuja 
Branch 
64 National Institute For Legislative Studies 
65 Women Making Difference Initiative 
66 Federation Of Muslim Women’s Organisation In Nigeria (FOMWAN) 
67 Al-Habibiyyah Islamic Society 
68 Centre For Women And Adolescent Empowerment 
69 Centre For Social Justice 
70 UNESCO Centre Abuja (Human Rights And Civic Education) 
71 Women’s International League For Peace And Freedom 
72 Change Managers International Network 
73 Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) 
74 Centre For Productive Visionary Leadership 
75 Muslim Sisters Social Justice 
76 National Unity And Peace Corps (NUPEC) 
77 All Nigerian Nationals In Diaspora (ANNID) 
78 Forum Of State Independent Electoral Commissions Of Nigeria 
(AFOSIECON) 
79 National Human Right Commission 
80 Orient Foundations For Social Justice And Civic Education 
81 Noble Orientation Agency 
82 National Orientation Agency 




1 U.S Embassy 
2 International Foundation For Electoral Systems (IFES) 
3 European Union Delegations To Nigeria 
4 Embassy Of Switzerland 
5 British High Commission 
6 UN Women 
7 International Republican Institute (IRI) 
8 German Embassy Abuja 
9 Embassy Of France In Nigeria 
10 Embassy Of Japan 
11 High Commission Of Canada 
12 Embassy Of Ireland 
13 Australian High Commission, Abuja 
14 Africa Students Association Of Ireland (ASAI) 
15 National Democratic Institute For International Affairs 
16 ECOWAS Mission 
17 UNDP/DGD Project 
18 European Union Election Observation Mission 
19 Centre For Conflict Management, Kennesaw State University, Atlanta, 
Georgia, USA 
20 Commonwealth Observers Mission 
21 African Union Election Observation Mission 
22 Independent Electoral And Boundaries Commission, Kenya 
23 Oxford Department Of International Development, University Of Oxford 
24 Ghana High Commission 
25 Embassy Of The Republic Of Korea 













Activity Supported Remark 
1 Ford  
Foundation 
Grant 
165,000,000.00 BPR and Voter 
Education 
$ 1 million 
2 UNDP/DGD 
Grant 




3 OSIWA Grant 13,986,060.00 Prosecution of 
Election Offences 
























7 IFES 114,000,000.00 Training   
8 UNDP/DGD 2,896,118,940.00 Sponsorship of 
INEC Engagement 

















The researcher developed questions for the field work with guide from the study’s 
research questions. The main questions were derived from the objectives of the study 
which also had supplementary questions due to the nature of interview (in-depth)   that 
allowed open ended discussion but without losing focus on the subject matter. The 
questions go thus: 
1 (a) What is the role of election administration on Nigeria’s democracy?  
   (b) How does it determine democratic sustainability in Nigeria? 
 
 2 (a) Why Nigeria’s elections have always been marred with irregularities? 
    (b) What are the implications for sustaining democracy in the country? 
     (c) Why is the EMB accused of partiality? 
 
3   (a) What are the factors that enhanced the 2015 elections? 
      (b) What were the policies initiated by the electoral commission? 
      (c) Did technology contribute to the credibility of the elections? 
       (d) In what ways did other stakeholders contribute to the conduct of the 
2015 elections? 
         (e) Was there political interference, if yes how? 
          (f) Was the election credible? 
 
4(a) How can Nigeria’s electoral democracy be strengthen? 
  (b) What are the way forward? 
